Texas Co. v. StrangeTexas Co. v. Strange
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Rainey
This suit was brought by appellee against appellant to recover damages for personal injuries occasioned by the giving way of a scaffold erected for him to stand upon in laying brick upon a wall being erected in the construction of a building for appellant. This is the second appeal of this case; the former appeal being reported in 132 S. W. 370, to which reference is made for a fuller statement of the nature of the case;
The objections to this testimony should have been sustained. It shows an endeavor , to secure a compromise of the damages claimed. The courts have uniformly held that offers of compromise and peaceful propositions to settle pecuniary differences between parties are encouraged by the law, and when such efforts fail of consummation the negotiations cannot be inquired into in the litigation of the controversy. Greenleaf on Ev. § 192; Railway Co. v. Ragsdale, 67 Tex. 24, 2 S. W. 515; Railway Co. v. Kern, 100 S. W. 071; Darby v. Roberts, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 427, 22 S. W. 529. Numerous other authorities might be cited, but these will suffice.
In Railway Co. v. Kern, supra, in passing upon the admission in evidence of a letter, this court said: “This policy of the law‘favors such séttlements and protects negotiations made in good faith for that purpose. It is true the letter does not expressly propose a compromise and settlement of the claim, but such, we think, is the clear import and significance of its words; and, if this interpretation is correct, it was clearly inadmissible upon clearly established legal principles.”
Tbe appellant submits that this was an “immaterial inquiry, and evidence showing, or tending to show, his impoverished condition is injurious.” This was improper evidence, as it was parading before tbe jury plaintiff’s financial condition, and is objectionable; but this standing alone might not be sufficient to reverse the case. However, as it will be reversed on other grounds,, we call attention to it that it may not be repeated on another trial.
Tbe testimony was collateral to tbe main issue, and was not subject to impeachment. Kirk v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. R. 624, 89 S. W. 1067; Power Co. v. Forwood (Ky.) 113 S. W. 112. Tbe statement of Dodge, being subsequent to the injury and not while tbe transaction was pending, and a mere opinion, was not binding on tbe appellant, therefore illegal, and should not havé been admitted. Railway Co. v. Sherwood Thompson & Co., 84 Tex. 125, 19 S. W. 455, 17 L. R. A. 643; City of Austin v. Forbis, 99 Tex. 234, 89 S. W. 405.
In view of the evidence this charge should have been given. ’ It applies the law to the facts in a specific and pointed way, which called the attention of the jury to this particular defense. The court charged on this issue, but did not group the facts and apply the law thereto as fully as presented in the special charge. Railway Co. v. McGlamory, 89 Tex. 635, 35 S. W. 1058.
For the reasons stated, the judgment is reversed and cause remanded.