Thе chair of the Republican Party of Texas (“RPT”) declared Representative Tom DeLay ineligible for election to the 22nd Congressional District of Texas. Af *585 ter the RPT declared DeLay ineligible, but before the Secretary of State removed his name from the ballot, the Texas Democratic Party (“TDP”) sought an injunction to prevent the removal of his name and to prevent the RPT from replacing DeLay with a new candidate. The district court granted the injunction, holding that the RPT, through its leadership, created an unconstitutional pre-election residency requirement. We AFFIRM on the constitutional grounds enumerated by the district court and also AFFIRM on the alternative state law ground that the declaration violated the Texas Election Code.
I.FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 7, 2006, Defendant Tina J. Benkiser, the chairwoman of the RPT, declared DeLay ineligible for reelection as the United States Representative for Texas’s 22nd District. She acted under the Texas Election Code provision that allows a party chair to declare a candidate ineligible. Tex. Elec.Code Ann. § 145.003(f) (Vernon 2003). DeLay had represented the 22nd District since 1984 and had won the Republican primary in March 2006. DeLay, however, announced on April 3, 2006, that he would resign from Congress and not seek reelection. Benkiser declared DeLay ineligible after receiving a letter from him advising her that hе had moved to Virginia. 1 The letter, dated May 30, 2006, included copies of DeLay’s Virginia driver’s license, Virginia voter registration, and employment withholding form reflecting Virginia as his residence. It is undisputed that Benkiser intended to replace DeLay on the ballot with a new candidate chosen by the RPT.
The TDP filed this suit in Texas state court on June 8, 2006, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The RPT removed the case to federal court, where on June 26, 2006, the court held a hearing on the merits. After receiving post-hearing briefs from both parties, the district court held that Benkiser’s declaration of DeLay’s ineligibility violated the Qualifications Clause of the Constitution. The court granted a permanent injunction that barred Benkiser from declaring DeLay ineligible and certifying to the Texas Secretary of State any candidate for the 22nd District other than DeLay. The court also declared that DeLay is “not ineligible” to be the Republican Party nominee and voided Benkiser’s previous declaration. Finally, it prohibited the Secretary of State from removing DeLay’s name from the ballot for the general election unless DeLay withdraws. The RPT appeals, arguing that the TDP lacks standing and that the district court erred in granting the ■injunction against Benkiser.
II.STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court’s interpretation of the Qualifications Clause is reviewed
de novo. See United States v. Osborne,
III.DISCUSSION
A. The TDP Has Standing
Before addressing the merits of this appeal, we must determine whether the TDP has standing to sue. To satisfy
*586
the standing requirement, a plaintiff must show: (1) an injury in fact; (2) that is traceable to the defendant’s challenged conduct; and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision in the district court.
Litjan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
1. The TDP Has Direct Standing
First, the TDP has direct standing because DeLay’s replacement would cause it economic lоss. The district court found that the TDP would suffer an injury in fact because it “would need to raise and expend additional funds and resources to prepare a new and different campaign in a short time frame.”
Tex. Democratic Party v.. Benkiser,
The RPT argues, however, that the TDP should be expected to absorb any additional costs that a replacement candidate would cause in order to promote the state’s interest in voter choice. In addition, the RPT points out that its own candidate will have to put togеther a campaign in a short period of time. These fairness arguments have no place in the standing analysis. Indeed, the RPT’s briefs confuse the issue of whether the TDP has shown an injury in fact with the different question of whether the TDP has a cause of action. The cases the RPT cites to support its fairness arguments were themselves decided on the merits. 3 In short, regardless of the equities in this case, injury to the TDP’s proverbial pocketbook is an injury in fact for standing purposes.
Turning to causation and redressability, the RPT’s declaration of ineligibility and replacement of DeLay with a different candidate would be a but-for cause of the TDP having to expend additional money on a nеw campaign strategy. And the district court’s injunction prevents the declaration of ineligibility and replacement, thereby redressing the TDP’s injury.
A second basis for the TDP’s direct standing is harm to its election prospects. The TDP’s witnesses testified below that if the RPT were permitted to replace DeLay with a more viable candidate, then its congressional candidate’s chances of victory would be reduced. In addition, according to the TDP, “down-ballot” Democratic candidates, like county commissioners and judges, would suffer due to the change’s effect on voter turnout and volunteer efforts. The RPT contends that these harms do not amount to an injury in fact.
