383 F.3d 169 | 3rd Cir. | 2004
JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge: 1199C now contest whether Tenet is
bound to pay sick leave benefits under the District 1199C of the National collective bargaining agreements between Union of Hospital and Health Care District 1199C and Allegheny. Employees and Tenet HealthSystem
After Allegheny filed bankruptcy, Philadelphia, Inc., each appeal from the Tenet and Allegheny entered an agreement district court's [1] order vacating an for Tenet to purchase Allegheny's assets arbitration order in part and dismissing and, later, an amendment to the agreement, Tenet's suit to vacate the other part of the with a closing date of November 10, arbitration order. We will affirm in part 1998. [4] Under the asset purchase and remand in part for entry of judgment agreement, Tenet assumed some liabilities in favor of District 1199C. of Allegheny and disclaimed other This case arises at the intersection liabilities, which remained the obligation of the bankruptcy and labor laws. The suit of the bankruptcy estate. In particular, the was filed as an adversary proceeding in the agreement contained a list of "Assumed Chapter 11 bankruptcy of Allegheny Contracts" in Schedule 2.01(e), which H ealth, Educ ation and R esearc h Allegheny, as debtor-in-possession, would Foundation and related entities, [2] which assume and assign to Tenet. The owned a number of hospitals in collective bargaining agreements between Philadelphia. Employees at four of the Allegheny and District 1199C were listed on Schedule 2.01(e). [5] The asset purchase hospitals were represented by District 1199C and were covered by collective agreement defined "Assumed Liabilities" Sellers arising on or after the Closing Date as including (inter alia) "all obligations of with respect to any period commencing on
the Closing Date under the Assumed Contracts." Conversely, the asset purchase agreement contained a list of "Excluded
amended agreement, but they are not. The Liabilities" for which Tenet would not bankruptcy court stated that District become liable; one item excluded was 1199C's collective bargaining agreements "liabilities or obligations arising from any were on the schedule: "Unfortunately for Assumed Contract before the Closing Date Tenet, the Court concludes that the or resulting from any breach or default [collective bargaining agreements] are prior to the Closing Date of any Assumed 'Assumed Contracts' within the meaning of Contracts or other Assumed Liabilities . . the [asset purchase agreement], which . ." The asset purchase agreement also conclusion is dictated because (a) contained a section labeled, "5.03, 'Assumed Contracts' is defined in the Employee Matters," in which Tenet agreed [asset purchase agreement] as 'the to bargain w ith unio ns cu rrently Contracts described in Schedule 2.01(e) as representing Allegheny's employees but the same may be amended by Buyer [(i.e., with the following proviso: "Employees Tenet)] as permitted by the Court,' and (b) employed under written Contracts will not the [collective bargaining agreements] are be offered employment pursuant to this described as Assumed Contracts in the Section, but employment of such initial Schedule 2.01(e), the Amended employees shall be governed by the terms Schedule 2.01(e), and the Second of the Assumed Contracts, if any, relating Amended Schedule 2.01(e)." Tenet to such employees." HealthSystem Philadelphia, Inc. v. Nat'l Union of Hosp. & Health Care Employees,
Allegheny moved in the bankruptcy AFSCME, AFL-CIO, District 1199C (In re court for an order approving the asset Allegheny Health, Educ. and Research purchase agreement under 11 U.S.C. §§ Found.), 265 B.R. 88, 102 (Bankr. E.D.
