35 Haw. 324 | Haw. | 1940
The grand jury of the fifth judicial circuit returned an indictment against the defendant in error, James N. Yoshimura. The indictment consists of two counts, each of which charges the defendant with the crime of manslaughter. Upon arraignment in the court below the defendant interposed a motion to quash the indictment upon the ground that neither count thereof charges the defendant with the commission of any crime and that the allegations in both counts are insufficient to advise the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and that the indictment contravenes the rights guaranteed to defendant under the Constitution of the United States and more particularly article six of the amendment thereto. The indictment reads: "FIRST COUNT: The Grand Jury of the Fifth Circuit of the Territory of Hawaii do present that JAMES N. YOSHIMURA, at Waipouli, in the County of Kauai, Territory of Hawaii, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, on the 28th day of January, A.D. 1939, with force and arms, unlawfully and feloniously, without malice aforethought, and without authority and without justification *326 and without extenuation by law, did kill and slay one, Katsutaro Urabe, a human being then and there being, and did then and there and thereby commit the crime of Manslaughter, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided. SECONDCOUNT: * * * that JAMES N. YOSHIMURA, in Waipouli, Kawaihau District, County of Kauai, Territory of Hawaii, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, on the 28th day of January, A.D. 1939, with force and arms, unlawfully and feloniously, without malice aforethought, and without authority and without justification and without extenuation by law, in and upon one Katsutaro Urabe, a human being then and there being, did make an assault; and that the said James N. Yoshimura then and there recklessly, carelessly, negligently, wantonly and heedlessly of the safety of Katsutaro Urabe then and there being, unlawfully and feloniously, without malice aforethought, and without authority and without justification and without extenuation by law, did drive on that certain public highway in Waipouli aforesaid which is the main government road, commonly called the Kauai Belt Road and more recently referred to as the Federal Aid Road, and more particularly on and along that portion of the said public highway between the All Saints Church and Fujii Cafe and Chop Sui House, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, a certain automobile, having thereon upon said date 1938 Territorial Registration Number 41-275, into, upon and against the said Katsutaro Urabe; and that by reason of the driving of said automobile by the said James N. Yoshimura in a reckless, careless, negligent and wanton manner, and heedlessly of the safety of Katsutaro Urabe then and there being as aforesaid, into, upon and against the said Katsutaro Urabe, he, the said Katsutaro Urabe, was then and there violently and forcibly struck, thrown to and *327 upon the upper (mauka) side of said public highway, and that the said James N. Yoshimura did then and there unlawfully and feloniously, without malice aforethought, and without authority and without justification and without extenuation by law, give to him the said Katsutaro Urabe, in and upon the body, head, neck, arms, hands, legs and back of him the said Katsutaro Urabe, divers mortal wounds of which said mortal wounds the said Katsutaro Urabe did thereafter on, to wit: the 29th day of January, A.D. 1939, die; and so in the manner and form aforesaid, and at the time and place aforesaid, the said James N. Yoshimura did unlawfully and feloniously, without malice aforethought, and without authority and without justification and without extenuation by law, kill and slay the said Katsutaro Urabe, and did then and there and thereby commit the crime of Manslaughter."
Manslaughter is defined by section 5996, R.L.H. 1935, as the killing of "a human being without malice aforethought, and without authority, justification or extenuation by law." The trial court granted defendant's motion to quash the indictment and the Territory has sued out this writ of error to review the order nullifying the indictment.
Little need be said of the first count of the indictment. It merely charges the defendant with manslaughter in the language of the statute and falls short of apprising the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation against him as required by the sixth amendment to the Constitution of the United States which provides that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall * * * be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation." This constitutional right is extended to every person accused of crime in order that he may be in a position to prepare his defense and avail himself of the plea of former jeopardy in a subsequent proceeding for the same offense. *328
This court pointed out, in Ter. v. Pupuhi,
The second count, however, is far more specific than the first count. It essentially charges that the defendant, at the time of the killing of the deceased, was in the act of committing a violation of the law of the Territory, namely, R.L.H. 1935, § 6280, which reads: "Whoever furiously or heedlessly of the safety of others, rides any horse or other animal, or drives or conducts any carriage, wagon, buggy, omnibus, cart, bicycle, automobile, motorcycle, locomobile, or other vehicle, and thereby imminently endangers the personal safety of any person, shall be punished by a fine," etc.
Express intent is not an essential in the crime of manslaughter. Negligence and reckless indifference to the lives and safety of others supply the intent for the purpose of the criminal law. Manslaughter may not only be committed while doing an unlawful act but may occur in the doing of a lawful act in a grossly negligent manner. (People v. Campbell,
In Ter. v. Puana,
In Ter. v. Braly,
The first ten amendments to the Federal Constitution, commonly known as the "bill of rights," guaranteeing protection to certain rights of the people, do not apply to the States. (16 C.J.S. 128.) Specifically holding that the sixth amendment is no restriction on the power of the State to legislate, see State
v. Bailey, 115 Ore. 428,
Early-day solicitude for an accused brought into existence the common-law system of criminal pleading under which it was deemed necessary to state the offense charged with great particularity. This was done sometimes to the extent of absurdity. Availing himself of the technicalities provided by law, the criminal altogether too frequently went unwhipped of justice. He took advantage of the rules provided for his protection and made the administration of the law little better than a public scandal. Illustrating this, the supreme court of California, in People
v. King,
In People v. Townsend,
As said in State v. Laundy, 103 Ore. 443, 464, 204 P. 958, 206 P. 290: "The state is not required to plead the evidence relied upon to prove the acts alleged to have been committed by the defendant. The indictment advises the defendant not only of the nature but also of the cause of the accusation made against him. The language employed is such as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended."
An indictment charging that the defendant "unlawfully, wilfully, wantonly, feloniously, and with malice aforethought did kill and murder J.H. by then and there striking and causing to be struck the said J.H. with an automobile being then and there operated, managed, and driven by said defendant in an unlawful, wilful, wanton, careless, and negligent manner," etc., was held to sufficiently charge the offense of involuntary manslaughter in the *333 commission of an unlawful act. (5 Berry, Automobiles [7th ed.] 512.)
The second count of the indictment in the present case charged in effect that the defendant was engaged in a criminal act, to wit, the violation of section 6280, R.L.H. 1935, and that such act was the direct and proximate cause of the death of the deceased. This count of the indictment fully informed the defendant of the time and place of the killing as well as the manner and means of the infliction of the mortal wound from which Katsutaro Urabe died. We think it cannot be said that the defendant or any person of common understanding, after reading the indictment, could fail to comprehend the nature and cause of the crime charged. The second count of the indictment is sufficient in every essential to charge the defendant with the crime of involuntary manslaughter.
The order appealed from, in so far as it quashes the indictment as to the first count thereof, is sustained. To the extent that said order purports to quash the second count of the indictment, the same must be and is vacated and set aside and the cause is remanded to the circuit court of the fifth judicial circuit of the Territory of Hawaii for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.