*1 der state law. The fact that these are munity. judgment of the district court intentional torts does not mean they REVERSED, and the case is REMAND- are 2302(b). not in 5 included U.S.C.A. § ED to the district defend- As Report clear, Senate made pro- “A ants’ motions for summary judgment. personnel practice hibited personnel is a action which is prohibited taken for pur-
pose.” S.Rep. No. 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. &
Admin.News 2742. Plaintiffs character-
ization of his conspiracy claims as in- tentional interference employment Terry RINGSTAFF, Kent claims does not alter our conclusion that Petitioner-Appellant, the claims are included within the scope of 2302(b). 5 U.S.C.A. § Dale HOWARD and Attorney Gen- Finally, defendants among are that class eral of Alabama, the State of Don of federal employees personnel whose deci- Siegelman, Respondents-Appellees. may sions challenged under the CSRA. Plaintiff conceded at oral No. 87-7573. Courtney acted as supervi- United States Court of Appeals, sor. undisputed It was that defendant Eleventh Circuit. D’Lugos plaintiffs supervisor. These actions were then taken by an “employee Dec. 1988. who authority take, has direct others to Granting Rehearing Order In Banc take, recommend, approve any personnel action.” 2302(b). Feb. U.S.C.A. § In this personnel actions chal-
lenged are included in 5 U.S.C.A. 2302(a)(2)(A);the challenges
§ among are challenges
those included in 5 U.S.C.A. 2302(b)(4),(5), (6); and the defend-
ants are members of the class of federal
officials covered 2302(b). U.S.C.A. § action,
This then, clearly falls within scope CSRA. In light of the con-
gressional policy unify challenges to fed- personnel
eral actions, we hold these state
law claims are preempted by the CSRA. emphasize
We that we do not decide
whether the preempts CSRA all state com-
mon law actions for tortious interference
with employment by federal employees. merely
We where, decide that here, as
employee challenges personnel actions
within scope of the Act's coverage un- law,
der those challenges are
preempted by the CSRA.
III. CONCLUSION
Because we hold that these state com-
mon law claims preempted by the Civil Service Reform Act of we need appellants’
address claims of im- absolute *2 Ala., Clarke, Montgomery, Baker
Janie petitioner-appellant. Gen., Alabama Atty. Siegelman, Don Jr., Brendle, Asst. House, G. Cecil State Ala., respon- Gen., Montgomery, Atty. dents-appellees. Judge, RONEY, Chief Before *, Circuit and SMITH
JOHNSON Judges. Judge:
JOHNSON, Circuit
appeal
involves
This case
for writ
aof
denial
district court’s
28 U.S.C.
brought under
corpus
dis-
direct
reverse
We
A.
the writ.
trict
BACKGROUND
I.
for the
arrested
Terry
Henderson
Mary
Circuit,
designation.
sitting
*
Federal
Smith,
Judge
Circuit
S.
Edward
Honorable
(1973),
7, 1980, Ringstaff
unless the first three factors
1980.1 On November
government,
made his first demand for a
He later reasserted his demand on March Ringstaff
preju-
must demonstrate actual
Mitchell,
and October
1981. On June
dice. United States v.
*3
24, 1981, Ringstaff
requested
1544,
(11th Cir.1985),
denied,
and was
cert.
granted psychiatric
1066,
819,
evaluation. On Janu U.S.
