*1 $77,703. UNFAIR TRADE time, IV. PRACTICES hours at a value Of that AND hours, CONSUMER PROTECTION O.K. Lumber asserts that rep- 160.7
ACT resenting $19,432.50, spent peti- tion; discovery matters; 25 hours on argues O.K. Lumber that the Con 44.9 hours on intra-office communication. Act, 45.50.471-561, sumer Protection AS remaining spent hours were on other private against creates a cause of action matters. Washington insurers. Providence contends apply that the act does not to the insurance Assuming Washington that Providence is industry. attorney’s generated not entitled to fees petition, issues, discovery or intra-of- expressly The Consumer Protection Act communication, fice Washing- Providence private creates a cause of action for a ton has still documented person purchases goods attorney 423.1 who or services $25,000 hours. The represents award of injured by practice a declared unlaw- roughly sixty per dollars ful AS 45.50.471. AS hour.11 We are 45.50.531. How- persuaded ever, expressly exempts superior the act also acts court regulated by chapter abused its broad 36 of title 21. discretion. AS 45.50.481(3). superior The decision of the court AF-
We conclude FIRMED. that O.K. Lumber has no cause of action under the Consumer Protec- express exemption
tion Act due to the for industry
the insurance found in AS 45.50.-
481(3).
V. ATTORNEY'S FEES
O.K. superior Lumber that the
court by awarding abused its discretion attorney’s excessive Specifically, fees. TETLIN NATIVE O.K. Lumber contends that the court CORPORATION, Appellant, (1) should attorney have excluded time for petition review that was dismissed Alaska, Knapp, STATE of Richard Com stipulation, (2) opposing compel a motion to Department missioner of the Alaska discovery, communicating among Transportation and Public Facilities counsel. Mat-Su, Inc., Appellees. money judgment When no is re No. S-2265. covered, superior court award prevailing party partial attorney’s fees in a Supreme Court Alaska. reasonable amount. Atlantic Richfield July 1988. State, Dep’t Revenue, Co. v. 723 P.2d 1249, 1251-52(Alaska 1986); Alaska R.Civ. 82(a)(1). P. We will reverse an award of
attorney’s only fees if the court abused its
discretion compensating excessive attor
ney awarding hours or overly high per
centage of an otherwise reasonable fee. Richfield,
See Atlantic
6; State, AMFAC Hotels & Resorts v.
Dep’t Facilities, Transp. & Pub. (Alaska 1983). P.2d
According Washing to Providence
ton, attorneys worked a total of 663.7 attorneys
11. participated hourly who in the case billed at an rate of $90.00-125.00. *2 Boness, Preston, Thorgrim-
Frederick H. Holman, Anchorage, appel- for son, Ellis & lant. Gen., Athens, Jr., Atty. Asst.
E. John Schaible, Berg Atty. Fairbanks, Grace Juneau, appellees. Gen., for MATTHEWS, C.J., and Before RABINOWITZ, BURKE, COMPTON MOORE, JJ. OPINION COMPTON,Justice. appeal material site concerns five
This within land owned located easements (Tetlin). Corporation Tetlin Native pursuant conveyed land 19(b) Claims Settle- of the Alaska Native § 1618(b) (ANCSA). 43 Act U.S.C. § ment summary (1982). On cross-motions ruled favor court judgment, the trial We affirm. of Alaska. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL Reservation.”3 BLM advised the State to
BACKGROUND file an with the Bureau of Indi (BIA) appeal Affairs Shortly after statehood the State of the Director Alas- (State) proceeded ka to obtain interests BLM. The State did not rights-of-way Instead, BLM decision. early 1963 it across land held the United States applied to the BIA for the five material site government. easements question. One of the five *3 gravel high- are a source of sand and for material sites was the same site which had way construction and maintenance. In rejected by been the BLM in 1961. applied to the 1960 the State Bureau of part application As of the BIA process, (BLM) Management for Land two material August 6, 1963, on the Tetlin Native Coun- located within the bound- 4 by cil consented juris- resolution “to the aries of the Tetlin Indian Reserve.1 necessary dictional transfer of the granted The BLM to the one mate pits for the improvement construction and easement, stating authority rial site to Highway by Alaska and grant request regula was “found Bureau Realty Indian Affairs Of- 244.54(a)(1) tions from 43 C.F.R. and Sec fice....” State was assessed Highway tion 17 of the Federal-Aid Act of $1,473.48 compensation as for these materi- 9, 1921, (42 November Stat. 23 U.S.C. approved compensa- al sites. The BIA this 18).”2 later, Several months on October being “just adequate.” tion as and In 1964 1961, the rejecting BLM issued a decision formally granted the BIA the State’s re- application grounds the other quest for the