*1 RIVERA, Appellant, Terri CENTER RESOURCE
WOODWARD Iowa, Appellees.
and State
No. 11-1784. of Iowa.
Supreme Court
May *2 (ITCA).
dеr the Iowa Tort Claims Act Initially, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs State failing for to first exhaust administrative remedies under the Act. She subsequently filed a second action in district six of the months dismissal of the first action and more than two time the action accrued but within six months of the dismissal of an administra- tive which was filed under the Act within six months after the dismissal first tort action. The district court held plaintiff comply failed to statute of limitations and dismissed On appeal, second lawsuit. we transferred the court appeals. case to court of appeals reversed the decision review, court. On further we vacate the decision of the court appeals, court, judgment reverse the district and remand case for further proceed- ings. We conclude the second lawsuit filed by plaintiff satisfied the limitations under the Background I. Facts and Proceed- ings.
Terry employed Rivera was at Center, Resource Woodward a home for administered De- disabled the Iowa partment Human Services. She was from her employment terminated on Octo- 3, 2006, after allegedly ber she reported Zwagerman Jill P. O’Neill Bryan M. supervisor her that another en- employee P.L.C., Firm, of Newkirk Law Des gaged in conduct. abusive Moines, appellant. a wrongful discharge Rivera filed Miller, General, J. Attorney Thomas Jef- Sep- the State in district court on Attorney frey Thompson, Deputy S. Gen- tember 2008. She claimed she eral, E.B. Galloway, Meghan Bаrbara discharged public violation of policy. Gavin, General, L. Assistant Attorneys for The moved to State dismiss the action appellees. failing to exhaust administrative remedies required ITCA. Rivera did CADY, Chief Justice. file an lawsuit, appeal, plain- believing prior must decide tiff required proceed satisfied statute of limitations un- she was not Rivera was not 669.13. based because her be- action was asserted her grant- The district court injury.
personal in section cause the clause found 10 and dis- on November ed the motion *3 669.13(2) her to file the lawsuit permitted case. It held the was missed by of the denial six months and that Rivera was subject to the Act tort of her administrative appeals state board pursue under thе ITCA required she filed within six months of which law- claim before her administrative her time the district court dismissed in district court. See original present to first failing lawsuit 669.2(3)(a) (2007) (defining a “claim” un- § her claim the state board. The appeals Act); (identifying § 669.5 id. der district court found procedural requirements to administrative applied improvidently filed claims not Act). be followed ITCA, brought and the ap- filed claim with state Rivera activated when the district court not 16, On on November 25. June peals board original her lawsuit un- dismissed 2009, claim.1 the board denied Rivera’s exhaust her failing der the Act for 8, her July Rivera filed lawsuit On remedies. The district time. In its an- district court second court the motion granted to dismiss. swer, many the State of Rivera’s denied and appealed, Rivera we transferred the interposed a number of allegations appeals. ease to the court of of defenses, including affirmative appeals reversed the decision of the dis- limitations and failure to exhaust admin- trict It concluded the remedies. istrative and the applied moved subsequently The State for sum- filed. Riv- gave It found section It claimed Rivera failed mary judgment. era six to file her lawsuit after months her within two to file appeals state board denied her administra- pursuant to tive sought, the time the action accrued claim.2 State we granted, further review. two-year period statute of limitations 2006, argued 2. The also that Rivera’s termi 1. Prior to administrative claims under State wrоngful were not and was not in viola the ITCA filed with considered nation was any public policy. appeals The State was the state board. Iowa Code 2006, 669.3, ground argue appeal §§ this on be .5 entitled to ground replace appeals had asserted the in the dis amended Act to cause it court, using although did present with the trict the district court not board scheme 56, State, department management v. 648 N.W.2d 61 director of reach it. DeVoss (Iowa 2002). disagreed, dispose appeals attorney general to The court and the concluding chapter filed under Iowa Code 135C evinces a administrative claims 105, (codi- against discharges public policy §§ Acts clear 2006 Iowa ch. 107 669.3, .5). Additionally, whistleblоwing question §§ and that fact fied at Iowa Code exist governing engaged protect ed as Rivera in a provisions of claims to whether Ctr., longer activity. v. appeals with the state board ed Rivera