105, 363, and 365. District 1199C Pa. 2001) (citations omitted). Tenet does received notice of the motion and the not dispute this statement of a key fact. hearing on the motion. In two sale orders Moreover, District 1199C attached to its
dated October 1 and 30, 1998, the reply brief Tenet's proposed schedule of bankruptcy court approved the asset executory contracts to be assigned to Tenet
purchase and assignment of the assumed as part of the asset purchase agreement, contracts to Tenet and ordered the non- which includ es sev eral co llective debtor parties to the assumed contracts to bargaining agreements. Therefore, we can
assert any claims for existing defaults only assume that the District 1199C against Allegheny in the bankruptcy or collective bargaining agreements are else to be barred from asserting the claims. indeed found on the relevant Schedule
The sale closed on November 11, 1998. 2.01(e). After the sale closed, Tenet and November 11, 1998, and to pay employees District 1199C took opposing positions sick leave for the first day of each absence. about what the terms of employment
Tenet notified Allegheny's trustee would be for District 1199C members. that it considered Allegheny liable to Tenet offered to credit the members with indemnify Tenet under the asset purchase 40 hours of accrued sick leave, which it agreement for the cost of the arbitration later conditioned upon District 1199C award. The asset purchase agreement agreeing to eliminate leave pay provided that Allegheny would indemnify prospectively for the first day of any Tenet against any loss due to excluded absence. District 1199C rejected the liabilities, and Tenet contended that the prospective elimination of pay for the first liability for accrued sick leave was an day of an absence, and Tenet responded by excluded liability. refusing to credit members with any accrued sick leave. Tenet then brought this suit in the
bankruptcy court. Count I sought vacatur District 1199C filed a grievance of the arbitration award on the grounds accusing Tenet of refusing to abide by the that the dispute was not arbitrable and that terms of the collective bargaining it fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of agreements. The grievance proceeded to the bankruptcy court. For convenience's arbitration on the following questions: sake, we will refer to the part of Count I "Did the Employer violate the collective concerning the accrued sick leave bargaining agreements by refusing to pay obligation as Count IA and the part employees sick leave starting with the first concerning the prospective sick leave day of absence and by refusing to pay obligation as Count IB. [6] Count II sought employees accumulated sick leave? If so, indemnity from the Allegheny bankruptcy what shall be the remedy?" Tenet maintained the position that the grievance was not arbitrable, but it participated in the [6] The prayer for relief in the First hearing, preserving its objection for Amended Complaint does not explicitly judicial review. The arbitrator observed ask for relief from the award of that the issue of arbitrability was reserved
prospective sick leave under the collective for judicial determination and that his bargaining agreements. However, Tenet powers were limited to interpreting the
characterizes its suit as seeking vacatur of collective bargaining agreements signed by the arbitrator's prospective sick leave Allegheny and District 1199C. He ruling, the bankruptcy court so considered concluded that those agreements provided
it, and District 1199C does not object. for accrued sick leave and payment for the There is a general prayer for relief which first day of leave, as requested by District could be broad enough to include relief 1199C. Accordingly, he ordered Tenet to
from the award of prospective relief, and pay sick leave that had accumulated before we will so treat it. estate for $4,500,000, which Tenet assigning all of the obligations, in which estimated as the cost to it of complying case Allegheny as debtor-in-possession with the arbitrator's award. District 1199C would remain liable for the obligations. counterclaimed, seeking enforcement of Id. at 113-14. the arbitration award, both as to accrued
Notwithstanding the common law, and prospective sick leave obligations. the bankruptcy court acknowledged that 11 The bankruptcy court held that the U.S.C. § 1113 governs rejection of terms of the asset purchase agreement collective bargaining agreements by a were binding on District 1199C by debtor-in-possession. The bankruptcy collateral estoppel because "the Union, court considered the partial assignment of although it received notice of the [asset the collective bargaining agreements in purchase agreement] and the hearings to connection with the sale of Allegheny's approve the same, failed to object at such assets to be a possible violation of 11 hearings to the Court's approval of the U.S.C. § 1113(f) by Allegheny (not by [asset purchase agreement] and, in Tenet). 265 B.R. at 116-17. However, the particular, to the Court's approval of bankruptcy court held that this possible Tenet's incomplete assumption [of the violation of § 1113(f) would not render collective bargaining agreements]." Tenet Tenet liable for the accrued sick leave HealthSystem Philadelphia, Inc. v. Nat'l because District 1199C did not raise a § Union of Hosp. & Health Care Employees, 1113 objection when the court was AFSCME, AFL-CIO, District 1199C (In re deciding whether to approve the asset Allegheny Health, Educ. and Research purchase agreement, and even if District Found.), 265 B.R. 88, 112 (Bankr. E.D. 1199C had objected, the appropriate relief Pa. 2001). The bankruptcy court construed would not have been to impose such the asset purchase agreement to include a liability on Tenet. Id. at 117. partial assignment of the District 1199C
