17 Haw. 174 | Haw. | 1905
Lead Opinion
OPINION OF THE COURT BY
This is an application for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent as district magistrate of Honolulu, one of the judicial districts within the county of Oahu, to issue a warrant for the arrest of each of five named persons upon a sworn complaint charging them with a violation of an ordinance made by the board of supervisors of the county of Oahu prohibiting the exposure of gambling implements in a room barred so as to make it difficult of access when three or more persons are present, or the visiting of such a room so barred under such circumstances, and to take jurisdiction of such a charge, — the said respondent having refused to issue such warrant or take such jurisdiction solely on the ground that he had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of any ordinances made by said board of supervisors.
The question that presents itself first is whether it is in the power of the legislature to authorize county boards of supervisors to make ordinances of the kind in question. There can be no doubt that such authority may be conferred upon cities and other municipal corporations proper. It is conceded for the purposes of this case by counsel for the respondent that such
It is not usual to give such power to counties. In a number of states in which it has been given, it has been under express constitutional provisions. See County of Los Angeles v. Eikenberry, 131 Cal. 461; State v. Forest County, 74 Wis. 610; People v. Baker 29 Barb. 81; Feek v. Township Board, 82 Mich. 399; Board of Commissioners v. Abbott, 52 Kan. 148 (34 Pac. 416). In some states the constitution grants the power directly, in others it authorizes the legislature to grant it. In either case, however, the fact that the grant is made or authorized by the constitution does not necessarily show that it could not be made by the legislature in the absence of express constitutional authorization. This is apparent when, as is the case in some states, the constitutional provision covers not only counties but also cities and other municipal corporations proper, as to which there can be no doubt of the power of the legislature irrespective of express constitutional authorization. So, when the constitutional provision itself makes the grant, it may be explained on the theory that it was deemed best not to leave discretion in the legislature to withhold the grant. In other cases the constitutional provision may have been inserted out of abundant caution. There is room for argument that such authority, in the nature of constitutional authority, is implied from the language of Section 56 of the Organic Act, which authorizes the Territorial legislature to “provide for the government” of, as well as “create counties and town and city municipalities.” We will proceed, however, as if the words first quoted from this section did not add in this respect to the powers of the legislature implied from the words last quoted.
Counties doubtless have not inherent or implied power, as municipal corporations proper have, to make by-laws, but even in the case of municipal corporations proper the power to make police ordinances of the kind in question, as distinguished from mere by-laws relating to the internal management of the corpor
No case has come to our attention which holds that the legislature may not without express constitutional authorization empower a county to make ordinances. The difficulty arises not so much from decisions against the proposition as from lack of* decisions in support of it and the uncertainty as to the precise reasoning upon which the question should be decided. There are indeed general expressions in both text books and decisions-to the effect that power to make ordinances may be delegated to-“other municipal corporations” or “quasi corporations” as well as to cities and towns, and also decisions that seem to take it. for granted that such power may be so conferred. See Ingersoll,, Pub. Corp., Sec. 19; HcQuillin, Mun. Ord., Secs. 38, 90; Commonwealth v. Turner, 1 Cush. 493; State v. Noyes, 30 N. H. 279; Haigh v. Bell, 41 W. Va. 19 (31 L. R. A. 131; Forsyth v. City of Hammond, 71 Fed. 443. For instance, in Dunn v. Wilcox Co., 85 Ala. 144 (4 So. 661), the court, referring to-a particular provision in the constitution, said: “It was not. intended to prohibit the delegation to counties of the quasi legislative powers commonly exercised by them as government or auxiliary agents of the state, and for local purposes. ^ '* This would defeat, rather than promote, that peculiarly American feature of Eepublican government, which is one of decentralization, The primary and vital idea of which is that local, affairs shall be managed by local authorities.’ ”
This brings us to the question of the principles upon which? the question should be solved. It is a fundamental rule- that delegated power cannot be delegated. This applies to legislatures as well as to other bodies. Legislative power delegated, to legislatures cannot be delegated to other persons or bodies. There is, however, an exception to this maxim as well established as the maxim itself. This exception arises by implica
The county act now in question provides, in subdivisions 1 and 8 of Section 9 (Laws of 1905, Act 39), “that each county shall be a body corporate and politic” and is subject to “sue and be sued in its corporate name.” It confers upon counties various corporate functions. The act 'as a whole was passed for the purpose of establishing, as far as it went, local government, although theoretically the counties established by the act may properly be considered as quasi corporations rather than municipal corporations proper.' The act 'also confers upon the boards of supervisors certain legislative powers other than that now in question, as, for instance, (Sec. 62, Subd. 1), “to fix the salaries of all county officers, not herein otherwise provided for.” This is a delegation of power which is generally held valid elsewhere except when expressly prohibited by constitutional provision.
