History
  • No items yet
midpage
Terminato v. Pennsylvania National Insurance
645 A.2d 1287
Pa.
1994
Check Treatment

*1 60 A.2d Petition For Reinstatement J.

In the Matter of John McGEE. 679, Disciplinary Docket No. 2. No. Disciplinary 108 DB Board No. 89. Pennsylvania.

Supreme Court of 3, Aug. 1994. ORDER PER CURIAM: 1994, consider- NOW, day August, upon this 3rd of

AND Disciplinary and Recommendations Report ation of the 7, July Pennsylvania dated Court of Supreme Board 1994, granted. is the Petition for Reinstatement 218(e), Pa.R.D.E., petitioner is directed to Rule

Pursuant investigation Board incurred expenses pay the Petition for Reinstatement. processing Jus- MONTEMURO, J., designation as Senior sitting by R1801, Docket No. 94 Assignment to Judicial pursuant tice J., LARSEN, see unavailability of No. 127 Judicial due 28, 1, 1993. Docket No. filed October Administration 645 A.2d 1287 TERMINATO, Appellant, Patricia

v. INSURANCE PENNSYLVANIA NATIONAL COMPANY, Appellee. Pennsylvania. Supreme Court of Argued 1994. March Aug. 1994. Decided *3 Collis, Brennan, Daley, for Pittsburgh, T. Robins & Michael appellant. Caine, Sloane, Abram, DiPasqua, L.

Leonard A. Jennifer Ronca, Ronca, Raffaele, Media, R. James Schmidt & Sloane & Pennsylvania Lawyers for curiae Trial Harrisburg, amicus on of appellant. Ass’n behalf Fitch, Crumrine, Washing- McCreight,

Colin E. Marriner & ton, for appellee. McCabe, Duane, Heckscher, Philadel- Morris &

James J. Farm Mut. Ins. Co. phia, amicus curiae State FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, NIX, C.J., and Before MONTEMURO, CAPPY, PAPADAKOS, JJ. CASTILLE OPINION ZAPPALA, Justice. of first question impression appeal presents

This Law Responsibility Financial under the Motor Vehicle (“MVFRL”), The seq. Pa.C.S.A. 1701 et MVFRL (Act 6). 7,1990, P.L. February amended the Act of evaluating plan peer amendment established services, treatment, or accommodations products health care in an automobile accident. person injured to a of an insured must seek reconsideration issue is whether an in initiating before an action peer adverse review decision under an court to recover medical benefits common is not We hold that an insured policy. automobile insurance peer of a review decision request reconsideration required to court. proceeding automobile requires to the MVFRL The 1990 amendment jointly separately or with insurers to contract or “PRO” organization” “Peer review organization or “PRO”. Organization Review with which “Any is defined as Peer or Financing Administration the Com- Federal Health Care review of Medicare or medi- contracts for medical monwealth services, company, health care review cal assistance commissioner, engages approved by the determining that medical and rehabilitation purpose necessary economically provided.” medically services are *4 § evaluates the medical treat- 75 1702. The PRO Pa.C.S.A. injured in an to an individual provided ment or services challenges the insurer the reason- automobile accident when treatment or service. necessity ableness and by a the insurer is set challenge review for 1797(b), provides: forth in 75 Pa.C.S.A. which (b) challenges plan for to reasonableness Peer necessity of treatment—

(1) plan. jointly shall contract or Peer review —Insurers for any peer organization established separately with treatment, services, health care purpose evaluating of any injured person. products or accommodations confirming be of purpose evaluation shall Such treatment, con- services or accommodations products, such performance standards of are professional form the An be medically necessary. challenge insurer’s must made days receipt of to a of the insurer’s PRO within may or services or be made at bill for treatment provider’s continuing time treatment or any for services. (2) insurer, or in- provider reconsideration —An PRO of a reconsideration the PRO may request sured request for reconsider- PRO’s initial determination. Such of days made within 30 the PRO’s initial ation must be the ser- requested If reconsideration for determination. or licensed health profession- vices of other care physician be, al, reviewing reviewing then individual must or the include, an in the specialty individual same as panel must subject to review. the individual (3) insurer Pending determinations PRO —If the of challenges days receipt of a bill for medical within services, need not treatment or rehabilitative insurer subject challenge provider to the until determina- pay tion has made the PRO. The insured been treatment, accommodations, or ser- products billed process. during vices (4) Appeal to court —A of medical treatment or provider or or insured may rehabilitative services merchandise past a court an insurer’s refusal to challenge pay before or or future medical treatment or rehabilitative services merchandise, or necessity the reasonableness which the challenged insurer PRO. Conduct consid- has subject to a payment ered to be shall be treble wanton damages injured party. to the