The bankruptcy court found that collective bargaining agreements to Tenet. under the asset purchase agreement, Tenet District 1199C argued that the asset assumed the collective bargaining purchase agreement could not have agreements, but only the obligations that contemplated a partial assignment, because arose after November 10, 1998. Id. at 105. a partial assignment would not have been Therefore, Tenet was not liable for the legal. The court reasoned that under the accrued sick leave obligation, but it was common law of assignment of contracts, liable for the prospective sick leave the assignor and assignee can divide obligation. Id. at 118. Accordingly, the among themselves responsibility for bankruptcy court granted Tenet summary performing the duties to the obligee. The judgment as to Count IA, vacating the bankruptcy court held that Allegheny arbitration award of accrued sick leave could assign the benefits of the collective benefits. Id. at 94. As to Count IB, which bargaining agreements to Tenet without sought vacatur of the award of prospective leave benefits, the bankruptcy court held and 1291 (2000). Because this case was that Tenet had assumed liability under the decided on summary judgment, it involves asset purchase agreement for the only questions of law, which we review de prospective sick leave obligation. This novo. American Flint Glass Workers being so, the bankruptcy court reasoned Union v. Anchor Resolution Corp., 197 that Tenet's indemnity claim was F.3d 76, 80 (3d Cir. 1999). unfounded and should not result in
As a threshold matter, District recovery from the bankruptcy estate. The 1199C contends that the bankruptcy court court reasoned that if the claim could not lacked core subject matter jurisdiction, but affect the bankruptcy esta te, the appears to concede that the bankruptcy bankruptcy court therefore lacked subject court had non-core, or "related to," matter jurisdiction over Count IB. Id. at jurisdiction. [7] A bankruptcy court may hear 118-19. On this reasoning, the court dismissed Count IB. Id. [7] Whether or not District 1199C The resolution of Count II, the concedes the existence of "related to" indemnity count, followed from the jurisdiction, such jurisdiction exists resolution of Count I. As to the part of because Tenet names the trustee as Count II seeking indemnity for the accrued defendant in Count II, seeking contractual leave obligation, the bankruptcy court
indemnification for District 1199C's claim dismissed Tenet's claim without prejudice against it. See Copelin v. Spirco, Inc., 182 as moot, because the court's holding on
F .3d 174 , 179 ( 3d Ci r. 1999) Count IA eradicated Tenet's claim for ("[J]urisdiction is a threshold issue indemnification. Id. at 127. As to the part determined by speculating whether the of Count II seeking indemnification for the
ultimate outcome of the litigation could prosp ective leave oblig ation, th e conceivably affect the bankrupt estate."). bankruptcy court reasoned that since Tenet A defendant's assertion of a claim for assumed the prospective obligation, the
indemnity against a debtor does not always bankruptcy estate was not liable for it; result in "related to" jurisdiction over the accordingly, the bankruptcy court entered claim against the defendant. See Pacor, summary judgment for the trustee and
Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994-96 (3d against Tenet on that part of Count II. Id. Cir. 1984) (no "related to" jurisdiction for at 128.
products liability claim in which defendant The district court affirmed the had impleaded debtor that manufactured bankruptcy court. Both District 1199C product), overruled on another ground, and Tenet appeal. Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 129 (1995); In re Federal-Mogul I. Global, Inc., 300 F.3d 368, 379-84 (3d Cir. Appellate jurisdiction over this 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1148 (2003). appeal is founded on 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) However, in this case the outcome of the both core and non-core matters, see 28 the suit was a core proceeding because it U.S.C. §§ 157(b) and (c), and "[w]hether a required the court to interpret and give particular proceeding is core represents a effect to its previous sale orders. See In re question wholly separate from that of Marcus Hook, 943 F.2d at 267 (motion to subject-matter jurisdiction." In re enforce bankruptcy sale order is core
proceeding). Marcus Hook Dev. Park, Inc., 943 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1991). The significance However, we must conclude that of the distinction between core and non- the bankruptcy court erred in determining core jurisdiction is that in core proceedings that it had no jurisdiction over Tenet's the bankruptcy court can enter a final Count IB to vacate the arbitration award j u d g m e n t , w h e r e a s i n n o n -c o r e concerning the prospective sick leave proceedings the bankruptcy court's power obligation or over District 1199C's is limited to submitting proposed findings counterclaim to enforce that part of the of fact and conclusions of law to the arbitration award. The bankruptcy court district court for entry of a final order after reasoned: de novo review (unless the parties consent
