*1 solely upon tiffs case based the defendant IV. physician’s rendition of events. CONCLUSION I respectfully dissent. therefore body explained For reasons opinion, affirm the circuit court’s granting summary Dr.
order
Saffle Benwood.
Affirmed. Justice,
McGRAW, dissenting. S.E.2d 10 2002) (Filed .2, Aug. Individually TENNANT, and as Jeanne The, majority nothing this case has done Mother and Next Friend for Andrea effectively grant than to Tennant, less defendants and Addie Both In plaintiffs com prerogative to redefine Below, fants, Appellee, Plaintiff plaint. An axiom of civil law is that a is, nearly every respect, plaintiff the mas SMALLWOOD, Russell A. complaint. of his or her own As one ter Jr., Below, Defendant recognized, imagi court has takes little “[i]t might nation the mischief result see Farm Mutual Automobile allowing party to define the contours ” Company, Insurance .... of his adversaries claim American To Appellant. Evans, Co. v. 508 So.2d bacco (Miss.1987). Such mischief nowhere more No. 30036. readily apparent present than in the ease. Supreme Appeals Court recites, opinion freely As the “this Court’s Virginia. presents Im- competing case two theories.” Feb. 2002. Submitted gravamen Goundry portantly, negligent Dr. claim is not that Saffle April 2002. Decided test; rather, failing pregnancy order Concurring Opinion of Justice plaintiff has averred such a test was July Starcher results performed, and were errone- Thus, Goundry’s of Ms. ous. the focus Dissenting Opinion of Justice whether, entirely upon cause action Aug. McGraw manner, purported pregnancy in what was conducted. Dr. Saffle dis- test While by asserting preg- no
putes this claim
nancy purportedly performed, test was ever Goundry had indicated that
because Ms. impossible,
pregnancy was testing required
whether such applicable standard of care is irrelevant of Dr. rendition of events.
outside Saffle’s plaintiffs obviously rise or fall case will as to
based the factual determination was, per- pregnancy test why I no reason
formed. therefore see to muster an
plaintiff should
expert to a standard of care that is address impose To such a to her ease.
extraneous impermissibly plain-
requirement recasts the *2 Holmstrand,
Jeffrey Esq., A. A. Jennifer Keadle, Esq., Bonenberger, McDermott & PLLC, Attorneys Wheeling, Virginia, for Appellant. McGuane, Esq.,
Michael W. & McGuane Haranzo, Virginia, Attorney Wheeling, West Appellee. DAVIS, Chief Justice: herein, appellant State Farm Mutual Company Automobile Insurance [hereinafter Farm”], appeals referred to as “State 2, 2001, by March order entered Cir- order, County. cuit Court of Wetzel granted summary the circuit court appellee in favor plaintiff herein and below, Tennant, individually, Jeanne representative capacity her mother children, next friend of infant her Andrea collectively Tennant [hereinafter Addie referred to as Tennant”]. “Ms. The crux ruling permitted the circuit court’s Ms. Ten- (UM) nant to collect uninsured motorist benefits under her State Farm despite previously the fact that she re- had proceeds covered from the in- below, policy insuring surance the defendant Smallwood, Russell A. Jr. [hereinafter re- appeal ferred as “Mr. Smallwood”]. On Court, to this Farm complains that the circuit denying court erred its motion summary awarding judgment, Tennant, such relief to Ms. when Mr. Small- statutory wood does not meet of an motorist so activate coverage provisions those in Ms. Tennant’s policy. Upon review of parties’ arguments, designated the record consideration, appellate perti- and the $40,000 $20,000 person, per authorities, per occur- we reverse the decision nent rence, minimum fi- with the commensurate County. of Wetzel Based the Circuit Court responsibility limits nancial enumerated recovery from Mr. Small- prior (1979) (Repl.Vol. § 17D-4-2 insurance, W. Va.Code insur- wood’s motor 2000).3 policy motor Ms. Tennant’s vehi- *3 responsibility the financial ance satisfied Farm, and such cle with State State,1 that Mr. we conclude laws (UM) motorist cov- policy provided uninsured not an uninsured motorist. Smallwood erage.4 provi- Accordingly, the uninsured motorist of Ms. Tennant’s State Farm sions accident, Following the Ms. Tennant filed to applicable this accident. are County, suit in the Circuit Court Wetzel 11, 1997, seeking recompense for August
