Tereshchenko v. LynnTereshchenko v. Lynn
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the motion pursuant to
In this action the plaintiff seeks to recover damages, inter alia, for dental malpractice allegedly committed by the defendants. As relevant to the instant appeal, the plaintiff and the defendant Carlos Carneiro entered into a stipulation, dated March 14, 2005, wherein they agreed that this action would be discontinued “with prejudice” insofar as asserted against Carneiro only. As of the date of the stipulation, none of the remaining defendants had asserted any cross claims against Carneiro. By letter dated March 14, 2005 Carneiro requested that counsel for the remaining defendants also execute the stipulation of discontinuance. Thereafter, Carneiro moved pursuant to
Under the facts of this case, the subject stipulation of discontinuance constituted a release within the meaning of
Moreover, Lynn and Toothsavers may not seek common-law indemnification against Carneiro. With regard to Lynn, Lynn‘s potential liability to the plaintiff, if any, would be as a joint tortfeasor. Thus, he could not obtain common-law indemnification from Carneiro (see Barry v Hildreth, 9 AD3d 341, 342 [2004]). With regard to Toothsavers, Toothsavers could not be held vicariously liable to the plaintiff for any negligence committed by Carneiro because Carneiro was not its employee, but rather was an independent contractor (see Kleeman v Rheingold, 81 NY2d 270, 273 [1993]; cf. Monir v Khandakar, 30 AD3d 487, 488 [2006]). Thus, the Supreme Court erred in denying Carneiro‘s motion and granting that branch of the cross motion of Lynn and Toothsavers which was for leave to amend their answer to assert cross claims for contribution and common-law indemnification against Carneiro.
Rivera, J.P., Spolzino, Ritter and Angiolillo, JJ., concur.