106 S.Ct.
649 reasonable have found as the until Just time a reasonable wait legitimately inter- motions pretrial delay while so that the locutory appeals settled law was issue of critical this Ringstaff rea- resolved, it was actually suffered he to show had until to wait the Government failed to sonable this has he Since delay. set- lawof issue important very I affirm showing, would a such make to trial. See bringing corpus re- tled denial court’s district Hawk, 474 U.S. v. Loud States United lief. (1986) 640 L.Ed.2d 88 106 S.Ct. (Government’s con- trial brought to which interlocutory appeal following 23 months some of murder victed weight little accorded years two took Barker I assume which arrest, period his purposes balancing); Government Sixth raise dissent 788 Birmingham, Islands Virgin is no concerns, although there Amendment precise delay between Cir.1986) (18-month (3d 933 constitutional time Territo- where justified trial indictment rial implicated. to be applicabili- sought clarification U.S. Wingo, proceed- criminal Trial Act Speedy ty (“We cannot (1972) Abney v. United court); see in its ings in a long too long is say definitely how States, U.S. supposed justice where system address- (although (1977) L.Ed.2d ing speedy deliberate.”) but swift in the recognizes trial, Court claim jeopardy a double context are attributable months request those Seven to trial prior issues of some resolution psychiatric for a defendant’s appropriate). are excused and computation. evaluation speedy United evidence is no There Cir.1985). dilatory purpose F.2d 1528 faith to bad O’Bryant, due Hawk, 474 Loud See Government. involve remaining months panel Nine 656. The at *6 until to wait by the Government a decision the Alabama was motive Government’s the that asserts to increase would this its rendered Supreme Court that likelihood the State, 396 So.2d Beck that decision (Ala.1981). receive Alabama Su- In that to maneuver anwas motive provision in that held preme Court advantage” over “tactical gain some prohibiting statute court state’s the trial speculates It defense. down as instructions —struck de offense a to sentence hesitant may have been States Su- by uncertainty the United unconstitutional of because to death fendant be sev- in June 1980—could preme Court prior to law surrounding the statute. the rest of fact finding ered no made The district such motive was State's such decision, Beck Until by the evidence. supported not finding is a statutory scheme capital entire the State’s the Government where case a is not This As doubt. spe or to delayed to harass stated, the Government Appeals Criminal defense, as such with cifically interfere cir caution and “commendable exercised particular a prevent trial to delaying ahead” rushing than cumspection rather testifying. United witness proceed to trial to it chose not when Cir.1976) (5th 1100, 1113 F.2d Avalos, 541 against charges pending 1656, 52 denied, cert. L.Ed.2d issue. a resolution v. Wain Arrant (1977); cf. (Ala.Crim.App.1984), State, 451 So.2d Ringstaff v. Cir.1972) 677, 681 wright, 468 No. t. cer justified not delay murder (two-year 1984). the Government (Ala., Had attorney offered only reason when possi faced the prosecution, it pursued the see [the want not “did that he con Ringstaff would have been bility that crime.”), acquitted be defendant] under a statute capital murder victed denied, 410 U.S. It would invalid. be determined later Rather, the Govern Ringstaff, a retry forced to have been then legal it could see if merely waited ment resources, es inefficient use particularly prosecu capital murder awith ly proceed likely it pecially where tion. convicted least he now would have dispense lightly requirement should ap charge for which very same be- prejudice the actual peals. necessarily cause to do so “severe results in the REHEARING AND ON PETITION FOR remedy of dismissal of the indict- REHEARING SUGGESTION FOR Barker, ment.” IN BANC is, at 2188. That the three Barker factors RONEY, TJOFLAT, Before Judge, Chief must indeed the HILL, FAY, VANCE, KRAVITCH, JOHN- Government before should be SON, HATCHETT, ANDERSON, CLARK, presumed. Indeed, in Barker itself there EDMONDSON, COX, Judges. Circuit was a five-year between the defend- ant’s arrest and with much of that BY THE COURT: time attributable to the State’s desire to A member this court in active service wait until the conviction of a co-defendant having requested poll application a on the testimony whose the defendant’s ing was believed rehearing majority and a banc Although conviction. not- judges of this having court in active service long period,” “too voted in granting rehearing favor of proceeded the Court nonetheless banc, analysis of whether the defendant had been prejudiced it, ultimately concluding he IT IS ORDERED that the above cause had not. shall oral reheard this court in banc with during the week of June Where, here, as was not the on a date to be fixed. hereafter result of a deliberate attempt “hamper specify briefing clerk will schedule for defense,” it should be afforded little filing of in previous banc briefs. The weight in Thus, the balance. I would re- panel’s opinion hereby VACATED. quire Ringstaff to show he suffered actual prejudice in prevail. order to The Court in Barker identified three interests which the Speedy Trial designed protect: “(i) prevent oppressive pretrial incarcera- tion; (ii)to anxiety minimize and concern of (U.S.A.), INC., ALIMENTA accused; (iii) the that U.S. at to limit the possibility Plaintiff-Appellant, the defense impaired.” will be at 2193. Of these interests, three Court charac- CARGILL, INCORPORATED, terized the cant. being third as signifi- the most Defendant-Appellee. *7 No. 87-8771. only impairment evidence of to his Ringstaff’s defense was United Appeals, States Court of testimony that he was unable to particular contact witness Eleventh Circuit. named “Larry” who could have established Dec. an alibi for him. That complaint goes to the fact of his incarceration, an issue that he raised, has not and not length time between his arrest and trial. It is at arguable least time, less, that more was needed in order for to find this man and that claim is that he should have been free during the interven- ing period. rate, At any as the district court found and Ringstaff himself con- cedes, there were several alibi witnesses
who testify did as to his whereabouts on the date of the “Larry's” murder and testi- mony was merely cumulative of the testi- mony already presented at Without some showing preju- of actual
dice, the district court’s denial of a writ of corpus should be affirmed.
