OPINION
delivered the opinion of the court,
We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether the decedent’s durable power of attorney authorized her attorney-in-fact to change the beneficiary of the decedent’s life insurance policy. For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the durable power of attorney authorized the attorney-in-fact to change the beneficiary of the policy. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the lower courts; however, because our holding does not resolve all of the issues raised in the pleadings, we remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.
I. SummaRy op Facts & PROCEEDINGS BELOW
On October 20, 1999, Brenda Gail Langley (“Langley”) purchased a $50,000 life insurance policy from the plaintiff, Tennessee Farmers Life Reassurance Company (“Tennessee Farmers”). Langley designated three of her four children and one grandchild as the named beneficiaries of the policy; those individuals are Kristin N. Taylor, Edward R. Langley, Phillip M. Langley, and Ethan E. Langley (the child of Edward Langley). The policy provided that the beneficiaries would share equally in the proceeds and also provided that the insured could change the beneficiary/beneficiaries.
On August 21, 2002, Langley executed a durable power of attorney, appointing her sister, Linda S. Rose (“Rose”), as her attorney-in-fact. In pertinent part, the power of attorney provided:
“I BRENDA GAIL LANGLEY ... do hereby appoint and constitute LINDA SUE ROSE, my true and lawful attorney for me and in my name and on my behalf:
... to transact all insurance business on my behalf, to apply for or continue policies, collect profits, file claims, make demands, enter into compromise and settlement agreements, file suit or actions or take any other action necessary or proper in this regard;....
Giving and granting unto the said LINDA SUE ROSE, my said attorney, full power and authority to do, execute and perform all and every other act and thing whatsoever, without any limitationwhatever and without being confined to the specific acts hereinabove set out, requisite or necessary to be done in and about the premises as fully and to all intents and purposes as I might or could do and I hereby ratify and confirm all that LINDA SUE ROSE, my said attorney, shall lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue of these presents, and for me and in my name and on my behalf. This power of attorney shall not be affected by any subsequent disability or incapacity of mine if such should occur. It is my express intent that the authority herein conferred upon my said attorney shall be exercisable in all events notwithstanding my subsequent disability or incapacity.”
On October 28, 2002, Rose, purportedly acting as Langley’s attorney-in-fact, signed a “Customer Service Request” revoking Langley’s original designation of beneficiaries (Langley’s three children and grandchild) and naming Rose as sole beneficiary. Rose signed the document as “Brenda G. Langley, P.O.A. Linda Rose.” The form also was signed by Langley’s insurance agent and was submitted to the insurance company.
Langley died on March 29, 2003. Five days later, Rose filed a claim for the proceeds of the policy. In July and early August 2003, the deceased’s three children and grandchild filed separate claims for the policy proceeds.
Due to the competing claims for the life insurance proceeds, Tennessee Farmers filed this interpleader action pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 22.01. 1 Tennessee Farmer’s complaint named Rose and the four original beneficiaries as defendants. The respective defendants filed answers to the complaint. The original beneficiaries subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment in which they asserted that Rose did not have the authority under the power of attorney to change the beneficiary designation on the policy. Rose responded to the motion, asserting that the power of attorney granted her the power to “transact all insurance business” and “to perform all and every other act and thing whatsoever, without any limitation.... ” Based upon that language in the power of attorney, Rose argued that she was authorized to change the beneficiary designation to herself.
The trial court granted the original beneficiaries’ motion for summary judgment, ruling that Rose “did not have the specific authority under the Durable General Power of Attorney executed by the decedent insured to execute a change of beneficiary form applicable to the life insurance policy at issue.” The Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
Rose filed an application for permission to appeal to this Court. We granted permission to appeal to address the issue of whether the deceased’s durable power of attorney authorized her attorney-in-fact to change the beneficiary of her life insurance policy.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court’s grant of summary judgment is purely a question of law. Accordingly, our review is de novo, and no presumption of correctness attaches to the lower courts’ judgments.
Cumulus Broad. Inc. v. Shim,
A written power of attorney that states it is not affected by the subsequent disability or incapacity of the principal is a “durable power of attorney.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-6-102 (2001). The power of attorney executed by Langley provides that it “shall not be affected” by her subsequent disability or incapacity, if any. Consequently, the instrument at issue is a durable power of attorney, which should be construed in light of the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 34-6-101 to -110 (2001) (“the Act”).
We begin our analysis by examining two particular sections of the Act, sections 34-6-108 and 34-6-109. Section 34-6-108(a) provides:
Upon the principal clearly expressing an intention to do so within the instrument creating a power of attorney, the language contained in § 34-6-109 may be incorporated into such power of attorney by appropriate reference. The provisions so incorporated shall apply to the attorney-in-fact with the same effect and subject to the same judicial interpretation and control in appropriate cases, as though such language were set forth verbatim in such instrument.
Tenn.Code Ann. § 34-6-108(a) (2001) (emphasis added).
