Testerman v. ZielinskiTesterman v. Zielinski
Addressing first the order in appeal No. 2, we reject the contention of Testerman that Supreme Court erred in granting Pisa‘s motion in the personal injury action. “Generally, the sole remedy of an employee[, i.e., Testerman,] injured in the course of employment against his . . . employer is recovery under the
We agree with Testerman in appeal No. 1, however, that the court erred in granting Daniel Bigelow‘s motion in the personal injury action. “To meet his initial burden on the motion, [Daniel Bigelow] had to establish both that [Zielinski‘s] vehicle ‘suddenly entered the lane where [Tenny Bigelow] was operating [her vehicle] in a lawful and prudent manner and that there was nothing [she] could have done to avoid the collision‘” (Fratangelo v Benson, 294 AD2d 880, 881 [2002]; see Richards v Bartholomew, 60 AD3d 1405 [2009]; see also Dorr v Farnham, 57 AD3d 1404, 1405-1406 [2008]). Although Tenny Bigelow “was entitled to anticipate that [Zielinski] would obey the traffic laws that required her to yield the right-of-way to [Tenny‘s vehicle] . . . , [Daniel Bigelow] failed to establish that [Tenny] used the requisite reasonable care when proceeding into the intersection . . . [He] thus failed to meet [his] initial burden on the motion because [he] failed to establish that the sole
With respect to the order in appeal No. 3, we conclude that the court erred in granting Daniel Bigelow‘s motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability in the wrongful death action, for the same reasons as those set forth with respect to the order in appeal No. 1. We therefore reverse the order in appeal No. 3 and deny the motion. Present—Hurlbutt, J.P., Smith, Centra, Green and Pine, JJ.