Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144

309 F.3d 144 | 3rd Cir. | 2002

Before: NYGAARD, ROTH and AMBRO, Circuit Judge s(cid:13) (Opinion filed October 24, 2002)(cid:13) Robert G. Sugarman, Esquire(cid:13) (Argued)(cid:13) Harris J. Yale, Esquire(cid:13) Craig L. Lowenthal, Esquire(cid:13) Weil, Gotshal & Manges(cid:13) 767 Fifth Avenue, 27th Floor(cid:13) New York, NY 10153(cid:13) Richard D. Shapiro, Esquire(cid:13) Hellring, Lindeman, Goldstein &(cid:13) Siegal(cid:13) One Gateway Center, 8th Floor(cid:13) Newark, NJ 07102(cid:13) Nathan Lewin, Esquire (Argued)(cid:13) Alyza D. Lewin, Esquire(cid:13) Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris,(cid:13) Glovsky & Popeo(cid:13) 701 Pennsylvania Avenue,(cid:13) N.W., Suite 900(cid:13) Washington, D.C. 20004(cid:13) Attorneys for Appellants(cid:13) Bruce S. Rosen, Esquire(cid:13) McCusker, Anselmi, Rosen, Carvelli(cid:13) & Walsh(cid:13) 127 Main Street(cid:13) Chatham, NJ 07928(cid:13) Walter A. Lesnevich, Esquire(cid:13) Lesnevich & Marzano-Lesnevich(cid:13) 15 West Railroad Avenue(cid:13) Tenafly, NJ 07670(cid:13) Noah R. Feldman, Esquire (Argued)(cid:13) New York University Law School(cid:13) 40 Washington Square South(cid:13) New York, NY 10012(cid:13) Attorneys for Appellees(cid:13) 2(cid:13) Kevin J. Hasson, Esquire(cid:13) Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., Esquire(cid:13) Roman P. Storzer, Esquire(cid:13) Derek L. Gaubatz, Esquire(cid:13) The Becket Fund for Religious(cid:13) Liberty(cid:13) 1350 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.,(cid:13) Suite 605(cid:13) Washington, D.C. 20036(cid:13) Nathan J. Diament, Esquire(cid:13) Union of Orthodox Jewish(cid:13) Congregations(cid:13) 1640 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.(cid:13) Washington, D.C. 20036(cid:13) Abba Cohen, Esquire(cid:13) Agudath Israel of America(cid:13) 1730 Rhode Island Avenue, Ste. 504(cid:13) Washington, D.C. 20036(cid:13) David Zwiebel, Esquire(cid:13) Mordechai Biser, Esquire(cid:13) Agudath Israel of America(cid:13) 42 Broadway, 14th Floor(cid:13) New York, NY 10004(cid:13) Ronald K. Chen, Esquire(cid:13) Rutgers Constitutional Litigation(cid:13) Clinic(cid:13) 123 Washington Street(cid:13) Newark, NJ 07102(cid:13) Edward Barocas, Esquire(cid:13) J.C. Salyer, Esquire(cid:13) American Civil Liberties Union of(cid:13) New Jersey Foundation(cid:13) 35 Halsey Street, Suite 4B(cid:13) Newark, NJ 07102(cid:13) Attorneys for Amicus-Curiae(cid:13) 3(cid:13) OPINION OF THE COURT(cid:13) AMBRO, Circuit Judge:(cid:13) The primary issues presented in this appeal from the(cid:13) District Court’s order denying preliminary injunctive relief(cid:13) are whether the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of(cid:13) the First Amendment allow the Borough of Tenafly, New(cid:13) Jersey, which has permitted various secularly motivated(cid:13) violations of a facially neutral ordinance, to invoke that(cid:13) ordinance against comparable religiously motivated acts by(cid:13) Orthodox Jews. Because there is no evidence that the acts(cid:13) in question are expressive, we hold that the Free Speech(cid:13) Clause does not apply. We further hold, however, that the(cid:13) Borough’s selective enforcement of its ordinance likely(cid:13) violated the Free Exercise Clause. Because the other(cid:13) requirements for injunctive relief are satisfied, we reverse(cid:13) and direct the District Court to issue a preliminary(cid:13) injunction.(cid:13) I. Background(cid:13) An ordinance in the Borough of Tenafly, which(cid:13) encompasses 4.4 square miles and has a population of (cid:13) 13,806,1 provides in pertinent part: "No person shall place(cid:13) any sign or advertisement, or other matter upon any pole,(cid:13) tree, curbstone, sidewalk or elsewhere, in any public street(cid:13) or public place, excepting such as may be authorized by(cid:13) this or any other ordinance of the Borough." Tenafly, N.J.,(cid:13) Ordinance 691 Article VIII(7) (1954).2 Although Ordinance(cid:13) 691 does not allow Borough officials to make exceptions on(cid:13) a case-by-case basis, in practice they have often done so.(cid:13) House number signs nailed to utility poles in plain view are(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 1. See Borough of Tenafly, About Tenafly, at http://www.tenaflynj.org/(cid:13) about.htm (last visited September 20, 2002).(cid:13) 2. Our description of the facts is based on our independent review of the(cid:13) record because, as explained in more detail below, the First Amendment(cid:13) bars us from deferring to the District Court’s factual findings unless they(cid:13) involve witness credibility. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian &(cid:13) Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 567 (1995).(cid:13) 4(cid:13) frequently left in place. Local churches are tacitly allowed to(cid:13) post permanent directional signs bearing crosses on(cid:13) municipal property. Lost animal signs and other private(cid:13) postings often remain undisturbed by Borough officials.(cid:13) Orange ribbons were affixed to utility poles "for a lengthy(cid:13) period of time" by supporters of the local high school during(cid:13) a protracted controversy over school regionalization, but(cid:13) Borough officials made no effort to remove them. Every(cid:13) year, officials in the small community permit the local(cid:13) Chamber of Commerce to affix holiday displays to the(cid:13) Borough’s utility poles for approximately six weeks during(cid:13) the Christmas holiday season. Red ribbons, wreaths, and(cid:13) seasonal holiday lights are attached to the Borough’s utility(cid:13) poles as part of these displays.(cid:13) The plaintiffs in this case are Orthodox Jewish residents(cid:13) of Tenafly3 whose faith forbids them from pushing or(cid:13) carrying objects outside their homes on the Sabbath or(cid:13) Yom Kippur.4 In accordance with a religious convention(cid:13) practiced by Orthodox Jews for over two thousand years,(cid:13) however, the plaintiffs believe they may engage in such(cid:13) activities outside their homes on the Sabbath within an(cid:13) eruv, a ceremonial demarcation of an area. Tenafly Eruv(cid:13) Ass’n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 155 F. Supp. 2d 142, 146(cid:13) (D.N.J. 2001). An eruv extends the space within which(cid:13) pushing and carrying is permitted on the Sabbath beyond(cid:13) the boundaries of the home, thereby enabling, for example,(cid:13) the plaintiffs to push baby strollers and wheelchairs, and(cid:13) carry canes and walkers, when traveling between home and(cid:13) synagogue. Without an eruv Orthodox Jews who have small(cid:13) children or are disabled typically cannot attend synagogue(cid:13) on the Sabbath.