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Terry v. St. Regis Paper Co.
459 A.2d 1106
Me.
1983
Check Treatment

*1 I terminology. meaning tious v. would the of the rele- See Yoder Common- construe wealth, requiring (1907). provision 107 Va. vant constitutional S.E. change, filing This have in- in the office of the Secre- might been official terpreted allowing day tary the date the fiftieth after of be made between State the date of of in convening convening Legislature in first regular five only day filing regular session as the for session and not later than o’clock, of the written in office on thereafter. petition p.m., day the fiftieth case, Hence, vote for secretary of state. in the instant total gubernatorial Governor cast in This led adoption of the 1979 con- controlling number of election was the (Constitutional stitutional resolution Reso- required percent ten upon votes which the lution, Maine, 3) State of which did provided in the electors Constitution enlarge the original forty-five day period must determined. There was error filing petition fifty days written Superior low I Court and would reverse by making following change in the lan- judgment. guage of provision by adding the relevant words: underscored may propose electors to the Legisla- bill, ture for any its consideration resolve resolution,

or including bills to amend or repeal legislation but not an Constitution, by amendment of the State petition Legisla- written addressed ture or to filed either branch thereof and Peter A. TERRY Secretary office of o’clock, the hour p.m., of five on before day fiftieth after the date of conven- PAPER ST. CO. REGIS first regular in Maine. Supreme Judicial Court of twenty-fifth session or on or before the convening dav after the date of Legislature Argued March regular in second session 12, 1983. May Decided This amendment became effective Novem

ber 1980. Where the constitutional change merely pro evinced an intention period vide definite time within which to petitions file direct of legisla initiative tion, which years had been existence which of a drafting previ inartistic

ous constitutional amendment seemed eliminated, have been sound construction the new constitutional amendment would

require that it be construed to have intend merely

ed no more put organic law back track. on See Griffin Vande griff, (1949). 205 Ga. S.E.2d An construed as amendment should not be

effecting any greater on the ex innovation

isting reasonably constitution than is neces its sary accomplish object adoption.

H07 Lanham, Stearns, Mitehell W. & Samuel Bangor, Weatherbee, M. (orally), Jr. Peter for defendant. GODFREY, McKUSICK, C.J., and

Before CARTER, ROBERTS, VIOL- NICHOLS, WATHEN, JJ. ETTE and VIOLETTE, Justice. a Terry appeals Peter A. from

Employee Division of judgment of Compensation (Appel- Workers’ Commission Division) which a decision late reversed Compensation Commission. Workers’ that a 1981 ceil- Terry contends ing workers’ compensation on maximum apply retroactively pre- does benefits injuries. Because we find enactment ceil- did not intend the 1981 retroactively, we reverse Appellate Division.

I. Paper employee of

Terry, an in- compensable a back Company, sustained receiv- jury January began 1981 and on incapacity beginning for total ing benefits day pursuant the next to an agreement the Workers’ approved by ini- Terry’s benefit level was Commission. tially by P.L. ch. codi- governed (1978), fied at 39 M.R.S.A. which § act came October 1975. That effective ceiling raised on weekly average benefits from the state 133yS% on wage average wage of the wage on July 1,1977,166%% average wage July 1,1979, average and 200% the on July 1981. 22,1981,

On enacted June McTeague, amendment”),1 Higbee Libner, (“the Maurice A. & Priest, (orally), as (Supp.1982), Libner Charles R. Bruns- codified at 39 M.R.S.A. § wick, plaintiff. emergency legislation to amend M.R.S.A. Commission; part: pertinent curity amended The statute week $25 reads nor less than weekly compensation ly; shall and such incapacity resulting While the for work annually July adjusted con on so that it 1st injury total, employer from shall percentage relation to bear the same tinues pay weekly compen employee a weekly wage ship average State in the equal average weekly gross to 2k sation his Security Employment computed as wages, earnings salary, more but not Commission, it time of did average weekly wage 166%% injury .... computed Employment Se Coates, under immediately. plaintiff effective new act left work weeks intended, wait requiring her to thirteen according statute compensa-

