83 P.2d 369 | Okla. | 1938
This is an original proceeding in this court brought by the Texas Company and its insurance carrier, hereafter referred to as petitioners, to obtain a review of an award made by the State Industrial Commission on February 23, 1938, in favor of C.E. Standridge, hereafter referred to as respondent. The record in this case shows that the respondent sustained two accidents involving his left leg, one of which was compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the other of which was not. The first accident happened on November 5, 1935, while the respondent was in the employ of the Texas Company and engaged in an occupation defined as hazardous by the Workmen's Compensation Act. As a result of this accident the respondent sustained certain injuries consisting of contusions and abrasions of his left knee and a fracture of the external condyle of the left tibia with a displacement of the fragment. The petitioners furnished necessary hospital, medical, and surgical attention, and respondent was discharged as healed on March 19, 1936, and on the following day returned to his employment. Payment of compensation in the sum of $310.80 for the period of temporary total disability following the accident was made to the respondent under a Form 7 agreement, which was approved by the State Industrial Commission on April 22, 1936. The respondent thereafter continued to perform the duties of his employment until the night of September 19, 1936, at which time, while crossing a street in the city of Tulsa at about the hour of 11 o'clock of said night, and at a time while not engaged in any business of his employment, the respondent was struck by an automobile, and as a result sustained a number of injuries which included a fracture of the tibia and fibula of his left leg and the rupture of ligaments of the knee joint. As the result of the automobile accident the respondent was confined to a hospital and under medical and surgical treatment until about the Ist of January, 1937, at which time he was released as able to do manual labor. The respondent, on or about the middle of January, 1937, returned to his employment with the Texas Company and continued to work for said company until about the 1st of May of said year, at which time he voluntarily left its employ. Subsequently, and on October 8, 1937, the respondent applied to the State Industrial Commission for a determination of the extent of permanent disability which he had sustained as a result of his accidental injury of November 5, 1935. The commission, after hearing the evidence offered in connection with said application, found that respondent had a 35 per cent. permanent partial disability to his left leg as a result of the injury which he had sustained on November 5, 1935, and awarded compensation in accordance with said finding. The sole question presented here for determination is whether there is any competent evidence to support the finding so made and the award based thereon. It is the contention of the petitioners that, since the evidence of the respondent was incompetent and the testimony of his only competent witness did not attribute his disability to the injury of November 5, 1935, the award cannot be sustained. In this connection the petitioners urge that it was incumbent upon the respondent to establish either that the disability was due to the original injury or to a recurrence thereof, or if due in part to the original injury and to the subsequent injury, then to establish the degree or portion attributable to each injury. The respondent relies largely upon his own testimony and that of the doctors who appeared for the petitioners to support his claim that there was some competent evidence before the commission sufficient to sustain its award.
In the case of Tippett Bond v. Moore,
"Where a claimant is asserted to have suffered two different accidental personal injuries while working for different employers, the question of whether either one or both of such injuries is responsible for the resulting disability is one of fact to be determined by the State Industrial Commission. The finding of that body on such a *463 question will not be disturbed in this court if supported by any competent evidence."
For a discussion of the rule relative to liability where there is a recurrence of the original injury, see New York Indemnity Co. v. Miller,
Award vacated.
OSBORN, C. J., and RILEY, PHELPS, GIBSON, and DAVISON, JJ., concur.