Case Information
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA JEREMY RYAN TERRELL, Case No. 25-cv-04341-LJC Plaintiff, GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING v. IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED CITY OF BRENTWOOD, et al., COMPLAINT; DENYING AS MOOT MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT; Defendants. DENYING REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT Re: Dkt. Nos. 6, 11, 15
Plaintiff Jeremy Terrell sued the City of Brentwood (the City), Officer Dustin Greene, Officer Doug Morrison, and former Officer Ryan Rezentes (the officer Defendants) (collectively, Defendants) in Contra Costa Superior Court, alleging that Defendants violated his civil rights during and after the officer Defendants’ entry into Plaintiff’s home in 2019. ECF No. 1-1.
Defendants removed the case to the Northern District of California and moved to dismiss. ECF Nos. 1, 6. Plaintiff amended his complaint, ECF No. 9, and Defendants renewed their motion to dismiss, ECF No. 11. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s original complaint, ECF No. 6, is denied as moot. For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (FAC), ECF No. 11, is denied in part and granted in part. Defendants’ request to strike portions of Plaintiff’s FAC is denied. Plaintiff’s request for entry of default against the officer Defendants, ECF No. 15, is denied.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND [1]
Plaintiff was arrested for marijuana cultivation in 2010 and was subsequently held in federal custody for two years. FAC ¶ 5. Following his release from custody in 2015, he was placed on five years of federal supervised release, which was terminated early in September 2017 due to his “exemplary conduct and successful reintegration.” Id. During and after his supervised release, Plaintiff lived with his parents in Brentwood, California, and worked as a painter. Id. In April 2019, he was living with his parents, working full time, and saving to buy a house. Id.
Officers Greene, Morrison, and Rezentes of the Brentwood Police Department were on duty early in the morning of April 16, 2019. See FAC at 29. They received a report of a burglary at a gas station convenience store and began searching the surrounding area. Id. Officer Morrison observed a white man in a t-shirt running down a street. The police dispatcher told the officers that Plaintiff, who lived with his parents nearby, was on federal probation. Id. The dispatcher’s description of Plaintiff matched the physical characteristics of the man seen running down the street. Id. The officers approached Plaintiff’s parents’ home at approximately 2:00 am with a police dog, Marco. Id. ¶ 1. They left for several minutes and then returned. Officer Rezentes knocked on the door, Plaintiff’s elderly father answered, and the officers asked where Plaintiff was. Marco was at the door with the officer Defendants, barking. Id. Plaintiff’s father turned to call to Plaintiff (who was sleeping upstairs), and the officers and dog entered the home. Id. The officers “proceeded upstairs to Plaintiff’s locked bedroom, where they ordered him—while nude and disoriented—to open the locked door at gunpoint, handcuffed him, and conducted a search of the room with the K-9.” Id.
Plaintiff’s mother and sister were also present inside the home. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. Plaintiff’s mother initially hid in a closet when the officers entered because she did not know who they were. Id. ¶ 3. She and Plaintiff’s sister were then forced to wait downstairs while the officers searched Plaintiff’s room. ¶ 4.
25
The officers received updated information from the dispatcher and learned that Plaintiff did 26
27
not match the description of the burglary suspect. See id. at 31. They released Plaintiff, apologized to his family, and left the home. Id. ¶ 2.