(5) or in- determination in favor or sured —If a PRO determines that medical treatment medically neces- rehabilitative services merchandise were *5 outstanding the provider must to the sary, pay the insurer on amount per year at 12% amount interest plus review. pending the insurer withheld in- provider or (6) in favor of determination Court (4), a court determines If, paragraph pursuant sured — or mer- services treatment or rehabilitative that medical pay must necessary, the insurer medically were chandise 12%, interest at plus amount outstanding the provider the attorney all fees. challenge of the and well as the costs as is deter- (7) in insurer —If it favor of Determination provided has provider that a a PRO or court mined services or or rehabilitative medical treatment unnecessary treatment, of such provision or that future merchandise both, or the unnecessary, merchandise will services or unneces- medically payment not collect provider If treatment, provider the services or merchandise. sary paid the amount it must return payment, collected such has In no case days. year within per interest at 12% plus payment, of the to return the failure does payment responsibility to assume obligate the insured treatment, or merchandise. services 21, 1989, Patricia Terminate Appellant On October of the acci- At the time in an automobile accident. involved Appellee, dent, policy insured under a issued she was Na- (Pennsylvania Company Insurance Pennsylvania National tional). medical treatment submitted bills for She accident to the insurance injuries sustained her for 1797(b), sub- company the insurance Pursuant to company. organization. Options, the claim to mitted the insurance sent a letter to January Options On physician summarizing opinion company indicated claim. The letter had reviewed Terminato’s who that the medical treatment had concluded physician that the motor related to her directly unequivocally “was stating: as quoted physician accident.” The letter vehicle received, that work-up she my opinion It is also her spine, cervical x-rays, C7 of the being spine cervical neurological evalua- chemistry laboratory studies nor necessary directly related her medically tion were *6 October, the in the At the time of evaluation auto accident. subjective of some ten- really only complaints had patient findings includ- positive objective There no derness. were Certainly nothing there was to ing neurological findings. no any diagnostic treatment or other indicate that specific was indicated. evaluation February 4, 1991, the By letter insurance

R. 13. dated attorney not that it would be company advised Terminato’s payment “they for of the medical bills because responsible related the automobile accident on 10-21-89.” not [were] R. 15. in complaint Terminate filed a the April

On County alleging of Common Pleas that the Washington Court the company responsible payment of medi- insurance out motor The insur- arising cal bills of the vehicle accident. denying company responsibility pay- ance filed an answer the medical services ment because bills unnecessary. company were insurance sub- Terminator asserting filed a to dismiss the sequently complaint, motion standing pleas had to file in common that Terminate no suit requested she had not reconsideration the court because review peer initial determination. granted court the motion and dismissed the com-

The trial trial that plaint July on 1991. The court concluded under 1797(b)(2), peer an initial request for reconsideration of made and disposed review decision must be before the jurisdiction court to review may common exercise the The trial construed of an ad- matter. court reconsideration a mandatory review decision as administrative peer verse prior obtaining judicial that must remedy be exhausted Because Terminate did seek reconsideration of review. determination, court that there had the found Options’ peer organization a final decision review been jurisdiction it to to review the initial would enable exercise affirmed, Superior Pa.Super. Court decision. 1032, holding A.2d that once remedies statutory their

invoked, must exhaust parties brought in an action and seek reconsideration pleas court. common remedies of administrative of exhaustion

The doctrine A peer procedure. application has no a court of agency, is not an administrative organization arising out disputes to resolve record, a tribunal authorized policy. insurance of an automobile in that it is neither panel A is similar to arbitration However, a agency. nor an administrative of record court panel from an arbitration significantly dissimilar PRO is at time the both parties latter is selected by a body is a established arises and former dispute society solely selected local professional state or *7 dispute arises. insurer before the Foster, 136 v. Pa. Chiropractic Federation Pennsylvania 583 A.2d Cmwlth. process PRO should

Pennsylvania National asserts consistent with doc- statutory construction be afforded that is Conceding a PRO not trine of remedies. of exhaustion Pennsylvania argues National that it agency, an administrative type akin to the duties fact-finding function performs by the General agencies to administrative normally allotted that the lower courts erred Assembly. argues Terminato 1797(b)(2) § statutorily is not a because reconsideration under pursuing relief remedy must be exhausted before defined that proce- peer in a contends that the court law. She method mandatory as a and exclusive designed dure was and, coverage insurance there- to claim of disputed resolve fore, remedy requires that exhaustion. statutory cannot 1797(b)(2) § that “an emphasizes language Terminato insurer, request a reconsideration or insured provider that to demonstrate the PRO of the PRO’s decision” required. than rather procedure permitted, reconsideration is the medical A determine whether PRO is authorized to an reasonable and neces- to insured was treatment to assist sary.1 designed of an determining deny insurer whether to the claim professional. an assessment of a medical upon insured based accept conflicting does not and review medical PRO as proffered by part evidence insured or agency, simply an administrative a PRO process. Unlike statutory authority to an insurer and has no expertise lends its disputes. resolve in the Only participates process. the insurer Pennsylvania contention that This fact alone rebuts National’s judicial a PRO should be entitled deference afforded The detachment re- agencies. neutrality administrative of a fact-finder is in the contrac- quired conspicuously absent relationship tual between a PRO and an insurer.