*587
Voluminous persuasive authority shows otherwise.
4
We find these casеs persuasive because a political party’s interest in a candidate’s success is not merely an ideological interest. Political victory accedes power to the winning party, enabling it to better direct the machinery of government toward the party’s interests.
See Storer v. Broim,
Having found injury in fact in the TDP’s threatened loss of political power, we also find causation and redressability. The injury threatened to the TDP’s electoral prospects is fairly traceable to Delay’s replacement and likely would be redressed by a favorable decision, which would preclude a Republican replacement candidate.
2. The TDP Has Associational Standing
In addition, the TDP has associational standing on behalf of its candidate.
5
Associational standing is a three-part test; (1) the association’s members would independently meet the Article III standing requirements; (2) the interests the association seeks to protect are germane to the purpose of the organization; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires participation of individual members.
See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n,
Here, Nick Lampson, the Democratic party’s candidate for DeLay’s House seat, would have standing for similar rеasons that the TDP has direct standing. The RPT’s actions threaten his election prospects and campaign coffers. Persuasive authorities establish that such injuries are sufficient to give a candidate standing to protest the action causing the harm.
See Krislov v. Rednour,
With respect to the second element of associational standing, the TDP undoubtedly seeks to protect its organizational interests. As the Supreme Court has noted, the goal of a political party is to gain control of government by getting its candidates elected.
See Storer,
As to
Hunt’s
third element, nothing requires the participation of Lampson himself. Lampson’s interests are fully represented by the TDP; after the primary election, a candidate steps into the shoes of his party, and their interests are identical. As well, the type of relief sought,
i.e.,
an injunction, will inure to Lampson’s benefit.
See Int’l Union v. Brock,
For the foregoing reasons, the TDP had standing to raise its claims before the district court. 6
B. Benkiser’s Acts Effectively Created a Pre-Election Inhabitancy Requirement and so Violated the Constitution
1. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions at Issue
The question before this Court centers on the Texas statute permitting a party officer to declare a candidate ineligible. Tex. Elec.Code Ann. § 145.003. An officer can do so if (1) a candidate’s application for a place on the ballot indicates ineligibility or (2) “facts indicating that the candidate is inеligible are conclusively established by another public record.” Id. at § 145.003(f). 7 If the public record establishes ineligibility, the officer “shall declare the candidate ineligible.” Id. at § 145.003(g). If the candidate is declared ineligible on or before the 74th day before the election, the candidate’s name is removed from the ballot. Id. at § 145.035. The party can fill the vacancy with a replacement candidate if the new candidate is certified to the secretary of state by 5:00 p.m. of the 70th day before the election. Id. at § 145.036(a), § 145.037. In situations such as the one before this Court, a replacement candidate cannot appear on the ballot if the original candidate merely withdraws. See id. at § 145.036(b).
The district court held that the ineligibility statute as applied in the present case violates the Constitution’s Qualifications Clause by creating a pre-election residency requirement. 8 See U.S. Const, art. 1, § 2, cl. 2. The Qualifications Clause states:
No person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven *589 Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.
Id. The RPT argues that the statute is constitutional under the Elections Clause because it merely acts as a procedural regulation. See id. at art. 1, § 4, cl. 1. The Elections Clause states:
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.
Id.
2. Benkiser’s Declaration Is Unconstitutional as Applied Under the Qualifications Clause
As the parties agree, the Qualifications Cláuse is exclusive and cannot be enlarged by the states.
9
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,
Moreover, there is ample evidence suggesting that the Framers deliberately chose to use the “when elected” language. As explained by the district court, records from the constitutional convention show that the Framers debated whether to include lengthy inhabitancy requirements. 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 217-19 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). Delegates considered sеven-year, three-year, and one-year requirements and rejected all three. Id. The position is further buttressed by an 1808 case in which Congress considered the election of a Representative who moved to Maryland a mere two weeks before the election. Cases of Contested Elections in Congress 224 (M. Clarke & D. Hall eds. 1834) (discussing Sundry Electors v. Key, case XXVIII). Congress found that the Representative was qualified, given that he was an inhabitant of the state as of election day. Id. at 233.