preamble, collecting unemployment before “negate” the increase in maxi- expected to Prior to the date Coates mum tion. days benefits which was to nine occur benefits, legislation receive her later. It the benefit capped level at 166%% *3 to, substantially ex- effectively, amended of the state average weekly wage. held there waiting period. tend her We July 1, 1981, On Regis to St. continued new to the application that of the statute pay Terry of the average weekly 166%% application, retroactive plaintiff constituted wage; responded by “Peti- Terry filing a having of her consequences as it altered the tion to Fix Benefit Level” the at 200% left work under the old statute. average wage anticipated he under the ear- suggest compensation cases Two legislation. lier The Compensa- Workers’ In case. the same conclusion instant Commissioner, tion concluding that the Co., 241 Reggep Lunder Shoe Products Legislature did not intend the 1981 amend- 802, (Me.1968), we that A.2d 804 noted retroactive, did, ment to be if it and that right worker’s to workers’ such retroactivity would be unconstitution- “and injury vested on the date of comes al, granted petition. ap- Terry’s Regis’s St. enlarged by legislation be or cannot reduced peal Appellate Division was sustained (citation to that date.” subsequent enacted opinion in an 1981 which held that omitted). amendment intended was to be retroactive only constitutionally retroactively and could that dealt Reggep be contends in effect applied. 22,1982, provisions “already On December we granted statutory that in the Terry’s injury” the time and Petition for Review. yet ceiling case 200% was not instant 395 Corp., “in effect.” Bernard Cives II. that (Me.1978),however, answers A.2d 1141 review, Terry’s petition In for granting Bernard, we that work objection. held In we ordered following that issues bill ceiling escalation injured ers after (1) prepared argument: appli- whether 1, 1977, to prior July was enacted but Terry cation of the 1981 amendment (to 133!/3 on which the first escalation date (2) would application, constitute retroactive occur, the bene %) were “entitled to whether the the 1981 Legislature intended ceiling periodic escalation of fit of each (3) apply retroactively, amendment rates of until their stated in the statute application whether satis- retroactive would statewide 200% the compensation reach fy requirements and Unit- Maine July wage computed average weekly ” conclusion, ed States Constitutions. Our rejected 1144. We thus 1981 .... Id. at require does not that we reach ceiling employer’s argument that constitutional issues. effec prescribed separate escalation statute and ruled escalation tive dates each Retroactivity A. entire became effective statute Id. at 1147-48. October

We noted recently that a statute the 1981 amendment’s retroactively applied ap Application considered “when who, like ceiling persons plied legal signifi so as determine 166%% benefit amend- prior to the prior Terry, injured cance of events were acts or that occurred ” alter significantly would to its .... v. Maine ment’s enactment effective date Coates been having of their Commission, legal significance A.2d Employment Security escalation (Me.1979) ceiling (quoting State Commission while Application in effect. on Human Relations v. Amecon Division statute still Inc., 120, 123, would there- Terry 360 the 1981 amendment to Systems, Litton Md. (1976)). application. 3-4 fore constitute retroactive A.2d B. Legislative Intent Mutual Insurance Co. v. Patrons-Oxford Co., Mutual Insurance determining whether to However, (Me.1980). even an examination retroactively Terry, we legislative of the 1981 amendment’s back- guided are “the by fundamental rule ground requisite to reveal fails clear statutory strictly construction followed expression legislative intent. this Court that all statutes will be con sidered to prospective operation have a preamble merely *4 Pope, 382, 384-85, of 103 616, Me. 69 A. 617 apply prior intended to to workers (1908); Hastings Lane, 134, 15 Me. 135 to the amendment’s effective date. (1838); see Uniform Statutory Construction Although legislative debate over the 14, Act 14 (1980); § U.L.A. 524 73 Am. Legisla- 1981 does amendment reveal Jur.2d, Statutes re §§ 350-51. That rule high ture’s concern about the work- cost of quires Legislature express to its intent Maine, compensation premiums ers’ in no a apply statute retroactively “strong, in appears emerged regard- consensus have clear imperative and language,” Barrett v. possible the amendment’s retroactivity. Herbert Inc., 633, Engineering, 371 A.2d representatives Two expressed their con- (Me.1977); 635 n. 1 Langley v. Home In cern application that retroactive would be demnity Co., 740, 272 A.2d (Me. 746-47 unconstitutional, while another insisted that 1971); we will only imply a retroactive in application of the amendment all work- tent when the statute inopera “would be ers, of regardless injury, posed their date of tive other than retrospectively.” Casto v. no problems. Leg.Rec. constitutional 1628- Greer, 332, 334, 100, 44 W.Va. 30 101 S.E. (June 11, 1981). find, 31 We are unable to (1898), Miller, quoted 134 Me. at 183 statements, any expression in those clear of atA. legislative retroactivity. intent favoring The 1981 amendment itself contains Finally, we note that the no express indication of intent of clearly aware how to create retroactive regarding possible retroactive application. legislation. The of Maine Manual for Nor do we find any expression such neces 1978), Legislative Drafting, (3d publish- ed. sarily implied amendment, as the ed of Re- Legislative the State Director amended statute equally operative search, gives examples several of retroactiv- applied whether prospectively or retroac ity clauses, p. Legis- id. and tively, in terms of both consistency internal incorporate leg- lature did such into clauses and actual effect. The language islation enacted contemporaneously thus persuade fails to us that See, e.g., 1981 amendment. intended to apply the 1662/3% 463, 465, chapters any 487. Neither benefit ceiling retroactively. compa- sample retroactivity any clauses nor unambig Because amendment is however, rable language, incorporated its uous on face necessary and carries no into the 1981 amendment itself. implication of application, retroactive we need look statutory behind the lan Ill guage to either amendment’s emergen cy preamble, that, see re Camden Shipbuilding We conclude in the absence Co., (D.Me.1964); or a F.Supp. imperative language Har clear and strong, (1854), low v. Young, necessary implication legisla- Me. or its indicating legislative history. See Concord General tive intent that the 1981 amendment for the (Me.1980). Although the reasons