[I]f, and to the extent that, to adjudication by the bankruptcy judge). the Sales Orders and the Id.; 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b) and (c). Because [asset purchase agreement] the district court considered this case are construed such that under both the standard appropriate for Tenet . . . assumed liability appeals of core-matter decisions and the de f o r t h e S i c k L e a v e novo standard, in the alternative, District Obligations, then (a) such 1199C's argument about the core/non-core liability is not that of . . . the distinction has little practical import in this Trustee and the instant case. However, in order to clarify debtor's bankruptcy estate, procedure on remand, we hold that the (b) Tenet cannot recover on bankruptcy court correctly determined that a claim for indemnification against the instant debtor's bankruptcy estate, and (c)
suit between District 1199C and Tenet the debtor's bankruptcy could have an immediate effect on the e s t a t e t h u s c a n n o t bankruptcy estate since Tenet's indemnity conceivably be impacted by claim, if it is meritorious at all, has already the outcome of litigation matured. The asset purchase agreement regarding whethe r the requires Allegheny to defend Tenet or else Arbitration Award should be pay for its defense of third-party claims set aside or enforced. covered by the indemnity agreement, and Tenet has already made demand on Allegheny to defend it against District
265 B.R. at 97. In other words, the court 1199C's claim on the arbitration award. reasoned that if the court decided to a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 88-102 (1998). interpret the asset purchase agreement to Because the bankruptcy court correctly place responsibility on Tenet for the determined that Tenet's suit to vacate the prospective leave obligation, then arbitration award and District 1199C's Allegheny could not be liable to indemnify counterclaim to enforce it required the Tenet and the claim for prospective leave court to interpret and enforce the sale would not have any potential to affect orders, 265 B.R. at 96, it was error then to Allegheny's estate. If the claim could have hold that jurisdiction disappeared once the no effect on the estate, there should be no court construed the asset purchase bankruptcy jurisdiction. Accordingly, agreement and sale orders to bind Tenet to when the court decided that Tenet had the collective bargaining agreement. The assumed liability for the prospective sick bankruptcy court had subject matter leave obligation, it held: jurisdiction over the entire suit and
counterclaim. [B]ecause the Sales Orders do not operate to preclude II. the Union from pursuing
On the merits, District 1199C Tenet for payment of the argues that Tenet is bound by the Prospective Sick Leave collective bargaining agreements in their Obligation, the Court lacks entirety because Tenet assumed them in even noncore subject matter the asset purchase agreement with jurisdiction over Tenet's 1st Allegh en y, notwithstand ing T enet's Count and the Union's attempt to limit its liabilities under that counterclaim to the extent agreement. District 1199C argues that this that the same seek to set obligation follows from our opinion in aside or enforce th e American Flint Glass Workers Union v. Arbitration Award as it Anchor Resolution Corp., 197 F.3d 76 (3d pertains to the Prospective Cir. 1997), which District 1199C interprets Sick Leave Obligation. to mean that a party that assumes any part of a contract's obligations automatically assumes all of them.
265 B.R. at 118. Thus, the bankruptcy court's holding that it lacked jurisdiction This is a misreading of American was based on its resolution of the merits of Flint Glass. American Flint Glass held the claim. that in order to effect a novation by
operation of law under 11 U.S.C. § 365(k), The existence of subject matter a bankruptcy debtor-in-possession must jurisdiction is determined before, not after, assign the old contract cum onere, with all adjudication of the merits and depends on rights and obligations intact. Id. at 80. A the nature, not the validity, of the partial assignment does not suffice to plaintiff's claim. See Steel Co. v. Cit. for effect a novation, releasing the original we interpret American Flint Glass to bind obligor from its duties under the contract. Tenet to terms of the collective bargaining The result in American Flint Glass of the agreement that it was not willing to employer-debtor's attempt to make a assume, we will have "disenfranchise[d]" partial assignment was that the debtor the Union by allowing the successor remained liable for the entire collective employer to discard burdensome terms bargaining agreement. The decision in without bargaining. We do nothing of the American Flint Glass bound the debtor kind. To the extent that Tenet has been only; it did not hold that the partial- able to enjoy the benefits of the collective assignee became obliged to perform duties bargaining agreements without having to it never agreed to undertake and which it pay for sick leave that accrued under them, expressly disavowed in the asset purchase District 1199C has itself to blame. The agreement. Therefore, American Flint division of responsibility between Tenet Glass might be authority for holding and Allegheny was ordained by the asset Allegheny liable on the collective purchase agreement. At the time the bargaining agreements, but it does not bankruptcy court was considering the provide authority for holding Tenet liable motion to approve the asset purchase for the parts of the collective bargaining agreement, District 1199C neither objected agreements that it declined to assume. [8] to the pro pose d agreeme nt nor
