84 Mo. App. 21 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1900
On the thirteenth of February, 1833, a corporation known as the Board of President and Directors of the St. Louis Public Schools, was created by an act of the legislature, which reserved the right to alter, amend, or repeal it at the pleasure of the lawmaking body. This corporation continued to exist and discharge the duties imposed by its charter, until the twenty-third of March, 1897, when its charter and all acts supplementary to and amendatory thereof were repealed by an act of the legislature, which at the same time constituted the city of St. Louis and the inhabitants thereof a single school district and body corporate, charged with the supervision and government of public schools, and vested these duties in a board of twelve members, termed The Board of Education of St. Louis. The charter of the original corporation invested its board with the power to make rules for its governance, in pursuance of which the several officers of the board were enumerated,' and provision was made for their election by the viva voce vote of the members of the board of directors, and the duties devolved upon the respective- officers were specifically defined.
The answer denied that the services claimed were rendered at the instance and request of said school board, or that it was liable to pay for the same. The answer admitted that the defendant was the corporate successor of the former school board, and also that plaintiff had rendered valuable services in obtaining a dissolution of the injunction, but alleged that plaintiff had been employed by the president of the school board in accordance with a custom of its regular attorneys to point out some one for the discharge of their duties during the short vacation, which it was the habit of the board to grant them, and alleged further that said school board had never retained the plaintiff in fact.
The reply took issue. There was a verdict and judgment for defendant, from which plaintiff appealed.
The two charters under which the defendant has existed since 1833, created it a public corporation and school district, charged with the duty of educating the children residing within its territorial limits. State ex rel. O’Connell, v. Board of Pub. Schools, 112 Mo. l. c. 218. In 1874 the legislature passed a law restrictive of the power of school districts and other corporations of a like character. By this act to make any contract of such corporation valid, it must first appear that it is within the scope of their corporate powers, and it must next be shown that the contract in question arises iipon a consideration to be rendered subsequent to its making, and that it was in writing and duly executed. R. S. 1889, sec. 3157; Acts of 1874, page 44. The legislature had full power to prescribe this mode of authenticating the contracts of school districts, and also to condition the enforcibility of such contracts upon compliance with these requirements. It has done so. Hence the contract of plaintiff not being in accordance with the statute, imposed
"While we think it clear that the plaintiff has no redress against the defendant, we do not decide that he can not recover from the president of the former school board for the services rendered on his behalf, nor do we decide that there is any reason why the latter (the president of the former school board), being one of the parties to the injunction suit should not be entitled to a recovery over upon the bond given in that litigation. As to these questions, however, we express no opinion. It is sufficient to say that under this record, the judgment of the lower court is manifestly correct, and is therefore affirmed.