Plaintiff alleges that the April 2019 police entry “severely impacted [his] mental health and ability to function.” Id. ¶ 5. He lost his job in May 2019, was hospitalized in November 2019 following a psychological crisis, and entered an inpatient psychiatric treatment program in January 2020, where he was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, dissociation, and depression. Id. His “psychological impairments persisted for over five years,” and, during this period, he experienced “trauma-related episodes, including flashbacks, panic, sleep disturbances, and dissociation,” and was hypervigilant and unable to “sleep or feel safe in his own home.” Id. ¶¶ 10, 11. “His mental state rendered him unable to consult legal counsel or initiate litigation” until December 2024. Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiff alleges that it took “years of emotional rehabilitation” for him to reach “a point of psychological stability sufficient to” review the police report and a neighbor’s surveillance footage showing the officers’ entry and “understand the constitutional violations that had occurred.” Id. ¶¶ 6. After the April 2019 incident, Plaintiff’s father requested a copy of the incident report pursuant to the California Public Records Act. Id. ¶ 38. Thomas Hansen, then Chief of the Brentwood Police Department, “denied the request until legally compelled to disclose the report.” Id. In April 2025, Plaintiff submitted a public records request “seeking records of sustained misconduct involving” each of the officer Defendants. Id. ¶ 39. “Records Supervisor Sonia Cardinale, acting on behalf of Chief Tim Herbert” informed Plaintiff that the department had no responsive records for Officer Rezentes. Id. ¶ 40. This was “knowingly false,” as the City had records “relating to at least two violent K-9 deployments” involving Officer Rezentes. Twelve days later, the City disclosed limited records and photographs regarding one of the K-9 deployments, “alongside an excessive volume of irrelevant material.” Id.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff sued the City of Brentwood and Officers Greene, Morrison, and Rezentes in Contra Costa Superior Court on April 9, 2025, alleging that Defendants violated his civil rights under the U.S. and California Constitution. [2] See ECF No. 1-1. Plaintiff served Defendants on April 21, 2025, and Defendants removed the action to federal court one month later on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. See ECF No. 1. Defendants then moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims, arguing that Plaintiff’s state law claims were barred because he had not first presented them as required by the California Government Claims Act and his federal claims were time- barred. ECF No. 6.
Plaintiff timely amended his complaint. See FAC. His First Amended Complaint alleges that the officer Defendants’ April 2019 entry and conduct during the entry violated Plaintiff’s civil rights. Plaintiff asserts that the officers entered his family’s home “without a warrant, without consent, without probable cause, and without exigent circumstance” or any other lawful justification and used excessive force against him when they pointed their firearms at Plaintiff and handcuffed him while he was naked with a police dog present. Id. ¶¶ 19, 24. Plaintiff brings three claims against the officer Defendants: a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claim alleging that the officers violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights (Count One); a claim under California’s Bane Act (Count Three); and a California common law trespass claim (Count Four). Plaintiff also asserts a municipal liability claim against the City pursuant to Section 1983 (Count Two). He alleges that the officers’ conduct during the April 2019 incident was consistent with the City’s “policy and longstanding custom of permitting warrantless entries and excessive force in non-emergency situations, frequently based on unsupported or demonstrably false information provided by dispatch or officers.” Id. ¶ 34. He contends that the City failed to properly discipline officers “with known misconduct histories,” which “enabled the unconstitutional entry into Plaintiff’s home and the excessive, degrading detention that followed.” Id. ¶¶ 41-42. He further alleges that the City had a “municipal practice of obstructing access to police misconduct records” which was “ratified by municipal leadership.” ¶¶ 38, 40.
Defendants renewed their motion to dismiss, in large part reiterating their previous arguments regarding the statute of limitations and government claims requirement. ECF No. 11. They also contend that Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim, Monell liability claim, and Bane Act claim otherwise fail as a matter of law. Id. at 15-18. Defendants request that the Court strike portions of Plaintiff’s FAC ( id. at 19) and that the Court consolidate Plaintiff’s lawsuit filed in Contra Costa Superior Court against the City with the instant action ( id. at 18-19).
After the motion to dismiss was fully briefed, Plaintiff filed a request for entry of default against the officer Defendants, arguing that they had not defended themselves in this lawsuit. ECF No. 15. Defendants opposed his request for entry of default. ECF No. 16.
III. PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT Plaintiff requests that default be entered against the officer Defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a). ECF No. 15 at 2. Rule 55(a) provides, “When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.” To date, the Clerk of Court has not granted or denied Plaintiff’s request for entry of default. Plaintiff argues that the motions to dismiss at ECF Nos. 6 and 11 were filed only by the City and, as the officer Defendants “have not filed an answer, Rule 12 motion, notice of joinder, or any responsive pleading,” entry of default against them is warranted. ECF No. 15 at 2. To Plaintiff’s point, the captions of the motions to dismiss identify the motions as “DEFENDANT CITY OF BRENTWOOD’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS” and the notices of motion state that “the CITY OF BRENTWOOD defendants (‘Defendants’) (‘City’) will, and hereby do, move to dismiss Plaintiff’s” Complaint and FAC. ECF Nos. 6 at 1, 2; 11 at 1, 2. Based on this language alone, there is no indication that the motions were filed by all Defendants. But the docket reflects that the motions to dismiss and Defendants’ reply in support of their motion to dismiss the FAC were filed by “Dustin Greene, Ryan Rezentes, Douglas Morrison, [and] City of Brentwood.” ECF Nos. 6, 11, 14. All Defendants are represented by the same counsel, see ECF No. 11 at 1, and the notices of motion and motions are submitted by the “Attorneys for Defendants CITY OF BRENTWOOD, DUSTIN GREENE, RYAN REZENTES, and DOUGLAS MORRISON.” at 2, 22; ECF No. 6 at 2, 11. And, as Defendants argue, the motions to dismiss “identify defects applicable to all claims and all defendants. The same limitations bar the claims against the officers, and the FAC contains no facts or theories that would justify separate treatment.” ECF No. 14 at 4. The Court accordingly construes the motions to dismiss as being filed by all Defendants.
While the motions to dismiss could have been drafted to more clearly reflect that they were
filed by all Defendants, not just the City, the officer Defendants have otherwise “indicated” that
they “intend to” participate in this lawsuit and “defend against the allegations therein.”
Johnson v.
Chudy
, No. 14-cv-04958,
aside.
See J.M. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc.
, No. 20-cv-00656,
IV. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE AND REQUEST FOR CONSOLIDATION
Defendants request that the Court strike portions of Plaintiff’s FAC pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). ECF No. 11 at 19. Rule 12(f) permits courts to strike “any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter” from pleadings. Defendants seek to strike paragraphs 93-97 and 102 [4] of the FAC. ECF No. 11 at 19. Paragraphs 93-97 pertain to Defendants’ removal of this case to federal court, which Plaintiff characterizes as “improper last minute forum shopping.” FAC ¶ 97. At paragraph 102, Plaintiff alleges: The defense’s posture amounts to: “Yes, this was unconstitutional— but we should escape liability because the victim wasn’t well enough to sue us in time.” That is not justice.…Such conduct undermines public trust and reinforces the very sense of powerlessness that victims of unlawful police action often feel. Defendants argue that these paragraphs must be stricken because they have no bearing on Plaintiff’s claims and serve “only to inflame, distract, and prejudice.” ECF No. 11 at 19. Plaintiff argues that these paragraphs “are relevant to issues of credibility, institutional conduct, and potential Monell liability.” ECF No. 13 at 8 (italics added).
Motions to strike are disfavored,
Platte Anchor Bolt, Inc. v. IHI, Inc.
, 352 F. Supp. 2d
1048, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2004), and “should be denied unless the matter has no logical connection to
the controversy at issue
and
may prejudice one or more of the parties to the suit.”
Hatamian v.
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
, No. 14-cv-00226,
Defendants also appear to request that the Court consolidate Plaintiff’s lawsuit filed in
Contra Costa Superior Court against the City on April 8, 2025, with this action. ECF No. 11 at
18-19 (requesting that the Court exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all related state law
claims and cases and explaining that “consolidating the two cases in this Court would serve
judicial economy”). Plaintiff’s state-court case against the City has been dismissed. Defendants
cite no authority—and the Court is aware of none—that would allow it to consolidate a state court
case with a federal action, let alone a state court case that has been dismissed.