(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 3. Tenafly Eruv Association, Inc. ("TEAI") is an organization formed to(cid:13) promote the creation of an eruv in Tenafly. Chaim Book, Yosifa Book,(cid:13) and Stefanie Dardik Gotlieb live in Tenafly. At the time of briefing in this(cid:13) appeal, Stephen Brenner was not a Tenafly resident, but was building a(cid:13) house in Tenafly and planned to move there once it was completed. For(cid:13) simplicity, we refer to TEAI and the individual plaintiffs collectively as(cid:13) "the plaintiffs" throughout this opinion.(cid:13) 4. For simplicity, we refer throughout the remainder of our opinion only(cid:13) to the Sabbath.(cid:13) 5(cid:13) Centuries ago, an eruv would be built using ropes and(cid:13) wooden poles. Today, Orthodox Jews can construct an eruv(cid:13) by attaching lechis--thin black strips made of the same(cid:13) hard plastic material as, and nearly identical to, the(cid:13) coverings on ordinary ground wires--vertically along utility(cid:13) poles. Along with preexisting horizontal overhead utility(cid:13) lines, the lechis designate an eruv’s boundaries.5 Unless one(cid:13) knows which black plastic strips are lechis and which are(cid:13) utility wires, it is "absolutely impossible" to distinguish the(cid:13) two. Id. at 149. Throughout this litigation, the plaintiffs(cid:13) have maintained that an eruv (as well as each constituent(cid:13) lechi) is "not a religious symbol," but rather is an item with(cid:13) "religious significance." Id. at 148.(cid:13) On June 1, 1999, Erez Gotlieb and Gary Osen, two(cid:13) Orthodox Jews who are not parties to this case, met with(cid:13) Tenafly Mayor Ann Moscovitz to discuss creating an eruv in(cid:13) the Borough. Gotlieb and Osen met with Moscovitz because(cid:13) under Orthodox Jewish law an eruv is not valid unless a(cid:13) civil official with jurisdiction over the circumscribed area(cid:13) issues a ceremonial proclamation "renting" the area for a(cid:13) nominal fee (e.g., one dollar). The Mayor said she lacked(cid:13) authority to issue the requested proclamation, but agreed(cid:13) to bring the matter to the attention of the Borough Council,(cid:13) the Borough’s legislative branch.6 She did not mention(cid:13) Ordinance 691 or suggest that affixing lechis to utility poles(cid:13) might violate any other ordinance.(cid:13) At the next Council meeting, on July 8, 1999, the(cid:13) Council and approximately thirty Tenafly residents debated(cid:13) whether the Borough should grant the proclamation. Many(cid:13) of those present expressed vehement objections prompted(cid:13) by their fear that an eruv would encourage Orthodox Jews(cid:13) to move to Tenafly. A Council member whom the District(cid:13) Court was unable to identify noted "a concern that the(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 5. Many major cities across the United States--such as Washington,(cid:13) D.C., New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Baltimore, Atlanta,(cid:13) and Cincinnati--have one or more eruvs. Both the White House and the(cid:13) United States Supreme Court are within the boundaries of an eruv.(cid:13) 6. Six Council members compose the Borough’s legislative branch. The(cid:13) Mayor does not participate in lawmaking unless the Council is(cid:13) deadlocked, in which case she casts the tie-breaking vote.(cid:13) 6(cid:13) Orthodoxy would take over" Tenafly. Id. at 151-52. One(cid:13) Council member voiced his "serious concern" that "Ultra-(cid:13) Orthodox" Jews might "stone[ ] cars that drive down the(cid:13) streets on the Sabbath." Id. at 153-54. The Borough(cid:13) Attorney participated in the debate. Neither he nor anyone(cid:13) else mentioned Ordinance 691 or indicated that attaching(cid:13) lechis to utility poles might be unlawful.(cid:13) The Council decided to demand a formal, written(cid:13) proposal before voting on whether to issue the(cid:13) proclamation. Mayor Moscovitz advised Gotlieb and Osen,(cid:13) who did not attend the meeting, that the Council was(cid:13) unlikely to grant their request for a proclamation, but(cid:13) invited them to submit a formal application. Frustrated by(cid:13) the Borough’s reticence, in August 1999 TEAI asked Bergen(cid:13) County Executive William P. Schuber, whose jurisdiction(cid:13) includes Tenafly, to issue the ceremonial proclamation(cid:13) necessary to validate the eruv. On December 15, 1999, he(cid:13) did so. The constitutionality of this action is not challenged(cid:13) in this case, and neither Schuber nor any other Bergen(cid:13) County official is a party.(cid:13) Verizon, the local telephone company, owns the utility(cid:13) poles in Tenafly, though the poles are located on the(cid:13) Borough’s property.7 In April 2000, the plaintiffs asked(cid:13) Verizon for permission to attach lechis to its utility poles.(cid:13) The plaintiffs said in a sworn statement, which the District(cid:13) Court found "credible," that they did not believe any(cid:13) municipal ordinance prohibited them from doing so, and(cid:13) thus that they did not need the Council’s permission. Id. at(cid:13) 155. After the plaintiffs informed Verizon about the(cid:13) proclamation, they say, the company’s in-house counsel(cid:13) researched whether municipal approval was required and(cid:13) advised the plaintiffs that it was not.(cid:13) In June 2000 Cablevision, holder of the local cable(cid:13) television franchise, volunteered to help the plaintiffs affix(cid:13) lechis to Verizon’s utility poles as a community service.(cid:13) With the help of Cablevision personnel and equipment, an(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 7. When some of the events pertinent to this case occurred, the company(cid:13) now known as Verizon was named Bell Atlantic Telephone Company.(cid:13) 155 F. Supp. 2d at 154-55. For convenience we refer to it as Verizon(cid:13) throughout.(cid:13) 7(cid:13) eruv was completed in Tenafly sometime in September 2000.8(cid:13) The plaintiffs represent, and the Borough does not disagree,(cid:13) that only private funds have supported the eruv and that(cid:13) no municipal assistance of any kind will be needed to(cid:13) maintain it.(cid:13) Borough officials apparently did not learn that an eruv(cid:13) was being erected in Tenafly until late August 2000. Mayor(cid:13) Moscovitz and Councilman Charles Lipson met with two(cid:13) local Jewish leaders on September 14, 2000, to discuss the(cid:13) matter. One of the Jewish leaders perceived some of the(cid:13) Mayor’s remarks as derogatory toward Orthodox Jews, and(cid:13) the meeting was unproductive. Twelve days later, Borough(cid:13) Administrator Joseph DiGiacomo, acting at the Mayor’s(cid:13) behest, asked Cablevision why it helped attach the lechis(cid:13) without the Borough’s permission. According to DiGiacomo,(cid:13) the company told him that "a Rabbi" had advised it that(cid:13) TEAI had the necessary government approval. Id. at 158.(cid:13) On October 10, 2000, Mayor Moscovitz and the Council(cid:13) directed the Borough Administrator to ask Cablevision to(cid:13) remove the lechis from the utility poles"as soon as(cid:13) possible." Id.