WoodwardRes. No. no 11-1784, (Iowa 2012 WL at *10 apply to claims ITCA. See However, 25.1(1) (2007). Ct.App.2012). Notwithstand- Iowa Code review, pursue ing, in this issue on further and we appeals board case made deny payment do it in this See State v. a “determination to not address decision. (stat (Iowa 2004) Doggett, her to claim” filed Rivera and directed address pursue her claim further under the ITCA.The we have the discretion to issues appli irregu- appeal, in an in this assert raised case does not Instead, review). larity con in thе method Rivera used to file her cation for further Rivera's termi- administrative claim under the ITCA. clude the issue whether 669.2(3)(a). II. Iowa Code Standard of Review. The Act covers all tort state, subject to ruling by We review a the dis exceptions identified the legislature. trict court on a summary motion for judg 669.2(3), .14; §§ see also Drahaus v. ment for legal correction of errors. Wal (Iowa 1998). 584 N.W.2d Indep. lace Des Moines Cmty. Sch. Dist. Generally, tort liability imposed on the Dirs., Bd. state under the same circumstances that 2008); R.App. see also Iowa P. 6.907. A impose liability private on a person. may district court summary enter judg 669.2(3)(a). *4 only genuine ment when no issues of mate Conceptually, the Act “does not rial of fact exist and moving party itself сreate a cause of action.” v. Sanford judgment entitled to as a matter of law. Mantemach, (Iowa 360, 601 N.W.2d 370 1.981(3). See Iowa R. P. Civ. are facts 1999). Rather, ‘merely “[i]t recognizes viewed in the light most favorable to the a remedy for a cause of nonmoving party. v. Lambda Garofalo already existing which would have Alpha Fraternity, 647, Chi 616 N.W.2d otherwise been without remedy because of (Iowa 2000). 649 ” the common law immunity.’ Magers-Fio State, (Iowa v. 672, 555 N.W.2d 674 nof Analysis. III. 1996) (quoting Engstrom State, v. 461 law, 309, (Iowa Under the common 1990)). the State en- N.W.2d 314 “Private' joyed sovereign immunity from suits citizens now have right to sue the sounding State, in tort. Boyer See v. Iowa High ‘but in the manner and to the Ass’n, 337, Sch. Athletic 347-48, 256 Iowa extent to which consent has been given by ” 127 legislature.’ Drahaus, N.W.2d 612 This immuni- 584 N.W.2d at however, ty, 272 partially (quoting Swanger waived our 445 N.W.2d (Iowa 1989)). 346 under the Iowa Tort Claims 669.4; § Iowa Code see also 1965 One of the most prominent condi Iowa Acts ch. (currently codified as tions interposed by the ITCA mandates 669) amended at Iowa Code ch. (adding compliance with an administrative Scheme Act). Now, the Iowa Tort Claims a claim proceedings before may- be initiated may be brought court against the state. Iowa Code 669.3, state of Iowa for money §§ .5. This requires scheme only, on damage account of to or loss of claimant to first file a claim with the di property or personal on account of inju- department rector of the management. ry death, or 669.3(2). negligent caused The claim must then be wrongful act or omission of employ- by-the attorney considered general, who ee of the acting state while within makes a final disposition of the claim be scope of the employee’s office or employ- fore may the claimant sue district court. ment, under 669.3, .5; Fish, §§ circumstances where the See id. McGill v. state, if private person, (Iowa 2010). would be liable N.W.2d 117-18 “Im to the claimant damage, loss, for such proper presentment of a claim ... de injury, or death. prives] subject the district court of matter wrongful nation was ground should be addressed in alternative for affirmance that was the first instance urged district court. See in the district court “remains within (Iowa Phillips, discretion”). Beck v. Accordingly, we vacate this 2004) (confirming that portion whether to reach an appeals court of decision. Voss, writing made and filed with director Estate re jurisdiction.” 1996). management Obviously, department two after ac- prerequisite [the Act]” the central 669.13(1). Accordingly, investi- crued. opportunity to the state an give two-year for the limita- making period time resolve the claim gate and period filing of a written requires resolve the claim. available to the courts 669.3(1). consideration. If a administrative claim is attorney general, a court See id. by the resolved unnecessary. the ITCA action is however, period, A second time to initiate a two-step process requires in the event the governs step the second in tort. The first against the state provide two-year period limitation does claim for administra- step is to submit the enough to file a lawsuit after the time 669.3(1), §§ id. .5. tive consideration. See disposition of file the step is to The second time to step normally requires The first process the administrative *5 complete attorney general the because is § claim. See id. 669.5.
