*1 subject any estate taxes delays estate is to federal of the misrepresentations or filed,” not true. “which have been respondent, according occurred. The respondent’s application remove the testimony, voluntarily his ceased the delinquency estate from the list stated practice of law in 1989. receipt the estate would be closed on of primarily We believe that based on Mr. receipt Iowa inheritance tax and that “all Schooler’s divulge failure to the dual na- necessary closing
other items of the representation, ture of his his intentional done_” respon- estate have been regarding misstatements to the court prepared report dent a final also that stat- proceedings, status of estate and his tacit paid ed that all taxes had been estate and approval of his client’s decision to violate statutory requirements relating that all laws, filing state and federal tax suspen- taxes had been satisfied. These state- justified. sion is ments were not true. Accordingly, it is ordered that Mr. In order to sustain violations of our suspended Schooler practice be from the of code, disciplinary the committee must indefinitely, possibility with no rein- of prove by convincing pre violations period statement for the of year one from ponderance greater of the evidence: a filing suspension of this This weight required than evidence a civil apply practice shall to all facets of the required trial but less than that to sustain Sup.Ct.R. law. Iowa Any ap- See 118.12. a criminal conviction. See Committee on plication for gov- reinstatement shall be Hurd, Ethics & Conduct v. Professional by erned Supreme Court Rule 118.13. 239, (Iowa 1985). 375 N.W.2d We be proceeding Costs of this are taxed to the lieve committee established that respondent. respondent’s acting as creditor and execu LICENSE SUSPENDED. 5-101(A) tor (“Except violated DR with the disclosure, consent of his client after full
lawyer accept employment shall not if the professional
exercise of reasonably
behalf of his client will or be financial, by be affected his own busi
ness, property, personal interests.”) (“A 5-105(B)
DR lawyer prof shall decline employment fered if the exercise of his Patricia TERRELL and Rosie independent professional judgment in be Terrell, Appellants, half of a client likely will be or is to be adversely acceptance affected proffered employment, except to the extent David A. REINECKER and Keen 5-105(D).”). permitted by DR Transport, Appellees. The misstatements as to the status of the No. 89-1962. 1-102(A)(4)(“A estate violated DR lawyer [ejngage Supreme shall not ... in conduct involving Court of Iowa. fraud, deceit, dishonesty, or misrepresenta- 18, March 1992. tion.”). 1-102(A)(5)(“A It also violated DR lawyer [ejngage shall not ... in conduct prejudicial
that is to the administration of
justice.”).
In determining appropriate discipline imposed,
to be we note that financial
harm to the estates was minimal. We un- penalties
derstand that the for failure to timely
file a estate tax return have been This, course,
waived. does not excuse
HARRIS, Justice. appeals court of reversed district arising judgment this tort suit from a collision of motor vehicles. Rever- predicated evidentiary ruling on an sal was testimony investigat- of an which allowed ing ap- officer. We conclude the court of peals decision was correct and hence re- remand. verse and Terrell, Rosie Terrell and Patricia mother daughter, injured their car were when proceeding with a truck in the collided highway direction on an interstate same bridge Mississippi over the River. The ac- shortly cident occurred after the Terrell highway vehicle had entered the interstate merged right-hand lane of and had into the crossing the the two eastbound lanes bridge. The facts of the accident are oth- disputed. erwise The Terrells maintain that the truck was they the inter- them when entered behind highway, passed that the truck then state lane, in the left-hand and that them sideswiped passing or truck them while trying prematurely to return while main- right-hand lane. The truck driver deliberately straddling he tains that of the eastbound lanes because of both load, pass he the Terrell wide did not time, at that the Terrell car failed car entering high- yield the interstate way, car hit the truck and that Terrell entering already while one of the two lanes occupied by the truck. sued the driver and owner
The Terrells
A
a verdict
jury
of the truck.
returned
finding
the truck driver was not at
(The
expressly reach
fault.
did not
at
question
whether the Terrells were
verdict,
fault.)
On the basis of this
district court entered a
favor
appealed
the defendants. The Terrells
judgment.
from this
Anthony
Anthony
Jamison
Jamison
appeals
The court of
reversed the district
Island, Ill.,
Offices,
appel-
Rock
for
Law
appeals
judgment. The court of
court’s
lants.
the district court erred
majority held
investigating
to testi-
permitting an
officer
Waterman,
D. Telleen of Lane &
John
had failed
fy he believed the Terrell vehicle
Island, Ill.,
appellees.
for
Rock
yield.
majority
concluded the offi-
scope
exceeded the
cer’s
appeals
determining
court of
it involved
was correct in
because
statutory vio-
concerning
should have been excluded.
legal conclusion
con-
further review
granted
We
lation.