(cid:13) On October 23, 2000, Cablevision wrote to the plaintiffs(cid:13) and informed them that the Borough instructed it to take(cid:13) down the lechis. Cablevision said it would begin complying(cid:13) with the Borough’s order within three days unless the(cid:13) plaintiffs demonstrated they had municipal approval.(cid:13) Counsel for the plaintiffs subsequently negotiated from the(cid:13) Borough a thirty-day reprieve to give TEAI an opportunity(cid:13) to apply for permission from the Council to maintain the(cid:13) eruv. The letter setting out this agreement, sent by the(cid:13) plaintiffs’ counsel to Borough Attorney Walter Lesnevich,(cid:13) states in part: "I also appreciate your advice that the(cid:13) Borough has no specific ordinance covering this matter or(cid:13) any particular format for the Eruv Association to follow in(cid:13) submitting its request." Id. at 159. By the beginning of(cid:13) November 2000, neither Lesnevich nor any other Borough(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 8. According to the District Court, a map of Tenafly, which does not(cid:13) appear in the appellate record, "suggests" that the eruv enables the(cid:13) plaintiffs to push and carry objects in 35-40% of the Borough. 155 F.(cid:13) Supp. 2d at 149.(cid:13) 8(cid:13) official had raised the possibility that Ordinance 691 or(cid:13) another ordinance might be relevant to the dispute over the(cid:13) lechis.(cid:13) On November 7, 2000, the plaintiffs filed their application(cid:13) with the Borough, asking the Council not to remove or(cid:13) order the removal of the lechis. On November 21, 2000, the(cid:13) Council decided to hold two hearings to allow members of(cid:13) the public to comment on the plaintiffs’ proposal. The(cid:13) Council scheduled the first hearing for November 28, 2000,(cid:13) and the second for December 12, 2000. Fifty-four members(cid:13) of the public, including plaintiff Chaim Book and other eruv(cid:13) proponents, spoke at the two hearings. The speakers were(cid:13) evenly divided between supporters and opponents of the(cid:13) eruv. During the hearings, Council members did not(cid:13) express their views until the conclusion of the December 12(cid:13) hearing. At that hearing, just before the Council voted on(cid:13) the plaintiffs’ application, one Councilman stated that "[t]o(cid:13) the best of my knowledge," the Borough had "no ordinance,(cid:13) no resolution that says that you cannot hang something(cid:13) from a utility pole." Mayor Moscovitz responded by saying(cid:13) "[t]here is an ordinance," and Lesnevich then described(cid:13) Ordinance 691. This exchange was apparently the first time(cid:13) that Borough officials mentioned Ordinance 691 with(cid:13) regard to the lechis.(cid:13) Shortly after Lesnevich brought Ordinance 691 to the(cid:13) Council members’ attention, the Council voted 5-0 to force(cid:13) the plaintiffs to remove the lechis.9 The next day, the(cid:13) Borough ordered Cablevision to take the lechis off the utility(cid:13) poles "as soon as possible." 155 F. Supp. 2d at 163. The(cid:13) plaintiffs responded by suing in the District Court on(cid:13) December 15, 2000, alleging violations of the First and(cid:13) Fourteenth Amendments, 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 and 1985, and(cid:13) the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. S 3604(a), and(cid:13) seeking an injunction barring the Borough from interfering(cid:13) with the eruv.10(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 9. One Council member was not present and thus did not vote.(cid:13) 10. The plaintiffs did not allege an Equal Protection Clause violation. In(cid:13) addition, though not relevant to this appeal, the plaintiffs sought(cid:13) compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees.(cid:13) 9(cid:13) Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b), the(cid:13) District Court issued a temporary restraining order(cid:13) precluding the Borough from disturbing the eruv . Consent(cid:13) orders extended the duration of the restraint until the(cid:13) Court ruled on the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary(cid:13) injunction. After the parties completed limited discovery,(cid:13) the Court held an evidentiary hearing that spanned four(cid:13) days, received additional affidavits, and heard oral(cid:13) arguments. On August 10, 2001, the Court issued an(cid:13) opinion denying the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief(cid:13) on the ground that they are not reasonably likely to(cid:13) succeed on the merits of any of their claims.(cid:13) The District Court’s discussion began with the plaintiffs’(cid:13) claim that the Borough violated the First Amendment’s Free(cid:13) Speech Clause. The Court concluded (albeit without citing(cid:13) our decision in Troster v. Pennsylvania State Department of(cid:13) Corrections, 65 F.3d 1086 (3d Cir. 1995)) that the act of(cid:13) affixing lechis to utility poles is "symbolic speech." 155 F.(cid:13) Supp. 2d at 173. Next the Court determined that the(cid:13) Borough’s utility poles are a nonpublic forum, and that the(cid:13) Borough did not discriminate against the plaintiffs’ religious(cid:13) viewpoint when it ordered the lechis removed. Id. at 174-80.(cid:13) The Court acknowledged that the Borough had expressly or(cid:13) tacitly permitted various facial violations of Ordinance 691,11(cid:13) such as the holiday displays and church directional signs.(cid:13) But it distinguished the lechis, reasoning that the other(cid:13) materials affixed to the utility poles served commercial or(cid:13) functional purposes, were not religious in nature, and were(cid:13) not intended to be attached permanently. Id. at 176-78.(cid:13) Other items frequently affixed to utility poles in violation of(cid:13) Ordinance 691, such as the lost animal signs and(cid:13) permanently attached house numbers, did not show(cid:13) discriminatory enforcement because the Borough said it(cid:13) made efforts to remove some of them after the plaintiffs(cid:13) sued. Id. at 177-78. As for the orange ribbons, the Court(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 11. The Borough submitted a copy of a separate ordinance that prohibits(cid:13) posting signs on utility poles. The Borough has not suggested, either to(cid:13) the District Court or to our Court, that its decision to remove the lechis(cid:13) was based on that ordinance. Instead, it has maintained throughout this(cid:13) litigation that its decision was based only on Ordinance 691. See, e.g.,(cid:13) 155 F. Supp. 2d at 159-60.(cid:13) 10(cid:13) stated that, notwithstanding Mayor Moscovitz’s testimony(cid:13) and other evidence in the record, it "lack[ed] sufficient(cid:13) information" to find that the Borough knew about and(cid:13) tacitly approved them. Id. at 177. The Court concluded that(cid:13) the Borough’s application of the ordinance did not(cid:13) discriminate against the plaintiffs’ religious viewpoint, and(cid:13) thus their free speech claim could not succeed. Id. at 180.