on I. injuries from Mr. Smallwood. Thereaf- her ter, pay per Auto to its full State offered AND PROCEDURAL FACTUAL $40,000 compen- to accident limits of HISTORY occupants of Ms. Tennant’s automo- sate the Tennant, September On Ms. her injuries. Ms. bile for their Tennant notified daughters, and two her mother-in-law2 were insurer, Farm, settlement, of this her State injured Ms. when the Tennant was vehicle designated for accepted and the monies her driving collided with Mr. Smallwood’s vehi- upon receiving approval of and children her The accident occurred when Mr. Small- cle. and release from State Farm the settlement stop stop sign at County.5 wood to failed Circuit Wetzel Court consideration, Road and intersection Meadland U.S. Ms. Despite this neither Ten- Taylor County, Virginia. injuries fully Route daughters’ nant’s were nor her collision, compensated by At the time of Smallwood Auto settlement. the State for insurance with filed a claim Although had of motor vehicle Ms. Tennant UM Company Farm Auto Mutual Insurance benefits under State State Auto”], Farm cover- policy, denied referred to “State [hereinafter bodily age.6 liability coverage injury limits for with 3, infra, appeal, quoting State Farm and Ms. Tennant entered 1. See W. Va.Code 17D- note effect, stipulation 4-2. which dismissed State to that contesting declaratory judgment action Farm's Tennant, Although Karen Ms. Tennant’s moth-
2. ap- which the circuit court UIM collision, er-in-law, in this she is was involved May proved by order 2000. entered proceeding party to not a to the instant underlying lawsuit. $40,000 payment Auto was 5. from State injured among parties in accor- distributed This 3. statute injuries, their with the extent of individual dance "proof responsibility" financial [t]he term approved distribution had been after such chapter of abili- used in this shall mean: Proof February order: Ms. circuit court liability, damages ty respond on ac- $11,000, Andrea received received Tennant occurring subsequent to accident count of $13,000, $11,000, and Ms. Ten- Addie received arising proof, out of date of said effective $5,000. received nant’s mother-in-law ownership, operation, maintenance or use of or semitrailer trailer correspondence Ms. In its October twenly thousand dollars because amount of denying UM counsel Tennant's any person in of one or death and, stated accident, subject to limit for one said one forty person, dollars in the amount of thousand your allegations objecting to are not [w]e bodily injury to or death of two or because severity liability, regard nor to to clear accident, persons in more one injuries sustained Jeanne or nature of the dollars because of amount of ten thousand injury Tennant, Tennant, Addie Ten- Andr[e]a of others to or destruction are, however, advising that would We nant. any one accident. Coverage Motor Vehicle appear the Uninsured (1979) (Repl.Vol.2000). 17D-4-2 apply to this Farm would not from State loss.... vehicle insurance Ms. Tennant's motor UM not, however, this declination of Farm reiterated contain Farm did un- with State 12, 2000, Ten- (UIM) letter Ms. in its June derinsured motorist attorney. during underlying proceedings the instant nant's (b) insolvent; communicating After numerous such deni- Farm, Tennant, als to Ms. on March (c) placed receivership; has been County Circuit moved Wetzel or, Court to dismiss Ms. Tennant’s lawsuit 2. A “hit and run” motor vehicle whose alternative, summary judgment owner driver remains unknown and a declaration the court effect which strikes: available Ms. Tennant (a) insured!,] the facts of this case. summary judgment. also filed motion occupy- vehicle the insured By order entered March ing, granted summary judgment court in Ms. (c) other of the insured and *4 favor, finding Tennant’s that she was entitled bodily injury causes to the insured or UM Farm collect benefits under her State property damage. ruling, the circuit court exam- The court then determined this definition of pertinent provisions ined the of Ms. Ten- ambiguous uninsured motor vehicle nant’s explain State Farm which the parties dispute meaning the term’s and availability of and “unin- define application Ms. Tennant’s claim for such motor sured vehicle”: Interpreting benefits. ambiguity Ms. portion of The Farm State favor, in Syllabus Tennant’s accordance with which addresses uninsured point 4 of National Mutual Insurance Co. v. states, pertinent part, as follows: Sons, Inc., McMahon & 177 W.Va. pay damages “We will (1987),7 granted court property damage an is insured le- Ms. Tennant’s motion summary gally from entitled collect the owner and denied the motion of State Farm. From an or driver of uninsured motor vehicle. court, this decision of the circuit Farm State injury bodily damage appeals to this Court. arising must be caused accident out maintenance, operation!,] of the or use of II. an motor uninsured vehicle.”