retroactively, only it given prospec- must be clear, I chapter tive effect. We hold are cannot therefore that enactment of Appellate ruling today’s Division erred in that the deci- impact the exact determine ap- 1981 amendment to 39 M.R.S.A. 54§ sion. plied retroactively Terry. discussed com- previously We have entry is: concept plex surrounding problems E.g., Adams Buffalo “retroactivity.” Appeal sustained. Co., (Me.1982). 941-44 Forge Decision of Division of Work- case Court in this agree I with the that ers’ Commission vacated. what to a retro- amounts argues Remanded to the en- Appellate Division for chapter Terry. application active try of the decision: following “Decision conclusion, only be- I that reach the Commission affirmed.” held that am- previously cause we have employer pay Further ordered that the 54 does not biguous language section an employee allowance counsel fees for each prescribe separate effective dates $550.00, together in the amount with his ceiling. escalation out-of-pocket expenses reasonable for this 1141, 1147 Corp., 395 A.2d Bernard v. Cives appeal. (Me.1978). We said in Bernard “plain on occasion used Legislature had concurring. All *5 the ap- describe unequivocal” language to J., ROBERTS, J., GODFREY, whom (“This Id. Act plication of an amendment. joins, concurring. injuries occurring after only apply shall enactment does make clear date.”) (quoting its effective temporal application of an amendment 5). Unfortunately, Act, the Workers’ P.L. unequivocal” chose such “clear and no (amending- ch. 483 39 M.R.S.A. 54§ at issue in the treatment of (Supp.1982-1983)). Because present case. compensation scheme is a creation of the itself, Legislature, rather Court, uniquely this equipped impact

discern the of its action and to in- accomplishment purposes. of its sure American Insurance Co. v. Mur- See Mutual (Me.1980); Wentzell ray, Timberlands, Inc., 412 A.2d notes only, unless the intent that “the contemplated stabilization this contrary is clearly expressed necessarily negate bill increase” in the would ben- [the] implied Coates, from the language used.” efit ceiling July scheduled to occur on (quoting 406 A.2d at 97 Fallon, Miller v. preamble 1981. The makes no mention 145, 148, 183 416, 417 Me. A. (1936)); Estate whatever of whether that stabilization was

Case Details

Case Name: Terry v. St. Regis Paper Co.
Court Name: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
Date Published: May 12, 1983
Citation: 459 A.2d 1106
Court Abbreviation: Me.
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