A body. PRO is not a neutral While a PRO cannot be owned or be otherwise affiliated with the insurance (31 68.3(d)), Pa.Code the law company provides company insurance to select will review the company initially pays claim. The insurance the PRO no role in plays its services. The insured the selection Obviously, strong PROs have a financial incentive process. eyes fair in the of the insurance Other- appear company. wise, company the insurance will take its business else- hand, where. On the other the PRO is not concerned with how the insured views the PRO because this will affect Consequently, its future business. the PRO does not have *8 independent body the characteristics of an for which the judicial would seek deference. Legislature Company, Harcourt v. General Accident Insurance 419 Lehman v. 71, (1992), 615 A.2d 78 Pa.Super. citing 78, (1992), Companies, State Farm Insurance 140 P.L.J. 82 (1993). 648, allocatur denied 534 Pa. 627 A.2d 179 Terminate) challenged 1. also whether a PRO is authorized to review has treatment for its causal connection to an automobile accident. We time, however, need not address the issue at this because our resolution statutoiy remedies of the issue of exhaustion necessitates a remand to pleas the common court.

69 statutory remedy a Legislature provides Where the exclusive, the rule is that a mandatory general that is No issue is power jurisdictional to act. is without court however, statutory remedy permissive a is where presented, 467 Pennsylvania, v. Commonwealth or alternative. Lilian (1976); Compa 15, Buckeye v. Coal 354 A.2d 250 DeLuca Pa. 513, 345 A.2d 637 ny, Pa. rule in general behind the

We the rationale explained 5, 791, Pennsylvania, 477 Pa. 383 A.2d Feingold v. Bell of (1977) stated, Legislature has seen in which “When the we regulatory scheme and to establish pervasive fit to enact a regulato expertise broad governmental agency possessing scheme, a powers statutory and remedial to administer that ry to interfere in those matters and court should be reluctant intended to be consid disputes by Legislature which were ered, agency.” at administrative initially, least rule is absolute exhaustion of administrative remedies jurisdiction where because the court exercise even an remedy inadequate remedy administrative exists when the mere does incomplete. remedy or “The existence of a Id., of its 477 Pa. at dispose question adequacy.” at A.2d 794.

In an common Feingold, brought action was equity seeking injunctive monetary damages against court relief and Company arising provide Bell from its failure to Telephone operable telephonic recording service. The issue was whether appellant should have first exhausted his administrative Law, Utility under the Public 66 P.S. 1101 et seq., remedies seeking judicial remedy. statutory We held that the (PUC) authority granted Utility to the Public Commission did damages private litigant to to a power not include the award public utility. for breach of contract We concluded that to have such a Legislature did not intend PUC stating: power, powers vested

It is clear that the remedial and enforcement were Utility designed in the PUC the Public Law but not regulations allow the PUC to enforce its orders and litigate empower damages PUC award *9 70 complainant. on behalf of a damages action for

private is not of administrative remedies requiring rule exhaustion recovery; up procedural intended to set obstacle only where the available administra- applied rule should be respect alleged with to the adequate tive remedies are injury requested. sustained and relief (footnotes 9-10, A.2d at 795-96 and citation 477 Pa. at 383 added). deleted) the PUC lacked the Because (emphasis appellant, of contract claim of the to resolve the breach power remedies did not of exhaustion of administrative the doctrine in common proceeding action from equity foreclose court. 1797(b)(2) insurer, “An that provides

Section MVFRL a reconsideration the PRO may request or insured must initial determination.” We determine of the PRO’S mandatory statutory is a and exclusive provision whether this may bring an insured remedy pursued that must be of medical against nonpayment civil action an insurer articulated in principles are guided benefits. We in the context of a statuto- compelling which are also Feingold, ry remedy. 1797(b) to serve as a empower does not

Section an insured and insurer. disputes forum to resolve between in a PRO to entertain Legislature authority did not vest of medical benefits. litigation arising nonpayment out of remedy statutory provision provide Nor does the nonpayment of medical benefits. provides specific, “a only Legislature

It is where exclusive, disposition method for the constitutionally adequate dispute” statutory remedy kind of particular of a adjudicate the before the courts must be exhausted Borough Alleghe School District v. dispute. West Homestead Directors, Pa. 269 School 440 ny County Board of (1970). remedy “A cannot be extend statutory A.2d Lashe v. Northern scope.” matters not within its ed cover District, 541, 548, 417 A.2d 52 Pa.Cmwlth. County York School a controver- apply does “If the statute *10 remedy, much less an obviously not intended to be sy, it is Id. remedy.” exclusive which through mechanism is a