jurisdiction approve pursuant the BLM lacked five material sites to a “right-of-way entirely (1982)5 within an Indian to 25 U.S.C. 323 and 25 C.F.R. § 1. In proposed appropriation President Hoover withdrew certain of such land or public promote lands "to contrary public interests material is to the interest or by appropriate training, natives vocational purposes inconsistent with the for which such encourage restocking and assist them in land or materials have been reserved ... then country animals, protecting fur-bearing and may appropriated such land and materials support to otherwise aid in the care and highway depart- and transferred to the State natives_” said Executive Order 5365. This ment, nominee, purposes or its for such subsequently withdrawal became known as the subject specified. to the conditions so Tetlin Indian Reserve. The Executive Order “oil, coal, expressly excluded all 3. or (1955) other miner- cited 43 C.F.R. 244.55 as land, deposits any al found at time in the grounds denying for the material site easement. for, right prospect mine and remove the provides part: 43 C.F.R. 244.55 same” from the interests withdrawn for the ben- by No will be received the [BLM] people. efit of the Tetlin Id. rights-of-way affecting entirely for lands with- in a national forest or an Indian reservation. Highway 2. The Federal-Aid Act of 1921 was redesignated part Part of Title 43 was as 27,1958, repealed by Highway August Act of Redesignation 2234 in 1964. 43 C.F.R. Table 85-767, Pub L. No. 72 Stat. 919. § However (1964 Supp.). redesignated Part was later replaced of the 1921 Act was with a near verba- part Redesignation as 2800. 43 C.F.R. Table Act, provision tim in the 1958 23 U.S.C. § 317 (1976). (1982). provides: Section 317 (a) Secretary If the deter- [of Commerce] 4. Tetlin Native Council is the Native govern- any part mines that of the lands or interests in organized ment of the Tetlin Indian Reserve pursuant by lands owned the United States is reason- Act, Reorganization to the Indian ably necessary right-of-way any for the 473a, 476, U.S.C. §§ highway, or as a source of materials for the any construction or maintenance of such 5. 25 U.S.C. § 323 (1982) provides: highway adjacent to such lands or interests in be, lands, Secretary Secretary Interior and he is shall file with the Secre- empowered grant rights-of-way pur- tary Department supervising all the admin- poses, subject to such conditions as he istration of such lands or interests in lands a map prescribe, any showing portion over and across lands now or of such lands or appro- interests in priate. hereafter held in trust the United lands which it is desired to States for tribes, individual Indians or Indian communi- (b) ties, bands, nations, period any If within a of four months after or or lands now or owned, filing, Secretary Department subject such of such hereafter against to restrictions alienation, Secretary shall not have certified to the individual Indians or final decision deleted reference (1958).6 part 161 to the passed Congress the Alaska Na- In Although by the BIA. the final deci- Act, No. 92- Pub.L. tive Claims Settlement longer specifically grant made the sion no (codified at 43 as amended 85 Stat. 688 sites, subject it did five material (1982)) (ANCSA). 1601-1629a U.S.C. §§ general savings a clause for valid contain 19(a) revoked the Exec- of ANCSA Section existing rights.7 creating the Tetlin Reserve Order utive 19(b) Department Interi- others) allowed accordance with (among Section while (1980), regulation 43 C.F.R. 2650.7 corporations village to elect receive fee expressly final decision stated that: simple title their former reserves lieu claiming from ANCSA. U.S.C. property other benefits Any interest Corpo- 1618(a), (b) (1982). decision, Tetlin Native lands affected § incorporated July 1973 and government, regional ration the Federal simple title to its corporation may elected receive fee the decision to Board, forego participation in Appeal the Alaska Native former reserve Claims *4 by monetary settlement authorized the
ANCSA. Any party known or unknown who com- early the BLM released for adversely by affected this decision shall determining a draft decision lands