When Benkiser reviewed the public records sent by DeLay and concluded that his residency in Virginia made him ineligible, she unconstitutionally created a pre-election inhabitancy requirement. The Qualifications Clause only requires inhabitancy when that candidate is elected. Given this language, Benkiser could not constitutionally find that DeLay was ineligible on June *590 7, the date she made her decision. 10 Therefore, her application of the ineligibility statute to DeLay was unconstitutional. 11
Our conclusion conforms with the Texas principle that “[a]ny constitutional or statutory provision which restricts the right to hold office must be strictly construed against ineligibility.”
Wentworth v. Meyer,
The RPT does not dispute that the Qualifications Clause requires inhabitancy on election day. Instead, the RPT argues that such a determination can be made prospectively in a procedural manner allowed by the Elections Clause.
S. The RPT’s Argv/ments for Finding Benkiser’s Declaration Constitutional Under the Elections Clause Fail
States, through the Elections Clause, exercise some regulatory authority over federal elections because “as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.”
Storer,
More to the point, even had Benkiser acted “with political neutrality,” her actions would not fall within the limited authority delegated to the states under the Elections Clause. The “manner”
13
of elections “encompasses matters like ‘notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, preventiоn of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication of election returns.’ ”
Cook v. Gralike,
The RPT argues that the determination did affect merely the “manner” of elections because the act was procedural and predictive. Assuming the RPT’s argument is correct, the problem with the theory is that the TDP makes an as-applied challenge. Despite the RPT’s attempt to classify the declaration as merely predictive, the evidence shows that it was not. 14 Benkiser’s declaration was based on DeLay’s current residence, not his in-habitancy on election day. Simply put, her declaration of ineligibility was not a mere predictive, ministerial act affecting the “manner” of the election. It was a direct determination of DeLay’s qualifications as a candidate. As such, the declaration was unconstitutional and cannot be saved by the Elections Clause.
The RPT also contends that the declaration of ineligibility is a permissible “manner” regulation because DeLay is a frivolous candidate and removing “frivolous” candidates from the ballot constitutes “protection of voters” under Supreme Court precedent. This argument fails. Whenever the Supreme Court has discussed the stаtes’ authority to prevent “frivolous” candidates from appearing on the ballot, it has been in the context of a candidate that will only receive minimal support in an election.
See U.S. Term Limits,
Even if Benkiser’s declaration could be construed as a “manner” regulation, it would only survive a constitutional challengе if it would not “exclude classes of candidates from federal office.”
U.S. Term Limits,
*592 C. The RPT Failed to Meet the Standards of the Ineligibility Statute
Apart from the federal constitutional questions, this case presents a state-law statutory question. For the purposes of this section, we assume arguendo that it would be constitutional for a state actor to make pre-election, prosрective judgments about residency and that Benkiser in fact made such a judgment. Even granting those assumptions, the RPT’s declaration of ineligibility would violate Texas law because DeLay’s future residency was not conclusively established by public record.
1. The “Conclusively Established” Standard
The governing standard, “conclusively established,” bears emphasis. Something is “conclusive” when, by virtue of “reason,” it “put[s] an end to debate or question,” usually because of its “irrefutability.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged (2002).
16
Accordingly, Texas courts have explained that public records must leave no factual dispute concerning the conclusiveness of ineligibility.
See In re Jackson,
The intersection of § 145.003, which requires that proof of ineligibility be conclusive, and the Qualifications Clause, which requires inhabitancy only “when elected,” presents an extraordinary burden to declaring a candidate ineligible on residency grounds prior to the election. This is because it is almost always possible for a person to change their residency: to move to the state in question before the election, thereby satisfying the Qualifications Clause. 17
2. DeLay’s Future Inhabitancy Was Not “Conclusively Established”
Although the public records relied on by Benkiser may have conclusively established DeLay’s present residency in Virginia, they did not conclusively establish whether he will inhabit Texas on election day. Proof of DeLay’s present residency may suggest where he will be in the future; however, it does not put the matter beyond dispute or question.
*593 Benkiser relied on three public records to declare DeLay inеligible:
1) DeLay’s Virginia driver’s license;
2) DeLay’s Virginia voter registration; and
3) An employment withholding form reflecting DeLay’s Virginia residence.
Dist. Ct. Op. at *5. These documents do not conclusively establish whether DeLay will be an inhabitant of Texas on November 7, 2006. DeLay could be a current resident of Virginia, as the documents above provide, and nonetheless move back to Texas before November 7. Indeed, Benkiser admitted in her testimony that the public records could not prove DeLay’s residency on election day and that DeLay could move back to Texas before election day.