fails to resolve the fully to evaluate the claim. See directed play two come into in con- steps These 669.3(1) attorney gen § (requiring id. the pe- with of limitations junction “consider, ascertain, adjust, eral com to the bring to a lawsuit state riod settle, determine, and allow promise, of limitations a tort. The еxclusive statute claim”). essentially Act the gives at provides: under the Act make torney up to six months to general permitted 669.5(1). claim or suit otherwise [A] § final See If disposition. id. chapter under this shall forever attorney general the has not made final barred, the months, unless within two after the determination six accrued, the claim is made in writ- pro may claimant withdraw the claim and filed the director of the ing and bring ceed a lawsuit in district court this department management disposition. final Id. Additional without a chapter. begin The time to suit under ly, a is not to file a permitted claimant chapter peri- this shall be extended for a pending com lawsuit the date mail- od of six months from review. pletion of the administrative by of notice to the claimant 445-46 Bensley v. the final attorney general disposi- (Iowa 1991). as to Thus, to accommodate the tion of claim or from date of essentially the Act process, withdrawal of the claim under section complete time imposes period a second 669.5, if the begin time to suit would by initiation of expire otherwise before the end of the peri petition in district court. This time period. disposition final od is six months by attorney general or from the with 669.13(1); § id. Id. see also by the claim the claimant. drawal of only is (providing provision that 669.13(1). applicable limitations Act). defined under the Importantly, the statute also contains a when a Thus, for those instances the statute of limitations сontem- clause as a tort originally pursued not plates segmented periods a series of time Act, under the but was of an A govern that timeliness action. Act, agen- a state outside “permitted” claim or lawsuit under the proceeding in that determined cy “the or court is “forever barred” unless 26, 2008, provided remedy “the exclusive tember the savings the ITCA 669.13(2). the claim.” Section applies “claims,” to administrative 669.13(2)provides: lawsuits. The State relies heavily on lan- guage opinion from our a claim Drahaus
If is made or “pointing] provisions out that various law of this state and a determina- chapter 669 ... draw a tion is made a state or court distinction between claim, action, chapter this terms and suit.” 584 remеdy two-year peri- Essentially, for the N.W.2d at 274. argues “claim” od authorized in 1 to make is what filed with an subsection administra- begin body, claim and to a suit under this tive Additionally, not a court. chapter shall for a period that, be extended of State asserts even the savings date of lawsuits, six months from the the court applies the lawsuit filed making order such determination Rivera on September involved mailing date of notice the claimant a tort claim State. Conse- such agency, determination quently, argues the lawsuit was if the time to the claim make and to Act, filed under the law not under begin the suit would law, another because expire otherwise end of the waive its “under immunity any other law” two-year period. othеr than the State claims the first two of the savings elements were not this case. satisfied in *6 essentially savings imposes The clause a period two-year peri- third limitation if Generally, a purpose “[t]he of provide fails to time to enough od make an savings prevent statute is to minor or tech begin administrative claim and a lawsuit nical precluding mistakes from a plaintiff a court agency after or has determined day from obtaining having his court and remedy the exclusive for the that claimant his claim decided on merits.” Furnald provided for under the Act. The two- Hughes, period limitation “make a claim step to 2011). It been long recognized has that: begin a to suit under the is extend- [Act]” period a savings [A ed for of six months from the broad and clause’s] time liberal purpose by determination be away that is not to frittered remedy. vides exclusive Id. Accord- narrow The impor- construction. that, three be tant ingly, by invoking elements