ment rights be deemed to have those waived conveyance to The for Tetlin. available adversely which were affected unless provided grant that the of draft decision timely Alaska appeal filed with the subject be to the the former reserve would Appeal Board. Native Claims BIA easements at issue five material site as as material site easements well four appealed any nor Neither the State Tetlin granted by BLM. relating issue the BIA sites. May Secretary On Shortly the draft decision was re- after patent conveyed by to Tetlin the Interior of the BLM for Alaska leased the director to the lands surface and subsurface estates regional asking to the for an wrote solicitor identified the final decision. opinion validity of the five BIA patent easements identified Sometime after the issued material site Tetlin informed the State informed that draft decision. solicitor right, claimed all the title and interest director that the five material sites BIA issued material site ease- to the State the BIA were invalid. The challenge Tetlin filed solicitor Tetlin is ments. suit reasoned that: “[s]ince Reservation, ease- jurisdiction State’s claim to the material site not an Indian Among things, Tetlin’s com- dispose gravel is under the BLM. ments. other of sought declaratory relief provisions plaint of 2802.1-6 that 43 C.F.R. § right, no title in the [(1979)] giving jurisdiction BIA over State had or interest parties Both and of 25 five BIA material sites. rights-of-way on ‘Indian [lands]’ is- summary judgment for on this apply C.F.R. do not this moved 161.3 § ] [ sue. ease.” granted summary judg- September the BLM The trial court
On issued denied Tet- conveying ap- its final to Tetlin ment in favor of the State and decision 743,000 summary proximately partial lin’s cross-motion for acres land. The communities, tribes, bands, grant shall of the above-described lands Indian or nations any subject ... and other lands heretofore hereaf- to: acquired therein, or set use any, ter benefit aside existing rights in- 1. Valid if the Indians. cluding but not limited to those created easement, right-of-way, any ... redesignated part 6. 25 C.F.R. 161 has since been complete enjoy- right grantee to the Redesignation part 169. 25 C.F.R. Table as rights, privileges, benefits of all ment (1982). thereby granted to him. provides savings part: 7. The clause judgment. specifically first determined the material site it is The court that until can- celled. State’s failure the [BLM “[t]he preclude not final does decision] 22(b) 14(g) ANCSA, Sections as insisting its claim from now is valid.” regulations governing well as BLM Upon reaching the merits court con- conveyance corporations, of land to Native grants cluded: “The material were val- interpreted imposing as duty have been pre-ex- id. The blanket reservation of valid upon validity the BLM to determine isting rights preserved the material sites third interests created the Federal appeals.
for the Tetlin State.” government. 1613(g), 1621(b); 43 U.S.C. §§ 2650.3-l(a) (1987). 43 C.F.R. Ap- See § peals the State Alaska and Seldovia II. DISCUSSION Ass’n, Inc., Native Interior Dec. (1977), modified, 379-80 Interior Dec. 1 A. THE NOT STATE DID WAIVE ITS decision, Following the Seldovia AN RIGHT TO CLAIM INTEREST Secretary of the Interior issued Secre- IN THE MATERIAL SITE EASE- (S.O.) tarial Order 30298 which stated in MENTS. part: the issues At the outset we note raised Clearly listing act administrative questions this case of law involve which we existing right an interest as a valid or of review de Sales and novo. Alaska Serv. failing to list it not does create or extin- Millet, (Alaska Inc. P.2d guish right. Because of this the 1987). may all ultimate interests re- to the now assert its claim quire litigation. court *5 appeal because it did not the BLM’s deci- appropriate Nevertheless it is for BLM sion which omitted the five material site to determine in the first instance the pat- easements from final decision validity of those interests which are cre- argues during ent. Tetlin convey- that since ated federal BLM is in most law process adjudicated ance the BLM the va- charged cases the with the ad- lidity easements, of the BIA ministration of laws. those so, and found them This is invalid. reasons amended, (1978), Fed.Reg. 55287, 43 55291 Tetlin, because the decision referred draft 1692, (1980). Fed.Reg. 45 1693 Decisions sites, opined the material BLM solicitor a Appeal of the Alaska Claims Native invalid, that the easements were (ANCAB) Board9 that indicate when con final decision did not refer to the ease- veying corporations land to Native ments. routinely adjudicates federally BLM all cre argues The State that a brief memoran- excep party ated third with two interests dum adjudication the solicitor is not an appeal. See, e.g., tions irrelevant to this Moreover, of the easements. the State Alaska, Dep’t of Transp. State & Pub. of points out that it did not receive the solici- Fac., (1982) (air 321 89 Interior Dec. navi opinion, tor’s the BLM Alaska, that did not site); Appeal State gation 86 necessarily take (road the solicitor’s advice be- (1979) Interior Dec. 45 easement and cause specifically the final did not fee). decision it material site state claimed owned cancel the material site easements. The adjudication federally Given that created argues State that the BLM’s failure to policy, interests is the BLM’s adjudicate the adjudicate sites does translate into that fails to a when the BLM a rights party waiver of all party to the third interest that sites. The State that interest. contends title lose the third Cf. Alaska, Fac., Dep’t Transp. & Pub. conveyed by patent subject remains pertinent part Appeals by 8. S.O. 3029 reaffirmed S.O. Interior Board of Land S.O. 3078. 3016, 1, (1977). (1982); 85 Interior 8 Fed.Reg. Dec. See 47 4.1(b)(3)(i). 43 C.F.R. 26392 Appeal 9. The Alaska Native Claims Board was abolished and all functions Board transferred to