Although
contend other
defendants
officer’s
admission
sider whether
*3
wise, we cannot find the error was harm
reversible error.
testimony was
jury may
less. The
have relied on a
well
is not
expert
an
witness
general
In
by
belief that the accident was caused
Pa
legal conclusion. Mil
to state a
permitted
yield,
tricia Terrell’s failure to
and done so
(Iowa
523,
Bonar,
529
337 N.W.2d
ler v.
improper
on
of the officer’s
testi
the basis
if a
1983).
somewhat
This rule is modified
mony.
way as to
in such a
legal issue is raised
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS
fact;
necessary operative
become a
AFFIRMED; DISTRICT COURT JUDG-
rule of
legal conclusion is a
however the
AND REMANDED.
MENT REVERSED
judge
applied
the
decision to be
case,
deciding
it is not a
the
except
All Justices concur
ANDREASEN
testimony.
Cen
subject
expert
for
United
LARSON, JJ.,
dissent.
and
who
Kruse, 439
Des Moines v.
tral Bank of
(Iowa 1989).
849, 852
N.W.2d
ANDREASEN,
(dissenting).
Justice
investigating officer testi
Here the
I
Because
believe the term “failure to
opinion Patricia Terrell had
fied that in his
yield”
commonly
descriptive
used
is a
yield
right-of-way
the
to the Rei-
“failed to
meaning, which
phrase
ordinary
with
does
This
does state
necker vehicle.”
conclusion, I
necessarily imply legal
not
a
that Patricia Terrell had
legal
conclusion
respectfully dissent.
statutory duty.
Federal
violated a
See
ago,
an ex
Fifty years
we decided that
61,
Woods, 480 N.W.2d
69
Bank v.
Land
pert
opinion testimony upon the
witness’
(Iowa 1992) (“Legal
pecu
conclusions are
controlling
in a
ultimate fact or
issue
case
to decide and not the
liarly for the court
province
was not an invasion of the
of the
testimony stopped
Although the
jury.”).
jury and was thus admissible. See Gris
occurred, it
stating negligence had
short of
Prods., Co., 232
more v. Consolidated
legal
into the realm of
did extend too far
(Iowa 1942).
328,
431
short,
In
legal
See also
standard
ordi-
663.
where
has
N.W.2d at
giver.
Id. 5
Iowa,
nary meaning, or
made
19
can be
clear
Evidence
Opinion
McCormick
by specific questions,
(1970).
witness
then
245, 259
Drake L.Rev.
testify
allowed
witness should be
has
proposition
The second Grismore
...
should be disallowed
exclude testi
applied
state to
in this
been
carry
does not
ordi-
where
standard
the rules of
mony relating to violations
nary meaning,
not
clari-
and has
been so
Bonar,
See,
337
e.g.,
road.
Miller v.
fied.
1983)
(Iowa
(testimony to ef
N.W.2d 523
Mueller,
D. Louisell & C.
Federal Evidence
by passing
party
violated the law
fect
added)
(1979) (emphasis
(predicating
395
§
zone);
v. Frank
no-passing
in a
Schlichte
704).
admissibility on rule
See also
J.
(Iowa
Trucks, 265
Troy
N.W.2d
lin
*4
Kincaid,
Adams K.
Iowa
Evi-
&
Practice:
1978) (testimony that skid marks indicated
(1988).
n. 7
dence
704.2
§
laws);
speed
v.
the
Bornn
a violation of
opinion
A court which does not ban
on
(Iowa App.1987)
Madagan,
intersection or had (Iowa 1982). There, N.W.2d 62 we allowed right way. testimony ef- reconstruction today sup- find I make the in a statements fect that one of vehicles involved on port recognized traveling seventy in some of the treatises least miles crash was at per evidence: at The manner hour. Id. 64-65. question asked and answer- which the was confusion; Sometimes the fears descriptive purpose ed for a about was convey different informa- conclusion impact, speed time even at jurors lawyers, a danger tion to than though clearly rendered exist there no which does not is legal speed- conclusion that the vehicle expert’s between conflict definition ing. the legal and definition. (1991) I in this case as (em- also see Evidence Weinstein’s 11704[02] added). permitted in Mur- similar to that State v. phasis (Iowa 1990). There, N.W.2d phy, 451 expert witness to state an
we allowed defendant “was under
opinion that the Id. at 155. impaired.”
influence and previously we my opinion that have
It is descriptive, it testimony when was
allowed implied a though it violation of
even my opinion It is legal or a conclusion. proposi- already approved of the
we have today we have an urge now
tions clear
opportunity to make a statement
this issue. presents case almost
Finally, since this presented
identical
Bornn, por- to overrule that I would vote Bornn, approving of
tion of the exclusion
of such evidence. *5 reasons, respectfully dissent.
For these MOINES
WEST DES STATE
BANK, Appellant, MILLS; Mills;
George M. Patricia J. Company, Inc.; Insulation D.G.
Mills
Investments; Carpet; Ed’s Shaw Indus
tries, Inc.; Savings and United Federal Iowa, Appellees.
Bank of
No. 91-324.
Supreme Court of Iowa. 18, 1992.
March