26 N.Y.2d 70 | NY | 1970
In an action to recover on fire insurance policies, the defendant'insurers have had judgment upon a verdict of no cause of action. There was a unanimous affirmance at the Appellate Division and appeal is taken by our leave.
The primary issue submitted on appeal is evidentiary in nature and one of first impression, presenting, as it does, the question whether, in a civil action such as this, the court may
The conceded denial of plaintiff’s request to be permitted to consult counsel did not render inadmissible upon the civil trial a voluntary confession otherwise competent and relevant. Reference to Escobedo (3-78 U. S. 478) and, Miranda (384 U. S. 436), as well as to People v. Donovan (13 N Y 2d 148) which preceded Escobedo, makes it clear that Escobedo and Donovan are concerned with the suspect’s right to counsel—the ground upon which the Huntley hearing Judge suppressed the statement now before us—and it is equally evident that the function of Miranda was to establish procedural safeguards in
While Matter of Zuckerman (20 N Y 2d 430, cert. den. sub nom. Zuckerman v. Greason,, 390 U. S. 925) otherwise differs significantly on the facts, it may be noted that there this court gave emphasis to the specific application of the Fifth Amendment to criminal cases (p. 438), and declined to hold that inculpatory statements made by lawyers during disciplinary proceedings — when to say nothing would automatically effect disbarment—could not be used a a basis for disbarment anyway. It was acknowledged, of course, that the statements could never have been used against the declarants in any criminal proceedings brought against them.
No sound analogy is to be found in the rules respecting the admissibility of illegally seized property and appellant’s reliance upon them is mistaken. The Fourth Amendment in pertinent part provides: ‘ ‘ The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated”. Rights are breached at the time the Government wrongfully invades the citizen’s privacy in such manner. The victim of such action has
Accordingly, there seems little relevance to the lines of argument set up in the briefs which involve the proper construction to be given Sackler v. Sackler (15 N Y 2d 40) and ensuing cases such as Matter of Finn’s Liq. Shop v. State Liq. Auth. (24 N Y 2d 647) holding that evidence seized in violation of Fourth Amendment rights by the State Liquor Authority may not be admitted in administrative forfeiture proceedings. To reiterate, a breach of Fourth Amendment rights occurs at the time a person’s belongings are illegally confiscated whereas a person’s Fifth Amendment rights are violated only when his statements, taken without the necessary observance of his protection, are used against him in a criminal case.
An additional assignment of error respects the reception of evidence that plaintiff declined to undergo a polygraph test. In view of the limited purpose for which this proof was properly received and of the Trial Judge’s correct instructions concerning it, no error occurred. There was proof that plaintiff agreed at his home to take the test and voluntarily accompanied a State Trooper to the State Police barracks for that purpose. Plaintiff nowhere denies this. Thus, it appears that he freely went to the barracks in the first place. The fact that once there he refused to take the test is material, as defendants correctly urge, because it is part and parcel of his claim that he wanted counsel, and is one of the events leading up to his conversations with the Trooper; as to which the Trooper testified that plaintiff said: “ Suppose I did set the fire? What would I get out of it? Would there be any publicity? What fine or jail sentence would there be? ”, all, of course, constituting admissions.
A further objection is that addressed to the admission of proof that within a period of nine months three fires destroyed various buildings on plaintiff’s farm and that plaintiff collected the proceeds of fire insurance covering the first two losses, the third being that for which recovery is sought in this action. In the confession which has been alluded to, plaintiff said that he “ made out pretty good on the insurance [from one of the earlier fires]. Then is when I got the thought that if I set a fire it might help me solve some of my financial problems.” The court correctly charged that from the fact of the fires ‘ ‘ no inference can be drawn as bearing upon whether or not the plaintiff set fire to this house which is the subject of this action * # * [but] you may consider those prior fires and the settlements therefrom as bearing upon any motive that the plaintiff may have had which you find has a bearing upon whether or not he set the fire to the house which is the subject of this action.” Evidence of other fires may generally be admitted when thus shown to be relevant to a contested issue. (See People v. Freeman, 160 App. Div. 640, affd. 213 N. Y. 688; People v. Zucker, 20 App. Div. 363, affd. 154 N. Y. 770; Wright v. People, 29 Hun 141, Opinion in 1 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 462; People v. Furgerson, 209 Cal. App. 2d 387; Ann., Arson-Evidence-Other Fires, 87 A. L. R. 2d 891.)
Chief Judge Ftjld and Judges Burke, Scileppi, Bergan, Breitel and Jasen concur.
Order affirmed.
. In the course of the police interrogation, plaintiff’s request to consult an attorney was denied, in violation -of the rule of Escobedo v. Illinois (378 U. S. 478) and upon the criminal trial the confession was excluded upon that ground. The trial was held prior to the decision of Miranda v. Arizona (384 U. S. 436).