2025-SC-0096

Ky.

Jun 25, 2026

TERRY GLACKEN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

2025-SC-0096-MR

Supreme Court of Kentucky

RENDERED: JUNE 25, 2026

HONORABLE REBECCA LESLIE KNIGHT, JUDGE

ON APPEAL FROM CARROLL CIRCUIT COURT; NOS. 21-CR-00152 & 22-CR-00201

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

AFFIRMING

Following a jury trial in Carroll Circuit Court, Terry Glacken was convicted of numerous sexual offenses perpetrated against three minor children and was sentenced to life imprisonment. He now appeals to this Court as a matter of right.¹ We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The factual allegations which emerged at trial were as follows. In 2005, Glacken married his second wife, April. Each had two children from previous relationships, and the family of six lived in a small, three-bedroom, one bathroom house in Carrollton, Kentucky. Glacken assigned the children various chores and set the rules. He would “make deals” with them to perform

certain tasks in order to get something they wanted like fast food or candy. Glacken’s biological daughter, E.G., would sometimes be required to give him back rubs or foot massages. However, these seemingly innocuous tasks would escalate to sexual abuse.

One night in 2010 when E.G. was about seven years old, Glacken entered her bedroom and locked the door behind him. Telling her they were going to play a new game, he had E.G. remove her clothing and lie down on the mattress on the floor. Glacken then rubbed her vagina, digitally penetrated her, and placed his hand over her mouth so “she wouldn’t make a sound.” He informed her not to tell anyone and that the game was their “little secret.” The sexual abuse continued on an almost daily basis and would occur whenever Glacken found an opportunity. E.G. was temporarily removed from the home in 2012 following an abuse and neglect complaint filed after Glacken was observed by family friends engaging in inappropriate conduct with E.G. During the investigation, E.G. denied any abuse and the complaint was dismissed, resulting in E.G.’s return to the home.

The sexual abuse quickly resumed upon E.G.’s return. Glacken told her that if she ever told anyone about the abuse, he would hurt her or kill himself. The illicit acts escalated to oral sex and touching of her breasts. By the time E.G. was a freshman in high school and around thirteen to fourteen years of age, Glacken held her down and forcibly raped her. The rapes became routine and would sometimes occur multiple times per day. E.G. recalled that on the night of her junior prom in April of 2019, upon returning from the dance and

telling Glacken how things had gone, E.G. went to her room to change. Glacken followed her and told her to leave the dress on before raping her. During the attack, Glacken told her she looked beautiful and that he loved her. The week before she graduated from high school, Glacken entered her room and told her to undress. When she refused, he took her clothes off for her and forcibly raped her while placing his hand over her mouth and nose. After he ejaculated, E.G. told him she was “done,” “could not take it anymore,” and “was gone” as soon as she graduated. Glacken cried, told her he loved her, and promised to change. E.G. retained her resolve and moved out the day following her graduation.

During the decade of ongoing abuse of E.G., Glacken sexually assaulted other children in his home. In 2014, April’s son was in middle school and had a girlfriend, T.R., who was also a good friend of E.G.’s. When she would visit the home, Glacken would often kiss her and E.G. on the mouth. T.R. stayed overnight at the Glacken residence two to three times per week as her parents were frequently not at home. When she did so, she would sleep on the couch in the living room. Glacken worked the swing shift and would arrive home in the early morning hours. One morning when she was in the seventh grade, she was awakened by Glacken while everyone else in the house was asleep. He groped her body, caressed her hair, rubbed her breasts under her sports bra, and digitally penetrated her vagina. On another occasion, Glacken rubbed her body under her clothes, sucked on her breasts, and digitally penetrated her vagina. In the third and final incident, Glacken first rubbed T.R.’s thigh and

stomach. He attempted to perform oral sex on her and she felt his hot breath near her panty line. T.R. was able to roll away and successfully halt the attack. Not long thereafter, she and her family moved out of town. When she returned to visit, she was never again alone with Glacken.

During the 2018-19 school year, April’s eight-year-old niece, R.H., moved to Carrollton with her mother, Michelle. Because Michelle had recently ended a relationship and had no stable employment or housing, R.H. stayed at the Glacken home the majority of the time. Early one morning while she slept on the couch, Glacken returned home from work and began touching her breasts under her clothing. He then attempted to force her head to his penis. R.H. was able to resist and retreat to the bathroom. When she returned to the couch, Glacken was waiting and again tried to force her to perform oral sex on him. R.H. was again able to thwart the attack. Glacken later told her not to tell anyone what had happened, or he would hurt her or her family.