must met before consideration is aid, savings judicial litigant gives timely clause will extend the statute notice (1) present limitations: “claim” to adversary must be his to filed, (2) or must rights made the claim be made maintain his before the courts. a law of other than this state York, City Gaines v. New 215 N.Y. (3) chapter agency an or court (1915). Yet, 109 N.E. while we must make a determination that that observed in Fumald “arcane plead- remedy is the for the exclusive ing” deprive rules plaintiffs should id. All three elements must be satis- obtaining dispute a rеsolution fied. merits, on the also acknowledged the savings State claims courts should not construe clauses apply case to predicate does because the swallow the statute of limita- only timely by Although Rivera was tion. 804 it is N.W.2d at merits, important court cases on the Sep- on decide “claim,” meaning enough and this is broad policy that the behind important
is also a lawsuit. include ensure trials oc- statute of limitations —to fresh and are nontesti- cur when witnesses This accord with interpretation be available—not evidence is still monial written of a law review article observations Thus, savings gener- statutes are Indeed, lost. shortly passage. after the Act’s liberally and are ally regarded as remedial attorney general as the assistant special for trials the mer- provide construed wrote: claims division its, always must proper balance against suit was commenced [I]f policies of competing struck between under some other agency and the statute of limitations that the State and the determined [Chapter provided statute. See id. 669] remedy, a claim could reject argument the State We made the State seemingly be does not apply that the provision limitation had not Act’s can Obviously, a claim be distin- lawsuits. expired agency when the suit Drahaus, from a suit. guished Cf. was commenced. (distinguishing N.W.2d at 274-75 between Bennett, R. Handling Don Tort Claims “claim, action, and suit” the terms as used Part Agаinst and Suits Iowa: “action” in in the Act the term I, 17 Drake L. Rev. 198-99 (emphasis Procedure omit- Rule Civil of the sav- imagined example author’s ted)). Yet, claim also exists within a suit, not ings operation clause’s involves a lawsuit, approach taken and we believe merely an administrative claim. See id. legislature under section 669.13 re- un- Admittedly, the statute of limitations applies broadly veals 669.13(1) uses “a phrase der section state, “claim made or filed” suit,” argu- claim or which fuels the State’s either with ment the word used the court. *7 purposes for “claim” in a different context of of limitations. See defining primarily guided We are the defini- Yet, in- § 669.2 Iowa Code 669.2. provided by the tion of word “claim” statutory in the structs that the definitions legislature in the Act. See Iowa Code “unless oth- be used the context must 669.2(3)(u). § We are bound to follow Here, of the requires.” erwise the context statutory and to use them to definitions term savings require does not the clause interpretive the of our build foundation a meaning “claim” to take on different Waal, v. Vander analysis. Zimmer the.statutory definition. 2010). Under Act, a legislature defined “clainT’.in legislature It is that the understandable right, desig- context of a substantive not a utilized the “claim” and generally terms sought from an nation relief adminis- Immunity “suit” the Act. is abro- agency. trative See only by utilizing gated for claimants 669.2(3)(a). 669.2(3)(a) specifi- Section an adminis- two-step process submitting ’ “ provides a means ... cally ‘[c]laim that law- instituting trativé a tort claim money ... [a]ny against the state in against the state by Yet, ... damage capture ... on account of caused savings serves .the' ... out- negligent against ... act ... ” Id.; 669.2(3)(6). these claims state.... also id. side the Act and redirect see Thus, court” legal agency “claim” into the Act once “a state term means provides legislature ruled the Act reason for the has to restrict 669.13(2). Thus, remedy. “a claim” remedial the savings effect .of savings context of the clause does exclude actions that would not ad- require a distinction between adminis- versely impact purposes of the statute claims, as in the trative claims and court more limitations than another elaim limitations, proce- statute becausе saved under the clause. within the Act for a claimant to dures proceed to consider ques- immunity have come into abrogate yet the savings whether captures when a
