27 Wis. 387 | Wis. | 1871
At the annual session of the legislature for the year 1869, the assembly passed resolutions instructing the committee on the assessment and collection of taxes, which was one of the standing committees of that body, to reduce into two acts all, the general laws of the state relating to the assessment and collection of taxes, and to submit their report at the earliest practicable period. The committee was prohibited from making any material changes in the existing laws on those subjects, except in certain particulars specified in the resolutions. One of the resolutions authorized the committee “to employ some
Pursuant to such authority, the committee employed Mr. Tenney, who performed .the whole work contemplated by the resolutions. The bills prepared by him were accepted by the committee, and reported to the assembly. That the duty was admirably performed, no person who is acquainted with Mr. Tenney can doubt. His industry and legal acumen, and the special attention which he had given to assessment and collection laws, peculiarly fitted him for work of this character.
The legislature of 1870 appropriated to Mr. Tenney, upon certain conditions, $150 for such services, which he refused to receive, on the ground that it was not adequate compensation therefor; and thereupon he brought this action in this court, pursuant to ch. 157 of the Revised Statutes, to recover what his services to the state were reasonably worth.
This action was in fact commenced before such appropriation bill was passed; but the plaintiff and the attorney-general have stipulated that it shall be deemed to have been commenced when the amended complaint was filed, which was after the passage of such bill. They further stipulated that no objection should be raised by the state to the maintenance of the. action, on the ground that the legislature had not refused to allow the plaintiff’s claim before the action was commenced. And they still further stipulated, that if the plaintiff failed to establish a claim against the state to an amount exceeding one hundred and fifty dollars, judgment should go against the plaintiff for costs.
An issue of fact having been made by the pleadings, it was sent to the circuit court for Dane county for trial. On the trial of the issue in the court below, the jury, under the direction of the court, found a special verdict as follows:
2d. That the plaintiff was employed as mentioned in the complaint, under his appointment, fifteen days.
3d. That a fair and reasonable compensation for such services — regarding the same as skilled or professional services — is nine hundred dollars.
The jury further assessed the plaintiff’s damages at nine hundred dollars.
The record of the proceedings in the circuit court, including the testimony given upon the trial, has been returned to this court; and the plaintiff now moves for judgment against the state upon the verdict.
That the services of the plaintiff, considered as skilled or professional labor, are reasonably worth the sum assessed by the jury, the evidence on the trial in the circuit court abundantly proves; and if he is to be compensated therefor on the quantum meruit, this motion should he granted.
If, on the other hand, he can only recover the wages of a clerk of a standing committee, as the attorney-general claims, then the motion must he denied, if the law fixes the compensation of such clerk at four dollars per day. Gen. Laws of 1868, ch. 58. Eor such wages, together with the sum paid by him for copying, do not amount to one hundred and fifty dollars; and under the stipulation, as I understand it, this would defeat the motion.
The questions, therefore, to he decided are: Can the plaintiff recover any sum for his services; and, if so, can he recover on a quantum meruit as for skilled or professional labor ? Or does the law restrict him to a specific sum ?
The first point to he considered is, whether one branch of the legislature may employ clerks for its committees without the concurrence of the other branch. It seems to me that this power must he con
The next question for consideration relates to the character of the employment. Did the resolutions of the assembly, by virtue of which the plaintiff was employed, authorize the committee to employ him as an attorney to aid the committee by legal advice in the discharge of the duties which the assembly had imposed upon it ?
.Much stress was laid in the argument upon the fact that the resolutions authorized the committee to employ a competent clerk; and it was urged with much earnestness that this language, considered in connection with the duties to be performed, indicates that the assembly intended to authorize the employment of something more than a mere clerk — that it intended thereby to authorize the employment of a person learned in the law, and fully competent to grapple with and solve all intricate and perplexing questions of law which might arise in the performance of those duties.
However necessary or valuable such legal services might have been to the state, and whatever may have been the understanding of members of the committee,
The language of the resolutions is so plain and unequivocal, and indicates so clearly the character of the employment, that there seems to he no room for the construction contended for.
We must hold, therefore, that the legal status of the plaintiff in respect to these services is that of the clerk of a standing committee of the assembly.
Holding these views, it becomes unnecessary to decide whether one branch of the legislature may employ legal advisers, and bind the state to pay for their services, without the concurrence of the other branch. But a few suggestions upon that question may not be entirely out of place.
In cases of impeachment, where the functions of the two branches are entirely distinct, and where the assembly prosecutes on behalf of the state, that body doubtless has the power to employ legal advisers, and to bind the state to pay for their services. But I should hesitate to hold that, in the ordinary course of legislation, one branch alone possesses that power. I have already expressed the opinion that each branch has power to choose its own clerks, and, unless restricted by law, to decide for itself how many it will employ. But attorneys, employed as such, stand upon a footing entirely different from that of clerks.
But the plaintiff contends that if there was any want of authority to employ him in the first instance, the legislature ratified the action of the assembly and its committee by passing an appropriation bill to pay
The legislature here says to the plaintiff, in substance, “If you will withdraw the action you have commenced against the state for these services, and execute a receipt in full therefor, the state will • give you one hundred and fifty dollars.” It is a mere proposition for a settlement, and it is quite clear that such a proposition, unaccepted, operates neither as a ratification nor as an estoppel.
Having held that the plaintiff was legally employed, and that the character of his employment was that of a clerk of a standing committee of the assembly, the only remaining question to be decided is, What compensation is he entitled to receive for his services ?
If there was any law in force at the time the plaintiff was so employed, fixing the compensation of such clerks, that law, of course, must control the amount to which the plaintiff is entitled. Massing v. The State, 14 Wis. 502.
We think that there then was and still is such a law in force in this state. That law is found in chap. 136, Gen. Laws of 1860, as amended by chap. 58, Gen. Laws of 1868. It is true that in the amended act the word “ annually ” was omitted from the appropriation clause, the same being in the original act, but this was doubtless an inadvertence, and there is nothing in the language of the amended act from which it can be inferred that the same should only be applicable to a single session of the legislature. Had such been the intention of the legislature, it would doubtless have repealed the law of 1860 entirely, and restricted that of 1868 to the session of that year. The object of the law of 1868 evidently was to so amend that of
The law of 1860, as amended, fixes the per diem of a clerk of a standing committee at four dollars; and we are of the opinion that the plaintiff, has no valid claim against the state for any greater compensation for his services.
The sum to which he is so entitled being less than one hundred and fifty dollars, under the stipulation before mentioned, his motion for judgment upon the verdict must be denied, and the state must have judgment for costs.
By the Court. — So ordered.