Information that was before Benkiser showing DeLay’s eligibility supports this conclusion. Benkiser had before her DeLay’s original candidacy application, in which he swore that he was eligible for office. In terms of the Qualifications Clause, such a declaration necessarily contained an implicit promise that DeLay would be an inhabitant of Texas on election day. It is also likely that Benkiser knew — because the RPT confirmed his eligibility in prior elections — that DeLay had been an inhabitant of Texas for decades. Under these circumstances, the public records provided by DeLay could not have conclusively established his future residency. Predicting DeLay’s future inhabitancy would have required a finding of fact, which the RPT had no authority to make.
See, e.g., In re Jackson,
The RPT argues against this analysis on several grounds, none of which is persuasive. First, relying on the language of the statute (“another public record”), the RPT contends that “one ... public record is sufficient for a declaration of ineligibility.” If this is true, the RPT contends, surely three public records are sufficient. This argument ignores § 145.003’s second requirement: that ineligibility must be conclusively established. Put another way, any number of public records may be sufficient only if they meet the “conclusively established” burden. Such is not the case here.
Second, the RPT relies on
Nixon v. Slagle,
Third, the RPT cites
Jones v. Bush,
In conclusion, DeLay’s future inhabitan-cy could not be determined conclusively without a finding of fact. His election-day inhabitancy outside Texas was not beyond dispute or question. Thus, Benkiser violated § 145.003 by declaring DeLay ineligible.
D. The Injunction Was An Appropriate Remedy
Apart from this case’s constitutional and statutory merits, the RPT argues that the district court erred in granting the TDP injunctive relief. In addition to prevailing on the merits, a party requesting an injunction must establish that there is а substantial threat of irreparable injury, the threatened injury outweighs the potential injury to the opposing party, and the injunction will not disserve the public interest.
ICEE Distribs. Inc. v. J&J Snack Foods Corp.,
1. The RPT Waived its “Irreparable Ha'rm” Argument
In its opening brief, the RPT ties its irreparable harm argument to its standing argument. It argues that the TDP cannot possibly show irreparable harm because it has shown no harm at all. The RPT’s lack-of-harm arguments have been addressed above, see Part III.A., and found meritless.
For the first time in its reply brief, the RPT argues that the TDP has not shown irreparable harm because it has an adequate remedy at law. We need not consider this argument because the RPT effectively waived it by failing to raise it in its opening brief.
See, e.g., Linbrugger v. Abercia,
2. The RPT Does Not Make A “Comparative Ham’’ Argument
The RPT’s argument concerning the appropriateness of the injunction centers on the public interest element. In fact, it never makes on argument concerning the requirement that the TDP’s threatened injury must outweigh any potential injury to the RPT. Given that it has failed to raise an argument on this element, it has certainly not proven that the district court abused its discretion by implicitly finding that the TDP would suffer greater harm.
S. An Injunction Would Not Disserve the Public Interest
The RPT and the TDP make conflicting public interest arguments. The RPT claims that the district court’s injunction reduces voter choice, requiring that an ineligible or unwilling major-party candidate remain on the ballot and prohibiting his replacement with an eligible candidate who would be willing to serve if elected. The TDP responds that the injunction prevents the RPT from perpetrating, in the district court’s phrase, “a fraud on the voters.”
*595 It is beyond dispute that the injunction serves the public interest in that it enforces the correct and constitutional application of Texas’s duly-enacted election laws. 19 The KPT’s arguments are not sufficiently persuasive to overcome this conclusion. The RPT has not shown that the injunction disserves the public interest and certainly has not proven that the district court abused its discretion. Therefore, the RPT has not met its burden.
E. We Will Not Cоnsider Whether the District Court Erred by Enjoining the Secretary of State
As an amicus curiae in support of the RPT, Texas’s Secretary of State complains that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin him because he is not a party to this suit. The RPT, however, does not challenge the scope of the district court’s injunction, focusing instead on standing and the merits of the constitutional issue before the court. “[A]n amicus curiae generally cannot expand the scope of an appeal to implicate issues that have not been presented by the parties to the appeal.”
Garcia-Melendez v. Ashcroft,
IV. CONCLUSION
For thе reasons stated above, the district court did not err when it held that the Texas ineligibility statute was unconstitutional as applied. In addition, Benkiser failed to meet the standards of the statute because the public records did not conclusively establish DeLay’s ineligibility. Finally, the injunction was an appropriate remedy. For these reasons, we AFFIRM.