See Or. Egg
Producers v. Andrew
,
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
,
A. The Timeliness of Plaintiff’s Federal Claims
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s federal claims are time-barred as Section 1983 claims have a two-year statute of limitations, and Plaintiff has not pled facts to support delayed discovery of the violations or tolling of the limitations period. Plaintiff brings two causes of action under Section 1983. The first cause of action is brought against the officer Defendants for their conduct on April 16, 2019, alleging that the officers used excessive force and entered Plaintiff’s home without a warrant in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. FAC ¶¶ 17-29. The second is alleged against the City of Brentwood based a municipal liability theory grounded on the City’s purported “policy and longstanding custom of permitting warrantless entries and excessive force in non-emergency situations” and concealment of police records. Id. ¶¶ 34, 38. Plaintiff alleges that equitable tolling is appropriate here because, after the April 2019 incident, he experienced severe “psychological impairments” that made him “unable to view the police report or surveillance footage” and “unable to consult legal counsel or initiate litigation.” Id. ¶¶ 10, 12. He recovered sufficiently by December 2024, reviewed the police report and surveillance footage for the first time in December 2024, and decided to sue. ¶ 13. He requests that the statute of limitations be tolled for the period between April 2019 and December 2024 when he was experiencing severe psychological distress.
“A claim may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that it is barred by the
applicable statute of limitations only when ‘the running of the statute is apparent on the face of the
complaint.’”
Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena
,
There is no universal statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims.
See Owens v. Okure
,
1. Equitable Tolling Under California Law
Plaintiff characterizes his request that the two-year statute of limitations be tolled as one
for “equitable tolling.” FAC ¶¶ 7-8. California’s equitable tolling “doctrine applies when an
injured person has several legal remedies and, reasonably and in good faith, pursues one” rather
than seeking “redress” in multiple forums simultaneously.
McDonald v. Antelope Valley Cmty.
Coll. Dis.
,
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s “complete lack of medical records, declarations, or corroboration” undercuts his claim that he was severely mentally incapacitated. ECF No. 14 at 3. This is beside the point. At this stage in the litigation, the Court accepts Plaintiff’s non-conclusory factual allegations as true.
Plaintiff alleges that the “traumatic and unlawful police intrusion [in April 2019] severely
impacted [his] mental health and ability to function” such that he lost his job by May 2019, was
hospitalized by November 2019, and entered in-patient psychiatric treatment in January 2020.
FAC ¶ 5. Plaintiff does not literally “allege that he was incapacitated at the time the claims
accrued…but…that his mental incapacity came on at some unspecified point
after
the incident”
due to the trauma he experienced during the April 2019 incident.
Avery
,
In addition to alleging that he was incapacitated at the time his claims accrued or as an
immediate result of defendant’s acts, Plaintiff must allege facts to plausibly support his claim that
he was “incapable of caring for his property or transacting business, or understanding the nature or
effects of his acts” for the duration of the tolling period.
Hsu
,
“The standard for pleading continuous lack of capacity under section 352(a) is high.”
Bamforth v. Facebook, Inc.,
No. 20-cv-09483,
Notably, Plaintiff alleges that he worked 1,054 hours in 2021. FAC ¶ 5. His allegation
that he worked in 2021 suggests that he was able to follow a schedule, complete assignments, and
interact with coworkers or supervisors. Tolling under Section 352 only lasts as long as an
individual is incapacitated.
See Est. of Stern
,
Hsu
establishes that “the basic question” under Section 352 “is whether the allegedly
[incapacitated] plaintiff is sufficiently aware of the nature or effects of his acts to be able to
comprehend such business transactions as the hiring of an attorney and the instigation of a legal
action.”
The Court accordingly finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to establish tolling
under Section 352. As Plaintiff alleged that he was able to return to work in 2021, the Court
anticipates Plaintiff will have a difficult path alleging facts showing that he was “incapable of
caring for his property or transacting business, or understanding the nature or effects of his acts”
for all but two years between April 2019 and April 2025.
