Texas Department of Transportation v. Aer-Aerotron, Inc.
39 S.W.3d 220
Tex.
2001
Check Treatment

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Petitioner, v. AER-AEROTRON, INC., Respondent.

No. 99-1070.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued Sept. 20, 2000. Decided Feb. 1, 2001.

Rehearing Overruled April 5, 2001.

major havoc in the court system. Further, I believe the additional formality in this context is worth the certainty and protections such a rule provides.

V. CONCLUSION

In Texas, the test for determining summary judgment finality has always been whether the judgment disposes of all parties and all issues raised in the pleadings. In

we created a legal fiction to simplify the process of determining finality. But
created more problems than it solved. It is beyond me why the Court insists on struggling through pages and pages of history about presumptions, magic language, and Mother Hubbard clauses instead of squarely considering the problems
caused and providing a solution. Its willingness to cling to this legal fiction, while refusing to recognize that our rulemaking in
and its progeny was not the correct solution, will only create more problems.

I concur in the judgment in these cases. But, because the Court declines to overrule

,
, and
, and await our promulgation of a rule governing summary judgment finality, I do not concur in its reasoning.

Gregory S. Coleman, Julie Caruthers Parsley, William Rich Thompson, II, Susan Desmarais Bonnen, John Cornyn, Andy Taylor, Linda Eads, Office of Atty. Gen., Austin, for Petitioner.

Elizabeth G. Bloch, Tonia Lea Lucio, Hilgers & Watkins, Austin, for Respondent.

Justice BAKER delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice PHILLIPS, Justice HECHT, Justice OWEN, Justice ABBOTT, and Justice HANKINSON joined.

The issue in this case involves whether the State may waive its immunity from suit by its conduct. The court of appeals held that by accepting benefits under a contract the State waives its immunity from suit.

. We disagree. Today in
, we declined to adopt a waiver-by-conduct exception to sovereign immunity because the Legislature has established an administrative process for resolving certain breach-of-contract claims against the State. See TEX. GOV‘T CODE § 2260.001-.108. Accordingly, we hold that Aer-Aerotron may not pursue its claim against the State without first participating in Chapter 2260‘s administrative process. See
. The trial court properly dismissed Aer-Aerotron‘s suit. We therefore reverse the courts of appeals’ judgment and dismiss Aer-Aerotron‘s claim for want of jurisdiction.

Justice ENOCH filed a dissenting opinion.

Justice O‘NEILL did not participate in the decision.

Justice ENOCH, dissenting.

For the reasons expressed in my dissent in

,1 I respectfully dissent.

Notes