533 (1981), issued on been and had not been cancelled was 629 88 Interior Dec. modified Dec. 346 insufficient when the adjudication 89 Interior record grounds, other conveyance, (easement questions before the raises about the omitted BLM conveyance amended so it appealed federally interests. to have created We easement). agree. listed the the ANCAB and the disagree. Both We Under the Procedure Administrative Act agree that the Interior Secretary of adjudication required an when is there failing to list an inter- act of administrative hearing. notice 5 must be and a See U.S.C. extinguish right. See est does not 554, 556, (1982). Moreover, because §§ 379-80;
Seldovia, Dec. at S.O. 84 Interior property the easements are interests which is Fed.Reg. at 55291. The law cause, only can be cancelled for holders of that a material site ease- similarly in accord process such interests to due are entitled adjudi- effect until ment remains in extinguished. those before interests are specifically cancelled. cated invalid (9th 135, 141 Kleppe, See Pence v. (1987) (easement 169.20 See C.F.R. § Cir.1976). “elementary An and fundamen 25 U.S.C. 323 termin- pursuant to § created requirement process procedural tal” due terms, comply with non- for failure to able reasonably is notice calculated to inform abandonment).10 also use or See Southern parties affecting interested of action their Day Adven- Idaho Ass’n Seventh Conf. property rights. Mullane v. Central Han States, F.2d 414-15 tists v. United Trust, Bank & 339 U.S. over (9th Cir.1969). L.Ed. S.Ct. to the circumstances turn now We requires Order 3029 Secretarial The final de case. decision instant federally adjudication of created inter BIA leted to the five reference conveyance part as ANCSA ests listed in the draft decision. process. undisputed It that the BLM possible for the Two reasons difference hearing gave held nor notice neither final exist. between the draft and decisions determining parties it was First, neglected to in have sites. validity of the BIA material We clude sites inadvert the material unpublicized that an ex refuse conclude failing to ence. is the reason for If that change of between state memoranda list the then the easements are *6 regional solici of the BLM and the director may extinguished not and the State assert Thus, pat adjudication. where a is an tor its claim to the easements. savings clause general ent contains a may Alternatively, rea- have existing patentee takes rights, valid adjudicated soned the easements and that they prop are rights until subject to those deleted to them because it found reference specifically adjudicated erly invalid adjudication If invalid. was the easements Alaska Land Title canceled. v. State Cf. easements, omitting the we the basis of (Alaska 714, 1983), Ass’n, 722 667 P.2d prop- the easements were not conclude that 1040, 704, denied, 104 S.Ct. 464 U.S. cert. erly to bar the from adjudicated so as State (1984)(patentee takes L.Ed.2d sub 79 168 in them. claiming an interest right-of-way previously established ject to silent as to adjudi where the instrument adequacy The issue of According right-of-way). existence of the pursuant to S.O. process cative 3029 Inc., properly found al ly, the trial court Interi Northway raised in Natives 88 appeal though the final the State did 14, part, part, or Dec. in in modified aff'd right decision, lose its (1981). There, did not 88 Dec. 711 Interior the material site ease merely reviewing assert a claim to ANCAB held that ments. rights-of-way if the had case file to see addition, (1964 Supp.) C.F.R. 2234.1-5 were 43 43
10. At the time the easements created (1964 right-of-way shall be deemed 2234.1-4(b)(2) provided provided that Supp.) “[n]o C.F.R. except issuance of a on the "rights-of-way subject to be cancelled to cancellation" for are construct, specific order of cancellation.” non-use. failure to abandonment or 534
B. TETLIN IS ESTOPPED TO ment estopped DENY should be invalidating from
THE
THE
VALIDITY OF
MATERI-
extinguishing
property
miner’s
inter-
AL SITE EASEMENTS.