The of the reason assessment seek a may professional an insurer in to order inde medical treatment necessity ableness de paid a claim should determine whether pendently informed decision making in an nied. It assists insurers a medical mandating by regarding a medical claim by the insurer. challenged the claim is professional when 1797(b) alterna not an provision, is a cost containment Section the This accounts for lack procedure. resolution dispute tive process. in the The the or provider of involvement of insured of the to reconsideration Legislature impose did intend judicial resolution as a precondition determination dispute. a private contractual in case, part relied Superior In instant Court the Insurance Commission upon regulation promulgated by 1797(b) judicial allow for interpreted er which Section has been by PRO made. only after a reconsideration 68.2(c), pro codified at Pa.Code regulation, formerly Act 6 interprets Department Insurance vided that “[t]he PRO, insurer, an by the permit upon final determination in Al the decision court.”2 may appeal or insured an of a statute administrative though interpretation an may be great weight, interpretation agency is entitled or incon clearly if is erroneous interpretation disregarded regulation promul which the the statute under sistent with Scanlon, 228, 465 A.2d 995 Wiley House v. 502 Pa. gated. regulation party forecloses To the extent that having recon- sought in court without from an action pursuing revised, substantively regulation subsequently was un- was but 2. provides, "Upon in pertinent regulation now effect changed. The PRO, insurer, provider or determination of a reconsideration courts.” 31 Pa.Code may appeal the to the insured determination 69.52(m). determination, sideration of the PRO’s initial the regulation is erroneous and be disregarded.3 The order of the Court is Superior reversed the matter is remanded to the common court for proceed- further ings consistent with opinion. this C.J.,

NIX, files a in Dissenting Opinion which MONTEMURO, Justice, joins. Senior reading regulation It is unclear from a 3. itself whether the specifically Insurance Commissioner intended to construe Section 1797(b) precluding judicial as review unless reconsideration was sought. possible regulation promulgated response It is 1797(b) challenges brought to earlier to Section before the Common- raising entirely prohib- wealth Court in the issue of whether statute *11 challenge findings ited the of a PRO’s in court when the reasonableness necessity challenged of the medical services has been before a PRO. Foster, 465, Pennsylvania Chiropractic In Federation v. 136 Pa.Cmwlth. (1990), process 583 A.2d 844 challenged on the right process basis that the statute violated the constitutional to due subject because the PRO’s decisions were not to review. The Insurance argument preliminary objections Commissioner asserted in on PRO decision was not entitled to review because it is an "arbitration- alternative, proceeding. like” In the the Insurance Commissioner contended that the Commonwealth Court could construe the statute as judicial allowing by applying principle of construction that statutes are to be construed so as to avoid unconstitutional results. The Commonwealth Court overruled the Insurance Commissioner’s process challenge. demurrer to the due The Court determined that it premature stage litigation impose any would be at that of the constitutionally based construction on the statute because it had degree certainty been established with a sufficient of what the due process rights Pennsylvania Chiropractic of the Federation would re- quire in that context. The Commonwealth Court addressed the same constitutional chal- lenge subsequent Pennsylvania in its decision in Medical Providers Foster, 203, v. Association 149 Pa.Cmwlth. 613 A.2d 51 petition medical association alleging had filed a for review that Section 1797(b) of the MVFRL was unconstitutional because it allowed a private, non-governmental aligned PRO with financial interests with the paid insurer to control the amount providing to a without any judicial charges review if the are denied. The Commonwealth review, petition concluding Court dismissed the that the Insurance regulation providing appeal Commissioner’s for an of a PRO’s final courts, 69.52(m), determination to the 31 Pa.Code addressed the due noted, specifically concern. The Commonwealth Court howev- er, ruling regarding regulations it made no whether the are vague or themselves 207, inconsistent with the MVFRL. 149 Pa.Cmwlth. at 53, 613 A.2d at in. 3. Jus- J., as Senior MONTEMURO, sitting by designation R1801, Docket No. Assignment pursuant Judicial tice LARSEN, J., No. 127 Judicial of see unavailability due 1, filed 1993. No. October Docket Administration Justice, dissenting. NIX, Chief affirm on the basis well-reasoned

I and would dissent Court. opinion Superior Justice, dissenting joins in this

MONTEMURO, Senior opinion.

645 A.2d Respondent, Pennsylvania, COMMONWEALTH v. RHODES, Petitioner.

Earl Pennsylvania. Supreme Court Aug. 1994.

Case Details

Case Name: Terminato v. Pennsylvania National Insurance
Court Name: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Date Published: Aug 4, 1994
Citation: 645 A.2d 1287
Court Abbreviation: Pa.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.