A few days later, R.H. was outside with several other family members when she was told to go inside to tell Glacken to come out and join the rest of the family. When she got into the bedroom where Glacken was, he ordered her to approach him as he lay on the bed. Glacken removed his pants and R.H.’s before bending her forward at the waist onto the bed. He got behind her and forcibly raped her as she struggled to get away. The attack stopped when either R.H.’s mother or aunt called for her from downstairs.

According to R.H., Glacken would rape her whenever he got the chance, but the majority of the time it would occur when she slept on the couch. Occasionally he would rape her in his bedroom. Glacken would “shush” her to make sure no one heard the abuse occurring. Sometimes he would put cream from a tube on his penis before engaging in the illicit act. In some instances, Glacken also performed oral sex on R.H. He would ejaculate into a towel or onto her back. Glacken fondled her breasts and vagina on numerous occasions.

If R.H. asked for things she wanted, Glacken would ask what she would do for him in return. If she replied with “a bunch of hugs and kisses,” he would whisper in her ear, “What else?” or “Are you going to let me do whatever I want?” R.H.’s attempts to disclose what was happening were met with disbelief. The abuses continued throughout the time R.H. lived in the home before she moved back to Texas with her mother in 2019. When she returned to visit, Glacken would fondle her breasts and vagina.

The last time R.H. saw Glacken was in June 2021. Glacken and his family travelled to her home in Texas for a visit. On the first night they were there, R.H.’s brother saw Glacken leaving her room zipping up his pants. The next night, Glacken informed everyone he was going to bed in the open game room upstairs. Shortly thereafter, a friend of R.H.’s brother noticed Glacken was not where he was supposed to be and, knowing about the incident the prior night, informed her family members. Glacken was in R.H.’s room. He had his pants unzipped and was touching her breasts. Hearing the approach of R.H.’s mother, Glacken quickly zipped up his pants and left the room. When questioned as to what he was doing, he merely stated he was checking on the

children. A short time later, Glacken returned to R.H.’s room and was preparing to rape her when April came up the stairs. He quickly pulled up his pants and rushed out.

R.H. told her mother and April about the abuses Glacken had been committing. April yelled at Glacken and asked him if he had been touching her niece. When he denied doing so, R.H. screamed back, “Yes, you have!” Glacken hurriedly packed up his vehicle and left with some of his family members in the middle of the night to return to Kentucky. Police in Texas were notified, and an investigation ensued. R.H. underwent a forensic medical examination and later a forensic interview at a child advocacy center. She disclosed the events which had occurred in her home as well as the rapes and sexual abuses she had endured since she was in the third grade.

Within days, and upon hearing of R.H.’s disclosures, E.G. went to the Carrollton Police Department to report what Glacken had done to her as she grew up. The case was assigned to the Kentucky State Police to investigate. Trooper Jonathan Callis spearheaded the investigation. Glacken was subsequently indicted on two counts of first-degree rape and one count each of first-degree sodomy, first-degree sexual abuse, and incest, for crimes committed against E.G. The indictment also charged one count each of first- degree rape and first-degree sexual abuse for actions taken against R.H. When she learned of the indictment, T.R. disclosed the abuses she had suffered which resulted in a second indictment charging Glacken with two counts of first-degree sexual abuse. Other victims came forward and Glacken was

subject to two additional indictments charging him with various sex crimes against two of the minor girls.

The Commonwealth moved to consolidate the indictments and join the charges relating to all of the victims for presentation in a single trial. Glacken objected to the proposed consolidation and further requested that the charges pertaining to E.G. and R.H. be severed for trial purposes. The trial court granted joinder of the counts related to E.G., R.H., and T.R., but denied joinder of the remaining indictments. Following a multi-day jury trial, Glacken was convicted on all counts and was sentenced in accordance with the jury’s recommendation to life imprisonment. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

Glacken raises three allegations of error in seeking reversal. First, he contends the trial court improperly permitted joinder of the charges relating to T.R. with those relating to E.G. and R.H. Second, he asserts the trial court erred in the admission of a hearsay statement from April. Third, Glacken argues the trial court palpably erred in admitting testimony from his brother, Joe. Finally, Glacken also asserts that if none of the errors alone warrant relief, their cumulative effect does, in fact, mandate reversal. We disagree.