(cid:13) The District Court also rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that(cid:13) the Borough violated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise(cid:13) Clause. Id. at 180-86. The Court disagreed with the(cid:13) plaintiffs’ position that the objective effect of the Borough’s(cid:13) decision was to discriminate against religiously motivated(cid:13) activity. It noted that, under Lyng v. Northwest Indian(cid:13) Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988), the(cid:13) Borough can deny access to utility poles on its land for a(cid:13) religion-neutral reason even if doing so imposes an(cid:13) "incidental" burden on Orthodox Jews’ ability to practice(cid:13) their religion. 155 F. Supp. 2d at 180-81. The Court(cid:13) reasoned that because the Borough ordered the lechis(cid:13) taken down pursuant to Ordinance 691, "a pre-existing,(cid:13) neutral law of general applicability," the issue was(cid:13) controlled by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Employment(cid:13) Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), rather than by its(cid:13) subsequent decision in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,(cid:13) Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 155 F. Supp.(cid:13) 2d at 181. The Court did not consider whether its earlier(cid:13) conclusion that Borough officials chose not to enforce(cid:13) Ordinance 691 with respect to some secularly motivated(cid:13) commercial and functional postings, see id. at 177-80,(cid:13) affected the free exercise analysis. Under Smith , the District(cid:13) Court reasoned, the Borough Council’s decision to enforce(cid:13) Ordinance 691 against the eruv had an objectively neutral(cid:13) effect that did not implicate the Free Exercise Clause. Id.(cid:13) The Court thought, however, that the Council members’(cid:13) improper subjective motivations nonetheless necessitated(cid:13) strict scrutiny under Lukumi. Id. at 183. It found that,(cid:13) while the Council members had no religious animosity, they(cid:13) acted because of the "constitutionally impermissible" fear(cid:13) that the eruv would facilitate the formation of an insular(cid:13) Orthodox Jewish "community within a community" in(cid:13) Tenafly. Id. at 182-83. Nevertheless, no Free Exercise(cid:13) 11(cid:13) Clause violation occurred because the Council members’(cid:13) decision was "narrowly tailored to further their interest in(cid:13) avoiding the appearance of an Establishment Clause(cid:13) concern." Id. at 184 n.26 (emphasis added).(cid:13) Finally, the Court held that the plaintiffs lack standing to(cid:13) sue under the FHA because the Borough did not "make(cid:13) unavailable or deny" housing within the meaning of the(cid:13) relevant provision, 42 U.S.C. S 3604(a). Id. at 186-90. Every(cid:13) case finding a violation of S 3604(a), the District Court(cid:13) noted, involved conduct that "directly affected the(cid:13) availability of housing," whereas the plaintiffs seek a "non-(cid:13) housing use of municipal property." Id. at 187.(cid:13) The Court concluded that, because the plaintiffs were not(cid:13) reasonably likely to succeed on any of their claims,(cid:13) injunctive relief was not appropriate. The plaintiffs timely(cid:13) appealed, giving us jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.(cid:13) S 1292(a)(1),12 and we granted their request for an(cid:13) injunction prohibiting removal of the lechis pending our(cid:13) decision. Tenafly Eruv Ass’n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, No.(cid:13) 01-3301 (3d Cir. Sept. 19, 2001) (order).(cid:13) II. Standard of Review(cid:13) We review the District Court’s ultimate decision to deny(cid:13) a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. See Dam(cid:13) Things from Denmark, a/k/a Troll Co. ApS, v. Russ Berrie &(cid:13) Co., 290 F.3d 548, 556 (3d Cir. 2002); St. Thomas-St. John(cid:13) Hotel & Tourism Ass’n, Inc. v. Virgin Islands, 218 F.3d 232,(cid:13) 235 (3d Cir. 2000). But "‘any determination that is a(cid:13) prerequisite to the issuance of an injunction . . . is reviewed(cid:13) according to the standard applicable to that particular(cid:13) determination."’ Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 258 F.3d(cid:13) 148, 150-51 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v.(cid:13) Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1427(cid:13) (3d Cir. 1994)). Thus "we exercise plenary review over the(cid:13) District Court’s conclusions of law and its application of the(cid:13) law to the facts."’ Id. at 151 (quoting Duraco Prods., Inc. v.(cid:13) Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1438 (3d Cir.(cid:13) 1994)).(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 12. The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. SS 1331 and(cid:13) 1343.(cid:13) 12(cid:13) Ordinarily we will not disturb the factual findings(cid:13) supporting the disposition of a preliminary injunction(cid:13) motion in the absence of clear error. See Fed. R. Civ. P.(cid:13) 52(a); Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-(cid:13) Merck Consumer Pharm. Co., 290 F.3d 578, 586 (3d Cir.(cid:13) 2002); S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl.(cid:13) Protection, 274 F.3d 771, 777 (3d Cir. 2001). This case,(cid:13) however, involves First Amendment claims, and "the(cid:13) reaches of the First Amendment are ultimately defined by(cid:13) the facts it is held to embrace." Hurley v. Irish-American(cid:13) Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,(cid:13) 567 (1995). Therefore, we have "a constitutional duty to(cid:13) conduct an independent examination of the record as a(cid:13) whole," and we cannot defer to the District Court’s factual(cid:13) findings unless they concern witnesses’ credibility. Id.; Bose(cid:13) Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S.(cid:13) 485, 499, 510-11 (1984); Christ’s Bride Ministries, Inc. v.(cid:13) Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir.(cid:13) 1998). Accordingly, we examine independently the facts in(cid:13) the record and "draw our own inferences" from them.(cid:13) Christ’s Bride, 148 F.3d at 247.(cid:13) III. Discussion(cid:13) Four factors governed the District Court’s decision(cid:13) whether to issue a preliminary injunction barring the(cid:13) Borough from removing the eruv. To obtain an injunction,(cid:13) the plaintiffs had to demonstrate (1) that they are(cid:13) reasonably likely to prevail eventually in the litigation and(cid:13) (2) that they are likely to suffer irreparable injury without(cid:13) relief. See S. Camden Citizens, 274 F.3d at 777; Adams v.(cid:13) Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir. 2000). If(cid:13) these two threshold showings are made the District Court(cid:13) then considers, to the extent relevant, (3) whether an(cid:13) injunction would harm the Borough more than denying(cid:13) relief would harm the plaintiffs and (4) whether granting(cid:13) relief would serve the public interest. See S. Camden(cid:13) Citizens, 274 F.3d at 777; Freedom Forge, 204 F.3d at 484.