play agency or court has the situation in this case in which plain- determined the Act the exclusive tiff filed lawsuit Moreover, remedy for the claim. the in- tort, based on a but did not file the claim terpretation by severely the State would procedures under the set out in the ITGA. scope savings limit of the inquiry This considers the second element It clause. would limit the clause those of the clause that the claim be might pur- which a tort victim instances made or filed “under other law of this sue a before a state outside state.” Act аnd would exclude a first primarily The State relies opinion on our in district court. case, Bensley. estates can interpretation of a statute al- three decedents initiated a tort claim reach ways different results an ambi- when state, alleging the negligent statute, guity exists there is no highway maintenance caused the reason explain solid offered in this case death of the decedents. Bensley, 468 why the would have intended to N.W.2d at 444. The claims accrued a savings rarely enact clause that would 4, 1983. February Id. The estates Zimmer, misguided litigant. save filed an administrative claim with the state Considering N.W.2d at 733. the pur- appeals board on June at 1984. Id. of the statute poses of limitation following day, 444-45. The the estates clause, purposes there is no filed suit state in district court justification for distinguishing between ad- based on the same claims filed with the ministrative claims and court claims within board, they believing simply could defer purposes clause. The proceeding on lawsuit until the admin limitations are not better served proceedings complete. istrative were by limiting adminis- clause to *8 later, at 445. five Approximately months sure, policy trative claims. For rejected the the administrative to be applies decided on the merits claims, notified two of the estates. equally to claims before an An in irregularity mailing prevented Id. Finally, is a reme- the clause, receiving third estate notice. Id. dial and we the must consider con- The 1984 lawsuit was then dismissed sequences of the interpretations. various 9, 1987, the on March Dohlman, district court be (Iowa 2006). cause it had been filed before the adminis a savings need for exhausted, trative were re under the Act remedies appear would to be quired under the ITCA. Id. The greatest plaintiffs the for claimants the pursue who then lawsuit in litigation by filing usual course of the of a filed a second district court May was lawsuit the state without under- which dismissed standing summary in to a special response need to exhaust motion for statutory procedure. simply There no judgment two-year is as barred stat- 669.5; 445 N.W.2d Swanger, limitations. from the appeal Id. On
ute of proce- exhaustion order, argued (recognizing at 349-50 plaintiffs dismissal In- “any requirements jurisdictional). under filed in dural stead, law state,” filed her claim as a common the dismissal she of this other law Notwithstanding, extended action in district court. therefore the lawsuit alleged a argues six claim period for the State Rivera’s of limitations necessarily and it Id. at clause. months under “claim” under within the definition of a fell 446. way, In asserts the Act. under the We held 26, 2008, con- September filed on petition period. not the limitation did extend Act, even filed under stituted requirement Id. at 446. We relied on procedure Rivera did not follow the though that a the clause of the second element of Act, the re- and it fell outside law and claim be filed under other of the element for quirement second “does for an exten- concluded it not allow claim to be filed “under other when sion of the of limitations the state.” Act].” initial suit is filed under [the the estates of the decedents The statute lend itself to does not received notice of the denial of administra- Obviously, any reading. narrow such a were the two- tive claims barred under course of a court or an in the agency, time suing un- year