A. Joinder was not improper.

Glacken first argues the trial court abused its discretion by consolidating the indictment charging him with crimes against E.G. and R.H. with the indictment covering his actions against T.R. He avers that the allegations were

too dissimilar to justify a joint trial and thus he was unduly prejudiced by the joinder and deprived of a fair trial.

RCr2 6.18 states that separate offenses may be joined in a single indictment “if the offenses are of the same or similar character or are based on the same acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.” RCr 9.12 permits a court to join two or more indictments for trial if the offenses could have been joined in a single indictment. Trial courts are afforded broad discretion in regard to joinder and such decisions will not be overturned absent a showing of prejudice and a clear abuse of that discretion. Violett v. Commonwealth, 907 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Ky. 1995); Rearick v. Commonwealth, 858 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Ky. 1993). A significant factor in identifying whether joinder for trial is prejudicial is the extent to which evidence of one offense would be admissible in a trial of the other offenses. Spencer v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Ky. 1977). That is, if the evidence of one of the offenses would be admissible in a separate trial of the other offenses, the joinder in most instances will not be prejudicial. Id. However, “while we have focused on mutual admissibility as an important factor in the prejudice analysis, mutual admissibility is not, by itself, determinative.” Peacher v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 821, 839 (Ky. 2013) (citing United States v. Cardwell, 433 F.3d 378 (4th Cir. 2005)). In this light, “evidence of independent sexual acts between the accused and persons other

than the victim, if similar to the act charged, and not too remote in time, are admissible to show intent, motive or a common plan.” Anastasi v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 860, 861 (Ky. 1988) (citing Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 685 S.W.2d 549 (Ky. 1985)). Further, “an erroneous severance ruling does not justify appellate relief unless it resulted in actual prejudice to the party opposing the motion.” Peacher, 391 S.W.3d at 838. Indeed, “a defendant must prove that joinder would be so prejudicial as to be ‘unfair’ or ‘unnecessarily or unreasonably hurtful.’” Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 258, 264 (Ky. 2006).

Glacken contends there was an insufficient nexus between the charged crimes because they occurred at different times and the circumstances of the abuses differed. In particular, he points out the differing ages of the girls when the abuse began and that T.R. was only abused on three specified occasions rather than the years of exploitation and molestation suffered by E.G. and R.H. He asserts the various acts were not close enough in time to be relevant to a common scheme or plan. Further, he avers that because T.R. was not raped or sodomized, nor did she live in the home at the time she was assaulted, the charges relative to her should not have been permitted to be tried at the same time as the others. Thus, he argues the dissimilarities among the factual allegations were so significant that severance was required. We disagree.

In determining whether joinder is appropriate, trial courts are tasked with considering whether a joint trial is justified based on a sufficient nexus between or among the offenses. Peacher, 391 S.W.3d at 837. If the separate

crimes are part of a common scheme or plan, such a nexus may exist. “While closeness in time and space is relevant, a common scheme or plan arises from a logical relationship among the offenses. This Court has found such a logical relationship exists where disclosure of offenses against one victim led to the discovery of offenses against another.” Gibbs v. Commonwealth, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2026 WL 886983, at *3 (Ky. Mar. 19, 2026) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Glacken attempts to differentiate the crimes committed against T.R. from his crimes against his other victims, but we are unpersuaded the trial court abused its discretion in determining he pursued a common scheme or plan. His actions against all three girls were plainly part of a “continuing scheme to obtain sexual gratification by engaging in sexual acts with easily accessible and vulnerable victims: little girls who depended upon him and regularly stayed at his home.” Elam v. Commonwealth, 500 S.W.3d 818, 825 (Ky. 2016).

The sexual acts Glacken perpetrated on the three girls were not identical but the trial court was convinced sufficient similarities existed between them to warrant joinder, noting it was “‘struck’ by the ‘similarities’ in how Defendant allegedly behaved towards” the trio, and indicating the dissimilarities relative to T.R. occurred only because she was able to extricate herself from the Glacken home before he could escalate to more heinous crimes. We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s assessment. Glacken had access to all three girls because they either lived in or were frequent guests at his home; the abuse occurred while others were present and continued until he lost access to the

victim; all of the crimes occurred in overlapping time periods; the assaults followed a clear progression from sexual touching and fondling to more intrusive and vile acts; and, as in Elam, 500 S.W.3d at 825, E.G.’s disclosure led to the discovery of Glacken’s crimes against the others. Based on the evidence presented, we conclude “a logical relationship exists among the offenses, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion” in rejecting Glacken’s arguments and denying his motion to sever. Gibbs, ___ S.W.3d at ___, 2026 WL 886983, at *3. Given the remarkable similarities in character and circumstance, we do not believe the events were so remote in time or dissimilar in nature that joinder at trial amounted to unfair prejudice to Glacken.