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Motor
Uninsured
Vehicle—means:
appeal,
In the
primary
instant
A
ownership,
motor
issues
contention are
Ms.
whether
Ten
maintenance
use of which is:
daughters
nant and her
are
entitled
recov
(a)
er UM
benefits under
Tennant’s
not covered
cash or securities
vehicle insurance with State Farm
Virginia
on
file
the West
Treasurer;
grant
circuit court’s
of sum
mary judgment to Ms. Tennant and her chil
bodily
not insured or bonded for
dren, awarding
benefits,
them
injury
property damage liability
issue, then,
proper. The first
is whether
accident!;]
time
poli
existed under the State Farm
(c)
inju-
bodily
insured
bonded
cy.
observed,
previously
We
and so
ry
damage
at the time of
“
hold,
‘[d]etermination
proper
accident;
coverage of an insurance contract when the
(1)
limits
these
less
are
”
dispute
question
facts are not in
ais
of law.’
required by
Virginia
than
the West
Co.,
Kemper
Mitchell v. Federal
Safety Responsibility
Motor Vehicle
Law; or
Linn,
(quoting
Indem. Co. v.
Pacific
insuring company:
(3d Cir.1985)
(citation
F.2d
omit
ted)).
(a)legally
coverage;
Weston,
denies
Payne
See also
Virginia
pany
Syl.
7. "It is well
law in
pt.
settled
and in favor of the insured.”
ambiguous
Sons, Inc.,
terms
are to
contracts
National Mut. Ins. Co. v. McMahon &
strictly
against
(1987).
construed
the insurance com
view: “A court’s Bodily injury liability prop- Syl. de is reviewed novo.” in erty damage liability insurance both Peavy, Painter v. two, article specified section amounts 755 (1994). four, code, chapter of this seventeen-d (ii) time; there is amended from time guide of review to With these standards insurance, company but the insurance such ease, proceed our decision of to evalu- writing same denies thereun- arguments. parties’ ate merits of the der; (iii) of there no certificate self- in accordance insurance issued III. A motor vehicle provisions of said section. if the to be uninsured shall be deemed DISCUSSION operator unknown: owner or thereof be Court, con- appeal On this Provided, recovery the en- That by finding court that the circuit erred tends subject to provisions shall be dorsement or Mr. Smallwood had not when set forth. the conditions hereinafter only procured in the limits re- 33-6-31(j) § also W. Va.Code quired by responsibility the financial laws See but, ascriptions State, 17D-4-2, (Repl.Vol.1996).8 § Of the various this see W. Va.Code damage 33-6-3l(j) (Repl.Vol. policy issued such vehi- § W. Va.Code 1996) additionally cle, in whole is uncollectible part, by in be reason shall be deemed to [a] section, being meaning issuing policy upon this if such vehicle within the bodily injury been valid there has term, however, given whereby to this none it has distributed the full limits of pres- enumerated conditions the facts exist ap- Mr. Smallwood’s ently so as to render Mr. Small- before us pellees herein.9 wood’s ear an uninsured motor vehicle. Likewise, subsection of W.Va.Code 33-6-31(c) § of W. Subsection i Va.Code 33-6-31(c) § govern proceeding does not that a lack directs of insurance Legislature as the financial has deemed re- specified by § amounts W. Va.Code 17D-4-2 sponsibility by compli- to be satisfied either constitutes the state of uninsurance. W. Va. guidelines ance with the enumerated in W. (1979) (Repl.Vol.2000), § 17D-4-2 Code 17D-4-2, above, § Va.Code discussed turn, requires minimum limits of insurance in by acquiring a certificate of self-insurance. the amount of § (Repl. See 17D-2A-3 twenty bodily thousand dollars because Vol.2000).10 As it is not controverted that injury person any to or death of one one did, Mr. satisfy Smallwood the re- accident, and, subject said limit for one 17D-4-2, § quirements of he was not re- person, forty the amount thousand quired additionally Fi- self-insured.11 because of dollars or death nally, the last an “uninsured persons any of two or more one acci- provided by motor vehicle” W.Va.Code 33- dent, and in the amount of ten thousand 6-31(c) contemplates op- that “the owner or injury dollars because of to or destruction [of erator the tortfeasor’s vehicle] of others in one accident. goes unknown”. It without saying that Mr. judice, parties In the case sub concede identity Smallwood’s as the driver Smallwood’s Auto con- quite vehicle that struck Ms. Tennant’s car is requisite tained this amount of apparent and is not in in this case. next construction of “uninsured motor Having vehicle,” determined that Mr. Smallwood forth in set W. Va.Code 33-6- *6 was not an 31(c)(ii), uninsured motorist in accordance a deems motor vehicle to unin- be statute, applicable governing with the by policy sured when it is covered of insur- ance, must public then consider but said dic- coverage insurer denies there- finding tates a This construction also is consonant with inapplicable under. the circuit See, parties dispute 1, ruling