(cid:13) Because the District Court ended its analysis after(cid:13) concluding that the plaintiffs did not show that their claims(cid:13) are reasonably likely to succeed, see 155 F. Supp. 2d at(cid:13) 171, 191, our discussion focuses on that factor. Disposing(cid:13) 13(cid:13) of the plaintiffs’ FHA claim in the margin,13 we will first(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 13. We can dispense quickly with the plaintiffs’ contention that they have(cid:13) a valid FHA claim. One necessary element of a cause of action under the(cid:13) FHA is that the plaintiffs must be "aggrieved person[s]," 42 U.S.C.(cid:13) S 3613(a)(1)(A), which in this context means victims of "a discriminatory(cid:13) housing practice," id. S 3602, that"make[s] unavailable or den[ies]"(cid:13) housing to them based on their religion. Id.S 3604(a). Some of the(cid:13) plaintiffs lived in the Borough before the eruv was established. 155 F.(cid:13) Supp. 2d at 188. Therefore, while the plaintiffs claim that the Borough(cid:13) wants to remove the eruv to discourage Orthodox Jews from moving into(cid:13) town, they do not claim that removing the eruv would make housing(cid:13) within the Borough "unavailable" to them. Instead, they argue that(cid:13) removing the eruv would make their living in the Borough much less(cid:13) desirable. But they concede that the Borough’s decision did not directly(cid:13) affect anyone’s current or future home. To our knowledge, no court has(cid:13) stretched the "make unavailable or deny" language of S 3604(a) to(cid:13) encompass actions that both (1) do not actually make it more difficult (as(cid:13) opposed to less desirable) to obtain housing and (2) do not directly(cid:13) regulate or zone housing or activities within the home. See, e.g., LeBlanc-(cid:13) Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 424 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that the(cid:13) pertinent language "has been interpreted to reach a wide variety of(cid:13) discriminatory housing practices, including discriminatory zoning(cid:13) restrictions"); South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of(cid:13) Realtors, 935 F.2d 868, 882 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that the relevant(cid:13) language of S 3604(a) applies to "actions by individuals or governmental(cid:13) units which directly affect the availability of housing") (internal quotation(cid:13) marks omitted). We believe that expanding S 3604(a) as the plaintiffs(cid:13) suggest is unwarranted, as it would "create an FHA claim in every(cid:13) circumstance where a religious group is denied a request to use(cid:13) municipal property to make an area more appealing for the private(cid:13) practice of their religion," even if the municipal action has nothing to do(cid:13) with housing. 155 F. Supp. 2d at 189.(cid:13) We note, however, that we do not agree with the Borough’s contention(cid:13) --and the District Court’s acquiescence, if its use of the word "standing"(cid:13) was meant to signify a perceived lack of subject-matter jurisdiction over(cid:13) the plaintiffs’ FHA claim--that the issue is jurisdictional. When the(cid:13) presence or absence of a cause of action depends on how statutory(cid:13) language is interpreted (as the plaintiffs’ FHA claim does), the absence of(cid:13) a valid statutory cause of action does not preclude jurisdiction unless(cid:13) the claim is frivolous or a transparent attempt to manufacture federal-(cid:13) court jurisdiction where none existed. See Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv.(cid:13) Comm’n of Md., 122 S. Ct. 1753, 1758-59 (2002); Steel Co. v. Citizens for(cid:13) a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-(cid:13) 85 (1946). Because the plaintiffs’ FHA claim is neither, we have(cid:13) 14(cid:13) consider the plaintiffs’ free speech claim and then discuss(cid:13) their free exercise claim.14(cid:13) A. The Free Speech Claim(cid:13) The First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause provides that(cid:13) "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of(cid:13) speech." U.S. Const. amend. I. "Speech" is not construed(cid:13) literally, or even limited to the use of words. Constitutional(cid:13) protection is afforded not only to speaking and writing, but(cid:13) also to some nonverbal acts of communication, viz.,(cid:13) "expressive conduct" (or "symbolic speech"). Affixing lechis(cid:13) to utility poles does not involve the use of words, so the(cid:13) plaintiffs’ behavior is protected by the Free Speech Clause(cid:13) only if it constitutes expressive conduct.15(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) jurisdiction to consider it. See Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County,(cid:13) 983 F.2d 1277, 1280-84 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that district court’s(cid:13) determination that defendant did not "make unavailable or deny"(cid:13) housing under S 3604(f) was "a judgment on the merits rather than a(cid:13) jurisdictional decision" because the plaintiff’s claim, though ultimately(cid:13) unsuccessful, was not frivolous).(cid:13) 14. Citing Elber v. City of Newark, 256 A.2d 44 (N.J. 1969), the plaintiffs(cid:13) attempt to raise a claim under New Jersey law. Presumably because the(cid:13) plaintiffs did not include this claim in their complaint, the District Court(cid:13) did not discuss it. We shall do likewise.(cid:13) 15. The Borough failed to contend in its brief that the act of affixing(cid:13) lechis to utility poles is not "speech" within the meaning of the First(cid:13) Amendment. Ordinarily we avoid addressing issues not raised in a(cid:13) party’s opening brief. See, e.g., Kirschbaum v. WRGSB Associates, 243(cid:13) F.3d 145, 151 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001). However, "[w]hen an issue or claim is(cid:13) properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal(cid:13) theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent(cid:13) power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law."(cid:13) Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991). Thus we "may(cid:13) consider an issue ‘antecedent to . . . and ultimately dispositive of ’ the(cid:13) dispute before [us], even an issue the parties fail to identify and brief."(cid:13) United Nat’l Bank v. Indep. Ins. Agents, 508 U.S. 439, 447 (1993)(cid:13) (quoting Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73, 77 (1990)) (omission in(cid:13) original). Whether the Free Speech Clause applies is a threshold question(cid:13) necessary to a proper analysis of the parties’ arguments. Therefore, we(cid:13) requested that the parties provide supplemental memoranda on the(cid:13) issue, at which time the Borough initiated its argument that no(cid:13) protected expression is involved here.(cid:13) 15(cid:13) Conduct is protected by the First Amendment when"the(cid:13) nature of [the] activity, combined with the factual context(cid:13) and environment in which it was undertaken," shows that(cid:13) the "activity was sufficiently imbued with elements of(cid:13) communication to fall within the [First Amendment’s](cid:13) scope." Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1974);(cid:13) Troster v. Pa. State Dep’t of Corrections, 65 F.3d 1086, 1090(cid:13) (3d Cir. 1995). Context is crucial to evaluating an(cid:13) expressive conduct claim because "the context may give(cid:13) meaning to the symbol" or act in question. Spence, 418(cid:13) U.S. at 410.(cid:13) Until 1995, the Supreme Court determined whether(cid:13) speech is "sufficiently imbued with elements of(cid:13) communication" by asking "whether ‘[a]n intent to convey a(cid:13) particularized message was present, and [whether] in the(cid:13) surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that(cid:13) the message would be understood by those who viewed it."’(cid:13) Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting(cid:13) Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11). Applying this two-prong test(cid:13) (the "Spence-Johnson test"), the Supreme Court held that(cid:13) the First Amendment shelters certain forms of nonverbal(cid:13) communication. For instance, Johnson held that burning(cid:13) an American flag as part of a demonstration against the(cid:13) Reagan Administration’s policies that coincided with the(cid:13) 1984 Republican Party convention was "speech" because its(cid:13) "expressive, overtly political nature" was"both intentional(cid:13) and overwhelmingly apparent" to the protestors’ audience.(cid:13) 491 U.S. at 399, 406. Similarly, Spence held that attaching(cid:13) a peace symbol to an American flag and displaying the(cid:13) "peace flag" upside down was protected expression. The(cid:13) actor "testified that he put a peace symbol on the flag and(cid:13) displayed it to public view as a protest against the invasion(cid:13) of Cambodia and the killings at Kent State University,(cid:13) events which occurred a few days prior to his arrest," and(cid:13) "it would have been difficult for the great majority of(cid:13) citizens to miss the drift of appellant’s point at the time(cid:13) that he made it." 418 U.S. at 408, 410. Additional types of(cid:13) nonverbal communication have also been deemed(cid:13) constitutionally protected. See, e.g., Schacht v. United(cid:13) States, 398 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1970) (wearing United States(cid:13) military uniforms as part of theatrical presentation(cid:13) opposing Vietnam War); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.(cid:13) 16(cid:13) Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969)(cid:13) (wearing black armband at school to protest Vietnam War);(cid:13) W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943)(cid:13) (saluting the American flag to show allegiance to the United(cid:13) States); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)(cid:13) (displaying red flag to express opposition to organized(cid:13) government). In other cases, the Court assumed, without(cid:13) deciding, that the nonverbal political demonstrations at(cid:13) issue implicated the First Amendment. Clark v. Community(cid:13) for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)(cid:13) (sleeping in a public park in front of the White House and(cid:13) on the Washington Mall, in the middle of winter, to protest(cid:13) homelessness); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376(cid:13) (1968) (burning Selective Service registration certificate on(cid:13) courthouse steps to protest war).16(cid:13) The Supreme Court’s unanimous 1995 opinion, Hurley v.(cid:13) Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston,(cid:13) 515 U.S. 557 (1995), modified somewhat the test for(cid:13) determining when conduct constitutes "speech." In Hurley,(cid:13) a group of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals of Irish ancestry(cid:13) sued under a state public accommodations law barring(cid:13) discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in an(cid:13) attempt to gain admission to a private St. Patrick’s Day(cid:13) parade in which an array of disparate groups participated.(cid:13) While the parade organizers asserted their First(cid:13) Amendment right to shape the content of their speech, the(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 16. Some Justices have viewed other examples of nonverbal political(cid:13) protest as sufficiently communicative to receive First Amendment(cid:13) protection. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966) (plurality(cid:13) opinion) (finding that black citizens who silently assembled in public(cid:13) library to protest segregated public facilities engaged in expressive(cid:13) conduct); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 201 (1961) (Harlan, J.,(cid:13) concurring in the judgment) (concluding that black persons who sat at(cid:13) "white" lunch counters to protest segregated dining facilities were(cid:13) engaging in symbolic speech and that their disturbing-the-peace(cid:13) convictions, which the majority reversed on insufficient evidence(cid:13) grounds, violated the First Amendment). In addition, the Supreme Court(cid:13) recently recognized a symbolic speech claim in a different context. See(cid:13) City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (plurality opinion)(cid:13) (stating summarily that nude erotic dancing is "expressive conduct,"(cid:13) though "it falls only within the outer ambit of the First Amendment’s(cid:13) protection").(cid:13) 17(cid:13) plaintiffs maintained that the organizers had no First(cid:13) Amendment interest because their lack of selectivity in(cid:13) accepting participants made it impossible for spectators to(cid:13) discern a specific message. Rejecting the plaintiffs’(cid:13) contention, the Supreme Court explained that "a narrow,(cid:13) succinctly articulable message is not a condition of(cid:13) constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions(cid:13) conveying a ‘particularized message,’ would never reach the(cid:13) unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollak, music(cid:13) of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis (cid:13) Carroll."17 Id. at 569 (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 411).(cid:13) By establishing that "a private speaker does not forfeit(cid:13) constitutional protection simply by combining multifarious(cid:13) voices, or by failing to edit their themes to isolate an exact(cid:13) message as the exclusive subject matter of the speech,"(cid:13) Hurley eliminated the "particularized message" aspect of the(cid:13) Spence-Johnson test. Id. at 569-70. The Hurley Court had(cid:13) no need to formulate a new test, however, because--unlike(cid:13) conduct that is not normally communicative--parades are(cid:13) inherently expressive. Id. at 568 ("Parades are thus a form(cid:13) of expression, not just motion, and the inherent(cid:13) expressiveness of marching to make a point explains our(cid:13) cases involving protest marches."). Thus Hurley left open(cid:13) how courts should evaluate symbolic speech claims.