B. There was no improper admission of hearsay.

Glacken next asserts the trial court erred in admitting a hearsay statement from April. He contends none of the exceptions to the hearsay rule applied and thus, the statement should have been excluded. We disagree that the statement was hearsay and discern no error in its admission.

During Michelle’s testimony, she was asked about the events which occurred in Texas which immediately preceded R.H.’s disclosure of Glacken’s abuse. She stated she heard April yell at Glacken and ask him whether he was “messing with [her] niece.” Glacken objected on hearsay grounds. The Commonwealth responded that the statement was not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted but rather to provide context for Glacken’s response and admission. The trial court overruled the objection. When her testimony resumed, Michelle restated the question April had asked Glacken.

Michelle indicated he replied “No,” to which R.H. exclaimed, “Yes, you are!” After this exchange, she stated Glacken packed up his family and left Texas.

Glacken avers that the trial court’s allowance of this portion of Michelle’s testimony resulted in sufficient prejudice to warrant reversal. We review a trial court’s ruling to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Melton, 670 S.W.3d 861, 866 (Ky. 2023). “Abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision in allowing or disallowing the introduction of evidence was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Boyd v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.3d 126, 129 (Ky. 2014) (citing Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)).

An out-of-court statement constitutes inadmissible hearsay only if it is offered to prove that the content of the statement itself is true. KRE3 801(c). An out-of-court statement that is not offered to prove that its content is true, but rather for some other purpose, is not hearsay. Indeed, “[h]earsay does not mean any or all out-of-court statements; rather, hearsay means only ‘a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.’” Daugherty v. Commonwealth, 467 S.W.3d 222, 229 (Ky. 2015) (quoting KRE 801(c)). Further, “[q]uestions and commands generally are not intended as assertions, and therefore cannot constitute hearsay.” United States v. Thomas, 451 F.3d 543, 548 (8th Cir. 2006). “When the utterance of certain words

constitutes or is part of the details of an act, occurrence or transaction which in itself is relevant and provable, the utterance may be proved as a verbal act, just as may be a visual observation of an event.” Preston v. Commonwealth, 406 S.W.2d 398, 401 (Ky. 1966). “This is not hearsay evidence; it is not admitted for the purpose of proving the truth of what was said, but for the purpose of describing the relevant details of what took place.” Id. Additionally, we have consistently held “the Commonwealth is entitled ‘to present a complete, un-fragmented, un-artificial picture of the crime committed by the defendant, including necessary context, background and perspective.’” Melton, 670 S.W.3d at 866 (quoting Major v. Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 700, 708 (Ky. 2005)).

In this instance, Michelle’s testimony was intended to describe an emotional scene which unfolded immediately after she and her sister discovered Glacken’s sexual misconduct with her daughter. It was not, contrary to Glacken’s assertion, introduced for the truth of the matter asserted. Further, April’s questioning of Glacken was not an assertion which would be barred by the hearsay prohibition, Thomas, 451 F.3d at 548, and Glacken’s own response was admissible as a statement from a party. KRE 801A(b)(1). Michelle’s testimony and recitation of April’s question was plainly necessary for the Commonwealth to provide the jury with appropriate context for Glacken’s response and subsequent actions. There was no error in its admission.

C. No palpable error in admitting testimony from Joe.

For his third allegation, Glacken contends the Commonwealth improperly introduced Joe’s testimony because he did not want to testify and told the Commonwealth before trial he could not—or would not—remember any details regarding Glacken’s admission to abusing E.G. He admits this alleged error is unpreserved and requests palpable error review under RCr 10.26. In reviewing for palpable error, this Court will only reverse the judgment if “the error is so manifest, fundamental and unambiguous that it threatens the integrity of the judicial process.” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 676 S.W.3d 405, 417 (Ky. 2023) (quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky. 2006)). “It should be so egregious that it jumps off the page . . . and cries out for relief.” Id. (quoting Chavies v. Commonwealth, 374 S.W.3d 313, 323 (Ky. 2012)). Under this standard, we must ask “whether on the whole case there is a substantial possibility that the result would have been any different. . . . A palpable error must be so grave that, if uncorrected, it would seriously affect the fairness of the proceedings.” Davis v. Commonwealth, 620 S.W.3d 16, 30 (Ky. 2021) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Relief is only warranted where the error also results in manifest injustice. Commonwealth v. Caudill, 540 S.W.3d 364, 367 (Ky. 2018).