Hsu
,
3. The Delayed Discovery Rule In the alternative to his argument that the statute of limitations should be tolled, Plaintiff argues that his claims did not accrue until late 2024, which was when “he became mentally capable of recognizing the legal implications of” the facts of his claim. ECF No. 13 ¶ 4.
Although California tolling law applies, federal law applies when determining when a
claim accrues.
Fink v. Shedler,
Plaintiff alleges that even though he was subjected to the allegedly unlawful search in
April 2019, he did not “comprehend the constitutional and statutory injuries arising from the 2019
incident until late 2024, when he was finally able to review the police report and surveillance
footage.” ECF No. 13 at 4. This argument is foreclosed by
Belanus
. “[A] cause of action for
illegal search and seizure accrues when the wrongful act occurs…even if the person does not
know at that time that the search was” illegal.
Belanus
,
Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to show that the statute of limitations for his Section 1983 claims regarding the April 2019 incident should be tolled under California law, and, under federal law, his argument that these claims did not accrue until December 2024 is unavailing. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims regarding the April 2019 incident are therefore dismissed without prejudice as they were untimely when filed, though the Court notes that these claims are dismissed with prejudice to the extent they are grounded on the Fourteenth Amendment. B. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claim Against the Officer Defendants Plaintiff’s first cause of action, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the officer Defendants, asserts that they violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment by entering Plaintiff’s home without a warrant, consent, probable cause, or exigent circumstances, and handcuffing him while naked at gunpoint and with a police dog present. FAC ¶¶ 19, 24. Defendants argue that this conduct is covered by the Fourth Amendment, and Plaintiff cannot advance a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim for government conduct covered by the Fourth Amendment. ECF No. 11 at 16.
“[I]f a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the
Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that
specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.”
United States v. Lanier
, 520
U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997);
see Graham v. Connor
,
C. Monell Liability Claim Plaintiff alleges that the City of Brentwood is liable for the misconduct of its officers as it “has maintained a policy and longstanding custom of permitting warrantless entries and excessive force in non-emergency situations, frequently based on unsupported or demonstrably false information provided by dispatch or officers” and because the officer Defendants’ conduct was the “direct and foreseeable result of the City’s failure to adequately train” or discipline its officers. FAC ¶¶ 33-34. He further claims that the City had a practice of concealing records of police misconduct, which was ratified by the former and current Chiefs of Police. FAC ¶¶ 40, 41. Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not allege facts to plausibly state a claim under any theory of Monell liability. ECF No. 11 at 17.
Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York
,
For the forgoing reasons, the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for Monell liability.
1. Warrantless Entry and Use of Excessive Force During the April 2019 Incident The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s claim that the City is liable for the alleged warrantless
entry and use of excessive force during the April 2019 incident. As an initial matter, the Court
finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to plausibly show that his Fourth Amendment rights
13
16
15
14
18
17
,
Plaintiff contends that the alleged constitutional violations that occurred on April 16, 2019, 20
were a direct result of the City of Brentwood’s “policy and longstanding custom of permitting 21
warrantless entries and excessive force in non-emergency situations.” FAC ¶ 34. Although 22
Plaintiff uses the term “policy,” he does not appear to allege that the City has a formal, written 23
policy directing officers to conduct “warrantless entries and [use] excessive force in non- 24
emergency situations,” instead arguing that this conduct was pursuant to a widespread practice or 25
custom.
Id.
;
see Monell
,
26
“must show a ‘longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure 27
28
[6]
Defendants do not challenge this.
of the local government entity.’”