statute of limitations from pro litigation brought independent sav- the ITCA the six-month der because ITCA, requirements of the deter cedural the dismissal ings apply clause did not to reme the Act the exclusive mines brought prematurely of the first lawsuit dy brought by plaintiff, for the claim words, the Act. Id. In the first actually in the brought litigation ITCA, brought lawsuit was under the permitted brought to be a tort Accordingly, another law of this state. view, the sav the Act. Under State’s savings clause the second element of the clause would never serve to save ings was not satisfied. Id. who the claim out claimant ITCA, but failed to understand Bensley support side appears
While clause, under the the claim needed State’s narrow view of the view is it under fact case that is Act. This so restrictive one critical exists the main Bensley, in this mines present case. deny missteps from actually prevent procedural their claims under plaintiffs claimant an to have opportunity tort claims requires ITCA. on its strive by first claim decided merits. We be filed consistently with their plaintiffs interprеt statutes precisely which what Dohlman, at Bensley. Additionally, purpose. the estates Bensley they had acknowledged that Rivera correctly The State observes *9 law- ceeded under the in wrong- have her claim for should original See id. at suit. . under For more discharge ful the ITCA. “under lawsuit was not claim filed twenty-five years, have considered than law of the state.” Id. wrongful in violation discharge a claim for tort case, policy to intentional public not file her claim of be an Rivera did See, Liberty Hold- e.g., Berry in under v. set out her 2008 lawsuit (Iowa Inc., 106, Act, 109-10 ings, needed to 803 N.W.2d ITCA. To file under the she 2011) (describing plaintiff must proof claim. See first file an administrative
733
on an
tort
prevail
grounds
intentional
dismissed
“[t]o
offer
other than the mer
its).
discharge
employ-
of
from
wrongful
public
in
policy”);
ment
violation of
Davis
Additionally,
phrase
“under
(Iowa
Horton,
538,
v.
661 N.W.2d
535
any other law of this state” does not limit
2003) (same);
&
v.
Leo
Springer Weeks
savings
statute to claims originally
1988)
Co.,
(Iowa
(“We
429 N.W.2d
brought under another
statute of this
believe
cause of action should exist for
state. Common law law of
this state as
with
of
tortious interference
the contract
statutory
much
law
law is
of this state.
discharge
hire when the
serves to frustrate
Critelli,
Civil
Iowa
Union v.
Liberties
well-recognized
public policy
defined
(Iowa 1976) (“Al
244 N.W.2d
state.”);
Pulley
also
v.
of
see
Abrisz
though
expressly
part
declared to be
Inc.,
Lines,
Freight
455 law
this state
constitution or
1978)
(Iowa
(mentioning
many
courts
statute, the
alwаys
common law has
been
recognized
recently
have
the intentional
Iowa.”);
recognized as
force in
accord
wrongful discharge
tort
violation of
Peters,
(Iowa
Dier v.
N.W.2d
policy).
public
2012). There would be no reason for our
legislature to
savings
limit the
clause to
Yet,
savings
clause does not contain
recognized by
claims
statute.
Such an
any language
suggest
it is concerned
interpretation would exclude a common
the underlying
reasons for
savings statute,
law tort claim from the
court
proceeding under
ITCA when a
comparative
include a
fault tort claim now
agency subsequently
or
determines
recognized under
chapter 668
the Code.
Act
exclusive
In
remedy.
strained,
impractical,
We seek
“avoid
stead, the
language
savings clause
absurd results” in interpreting statutes.
pur
seeks
determine
the claim was
Revenue,
Iowa
Welp
Dep’t
sued under a law other than the
Act.
1983)
(citation
savings clause does not turn on whether
omitted).
quotation
internal
marks
the claim
have been
under
should
case
savings
This
illustrates how the
Act
because the
constituted a
operate by
clause was intended to
state.
important
tort
legislature.
Rivera
filed her claim
point
under the
clause is that the
against the State in district court under
first claim
Act
was not
under the
governing
statute
limitations
when
should have been filed
in Iowa. The
claims
ultimate-
Act, and the only reason the first action
determinеd, however,
ly
was sub-
was dismissed
because the
provid
Act
ject to
the ITCA and dismissed
remedy.