The case of a territory of the United States is somewhat analogous. The rule that delegated power cannot be delegated applies to Congress as well as other legislative bodies, as has been held repeatedly. Territories, moreover, are not municipal corporations proper, but, as was said in National Bank v. County of Yorktown, 101 U. S. 129, “their relation to the gen
On the whole we are of the opinion that the legislature could delegate to the county boards of supervisors power to make ordinances relating to certain matters of local concern.
Power has been conferred expressly by the county act (Sec. 62, Subd. 5) upon the board of supervisors of each-county,
“5. To regulate by ordinance within the limits of the county, all local police, sanitary and other regulations not in conflict with the general laws of the Territory, or rules and regulations of the Territorial board of health, and fix a penalty for the violation of' such ordinances.”
This is sufficient authority for the enactment of an ordinance of the kind in question. Gambling is one of the subjects as to which power to make ordinances may be delegated. See State v. Carpenter, supra.
The language of this authority is open to criticism, for in terms it is an authority to “regulate * * * regulations,” which, construed strictly, would not make good sense and would apply only to regulations already in existence, but the intention is so clear that we may well construe “regulate” as “make.” See Shillaber v. Waldo, 1 Haw. 40; Republic v. Waibel, 11 Id. 226; Hall & Son v. Dickey, 15 Id. 593; Mankichi v. Hawaii, 190 U. S. 197.
Moreover, we do not understand that this statutory provision authorizes the board of supervisors to impose imprisonment as a penalty, although as to that we are not required to decide, for the ordinance, which imposes a fine not exceeding $500 or imprisonment for not more than six months or both, may stand even if the part relating to imprisonment is void. Of course the penalty, whatever its character, should be reasonable in amount, and it is usual for statutes to specify both the character and the maximum amount that may be prescribed by the ordinance. This statute does not specify either. It is generally
The enacting clause of the ordinance also is invalid. It reads : “The people of the county of Oahu do ordain as followsThe power to make ordinances is conferred upon the board of supervisors and not upon the people of the county. But this does not invalidate the ordinance, for it did not have to contain any enacting clause, and the petition and return show that it was •in fact made by the board of supervisors.
The next question is whether the proceeding to enforce the ordinance is civil or criminal and within the jurisdiction of a district magistrate. The respondent contends that the proceeding is civil, that the county act doe's not confer jurisdiction of cases under county ordinances upon district courts, that the jurisdiction of such courts, of inferior and limited jurisdiction, should be strictly construed and that the board of supervisors could not either create a court or confer jurisdiction upon one or make an act a misdemeanor. The ordinance in question purports to make a violation of it a misdemeanor and to confer jurisdiction of offenses arising under it upon all district magistrates within the county. We will assume that these portions of the ordinance are void or surplusage, as they doubtless are. The question is whether a violation of the ordinance is a criminal offense and whether jurisdiction over it has been conferred upon the respondent, not by the ordinance itself, but by the-laws of the Territory, including the county act. Whether violations of municipal ordinances are of a criminal or civil nature,
“The county attorney is the public prosecutor for the county in which he shall have been elected and he, or his deputy shall:
“1. Attend the circuit court in and for said county and conduct on- behalf of the people all prosecutions therein for offenses-against the laws of the Territory of Hawaii and the ordinaneesof the board of supervisors of the county.”
This shows an intention on the part of the legislature that' at least some violations of some ordinances of boards of supervisors were to be offenses to be jmosecuted as such by the public-prosecutor and on behalf of the people, in other words, that they were to be considered criminal or public offenses. If any such violations are to be regarded as such offenses, those now in.question are certainly among them. Moreover, offenses against' ordinances are classed with offenses against laws, as if both were: of the same character.
If, as we hold, the violation of this ordinance is a criminal offense it would be within the jurisdiction of a district magistrate under Sec. 1664 of the Pevised Laws, which provides that;
It is suggested, however, that the first subdivision of section '90 of the county act above quoted gives exclusive jurisdiction Tinder county ordinances to the circuit courts. Subdivision 3 «of the same section has some bearing upon this question. It reads thus:
“3. Institute proceedings or direct the sheriff or deputies to ■do so before the magistrates for the arrest of persons charged with or reasonably suspected of public offenses, when he has information that any such offenses have been committed; and ■for that purpose take general charge of criminal ca’ses in the district courts either in person or by the sheriff, deputy sheriff «or such other prosecuting officer as he shall appoint; attend Tipon the magistrates in case of arrest; and attend before and •give advice to the grand jury whenever cases are presented to ■them for their consideration; provided, however, thát nothing Iherein contained shall prevent the institution or conduct of •proceedings by private counsel before magistrates under the direction of the county attorney.”