Trevino v. Gates
,
In support of his claim that the City of Brentwood police department has a “longstanding
custom” of warrantless entries and using excessive force, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Officer
Rezentes was involved in two similar incidents involving the police dog, Marco, who was present
at the April 2019 incident. FAC ¶¶ 35-37. Plaintiff alleges that Office Rezentes deployed Marco
“on an unarmed woman hiding in an attic, causing a serious scalp injury” in January 2019 and that
Office Rezentes deployed Marco on another unarmed woman in February 2020. The victim in
the February 2020 incident was seriously injured and sued the City, ultimately settling for
$967,000.
See
FAC ¶ 36;
Bates v. Rezentes
,
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations regarding these two incidents “do not establish a pattern of similar unconstitutional conduct.” ECF No. 11 at 17. They appear to be making two distinct, though related, points: two corroborating incidents are not enough [7] and the two incidents Plaintiff describes are too factually dissimilar to show a pattern.
The Court finds persuasive Defendants’ first argument as to Plaintiff’s warrantless entry
and excessive force claims. First, the FAC includes no allegations regarding the Brentwood
Police Departments’ involvement in other warrantless entries. This is plainly insufficient to
plausibly allege that the City has a “longstanding custom of permitting warrantless entries.” FAC
¶ 32. Next, Plaintiff describes two prior excessive force incidents involving Officer Rezentes and
Marco. “The line between ‘isolated or sporadic incidents’ and ‘persistent widespread conduct’ is
not clearly delineated,” but courts generally require allegations of “more than a few” similar
incidents to advance past the motion to dismiss stage.
Lemus v. Cnty. of Merced
, No. 15-cv-
00359,
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s
Monell
claims fail because the two other incidents
involving Officer Rezentes and Marco are factually dissimilar to the incident here. ECF No. 11 at
17. While that is true to the extent Plaintiff alleges that the City has a practice of conducting
warrantless entries (as neither of the other incidents involved warrantless entries), the Court
disagrees that the incidents are too dissimilar to support to Plaintiff’s claim that the City has a
custom of using “excessive force in non-emergency situations.” FAC ¶ 34;
see Connick v.
Thompson
,
Additional allegations of incidents involving similar uses of excessive force, as well as
allegations of similar incidents involving warrantless entries, may be sufficient to state a claim for
Monell
liability under this theory.
See Zaragoza
,
b. Failure to Adequately Train or Discipline Plaintiff claims that the officer Defendants’ alleged warrantless entry and use of excessive force during the April 2019 incident were the “direct and foreseeable result of the City’s failure to adequately train, supervise, and discipline its officers.” FAC ¶ 33; see id. ¶ 42 (“The City’s failure to remove or constrain officers with known misconduct histories…enable the unconstitutional entry into Plaintiff’s home and the excessive, degrading detention that followed.”).
“Failure to train an employee who has caused a constitutional violation can be the basis for
§ 1983 liability where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons
with whom the employee comes into contact.”
Long v. City of Los Angeles
,
As discussed above, Plaintiff’s allegations of two other incidents of excessive force
involving Officer Rezentes and Marco are insufficient to plausibly allege “[a] pattern of similar
constitutional violations” necessary to state a failure-to-train or failure-to-discipline
Monell
claim.
Connick
,
A failure to discipline theory may also fit into the ratification framework of
Monell
liability.
See Rabinovitz v. City of Los Angeles
,
2. Withholding of Records In addition to alleging that the City is liable for the warrantless entry and excessive force of the April 2019 incident, Plaintiff claims that the City is liable for withholding police records. FAC ¶¶ 38, 40, 41. Plaintiff appears to allege that the City is liable for this particular conduct under a practice or custom theory and under a ratification theory. Id. This claim is dismissed because Plaintiff has not alleged how this conduct violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff alleges that after the April 2019 incident: [T]he Brentwood Police Department refused to voluntarily release the incident report. Plaintiff’s father was forced to submit a formal California Public Records Act (CPRA) request. Then-Chief of Police Thomas Hansen denied the request until legally compelled to disclose the report—illustrating a municipal practice of obstructing access to police records. FAC ¶ 38. Plaintiff further alleges that in April 2025, he “submitted a CPRA request seeking records of sustained misconduct involving” the officer Defendants. Id. ¶ 39. The Brentwood Police Department, “through Records Supervisor Sonia Cardinale, acting on behalf of Chief Tim Herbert—responded in writing that it had ‘no responsive records for Officer Rezentes.” Id. ¶ 40. Subsequently, “under legal pressure, the City reversed its position and selectively disclosed partial records and photographs related” to Officer Rezentes’s deployment of Marco, “alongside an excessive volume of irrelevant material.” Id. Plaintiff contends that this conduct “evidences a deliberate policy of concealment ratified by municipal leadership.”