If
ed
the first ac
failing to
exhaust the administrative
reason,
dismissed
some other
required
remedies as
under the Act. The
as the
such
limitations otherwise
gave
clause of the
then
Rivera
Act, see,
applicable
the absence of the
six months
that determination to
e.g.,
(requiring
ac
ceed under
personal
injury
tions for
accrual),
Accordingly,
within two
we hold the
669.13(2) applies
clause would not save the claim
both to
Furnald,
third
element of the clause. See
claims made before a
(recognizing
pur
claim is 669. chapter derlie the Act. This under steps required cedural proper balance strikes interpretation provides: Section 669.13 goals and the stat- purpose between provided 1. as in section Except of a savings those of limitations and ute 614.8, permit- claim or suit otherwise of a statute The clause. chapter ted this shall be forever under effi- the timeliness and promote not to barred, within two after the unless lawsuits, give diligent to but ciency of accrued, the claim is made writ- have litigants opportunity an mistaken with and filed the director the merits. More- claims decided on depаrtment management under this over, does not choose statute chapter. begin The time to a suit under will be saved under the those claims that peri- for a chapter this shall extended that will not be saved and those of mail- od of six months the date judgment on by passing under to the ing of notice claimant may attorney or claimant the reason disposi- the final attorney general mistakenly to utilize the admin- have failed the claim or from the date of under the Act in first procedures istrative of the claim under section withdrawal Courts should not pursuing claim. 669.5, time to begin if the suit would to exclude a class of limit a expire before the end of the otherwise a class of cases. simply cases exclude period. 2. claim is or filed under If a made
IV. Conclusion. this state and deter- agency made mination is a state or complied the sav- properly Rivera chapter the ex- court that this clause once the district court deter- ings remedy for two- clusive provided mined year period authorized in subsection to her We vacate the deci- remedy for claim and to a suit under begin make a appeals of the court of reverse sion peri- this shall be extended for a chapter judgment the district od six months from the date OF COURT OF AP- DECISION making determination order such VACATED; PEALS DISTRICT COURT of notice to the mailing the date REVERSED; RE- CASE JUDGMENT by a claimant of such determination MANDED. make if the time to agency, begin claim and to the suit under this justices except All concur MANSFIELD expire would otherwise chapter JJ., WATERMAN, who dissent. two-year period. end of begin chapter a suit time to MANSFIELD, (dissenting). Justice may provided be further extended as I ma- respectfully I believe the dissent. 1. subsection jority misreads section is the statute of This 669.13(2). A common law claim au- claims as de- applicable limitations only by thorized 669 not a claim chapter. fined in this Based on “any other law.” its stat- 669.13 utory misreading, majority allows this clear, original As makes litigant to roam from court subsection been made again, to court over an incident that claim must have filed or back law of torts is “other law.” common occurred 2006. This undermines *11 law; by chapter jected plaintiffs’ it is law covered argument other that n Fish, 113, 669. See v. of the first suit salvage McGill N.W.2d could their (Iowa 2010) (“[T]he Tort Claims second suit what now [Iowa section n 669.13(2).Id. (ITCA) explained not create a new cause of We that ] did this sec- action, tion that a remedy “requires exist- claim be filed recognized other this state previously possi- causes of action unavailable bility extending the statute of limita- sovereign immunity.”). because of The tions exists.” Id. The first was not dissenting judge appeals on the court of such a claim. Id. point very cogently. makes this Riv- See Ctr., 11-1784, era v. Woodward Res. No. Bensley, In we say that the first suit 5536117, *11 Ct.App. WL at was under chapter “filed 25A [now 2012) 15, (Eisenhauer, C.J., Nov. dissent- 669].” Id. But as the has State demon- times, ing). At all Rivera’s was lawsuit (as here), strated, Bensley in the petition money only, of Iowa for State simply brought was as a common law ac- (i.e., property employ- on account of loss without reference the ITCA. ment), wrongful caused of em- act Such a we in Bensley, concluded was ployees acting scope state “any not a claim finder law.” In other Id: employment. of their office or short, Bensley indicates that to take ad- 669.2(3)(a). No legal Code basis 2, vantage plaintiff of subsection must for an action was asserted. .have asserted some basis other than the common law of torts for initial view,