Eeading these subdivisions (1 and 3) together it is apparent that the circuit courts were not intended to have exclusive ■jurisdiction of offenses against ordinances. The fact that ordinances were mentioned in the first subdivision and not in the third would not show that the circuit courts were to have exclusive jurisdiction of offenses under them any more than the fact that the laws of the Territory were mentioned in the first sub
Apparently it w'as the intention to prosecute the case before the district magistrate in the name of the county. In our opinion it should be prosecuted in the name of the Territory.
Section 11 of the Organic Act provides that, “The style of all process in the Territorial courts, shall hereafter run in the name of ‘The Territory of Hawaii,’ and all prosecutions shall be carried on in the name and by the authority of the Territory of Hawaii.” In Brownville v. Cook, 4 Neb. 101, it was held that a somewhat similar provision applied to prosecutions under ordinances as well as to those under state laws. But the correctness of this decision has been questioned (1 Dillon, Mun. Corp., Sec. 424, note 1) and several other courts have held that provisions of this kind do not apply to prosecutions under ordinances, so as to render void statutes or ordinances that provide expressly that such prosecutions shall be in the name of the municipality, although possibly the cases which so hold are distinguishable from the present case. See Davenport v. Bird,
As we construe it, the county act in question contemplates that such prosecutions shall be in the name of the Territory rather than in the name of the county, and in view of the law as above set forth upon this general subject but little is required to show such an intention. Not only are violations of ordi
Under all the circumstances shown by the petition and return, which need not be set out in full, we are of the opinion that the district magistrate should not be required to take any particular action, but that he should be required to take jurisdiction of the case and, if necessary, a writ may issue requiring him to do so.
Concurrence Opinion
CONCURRING.
The question of the power of the legislature to authorize counties as well as town and city muiiicipalities “To regulate by ordinance within the limits of the county all local police, sanitary and other regulations not in conflict with the general laws of the Territory” involves consideration of important elementary principles. The maxim, Delegata potestas non potest delegari, that an “agent cannot lawfully nominate or appoint another to perform the subject matter of his agency” unless power of substitution is given, applies not only to transactions between principal and agent but to Congress and legislative bodies generally. Public attention is now directed to the question whether, assuming that Congress has constitutional power to enact laws regulating railway rates, it can delegate to an executive board the power to make rates from time to time, according to changing conditions.
Grammatically the words “provide for the government thereof” may refer to counties as well as to town and city municipalities.
“It is true that, in strict grammatical construction, the relative ought to apply to the last antecedent; but there are numerous examples in the best writers to show, that the context may often require a deviation from this rule, and that the relative may be connected with nouns which go before the last antecedent, and either take from it or give to it some qualification. * * Suppose, for example, this phrase * * ‘If there be any powers or provisions of an act of Parliament, of which the corporation are sole commissioners for executing,’ — is it not obvious here that the relative ‘which’ refers to the powers and provisions,’ and not to the ‘act of Parliament ?’ ” Abinger, C. B., Staniland v. Hopkins, 9 M. & W. 191.
It is not true that historically it is generally towns and cities rather than counties which have regulated their own affairs, although the powers of counties have more frequently been defined by general laws of the state, and restricted to administration of state laws, making them mere agencies of thp state.
The student readily ascertains that the New England town is the administrative unit, as it is called, governed by its town meeting representing an intermediate stage between the munici
“A municipal corporation proper is created mainly for the interest, advantage and convenience of the locality and its people; a county organization is created almost exclusively with a view to the policy of the state at large, for purposes of political organization and civil administration, in matters of finance, of education, of provision for the poor, or military organization, of the means of travel and transport, and especially for the general administration of justice.” 1 Dillon, Mun. Corp., Sec. 23, citing Hamilton Co. v. Mighels, 7 Oh. St., 109.
It would also be incorrect to confine legislative power to grant local government to towns and cities by reason of their inherent powers of self control, meaning powers which, when left free to do so, they have been used to exercising.
Delegating to towns and cities a restricted and limited power to govern themselves cannot be based upon the theory that the inhabitants of those corporate bodies are merely allowed to resume original powers in that regard.
Nor can any distinction be based upon the fact that counties are usually created solely by legislative enactment with topographical limits and without consulting the wishes of those Avho dAvell within those limits Avhile toAvns and cities are a groAvth and usually are voluntary corporations requiring for their incorporation the consent of the inhabitants. History shows that these organizations are formed or come into existence in various ways.
Moreover, if counties h'ad always originated in one way and towns and cities in another, that fact Avould furnish no reason for restricting the power of local government to the latter. In any point of vieAv then, I see no reason for excluding from
It will be seen that the foregoing discussion assumes that providing a government for towns and cities means providing for their self government, the argument being that as counties are classed in the same sentence with town and cities the intention is to grant to them like powers, as far as by the nature of those organizations is practicable.
I fully concur in the opinion of the court and in the decision.