At most, Plaintiff’s allegations support that the Brentwood Police Department made it
difficult for him and his father to obtain police records. He does not identify how this amounted to
a “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws”
necessary to state a claim under Section 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
Price v. Sery
,
Plaintiff’s claim that the City is liable for the concealment of police records is accordingly dismissed without prejudice. If Plaintiff chooses to amend this claim, he must allege what constitutional right he believes he was denied and nonconclusory facts supporting a theory of Monell liability. D. The California Government Claims Act In addition to his federal claims, Plaintiff asserts state-law claims against Defendants for violation of the Bane Act (California Civil Code Section 52.1) and for common law trespass. FAC at 1. Defendants argue that both claims are barred because Plaintiff did not first present his claims to the City of Brentwood. ECF No. 11 at 13. The California Government Claims Act (GCA) requires plaintiffs to timely file claims with
a public entity before suing the entity or its employees.
See Willis v. City of Carlsbad
, 48 Cal.
App. 5th 1104, 1118 (2020). The claim presentation requirement applies to “all claims for money
or damages against local public entities,” subject to an enumerated list of exceptions. Cal. Gov.
Code § 905. “Claims for personal injury must be presented not later than six months after the
accrual of the cause of action, and claims relating to any other cause of action must be filed within
one year of the accrual of the cause of action.”
California Rest. Mgmt. Sys. v. City of San Diego
,
Plaintiff does not allege that he presented his state law claims to the City of Brentwood prior to commencing this action. He instead argues that he was not required to do so as he is only seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Bane Act and for common-law trespass, and thus the GCA does not apply. ECF No. 13 at 5; see FAC as 12-14 (seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees for his state law claims). Defendants argue that “[a]s far as defense counsel is aware, California law requires a timely government claim before suing a public entity for tort liability—even if equitable relief is sought.” ECF No. 14 at 3.
Contrary to Defendants’ position, there is a “general rule that the claims statutes do not
apply to nonpecuniary actions, such as those seeking injunctive, specific or declaratory relief.”
Gatto v. County of Sonoma
,
Here, Plaintiff seeks “declaratory relief that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights” under
the California and U.S. constitutions and that “the April 16, 2019 entry into Plaintiff’s residence
by Defendants constituted unlawful trespass,” and injunctive relief to “prevent similar future
conduct by Defendants.” FAC at 12, 14. He specifies that he requests “such other and further
non-monetary relief
as the Court deems just and proper.” (emphasis added). Although he also
requests attorneys’ fees, this request is “incidental” to his request for declaratory and injunctive
relief and is not the primary relief he seeks.
Khan
,
Defendants’ request that Plaintiff’s state law claims be dismissed for failure to comply with the GCA is accordingly denied. Although Defendants argue that the deadlines for Plaintiff to present his claims to the City of Brentwood under the GCA cannot be tolled, as the GCA does not apply to Plaintiff’s claims, Plaintiff is under no obligation to comply with these deadlines. ECF No. 11 at 14-15. Defendants do not otherwise argue that Plaintiff’s state law claims are barred by the statutes of limitations for Bane Act and trespass claims, and the Court accordingly does not address further whether these claims are time-barred. E. Bain Act Claim
Defendants lastly argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under California’s Bane
Act. The Bane Act, at California Civil Code Section 52.1, prohibits interfering with another
individual’s “exercise or enjoyment…of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States” or California “by threat, intimidation, or coercion.” “The elements of a Bane Act claim are
essentially identical to the elements of a § 1983 claim, with the added requirement that the
government official had a ‘specific intent to violate’ a constitutional right.”