Section 34-6-109 then proceeds to list twenty-two various powers which, pursuant to section 34-6-108, may be incorporated by reference into a durable power of attorney. In pertinent part, section 34-6-109(5) authorizes an attorney-in-fact to “[ajcquire, maintain, cancel or in any manner deal with any policy of life, accident, disability, hospitalization, medical or casualty insurance, and prosecute each claim for benefits due under any policy!.]” (emphasis added.) The words “or in any manner deal with any policy of life ... insurance” could be interpreted to include the power to change the beneficiary of a life insurance policy. However, those words must be read in pari materia with section 34-6-108(c) which expressly provides:
Nothing contained in this section and § 34-6-109 shall be construed to vest an attorney-in-fact with, or authorize an attorney-in-fact to exercise, any of the following powers:
(5) Change beneficiary designations on any death benefits payable on account of the death of the principal from any life insurance policy, employee benefit plan, or individual retirement account!.]
Tenn.Code Ann. § 34-6-108(c) (2001).
In light of section 34 — 6—108(c)(5), the phrase “in any manner deal with any policy of life ... insurance” as used in 34-6-109(5) must be read to exclude the power to change the beneficiary of a life insurance policy. Despite section 34-6-108(c)(5)’s exclusion, however, section 34-6-108(b) provides:
Nothing contained in this section and § 34-6-109 shall be construed to limit the power of the principal either to:
(1) Grant any additional powers to the attorney-in-fact, including any powers otherwise excluded under subsection (c); or
(2) Delete any of the powers otherwise granted in § 34-6-109.
TenmCode Ann. § 34-6-108(b) (2001) (emphasis added).
While the foregoing sections are somewhat cumbersome to read, they essentially provide that, in cases in which the provisions of section 34-6-109 are incorporated by reference into the power of attorney, an attorney-in-fact is not authorized to change the beneficiary of the principal’s
We note that Langley’s power of attorney did not mention any provisions of the Act, nor did her power of attorney otherwise clearly express an intention to adopt the language contained in section 34-6-109. For that reason, our resolution of this case does not involve the application of sections 34-6-108 and 34-6-109; instead, the language of Langley’s power of attorney solely controls the attorney-in-fact’s power, if any, to change the beneficiary of Langley’s life insurance policy.
The execution of a power of attorney creates a principal-agent relationship.
E.g. Rawlings v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
The authority of the agent may be couched in general terms and may be as broad as the principal decides to make it. In the absence of specific legal requirements, a power of attorney may be in any form and may be executed in accordance with any recognized common-law method for executing written instruments.
Realty Growth Investors v. Council of Unit Owners,
A power of attorney is a written instrument that evidences to third parties the purpose of the agency and the extent of the agent’s powers.
Lempert v. Singer,
The legal effect of a written contract or other written instruments is a question of law.
In re Trust of Jameison,
A formal written instrument that has been carefully drawn can be assumed to spell out the intent of the author with a high degree of particularity. Thus, an instrument like a power of attorney should be subjected to careful scrutiny in order to carry out the intent of the author and no more. There should be neither a “strict” nor a “liberal” interpretation of the instrument, but rather a fair construction that carries out the author’s intent as expressed in the instrument.
In re Estate of Kurrelmeyer,
This case was decided in the trial court on the original beneficiaries’ motion for summary judgment. The sole ground raised in that motion was whether Langley’s power of attorney authorized Rose to change the life insurance beneficiary. In granting the original beneficiaries’ motion for summary judgment, the trial court pre-termitted all of the other defenses raised in the original beneficiaries’ answer to the complaint. In their answer to the complaint filed by Tennessee Farmers, the original beneficiaries denied that Langley “had the capacity to execute said durable general power of attorney given her physical and mental condition.” They went on to allege “that if the decedent did indeed sign said durable general power of attorney, said execution was not of her own free will but was rather the result of the duress, coercion, control and/or undue influence exercised by the defendant Linda [S.] Rose upon the decedent.” Their answer also asserted that Rose’s action in changing the-beneficiary of Langley’s life insurance policy to herself “was a violation of [Rose’s] fiduciary duty and was done for her sole benefit and to the detriment of the decedent and the decedent’s children and grandchild.”
Our holding that Langley’s power of attorney granted Rose the authority to change the beneficiary designation does not foreclose any of those defenses.
See Matlock v. Simpson,
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. The costs on appeal are taxed to appellees, Kristin N. Taylor, Edward R. Langley, Phillip M. Langley, and Ethan E. Langley, for which execution may issue if necessary.
Notes
. Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 22.01 provides, in pertinent part: "Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined as defendants and required to interplead when their claims are such that the plaintiff is or may be exposed to double or multiple liability.”
. For example, other jurisdictions have held that a principal may not use a power of attorney to authorize another to create a will on his or her behalf.
In re Estate of Garrett,
. Agents acting pursuant to an unrestricted power of attorney have a fiduciary relationship with the principal.
See Askew v. Askew,
. The facts of this case illustrate the critical importance of carefully considering, when drafting a durable power of attorney, whether or not to incorporate by reference the various powers listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 34-6-109.