(cid:13) Before Hurley, we treated the Spence-Johnson factors as(cid:13) prerequisites for conduct to be deemed expressive. See(cid:13) Steirer by Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d(cid:13) 989, 995, 997 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that participating in(cid:13) community service is not expressive conduct). But after(cid:13) Hurley, our decision in Troster v. Pennsylvania State(cid:13) Department of Corrections, 65 F.3d 1086 (3d Cir. 1995),(cid:13) concluded that Spence (and, implicitly, Johnson as well) set(cid:13) signposts rather than requirements, and that its two factors(cid:13) can no longer be viewed as the only criteria. See id. at 1090(cid:13) & n.1. Because Spence "contained no language of(cid:13) necessity," we adopted the following standard: conduct is(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 17. The Hurley Court proceeded to hold that applying the public(cid:13) accommodations law to force the parade organizers to include the(cid:13) plaintiffs violated the organizers’ First Amendment right to select the(cid:13) components of their message. Id. at 579.(cid:13) 18(cid:13) expressive if, "considering ‘the nature of[the] activity,(cid:13) combined with the factual context and environment in(cid:13) which it was undertaken,’ we are led to the conclusion that(cid:13) the ‘activity was sufficiently imbued with elements of(cid:13) communication to fall within the scope of the First and(cid:13) Fourteenth Amendments."’18Id. at 1090 (quoting Spence,(cid:13) 418 U.S. at 409-10) (alteration in original). We emphasized(cid:13) that this "is a fact-sensitive, context-dependent inquiry,"(cid:13) and that the putative speaker bears the burden of proving(cid:13) that his or her conduct is expressive. Id.(cid:13) We then applied this formulation to reject a state(cid:13) corrections officer’s claim that a regulation mandating that(cid:13) each corrections officer wear an American flag patch on his(cid:13) uniform’s right shirt-sleeve, with the star field facing his(cid:13) rear, violated the First Amendment by compelling him to(cid:13) engage in expressive conduct. Id. at 1088. The officer(cid:13) believed that compulsory display debases the flag and that(cid:13) "displaying the flag with its star field to the rear signifies(cid:13) cowardice and retreat from the principles for which the flag(cid:13) stands." Id. Though we recognized the strength of the(cid:13) officer’s convictions, we determined that he did not show(cid:13) that the act of wearing a flag patch was sufficiently(cid:13) communicative to receive First Amendment protection, as(cid:13) he did not present "evidence to support his otherwise bare(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 18. Outside our Circuit, courts continue to view the Spence-Johnson test(cid:13) as the governing standard for determining whether conduct constitutes(cid:13) protected expression. See, e.g., Gun Owners’ Action League, Inc. v. Swift,(cid:13) 284 F.3d 198, 211 (1st Cir. 2002); Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist.,(cid:13) 268 F.3d 275, 283 (5th Cir. 2001); Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188(cid:13) F.3d 531, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Colacurcio v. City of Kent, 163 F.3d 545,(cid:13) 549 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); Stephenson v. Davenport Cmty. Sch. Dist., 110(cid:13) F.3d 1303, 1307 n.4 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Lewis, 2002 WL(cid:13) 31055185, *8 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 11, 2002); Daly v. Harris, 215 F. Supp.(cid:13) 2d 1098, 1108 (D. Haw. 2002); Isaacs ex rel. Isaacs v. Bd. of Educ., 40(cid:13) F. Supp. 2d 335, 336 (D. Md. 1999); Al-Almin v. City of New York, 979(cid:13) F. Supp. 168, 172 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Fighting Finest, Inc. v. Bratton, 898(cid:13) F. Supp. 192, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Gallo v. County of Sonoma, 120 Cal.(cid:13) Rptr. 2d 550, 569 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), State v. Machholz, 574 N.W.2d(cid:13) 415, 419-20 (Minn. 1998); Binkowski v. State, 731 A.2d 64, 70 (N.J.(cid:13) Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999); State v. Janssen, 580 N.W.2d 260, 266 n.11(cid:13) (Wis. 1998); State v. Berrill, 474 S.E.2d 508, 516 (W. Va. 1996).(cid:13) 19(cid:13) assertion that the flag patch regulation compels expressive(cid:13) conduct." Id. at 1091 n.4.(cid:13) Our discussion in Troster focused on two inquiries. First,(cid:13) we examined whether the officer intended subjectively (i.e.,(cid:13) actually intended) for his conduct to communicate to(cid:13) persons whom he expected to observe it (i.e., his intended(cid:13) audience). We determined that there was no proof that his(cid:13) conduct was "demonstrative of an attitude or belief" or that(cid:13) he "actually assert[ed] anything to anyone." Id. at 1091-92.(cid:13) Second, we considered whether observers understood the(cid:13) message the officer intended his conduct to convey. The(cid:13) record contained no evidence that "observers would likely(cid:13) understand the patch or the wearer to be telling them(cid:13) anything about the wearers’ beliefs" or "that the flag patch(cid:13) on the correctional officers’ uniform will relay any message(cid:13) (ideological or otherwise) to anyone." Id. at 1091-92(cid:13) (emphases in original). Therefore, the officer’s compelled(cid:13) speech claim failed because he did not show that the(cid:13) conduct in which he was forced to engage was expressive.(cid:13) Our emphasis in Troster on the putative speaker’s burden(cid:13) of proving that his conduct is "sufficiently imbued with(cid:13) elements of communication" is important to our resolution(cid:13) of the plaintiffs’ expressive conduct claim in this case. If the(cid:13) putative speaker’s burden were "limited to ‘the(cid:13) advancement of a plausible contention’ that [his or her](cid:13) conduct is expressive"--a view espoused by a plurality of(cid:13) the D.C. Circuit but rejected by the Supreme Court in Clark(cid:13) --the result "would be to create a rule that all conduct is(cid:13) presumptively expressive." Clark, 468 U.S. at 293 n.5. Such(cid:13) a rule would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s(cid:13) repeated admonition that "[w]e cannot accept the view that(cid:13) an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled(cid:13) ‘speech."’ O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376; see also Johnson, 491(cid:13) U.S. at 404; Spence, 418 U.S. at 409. Therefore, as we(cid:13) stressed in Troster, 65 F.3d at 1091-92, and as the(cid:13) Supreme Court held in Clark, "it is the obligation of the(cid:13) person desiring to engage in assertedly expressive conduct(cid:13) to demonstrate that the First Amendment even applies."(cid:13) Clark, 468 U.S. at 293 n.5.