22 Haw. 132 | Haw. | 1914
OPINION OP THE COURT BY
The defendant having been tried, convicted and sentenced on a charge of keeping a house of ill fame under section 3162 of the Revised Laws, brings the case here on exceptions. The bill of exceptions as transmitted to this court is hardly intelligible by reason of the many interlineations, substitutions and amendments endorsed thereon in ink by the trial judge in settling and allowing the same.
Exception 1 relates to certain remarks of the trial judge in the presence of the jury and directed to the attorney for defendant and one H. C. Mossman, a district court practitioner, who was then sitting by the side of said attorney. From the transcript the following colloquy appears to have taken place: The court: “In what capacity are you acting in this case, Mr. Mossman?” Mr. Mossman: “I am helping Judge’ Quarles as Hawaiian interpreter. I am assisting him as interpreter.” The court: “I have good hopes for Mr. Mossman. I have no hopes for a, young man who works himself into a hard case. He can act as interpreter.” The court: “I advise you, as soon as you can, Mr. Quarles, to get an interpreter. It is disgusting for a young lawyer to work himself into such a case.” Mr. Quarles: “I have to take an exception to the remarks of the court, said in the presence of the jury.” The court: “You can have an exception. I say that to you and I now ask you to get an interpreter as soon as you can to serve your purposes.” We are not called upon to pass upon the propriety or impropriety of these remarks of the judge, the only question we can properly consider being whether the same constituted reversible error. “The probable effect of any such comments must be measured largely by the facts of the case presented.” Pinkerton v. Sydnor, 87 Ill. App. 76, 82. “In a criminal prosecution,
Exception 2 is to the oral charge given by the court to the jury of its own motion. The exception noted by counsel to .the giving of such oral charge was a general one as follows: “Mr. Quarles: The defendant excepts to the oral charge given by the court.” The charge is a somewhat lengthy one, consisting of a series of propositions but containing, as this court believes, considerable irrelevant and objectionable comment and some erroneous propositions of law. Portions of the charge, however, may, in our opinion, be sustained as correct expositions of the law. The general exception noted is insufficient and must be overruled. In the case of Territory v. Lau Chong, 20 Haw. 235, Chief Justice Hartwell, speaking for the court, said: “The statutory right (Sec. 1863 R. L.) to except to any instruction of a judge in any matter of law (Sec. 1863 R. L.) does not contemplate a general exception to an entire charge or to a series of instructions or propositions of law, unless it is bad throughout. * * * The law is correctly stated in Shelp v. U. S., 81 Fed. 694, 700: 'An exception to an entire charge of a court or to a series of propositions contained therein cannot be sustained if any portion thus excepted to is sound.’ ” See also Territory v. Johnson, 16 Haw. 743, 757; Territory v. Hale, 18 Haw. 665.
Exception 3 is to the verdict as contrary to the law and the evidence. We have carefully examined the transcript of evidence and are of the opinion that the same amply supports the verdict of the jury. Each of four witnesses called for the prosecution, Christina Peter, Louisa Kapule, Mary Kamee and
The only remaining exception which was taken to the overruling of defendañt’s motion for a new trial raises only questions that have already been disposed of under other exceptions.
Exceptions overruled.