The Commonwealth called Glacken’s brother, Joe, to testify about conversations he had with Glacken and E.G. According to E.G., Glacken had confessed his abuse of her to Joe and Joe subsequently told her about the conversation. Joe was subpoenaed to testify at trial, and it was clear he did

not wish to do so. Early in his testimony, the Commonwealth asked if he recalled calling her office after receiving the subpoena and making a statement that if he was called as a witness, he “would come in and give me a bunch of quote ‘I don’t knows?’” In response, Joe stated his actual response was that it had been a number of years since those events occurred and he did not remember anything. In subsequent questioning, Joe indicated he was not going to answer the inquiry or did not remember the conversations being asked about. The Commonwealth then introduced a series of messages Joe sent to E.G. after she told police about their conversation and an officer contacted him about it. Joe told E.G. he felt betrayed by her because he had told her he wanted to “stay out of everything.” E.G. was later called to testify and stated Joe told her at the funeral home that Glacken “admitted everything of what he did to me . . . but he denied” ever abusing R.H.

Glacken now asserts the Commonwealth improperly called Joe as a witness knowing he would testify to not remembering any of the events, utilized improper leading and confrontational questioning techniques, and improperly impeached Joe with E.G.’s subsequent testimony and the messages between them. He argues the Commonwealth’s tactics gave the jury the impression Joe was evasive and untruthful, thereby resulting in undue prejudice. We disagree.

The Commonwealth was made aware by E.G. that Glacken had made a confession of guilt to Joe. As such a statement constitutes an admission of a party, it would not be excluded by the hearsay rule. See KRE 801A(b)(1).

However, Joe proclaimed he had no recollection of any confession and contradicted prior statements he had made to E.G. regarding same. Upon doing so, the Commonwealth was permitted to subsequently present E.G.’s testimony regarding his prior inconsistent statements. KRE 801A(a)(1).

While the Commonwealth may have had an indication Joe would testify that he was unable to recall any details, it was not impermissible to compel him to take the stand to question him about the conversations. Further, we cannot fault the Commonwealth’s adoption of a confrontational tone in the face of Joe’s evasiveness and proclamations he would not give an answer to some questions posed. Although the prosecutor was firm and direct, she did not raise her voice, use improper verbiage, nor badger or berate Joe during his testimony. She remained measured and steady in her examination. Furthermore, Joe’s alleged lack of memory was cause for the appropriate use of leading questions under KRE 611(c) as an aid in developing his testimony. We discern no undue prejudicial effect from the questions asked and the answers received and cannot say “a shocking miscarriage of justice resulted.” Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 13, 27 (Ky. 1998). Upon consideration of the whole case, there does not exist a substantial possibility that the result would have been different absent Joe’s testimony. Martin, 207 S.W.3d at 3. There was no error, and certainly no palpable error.

D. No cumulative error occurred.

Finally, Glacken contends his convictions should be overturned due to cumulative error. We disagree.

Under the cumulative error doctrine, “multiple errors, although harmless individually, may be deemed reversible if their cumulative effect is to render the trial fundamentally unfair.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577, 631 (Ky. 2010). Cumulative error has been found “only where the individual errors were themselves substantial, bordering, at least, on the prejudicial.” Funk v. Commonwealth, 842 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1992) (citing Furnish v. Commonwealth, 95 S.W.3d 34 (Ky. 2002)).

As we have found no individual errors, there can be no cumulative error.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Carroll Circuit Court is affirmed.

All sitting. All concur.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Shannon Dupree Smith

Kathleen Kallaher Schmidt

Assistant Public Advocates

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Russell M. Coleman

Attorney General of Kentucky

Joseph A. Beckett

Assistant Attorney General

Notes

KY. CONST. § 110(2)(b).

Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Kentucky Rules of Evidence.