e.g., pt. these facts as the do not court’s below. Syl. insurer, Auto, Comm’r, that Smallwood’s v. Comp. Smith State Workmen’s 108, (1975) (“The has denied for the Tennants’ 159 W.Va. 219 361 S.E.2d and, loss, in object has primary construing entered settlement in a statute is to four, having placed code; insolvent or chapter been in receiver- article seventeen-d of this ship .... or any By approved by other method reason, 9. For the same Mr. Smallwood’s vehicle department commissioner of the of motor vehi- pursuant uninsured the definition affording security equiva- cles of state this as provided by (j). § thereof W. Va.Code 33—6—31 insurance, by lent to that offered of supra See note 8. including qualification as a self-insurer under 17D-6-2], provisions of two [§ section arti- part, pertinent § In W. seventeen-d; Va.Code 17D-2A-3 six, chapter cle or (1988) (Repl.Vol.2000) directs (c) By depositing with the state treasurer such cash or other securities in the manner set "[e]very registrant or owner of a vehi- motor 17D-4-16], forth [§ in section sixteen article registered cle to be licensed four, chapter of seventeen-d this code. security this slate shall maintain as hereinafter added). (Emphasis continuously provided throughout in effect registration licensing period .... or 11.Furthermore, based the criteria attend- status, ing security appear by self-insured it does not from provided Such shall be one of following the facts before this Court that Mr. methods: Smallwood (a)By qualified would have an insurance such See delivered is- 17D-6-2(a) delivery by § (Repl.Vol.2000) sued in this state an insur- ("Any person twenty- ance authorized lia- to issue vehicle whose name more than bility policies registered qualify in this five are vehicles as a self- by obtaining within state limits which shall be no less than insurer a certificate of self-insur- 17D-4-2], requirements commissionerf.]”). by f§ of section two ance issued (1988). 345, S.E.2d 347-48 See also to the intent of the give effect ascertain 5, part, v. Syl. Marquez, Hartwell v. W.Va. Legislature.”); (1908) (“A (“This Snyder, 64 W.Va. 63 S.E. state’s interest applied inju as to just be read and of citizens compensation should statute purposes and spirit, it accord with the motor make received in vehicle accidents ries system of law of which objects general requirement that all insur evidenced part[.]”). to form a addition it is intended policies ance issued delivered this state defining (cita motor nature of an uninsured coverage[.]” provide uninsured motorist Legislature has established omitted)). otherwise, pur tions Stated “the policies of vehi- requirement motor firm statutory requirement of our pose insur coverage: contain UM cle insurance protection ers offer uninsured motor liability policies protect [of or contract an in Nor shall vehicle is to jured issued insurance] insured when defendant tortfeasor (unin contain an en- liability delivered unless shall ... no sured)[.]” provisions undertaking to dorsement ex rel. v. Allstate Co. 180-81, Karl, all shall be pay the insured sums he 190 W.Va. omitted). damages (1993) (citation
legally to recover as entitled 753-54 operator the owner our 33- As above W. Va.Code vehicle, within limits which shall (c) demonstrates, Mr. 6-31 Smallwood requirements than the of section no less driver,” “financially irresponsible neither two, four, chapter article seventeen-d Perkins, at 350 S.E.2d at code, time[.] amended from time to this nor a tortfeasor without 33-6-31(b) (Repl.Vol. W. Va.Code Allstate, at 1996). his evidenced We, too, recognized Legisla Auto con- motor vehicle insurance to be ture’s consideration UM mandatory taining coverages minimum holding importance by succinctly utmost Thus, § 17D-4-2. mandated W. Va.Code cover motorist insurance “[uninsured that, just governing apparent as the it is part, mandatory.” Syl. pt. Miller age is suggest a did not state uninsuranee statute Lambert, case, public do to exist neither Sweeney, Deel v. Accord Legislature’s underlying reasons *7 92, 460, 463, “The 383 95 S.E.2d mandatory coverage sup- requirement of mandatory purpose of primary, if not sole port finding that Smallwood’s vehicle protect coverage motorist to it with when collided the car was uninsured hardships from caused innocent victims by driven Ms. Tennant.12 irresponsible driv by negligent, financially Nevertheless, Doe, arguments her v. 177 W.Va. Perkins ers.” (1986) (internal 711, urges uphold us to quotations this Court Ms. Tennant added). omitted) awarding order Ac court’s her UM (emphasis and citation 764-65, 762, upon its conclusion that ambi- Saliga, benefits based Lee v. 179 W.Va. cord type less goes saying accident to limits than limits the insured that the of motor It without ordinarily coverage”). that insure would motorists’ carried underinsured by Ms. and Sweeney, such that asserted Tennant