Hughes v. Rodriguez
,
Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim is based on the same facts as his Fourth Amendment claim: he alleges Defendants entered his house “without a warrant, consent, or any lawful exigency,” awoke him with a barking police dog and weapons pointed at him, and handcuffed him, naked, while they searched his home. FAC ¶¶ 47-49. He further alleges that “Defendants acted with specific intent to interfere with Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” ¶ 50. Defendants do not argue that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for a Fourth Amendment violation, or that Plaintiffs failed to allege that Defendants acted intentionally. Instead, they argue that “the FAC contains no factual allegations that Defendants used threats, intimidation, or coercion distinct from the underlying seizure itself .” ECF No. 11 at 18 (emphasis added). They argue that as the only coercion was the coercion “inherent in the alleged constitutional violation,” Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim fails as a matter of law. Id. Their argument relies on Shoyoye v . Cnty. of Los Angeles , which held: [W]here coercion is inherent in the constitutional violation alleged…
the statutory requirement of threats, intimidation, or coercion is not met. The statute requires a showing of coercion independent from the coercion inherent in the wrongful detention itself.
The Court accordingly rejects Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim fails as
a matter of law because Plaintiff does not allege any “threats, intimidation, or coercion distinct
from the underlying seizure itself.” ECF No. 11 at 18. He is not required to do so. Plaintiff has
alleged that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that they did so with the
“specific intent to interfere with Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” FAC ¶ 50. This is sufficient.
Hughes
,
VI. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the FAC is denied as to
Plaintiff’s state law claims and granted as to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Monell liability claim and Section 1983 claim that the officer Defendants violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment are dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim that the officer Defendants violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment is dismissed with prejudice. Defendants’ requests to strike portions of Plaintiff’s FAC and to consolidate this action with Plaintiff’s prior state case is denied. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s original complaint is denied as moot. Plaintiff’s request for entry of default against the officer Defendants is denied.
//
//
//
//
//
// Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is due no later than September 29, 2025. His amended complaint will entirely replace his prior complaints and so he must allege or re-allege all facts and claims that he wishes the Court to consider. The Court encourages Plaintiff to refer to the Northern District’s resources for pro se litigants, available online at: https://cand.uscourts.gov/pro-se-litigants/.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 8, 2025 LISA J. CISNEROS United States Magistrate Judge
Notes
[1] As the plaintiff’s factual allegations are taken as true at the motion to dismiss stage, this 28 summary treats the facts alleged in the First Amended Complaint as true.
[2] Plaintiff separately sued the City of Brentwood in Contra Costa Superior Court on April 8, 2025 (Case No. C25-00984) regarding the April 2019 incident. The City was never served and Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed that lawsuit in May 2025.
[3] Although a notice was issued on June 17, 2025, directing Defendants to file their consent or declination form, this was in error as all parties had consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction by that date. ECF Nos. 7, 10.
[4] Defendants also request to strike paragraph 101, but this appears to be a mistake as the language that they argue is “immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous” in paragraph 101 is contained in paragraph 102. ECF No. 11 at 19.
[5] Plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations should be tolled under the federal doctrine of equitable tolling. See ECF No. 13 at 3. But the Court must follow state tolling law and is not aware of authority that would allow it to apply federal equitable tolling principles here.
[7] Defendants note that the February 2020 incident that Plaintiff references “occurred ten months
after” the April 2019 entry into Plaintiff’s home. ECF No. 11 at 17. The fact that the February
2020 incident occurred
after
the April 2019 incident does not render it irrelevant to Plaintiff’s
municipal custom claim. ECF No. 11 at 17
; see Henry v. Cnty. of Shasta,