affirmatively endorsed it. Deciding District 1199C argues that unless whether District 1199C became bound by the terms of the asset purchase agreement under such circumstances would require us [8] American Flint Glass also held to consider difficult questions of that when a debtor-in-possession makes a bankruptcy and labor law. However this partial assignment of a collective inquiry has been rendered unnecessary bargaining agreement in connection with because in the briefs before us, District a sale of substantially all its assets, this 1199C has conceded that the asset amounts to an attempt to reject the purchase agreement binds it. The collective bargaining agreement, and bankruptcy court held, "[T]he Sales compliance with 11 U.S.C. § 1113 is Orders, which approved the [asset required. Under § 1113, before a debtor- purchase agreement] . . . are final orders, in-possession can reject a labor which fact, when coupled with the notice agreement, there must be negotiations to the Union as just described, means that, and a hearing. §§ 1113(b), (c), and (d). by virtue of collateral estoppel . . . the In American Flint Glass there was no Union can no longer press, and the Court attempt to comply with § 1113. The
is not now free to entertain, collateral remedy was that the debtor remained attacks upon said orders . . . ." 265 B.R. at liable under the collective bargaining 112. District 1199C does not contest this agreement, not that the assignee became holding that it is bound by the terms of the liable. 197 F.3d at 82. asset purchase agreement, as enshrined in A. the sale orders:
The asset purchase agreement [T]he Union is not objecting excludes from Tenet's obligations any to the approval of the [asset liability for "liabilities or obligations purchase agreement] or arising from any Assumed Contract before seeking to make a collateral the Closing Date." Conversely, Tenet attack upon it. Rather, the assumed Allegheny's obligations "arising Union is arguing that the on or after the Closing Date with respect to [asset purchase agreement] any period commencing on the Closing did not, and should not be Date under the Assumed Contracts." The construed as if it did, collective bargaining agreements provide establish an incomplete for the accrual of leave upon completion assumption of the collective of specified periods of employment; the bargaining agreements. leave accumulates and is then available for
employees to use in case of illness or injury. Most of the collective bargaining
Thus, District 1199C does not dispute that agreements provide that the employees it is bound by the asset purchase who retire will be paid for some agreement; instead, it only argues about accumulated sick leave. how to interpret the asset purchase
District 1199C contends that the agreement. We will therefore assume that asset purchase agreement's exclusion of the asset purchase agreement is binding on "liabilities or obligations arising from any both Tenet and District 1199C. Assumed Contract before the Closing III. Date" does not exclude accrued sick leave claims because the employees did not have We now turn to the proper a claim for the accrued sick leave until interpretation of the asset purchase they became sick or retired and tried to use agreement. Tenet says the asset purchase the leave. Our review of the collective agreement excludes liability for the bargaining agreements shows that once the accrued sick leave and allows Tenet to set employees had accumulated sick leave, the initial terms of employment and to they had a right to the leave, albeit a right bargain with District 1199C for a new contingent on future illness, injury or collective bargaining agreement. District retirement. A contingent obligation is, 1199C says the asset purchase agreement nonetheless, an obligation. See Avellino does not exclude liability for accrued sick & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. leave and requires Tenet to abide by the Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332, 336 & n.7 collective bargaining agreements with (3d Cir. 1984). The accrued sick leave regard to prospective sick leave obligation was an obligation arising before obligations. the closing date. District 1199C also argues that Tenet argues that this obvious Allegheny was not in default on the conclusion is rendered problematic by accrued sick leave and was not liable to language in section 5.03 of the asset pay such amounts as "cure" under 11 purchase agreement, in which Tenet U.S.C. § 365(b). This may be true, but we agreed that it would bargain with unions are determining Tenet and Allegheny's representing employees of Allegheny. contractual division of liabilities in the Section 5.03 provided: asset purchase agreement, not ascertaining