Appellant’s motion for partial stay pending appeal is DENIED AS MOOT. Appellant’s second motion for partial stay pending appeal or, in the alternative, motion for full stay is also DENIED.
Notes
. On May 26, 2006, Benkiser had received a draft of the same letter for her review.
.
See also Taxation with Representation of Washington v. Regаn,
.
See California Democratic Party v. Jones,
.
See Smith v. Boyle,
. The TDP contends it also has associational standing to sue on behalf of (1) the party’s noncandidate members and (2) Democratic voters more broadly. Out-of-circuit authority supports at least the former contentiоn.
See Gable v. Patton,
. We need not consider additional arguments raised by the TDP in support of its standing. We note, though, that Texas law provides that suits to challenge a declaration of ineligibility may be brought by that candidate’s competitors. Tex Elec.Code § 273.081 (providing a right of action to any "person who is being harmed or is in danger of being harmed by a violation or threatened viоlation of this code”);
see In re Jones,
. It is undisputed that the present case concerns the second method for declaring a candidate ineligible.
. The district court did not explicitly state whether it held the statute facially unconstitutional or unconstitutional as applied. Much of its language, however, implies an as-applied analysis.
See
Dist. Ct. Op. at *8 ("[C]on-struing the Texas Election Code to permit such a declaration of ineligibility based on inhabitanсy at this time would be an uncon
*589
stitutional application of state law.”). Given that the statute also governs the ineligibility of state candidacies, an as-applied holding is appropriate.
See Women’s Medical Prof. Corp. v. Voinovich,
. There is no dispute that when Benkiser applied the ineligibility statute to DeLay she did so as a state actor.
See Smith v. Allwright,
. Benkiser's testimony acknowledges this fact:
Q: [T]here’s nо way you can represent to this court where [DeLay’s] going to live on November 7th?
A: I can't represent anything that’s going to happen on November 7th.
. That DeLay may have no interest in remaining a candidate does not alter this constitutional analysis; a candidate's subjective interest, or lack thereof, in competing for elective office does not speak to whether the candidate is qualified to do so under the Constitution.
.Contrary to the RPT’s assertion, Schaefer and Campbell do apply to the present case. While it is true that they concerned facially unconstitutional statutes, the reasoning holds for an as-applied challenge. Both emphatically hold that a pre-election rеsidency requirement is unconstitutional and do not limit their holdings to their particular facts.
. The RPT does not suggest that Benkiser’s actions affect the time or place of elections.
. Q: [N]othing that you have in these public documents indicates to you where Mr. DeLay will be on election day, does it? A [Benkiser]: No, it doesn’t.
.The Secretary of State asks this Court to find the ineligibility statute constitutional by applying the
canon of
avoidance. As explained above, this is an as-applied challenge to Benkiser's specific acts. Therefore, the canon of avoidance is not an appropriate analytical vehicle. In addition, courts facing
*592
similar questions did not even consider the canon.
See Schaefer,
. See also Black's Law Dictionary 308 (8th ed.2004) (defining "conclusive” as "authoritative,” "decisive,” or "convincing”).
. Though we do not decide this issue, the "conclusively established” standard might be met by party officials in less uncertain contexts. A candidate’s age, for example, can be established conclusively prior to the election. The problem of inherent uncertainty is not an issue in most applications of the statute; it is a function of the particular requirement in question here, future inhabitancy.
As to inhabitancy "when elected,” the conclusively established burden may be insurmountable. Although we need not create a per se rule to decide this case, we cannot conceive of a situation in which it could bе met.
. Likewise, Jones does not provide a remedy for the constitutional deficiencies in Benkiser’s actions. In relying on Jones, the RPT points this Court to dicta in a nonbinding decision from a lower court. In Jones, the district court held that the plaintiff lacked standing, and only as an alternative holding, in anticipation of appeal, did it address the merits. What it did address concerned "inha-bitancy” under the Twelfth Amendment, not the "when elected” language of the Qualifications Clause. The case is plainly inapposite.
. This conclusion also conforms with legislative intent. Records from the 68th Texas Legislature show that the current withdrawal provision in the Election Code, § 145.036, was drafted to prevent unwarranted replacement candidacies.
See In re Bell,