claim her v. See also Deel i.e., recovery daughters, that their (1989) ("The purpose op- inadequate compensate insurer tortfeasor's coverage is to en- tional underinsured motorist (UIM) injuries, motorist is underinsured their coverage. himself, protect if the insured to he chooses able 33-6-31(b) W. See Va.Code so, negli- against losses occasioned to do 1996) (defining (Repl.Vol. ”[u]nderinsured underinsured.”). gence However, who are of other drivers respect with motor vehicle vehicle” as "a not available to Ms. ownership, operation, there is use of which opted purchase such insur- she liability accident, applicable at the of the time insurance ance, which decision is further memorialized insurance are the limits of that parties' stipulation and the circuit of that fact (i) than the insured carried Less limits either: underinsured motorists’ supra entry an order thereon. See note court’s (ii) coverage; has injured by payments to others reduced been guities policy STARCHER, Justice, concurring: insurance Farm support recovery. such a Such an (Filed 2002) July interpretation policy language, though, majority’s opinion I concur with the require disregard governing would us to simple instant case for one reason: State statutory legislative law intent from policy Farm’s provide cannot be read to cov- previ It has the statute derived. erage plaintiffs for the loss. majority The ously been that “this Court will established however, opinion, suggests analysis an of the give language effect in an insurance that complex case is much more than it policy which conflicts with intent of should be. uninsured ... motorist statute[.]” Cox Amick, majority opinion partly correct (citations omitted). beginning Accord its comparing Syl. pt. part, W.Va.Code, 33-6-31(c) D'Annunzio v. Securit- Co., [1995], Connecticut determining whether the Life (1991) (“An S.E.2d 275 insurance conformed to the statute’s mandates. As we interpreted Meador, should never be as to so create stated Adkins v. result[.]”). (1997) (with an absurd the con Given empha- added): policy urged by struction of the State Farm sis require completely Tennant would us to construing any policy, it is ignore both the letter and intent the UM appropriate begin by considering wheth- statute, we cannot an incon condone such policy language er the is in accord with Therefore, gruous result. we hold an Virginia law. The poli- terms of the injured cannot insured collect UM benefits cy should in light be construed of the own in his/her language, purpose intent appli- surance where the tortfeasor driver earned cable statute. motor vehicle insurance which satisfies the not, however, This should have been the end financial responsibility limits enumerated of, of, primary or even the focus majority 17D-4-2 (Repl.Vol. opinion’s analysis. 2000), and paid the tortfeasor’s insurer majority opinion I believe should injured limits to the insured.13 analysis upon focused language holding, Consistent with this we reverse the policy. the State Farm insurance An in- contrary ruling of the Circuit Court Wet- company surance is not to follow County. zel W.Va.Code, 33-6-31 exacting precision crafting an automobile IV. Instead, simply the statute mandates the types minimum levels of CONCLUSION contain; must if the in- chooses, surance offer *8 Because conclude that is types additional of coverage levels be- not entitled to recover UM benefits under yond required that by the statute. If the policy of motor vehicle insurance company’s policy does not contain Farm, 2, 2001, State we reverse the March coverage required by law, the state then County order Court of Circuit Wetzel will statutorily courts construe required granting her such relief. coverage W.Va.Code, policy. into the 33-6- [1957], Reversed. holding continuing purposes obtaining This echoes our reluctance cle for the uninsured mo scope expand coverage beyond coverage to of UM tire that torist policy." the terms the insurance See, by (citation contemplated Legislature. e.g., omitted)); Dairyland Met Ins. Co. v. Acord, ropolitan East, Prop. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. 425 S.E.2d (1995) (“[J]ust prevents because an exclusion ("[W]here liability coverage properly recovering policy, is denied individual from under the policy,: under an not vehicle does vehicle does not then become an uninsured mo (footnote automatically omitted)). become an uninsured motor vehi- tor vehicle." and citation
7H
beyond the
actually hinges upon
require
which extends
minimum
instant case
The
drafting ments of the statute. While State Farm
language
by
Farm in
chosen
obviously
a policy
cannot issue
with unin
policy,
mir
its
coverage
sured motorist
that does
meet
the minimum
rored the statute or contained
requirements,
statutory
there
no
these
is
coverage
by
required
the statute
violated
prohibition against
offering
an insurer
more
public policy.