upon
ests based
pamphlet
an erroneous
BLM).
issued
primary
issue
raised
judgment
summary
cross-motions for
“Estoppel
equitable
is an
doctrine in-
whether the BIA material sites were valid
injustice
voked to
particular
avoid
ly
rights-of-way.
created
If the material
Heckler,
59,
cases.”
535
(cases
discussing
In
Corp.,
F.Supp.
611
at 1202
caselaw.
the true
ele-
facts
Tosco
therein).
ment the Colorado
Court
cited
District
wrote:
We also find that these claimants were
principles of
are
federal
We
bound
ignorant of the
facts
“true”
and were
estoppel
case
concerns
because
rely
department’s
thus entitled to
once
a title to land which had
“whether
conduct between 1935 and 1960. As a
has
property
the
of the United States
been
general rule, persons dealing with the
passed
Oregon
of federal
v.
[out
control].”
charged
government
knowledge
are
with
Co., 429 U.S.
Corvallis Sand & Gravel
of and are
statutes and
377,
590,
550,
bound
lawful-
363,
582,
50 L.Ed.2d
97 S.Ct.
regulations,
ly promulgated
despite
550,
(1977)
their
(citing
562
50 L.Ed.2d
Wilcox
on
Jackson,
498, 517, 10
reliance
incorrect information received
273
Pet.
L.Ed.
13
government agents.
This
has
(1839))
original). Applying
rule
(emphasis
impact, however,
per-
less
to
when those
estoppel
test
the case at bar we
upon
dependent
governmental
are
in interest
sons
conclude that Tetlin as successor
agency
interpret
complex
to
its
government
estopped
body
own
to the federal
regulations.
deny
of the material site ease
of rules and
ments.
Plaintiffs,
claimants,
as oil shale
are
among
persons
depend
the class of
most
Department of
In 1961 the
the Interior
upon
department’s interpreta
ent
appli-
denied
State’s
respect
tions and statements with
to the
material
Tetlin
cation for a
site within the
mining
language
laws. The
ap-
[Wilbur
advising
Indian
that the
Reserve
Krushnic[,
ex
v. U.S.
U.S.
1964, upon
rel.]
In
ply
BIA.
S.Ct.
74 L.Ed.
BIA,
BIA granted
to the
Virginia-Colorado
and]
[Ickes v.]
easements. Neither the BLM
[Development Corp.,
295 U.S.
hastily
nor BIA
in their
mak-
acted
decision
(1934)] upon
S.Ct.
With third element we law. upon dependent are ignorant ing Native land of the “true” facts. government implicitly interpretations con- In Tosco the district court administering charged Native land cir- with cluded that “true facts” under certain *8 complex body of accompanying interpreta- true and the cumstances also includes Although BLM ini- regulations. Corp., F.Supp. rules and tions law. See Tosco least one materi- tially granted the State at at 1204. In oil failed Tosco shale claimants Reserve, within the perform in re- site easement annual assessment work al changed its the BLM upon Department in- in 1961 liance of the Interior sometime juris- concerning agency had which terpretations applicable regulations position grant diction to such easements. In 1980 be estoppel remembered that eq- is an the BLM determined that it erred in 1961. uitable doctrine requires which judi- the decline, however, charge We the State cial consideration of equities the relative knowledge original parties.... with that BLM’s inter- of the pretation, change rather than its 1961 in addition, In we do not believe that the interpretation, interpreta- was the “true” Court, Supreme suggesting “affirma- tion.11 tive misconduct” as an estop- element of pel, government intended that a agent respect With the reliance element engage in an misrepre- intentional upon there is no doubt the State relied the sentation or concealment before his con- Department actions of the of the Interior. estop duct government. could the Such gave the BLM denied the When easement it requirement a would be irreconcilable the a choice of two administrative with the Court’s long-standing rule that apply agen- remedies: to another government the estopped by cannot be cy. The apply State chose to to another the agents. unauthorized conduct of its agency a and as result received de- imagine It is hard to a situation where sired easements the BIA. Because agent conduct of an can be both goal through the State achieved its desired intentionally tortious and authorized by one of two alternative administrative reme- government. Therefore, BLM, presented by dies the State’s we conclude upon estoppel that for the authority ap- reliance the BIA’s doctrine to was rea- plied against upon government, sonable. The State further relied the con- by duct removing grav- scope material site easements must be within the of the using gravel agent’s el and improve authority and must be an affirm- Highway. which, Alaska act ative on a balance of all the equities, amounts to “unconscientious or Finally we must determine whether the inequitable” Assuming behavior. all