In my majority decision is contrary Bensley majority disregards also the context (Iowa 1991). There, in which section 669.13 a fatal .car аcci- was enacted. His- 1983, 4, torically, the rule February sovereign immunity dent on a occurred on protected Everyone state from highway. Bensley, at suit. Bennett, 28, 1984, Handling knew that. See Don R. 444. On June three estates filed Against State Tort Claims and Suits appeal alleging claims with the state board I, Iowa: Part 17 Drake L. Rev. negligent that the state’s maintenance 189,189 (1968) (“Pri- [hereinafter Bennett]' highway caused deaths. passage or to the Iowa Tort Claims Act 29, day, next without for a waiting June maxim King that ‘the can do board, response appeal from the the es- wrong’ prevailed no No tort action Iowa. tates could be maintained the State or district at 445. On November (footnote omitted)). agencies.” its two of were the estates notified appeal board that had been fanfare, great all that was denied. 444-45. Id. at Over two when the changed general assembly later, 9, 1987, on March adopted Acts ch. 79 the ITCA. 1965 Iowa dismissed the estates’ first Id. at lawsuit. (currently codified as amended at Iowa May 445. On the estates 669). commenced time, legisla- Code ch. At that action, second which district court then ture included section which had sub- also dismissed. Id. wording stantially same today. Compare 669.13 Iowa dismissal, appeal On the latter (1966), with id. 669A13 25A.13 ruled that the second lawsuit properly (cid:127) context, dismissed as to two estates that had Given I cannot this historical received a notice of denial accept majority’s notion subsеc- attorney 1984. Id. at 447. We re- tion 2 specifically designed protect *12 668). According majority, cart in to the those just apple off the ter
who had
fallen
you could not sue
up being
not know
would end
treated differ-
claims
That
at common law.
against
the state for a tort
law tort
ently
common
claims
time, any
reality. At the
practical
defies
brought by
injured party.
state
an
attorneys
protection
need for such
for
point,
This is a nice theoretical
but the
Rather,
quite
have seemed
odd.
would
up.
not back
Section
actual statutes do
it
protect
was to
subsection 2’s
668.10(2)
brought
“In
provides,
against
a
attorney
who
chapter,
state shall
pursuant
this
statutory
some other
state based on
аssigned
be
a
of fault for
percentage
not
sov-
involved a waiver of
scheme that also
con-
party claiming
contribution unless
ultimately
immunity but which was
ereign
of the
given
tribution has
state notice
“[A]ny
other
inapplicable.3
found
be
Thus, a
pursuant
to section 669.13.”
clearly
this
would have been
law of
state”
Rivera,
who,
tortfeasor
like
filed a lawsuit
positive
mean some
law oth-
understood to
against
having complied
without
state
supported
law tort claim
er than
common
tolling
would
no
get
with
669.13
This is
ITCA.
confirmed
fact,
In
would be
benefit.
such claimant
contemporary observer:
totally out of luck because he or she would
against
a tort
was commenced
[I]f
suit
jury
assigning
line in the
have no
verdict
agеncy under some other law of
State
fault to
state on which he or she could
the court determined that
words,
rec-
rely.
Chapter 25A [now
669]
ognized
consistency
the need for
reme-
provided
Iowa Code
that a tortfeasor
walks into
vided
who
made
dy,
seemingly
claim could
against
a contribution claim
if the
against the State
Act’s limitation
state,
complying
the notice
without
expired
when the
provision had
no
requirement, would fare
better than
against
commenced.
ma-
injured party who did
same. The
(foot-
Bennett,
results” under other applied claims
statutes but not common law tort claims. specific example
Their involves claims contribution, which (chap- governed by separate
are enacted, provided couple 3. The of exam- 2 served a State has subsection instance, ples employ- For of such schemes. purpose by protecting individual useful ees of of Iowa have been able to compensation who had a workers' bring compensation workers' it was the state the event past years. See Iowa an inde- later determined the individual was (2013) (predecessor 85.2 codified at pendent contractor. 2477-m(b) (Supp.1913)). When