question presented
some
The
coverage to
expansive
the insured —even
to
was whether the
could
construed
approximates
effectively
which
that
underin-
mo
plaintiffs
allow the
recover uninsured
Indeed,
sured motorist
W. Va.
coverage from
Farm
torist
when the
6—31(k)(1995) (2000 Repl.VoI.),
§
Code
alleged
had
33 -
tortfeasor
automobile insurance.
“[njothing
part
in
that
con
words,
In other
did
Farm
intend
prevent any
herein
insurer from
tained
shall
coverage
than was
offer more
offering
and limits other than
also
benefits
33-6-31(c)?
W.Va.Code,
herein,”
prescribed
clearly permits an
those
to,
I
if
believe that
State Farm wanted
go beyond
statutory
the minimum
insurer
could have defined “uninsured
vehicle”
Broadnax,
requirements.
See Mitchell
way
in
that the
tortfeasor
in the instant case would have been consid-
J.,
(McGraw,
concurring
part
and dissent
“uninsured,”
plaintiffs
ered
and the
could
33-6-31(k)
(noting
ing
part)
that under
have
benefits under
recovered
“easily
that an insurer could
it is
conceivable
However,
reading
policy language, I
after
offer,
required offerings
addition
ambiguity
policy’s language
no
find
...,
including
coverage,
other forms
alter
clearly
that
believe
intended
protect
native uninsured
underinsured
only
provide
coverage
uninsured motorist
ion”).1 Thus, as Justice Starcher has
for losses caused
drivers who carried
ease,
in his concurrence to this
stressed
liability
required by
insurance less than
majority opinion should
concentrated
in this
state law. The tortfeasor
ease had
exclusively upon
language
of State
plenty
policy,
Farm’s
since there is no
State Farm uninsured motorist
therefore the
requirements
the minimum
meets
triggered.
was not
§of 33-6-31.
In-sum, I concur with the result reached
further,
step
Taking
one
believe, however,
by the-majority opinion. I
therefore, I
con-
fail
see how one could
majority
reasoning employed
that the
Farm’s
language
strue the
of State
policy’s language,
should have focused on the
case,
present
not to find
not state law.
particularly
settled law
“[i]t
since
well
Virginia
ambiguous
insur-
terms
Justice,
McGRAW,
dissenting:
strictly
to be
ance contracts are
construed
2002)
(Filed
Aug.
company and in favor
against the insurance
Syl. pt. National Mut.
majority opinion
grossly
in this ease
The
insured.”
Sons, Inc.,
First,
controlling
misguided.
emphasis
Ins. Co. v. McMahon &
33-6-31(c)
(1987);
syl.
see also
placed upon
(2000
Assoc., 205 W.Va.
inappropriate
cur-
v. Home Finders
Repl.VoI.)
Riffe
context,
nothing in
uses the
as there is
the law of
any one of three enumerated circum- Thus,
stances is satisfied.
since the tortfea-
Smallwood,
ease,
sor in this
had not
Farm certainly cannot assumed to have
intended that “or” the term should have en- (b) (b) insolvent; bodily injury not insured or bonded property liability (c) damage placed at receivership; the time of the has been accident; 2. A "hit and run” motor vehicle own- whose (c) bodily injury insured or bonded er or driver remains unknown and which accident; property damage time of the strikes: (a) insured; these occupying; limits of are less than re- the vehicle the insured is (c) quired by Virginia the West Motor Vehicle other of the insured and causes Law; Safety Responsibility insured or dam- insuring company: age. (a)legally coverage; added.) (Emphasis denies