oth- government’s conduct is “affirmative mis- estoppel er elements present, are ... by conduct” as construed the courts. Deci- even conduct based on a mistake of law sions suggest of the Ninth Circuit qualify will as “affirmative misconduct” requires” “affirmative misconduct more estop if the government refusal negligence. TRW, than mere Inc. v. Feder- inequitable will unjust work an result. Comm’n, al Trade (9th (citations F.Supp. omitted; Cir.1981); at 1205-06 Co., Ruby United States v. emphasis original). persuaded F.2d at 704. are We Chief Judge interpretation Finesilver’s of affirm- bar, In the case at the actions of the Tosco, ative misconduct he where states: Department denying Interior both case,
In this the AU granting easements constitute autho- [Administrative Judge] depart- Law concluded that rized affirmative conduct. The State has ment’s conduct between grants 1935 and 1960 relied on the years. for over 20 Equity result of a mistake of prevents law and from redeter- could not mining be characterized as grant misconduct. of a where a The ALJ’s conclusion injustice reflects too narrow “serious would be worked estoppel, view of the law of public’s even as it unduly interest would not be dam- applies against government. aged imposition estoppel.” It must See 11. The dissent that the State interpreta- has not 443-44. For the State to learn which requirement ignorance satisfied the interpretation" tion was the “true acquiring engaged litigation true facts because it had the means of would have had to have pertinent knowledge appealing agen- but did not do so. See BLM’s decision Mansell, City Long cy Beach v. 3 Cal.3d and courts. The State chose the more conve- Cal.Rptr. applying 476 P.2d agency. nient method to another Supreme Mansell the California explained Court further We believe conduct satisfies the State’s ac- person quisition knowledge obligation. that a need not "be destitute of We do not possible believe, context, acquiring knowledge all means of in this that the onus was on the but ready jurisdictional rather of all convenient or means to State to resolve conflicts between 43-44, 476 CaLRptr. such agencies. end." Id. 91 at P.2d at federal *9 United, Ranch, (1979), L.Ed.2d 284 lists five elements that Lazy v. FC States justify be in order to (9th Cir.1973). must found invocation 985, 989 equitable estoppel. of the doctrine of if Tetlin injustice would be worked An Those factors are: the permitted to contest were 1) estopped (Tetlin) party the to be must since the Unit- material site easements the facts; know the government longer the no owns ed States cannot, therefore, re-issue the land 2) party that must intend its con- that interest be public’s would easements. upon; duct shall be acted longer had damaged if the no access 3) (the state) party claiming estoppel the for road maintenance the material sites facts; ignorant must the true contrast, imposition estop- In purposes. 4) rely party that on its adver- damage Tetlin. unduly not When pel will sary’s detriment; and, its conduct to it granted followed BIA the the estoppel against in the case of the designed protect and com- procedures government,1 people living on the Tetlin pensate the then 5) estopped the action of to be comprising the Reserve. The land Indian must constitute “affirmative miscon- land now owned reservation constitutes duct.” This Corporation. Native land is by Tetlin portion highway benefited superior ruling court made no Further, Tetlin as crosses it. succes- which however, estoppel The majority, issue. Government to the Federal sor-in-interest of es- concludes that each of elements power terminate the material has satisfied, toppel Tetlin is has and that been if abandons or estopped denying therefore from the validi- discontinues the use for which sites ty my opinion In of material sites. granted. 169.20 were 25 C.F.R. § third conclusion is incorrect because the Depart- that We therefore conclude estoppel fourth have not elements granting ment of the Interior’s conduct been satisfied. easements is misconduct to sufficient may well not have known While the state justify estoppel estop refusal to because original interpretation, whether “BLM’s government work an and Tetlin will change interpreta- rather its 1961 than inequitable and unjust result. tion, interpretation,” it did was the ‘true’ involved, light equities we con- following facts: it had sub- know the that challenge estopped clude Tetlin is virtually applications mitted two identical validity of the material sites.12 other; days BLM four of each within application; one that that BLM III. CONCLUSION stating application, rejected other AF- The decision of trial court is authority- over be- that lacked FIRMED. Reserve, Tetlin Indian cause it was on the be sub- suggesting