Subject to the foregoing and what their statutory liabilities would be in subject to the right of the absence of such a contract. We [Tenet] to set the initial therefore interpret the asset purchase terms and conditions of agreement to exclude from Tenet's e mploym e n t of u nio n liabilities the obligation to pay for sick employees, Bu yer will leave that accrued before the closing date. recognize all existing unions B. at the Hospitals and will bargain in good faith the Tenet claims that the asset purchase subse qu ent terms a nd agreement does not purport to bind Tenet conditions of employment to the terms of the District 1199C for emp loyees in th e collective bargaining agreements, but bargaining units represented leaves Tenet free to set initial terms of by those unions, to the employment and to bargain for new extent required by law. collective bargaining agreements. In the Employees employed under definition of "assumed liabilities," Tenet written Contracts will not be agreed to be responsible for "all o f f e r e d e m p l o y m e n t obligations of Sellers arising on or after pursuant to this Section, but the Closing Date with respect to any e m p l o ym e n t o f s u c h period commencing on the Closing Date e m p l o y e e s s h a l l b e under the Assumed Contracts." The governed by the terms of the District 1199C collective bargaining Assumed Contracts, if any, agreements were included in the list of relating to such employees. assumed contracts. See note 5, supra. Inclusion of the District 1199C collective Thus, Tenet agreed to bargain with union bargaining agreements as "assumed employees generally, but employees contracts" would seem to be conclusive covered by a written contract were taken evidence that Tenet indeed assumed them out of the class of employees with whom (with respect to obligations that accrued Tenet agreed to bargain. This exemption after the closing date, that is), not that it makes sense, since employees who already reserved the right to set them aside and had a contract would presumably have bargain for new terms. nothing left to bargain over. This exemption would seem to apply to the would not necessarily have had a "written District 1199C employees, who were Contract" with Tenet. Those unions would covered by an "Assumed Contract," and still have to bargain with Tenet. The who therefore had no need to bargain for a District 1199C collective bargaining new contract. agreements, however, were expressly
assumed by Tenet. They were "written However, Tenet argues that the Contracts" to which Tenet became a party. exemption for "written Contracts" should Thus, it still makes sense for section 5.03 not apply to District 1199C's collective to exempt District 1199C from the need to bargaining agreements. Tenet contends bargain even if all the unions did have that "all employees in bargaining units collective bargaining agreements with represented by unions at [Allegheny] were Allegheny. covered by written collective bargaining agreements." Tenet argues that if "written In sum, we reject Tenet's argument collective bargaining agreements" were that the asset purchase agreement did not synonymous with "written Contracts" bind it to performance of District 1199C's under section 5.03, then there would only coll e ctive b a r g a i n in g a g r e e m e n ts be one class of employees, those covered prospectively, beginning on the closing by written contracts. It contends that date. under such a reading, the part of section
IV.
5.03 agreeing to bargain would not apply to anybody, which is an absurd In accordance with the foregoing interpretation of the asset purchase opinion, we will affirm the judgment of agreement. the district court entering summary
judgment for Tenet on its claim to vacate Tenet's assertion that all union the arbitrator's award of accrued sick leave employees were covered by written benefits and entering judgment against collective bargaining agreements is District 1199C on its suit to enforce that unsupported by citation to the record. But part of the award. We will reverse the even if all unions had contracts with dismissal of District 1199C's claim to Allegheny, Tenet does not allege that it enforce the arbitration award with regard assumed all those collective bargaining to the prospective sick leave obligation agreements. Since a successor employer is and the dismissal of Tenet's suit to vacate not auto matica lly bo u nd by i ts that part of the arbitration award. We will pred ec esso r's collective bargaining remand with instructions to the bankruptcy agreements, see NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. court to enter judgment in favor of District Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 281-91 (1972); 1199C on its claim to enforce the award of Ameristeel Corp. v. Int'l Bhd. of prospective benefits and against Tenet on Teamsters, 267 F.3d 264, 273-77 (3d Cir. its claim to vacate the award of 2001), unions that had a collective prospective benefits. bargaining agreement with Allegheny
NOTES
[3] The Honorable M. Bruce
[1] The Honorable Donald E. Ziegler, McCullough, Bankruptcy Judge for the United States District Judge for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Western District of Pennsylvania.
[4] The sale actually closed on
[2] The related entities are Allegheny November 11, 1998. University of the Health Sciences,
[5] We have searched the record in Allegheny University Medical Practices, Allegheny Hospitals, Centennial, and vain for a copy of the elusive Schedule Allegheny University Hospitals-East. We 2.01(e). The asset purchase agreement is will refer to the debtors collectively as reproduced in the record with a note "Allegheny." stating that schedules are attached to the
