OPINION
Opinion by
(Retired).
Tеxas Capital Securities, Incorporated, et al., (hereafter Texas Capital), appeals the trial court’s denial of its motion to deem a liability judgment satisfied. The issue presented is whether a joint tortfea-sor is entitled to a credit for the amount of a postjudgment, bankruptcy court settlement between the plaintiff and a codefend-ant. Texas Capital asked the trial court to reduce the liability award against it by the amount of the bankruptcy settlement between the plaintiffs and one of Texas Capital’s co-defendants in the underlying cause of action. The trial court refused.
We initially reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
See Tex. Capital Sec., Inc. v. Sandefer,
No. 06-02-00042-CV, 2003 Tex.App. LEXIS 2513 (Texarkana Mar. 26, 2003, no pet. h.). Texas Capital has filed a motion for rehearing in which it asks us to render judgment rather than remanding the case for further consideration by the trial court. We grant the motion for rehearing, withdraw our opinion
J.D. Sandefer, III, and Stephen F. Smith (collectively referred to as Sandefer) bought stock in Titan Resources, Inc., at the urging of Stephen Johnson, a stockbroker for Texas Capital. The pricе of the Titan stock eventually plummeted, and Sandefer sued Titan, Texas Capital, Johnson, and Butch Ballow (a stock promoter who worked with Johnson to sell thе stock) for common-law and statutory fraud. San-defer’s petition alleged the defendants knowingly and recklessly made false and material representations intended to persuade Sandefer to buy the stock. Sande-fer further alleged that the defendants violated the Texas Securities Act. Defendants Johnson and Titan settled out of the suit before trial.
Tex. Capital Sec., Inc. v. Sandefer,
At trial, the jury ruled against the remaining defendants, finding Texаs Capital and Ballow had defrauded Sandefer.
Tex. Capital Sec., Inc. v. Sandefer,
Almost two years after the securities fraud judgment, Ballow settled his obligations to Sandefer in federal bankruptcy court. In the settlement, Ballow agreed to (1) pay Sandefer’s attorney’s fees and legal costs, (2) make an initial $600,000.00 payment, and (3) issue a promissory note secured by real property deeds to be held in trust by the bankruptcy court for the remainder of the settlement amount. The bankruptcy settlement did not state whether the settlement represented payment for punitive damages or fulfillment of Ballow’s joint obligations with Texas Capital.
Texаs Capital subsequently filed a motion with the state trial court asking it to reduce Texas Capital’s liability for the judgment by the amount of Ballow’s bankruptcy settlement with Sandеfer. The trial court denied the request; Texas Capital appealed. The Texas Supreme Court subsequently transferred the appeal of the mattеr to this Court. See Tex Gov’t Code Ann. § § 73.001-.003 (Vernon 1998 & Supp.2003).
A trial court’s determination of the existence of, or the amount of, a settlement credit is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Goose Creеk Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Jarrar’s Plumbing, Inc.,
Sandefer argues that Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code controls, and under the applicablе provisions of that chapter, Texas Capital is not entitled to a settlement credit because the settlement was effectuated after the chаrge was submitted to the jury. On the other hand, Texas Capital contends it should be discharged from its entire obligation based on the “one satisfaction rule.”
First, Chapter 33 does not apply in this case. Section 33.002 sets forth the applicability, and it provides that Chapter 33 applies only to “any cause of action basеd on tort in which a defendant, settling person, or responsible third party is
Second, under the one satisfaction rule, the nonsettling defendant may only claim a credit based on the damages for which all tortfeasors are jointly hable.
Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel,
In the underlying case here, Texas Capital and Ballow were hеld jointly and severally hable for $398,904.38 in actual damages, and that sum was to bear interest at the rate of ten percent per annum from the date of the judgment until рaid. After the judgment was entered, Ballow settled with Sandefer, agreeing to pay the principal sum of $2,600,000.00, and Texas Capital presented this settlement agreement to the trial court.
2
Further, J.D. Sandefer stated in his affidavit that, at the time this proceeding reached the trial court, Ballow had paid $1,123,763.23 of the $2.6 million settlement. The settlement
For the reasons stated, we reverse and render judgment as set out above. Texas Capital remains liablе to Sandefer for the amount of damages for which it was held solely liable.
Notes
. Further, even if Chapter 33 were applicable, it does not preclude a settlement credit merely because settlement was effectuated after the case was submitted to the juiy. Under the provisions set forth therein, a codefеndant who settles after the case has been submitted to the jury is no longer considered a settling person. Tex Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 33.011(5) (Vernon 1997). However, this merely affects the manner in which a settlement credit is administered. If a parly settles post-submission, the nonsettling defendant is entitled to a credit based on Section 33.013, as opposed to the formula provided in Sections 33.012 and 33.014 for presubmission settlements. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 33.012-014 (Vernon 1997);
Knowlton v. United States Brass Corp.,
. Ballow was also held personally liable for an additional $8,000,000.00 in punitive damages.