RABINOWITZ, Justice, dissenting. BIA; on its two mitted to that the decisions inconsistent; it did applications United States majority, citing were re- Co., (9th Cir.1978), application which BLM Ruby not submit F.2d denied, BIA;2 appeal- that it had not cert. jected 99 S.Ct. U.S. government the 1981 from patent.... federal 12. that there are issues Accordingly, in the prevented Tetlin stands fact which should have the court respect government granting summary judgment. with is no shoes the federal There being estopped." supporting evidence in the Tetlin’s factu- record allegations. conclude are al We therefore there "one persuaded that the chose 2. I am state preventing issues no factual the trial court from remedies of presented by two administrative alternative summary judgment granting the State’s motion. submitted BLM”—i.e. that it 56(e). See Alaska R-Civ.P. Rather, waiting rejected application BIA. half, applica- including majority opinion year and then 1. The that "Tetlin’s inter- and a *10 site, ed the BLM-granted inconsistent decisions. As Tetlin years later, to in- argues, expedient “the State chose the rejected clude the group site in a applica- of ignoring problem.” route of Knowing tions to BIA. that either BLM or BIA authority grant had the material majority holds that because the state sites, knowing granted that it had sites did not know which of decisions con by BLM BIA, and sites it was cerning applications its was “true” in not reasonable for the state to assume that terpretation by governing reg of BLM the BIA-granted sites were valid. The ulations, the state satisfies the third criteri state realized that there uncertainty was as estoppel (ignorance on for of the true agency which authority grant had facts). ignorant But the state was not material sites and the state had the means facts; merely ignorant was acquiring knowledge of the true proper ambiguous resolution of the situa (i.e. agency facts which had the authority tion created those facts. The California grant applications question). Court, Supreme explicating the elements of state’s decision not to ascertain which estoppel, satisfy has noted that to the ele properly grant could the material ignorance ment of of the true facts “the sites renders its “reliance” on BIA’s au- [claiming estoppel be] thority grant them unreasonable. only [facts], destitute of the true but of the acquiring knowledge.” means of such ignorant Because the state was not City Long Mansell, Beach v. 3 Cal.3d facts, the true and because its reliance on 462, 23, Cal.Rptr. 476 P.2d validity grants of the BIA was not (Cal.1970)(quoting Boggs Biddle v. Merced reasonable, it require- has not fulfilled the Co., Mining (Cal.1859)). 14 Cal. estoppel, ments for and summary judgment only knowledge Not did the state have for the state on improper. issue is facts, but it could have obtained a hand, On the other since the state had a determination as to which of the contra duty to seek ambiguous clarification of the dictory decisions it had received was cor resulting situation from the decisions on its by appealing rect to BLM immediately applications BLM, and the state did not submitting to BIA. A “con so, do the state estop cannot now venient ready end,” means to such from contesting of the material Mansell, Cal.Rptr. at 476 P.2d at grant sites. I summary Therefore would 443-44, was thus available to the state. It judgment estoppel in favor of Tetlin on the advantage chose not to take oppor of that issue.3 Thus, tunity. it can not claim now that it ignorant was of the true facts and is there estop
fore entitled to Tetlin. estoppel fourth element of is the
state’s grants reliance on the BIA my
material sites. view reliance light not reasonable in of the facts
noted above. The state knew that BLM
had made contradictory decisions concern-
ing the applications. state’s two Rather
than situation, seek a resolution of this
however, the state was keep content to BIA, applications steps estoppel the state took no becomes one of law.... [I]n problem presented by resolve the BLM’s incon- case ... we find there to be no material facts applications. sistent treatment of its site dispute question and thus conclude that the estoppel properly resolved at this time as 3. As the Ninth Circuit has noted: a matter of law. Generally, estoppel ques- the existence of is a Sonoma, Sawyer County However, tion for the trier of fact. if the facts (9th Cir.1983) omitted). (citations 1006 n. 12 disputed, only are not one inference can evidence, be drawn question from the notes group rejected by BLM in a est in the site easements is tion the site derived