(cid:13) With this background as context, we conclude that the(cid:13) plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that affixing(cid:13) 20(cid:13) lechis to utility poles is "sufficiently imbued with elements(cid:13) of communication" to be deemed expressive conduct. The(cid:13) record indicates that the lechis were attached for the benefit(cid:13) of other Orthodox Jews, not the general public. Therefore,(cid:13) if the plaintiffs’ conduct is expressive, their intended(cid:13) audience is other Orthodox Jews. But the plaintiffs have(cid:13) not introduced evidence that the lechis are meant to(cid:13) demonstrate a belief or assert anything to Orthodox Jews or(cid:13) that Orthodox Jews "likely understand" the eruv "to be(cid:13) telling them anything," i.e., that they discern "any message(cid:13) (ideological or otherwise)" from the lechis .19 Troster, 65 F.3d(cid:13) at 1091 (emphases in original). Instead, on the record(cid:13) before us, it appears that the eruv serves a purely(cid:13) functional, non-communicative purpose indistinguishable,(cid:13) for free speech purposes, from that of a fence surrounding(cid:13) a yard or a wall surrounding a building.(cid:13) Rather than "actually assert[ing] anything to anyone," id.(cid:13) at 1092, it seems that the eruv simply demarcates the(cid:13) space within which certain activities otherwise forbidden on(cid:13) the Sabbath are allowed. Plaintiff Chaim Book described(cid:13) the eruv as a "boundary" that "requires physical(cid:13) demarcation," a function historically achieved by"rop[ing](cid:13) an area off." Similarly, at oral argument counsel for the(cid:13) plaintiffs told us that the lechis "replace[ ] the pole[s] that(cid:13) would be used prior to the time there were telephone poles"(cid:13) to designate the eruv’s boundaries. While the plaintiffs(cid:13) describe the eruv in functional terms, explaining that it(cid:13) establishes an area within which Orthodox Jews may(cid:13) engage in certain otherwise impermissible activities, they(cid:13) offer no evidence that it communicates anything. The only(cid:13) evidence the plaintiffs introduced with respect to the(cid:13) religious significance of the eruv was the affidavit of Rabbi(cid:13) Hershel Schachter of Yeshiva University, an expert on(cid:13) Orthodox Jewish law. Rabbi Schachter explained that the(cid:13) eruv enables couples with young children and persons who(cid:13) use wheelchairs to attend synagogue on the Sabbath. He(cid:13) did not, however, suggest that the Orthodox Jews who affix(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 19. As we stated above, see supra note 15, it appears that until we(cid:13) requested briefing on the issue the parties merely assumed that the(cid:13) lechis are protected by the First Amendment.(cid:13) 21(cid:13) lechis intend to send any message thereby, or that the eruv(cid:13) conveys any message to Orthodox Jews.(cid:13) Further, there is no evidence that Orthodox Jews receive(cid:13) a message or ascertain the eruv’s boundaries by looking at(cid:13) the lechis. To the contrary, Rabbi Howard Jachter, speaking(cid:13) on behalf of the TEAI, said that "most Orthodox Jews do(cid:13) not . . . would not know how to make an eruv, wouldn’t see(cid:13) where the eruv is, how it is. A rabbi wouldn’t know how it(cid:13) is." Even plaintiff Chaim Book, who is obviously familiar(cid:13) with the eruv’s boundaries and the lechis’ locations, said, "I,(cid:13) who know some of the poles have lechis, have a hard time(cid:13) recognizing the lechi on the pole by just looking at it." In(cid:13) addition, plaintiffs’ complaint states that "the eruv is not a(cid:13) religious symbol." Thus there is no evidence contradicting(cid:13) the Borough’s assertion at oral argument--which the(cid:13) plaintiffs did not dispute--that Orthodox Jews learn the(cid:13) eruv’s boundaries by word of mouth from the persons(cid:13) charged with erecting and inspecting it.(cid:13) Even if the plaintiffs had introduced evidence that the(cid:13) lechis serve a boundary function, that would be insufficient(cid:13) to prove they are "sufficiently imbued with elements of(cid:13) communication to fall within the scope of the First and(cid:13) Fourteenth Amendments." Troster, 65 F.3d at 1090(cid:13) (internal quotation marks omitted). All boundary lines(cid:13) delineate the realms within which certain activities are or(cid:13) are not allowed. For instance, the invisible boundary(cid:13) between Nevada and Utah separates an area where(cid:13) gambling is legal from one where it is not. A homeowner’s(cid:13) fence demarcates where his neighbor’s garden must stop.(cid:13) The walls of a synagogue delineate the space where(cid:13) congregational worship takes place. But geographical(cid:13) boundary lines, fences, and walls are simply not protected(cid:13) expression in the absence of evidence that some"attitude(cid:13) or belief," Troster, 65 F.3d at 1091, is conveyed or received(cid:13) from them. Cf. Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989)(cid:13) ("It is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost(cid:13) every activity a person undertakes--for example, walking(cid:13) down the street or meeting one’s friends at a shopping mall(cid:13) --but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity(cid:13) within the protection of the First Amendment."); Pro v.(cid:13) Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1293 (3d Cir. 1996) (Roth, J.,(cid:13) 22(cid:13) dissenting) (noting that "expression and communication are(cid:13) the crucial attributes of speech," that "[n]owhere is this(cid:13) stress on expression and communication more clear than(cid:13) in the Court’s approach to speech that falls outside the(cid:13) traditional domain of the spoken or written word," and that(cid:13) "[t]he classic examples of conduct-as-speech all contain(cid:13) patently expressive messages."). Otherwise, the act of(cid:13) constructing houses of worship would implicate the Free(cid:13) Speech Clause, whereas courts consistently analyze the(cid:13) constitutionality of zoning regulations limiting such(cid:13) construction under the Free Exercise Clause, not the Free(cid:13) Speech Clause. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.(cid:13) 507, 534 (1997); Messiah Baptist Church v. County of(cid:13) Jefferson, 859 F.2d 820, 823-26 (10th Cir. 1988);(cid:13) Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Inc.(cid:13) v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 307-08 (6th Cir. 1983);(cid:13) Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Jefferson(cid:13) County, 741 F. Supp. 1522, 1527-34 (N.D. Ala. 1990); cf.(cid:13) Congregation Kol Ami v. Abington Township, 2002 WL(cid:13) 31312280 (3d Cir. Oct. 16, 2002). Moreover, if solely the(cid:13) act of erecting a wall separating the interior of a building(cid:13) from the secular world constituted "speech," every religious(cid:13) group that wanted to challenge a zoning regulation(cid:13) preventing them from constructing a house of worship(cid:13) could raise a "hybrid" rights claim triggering strict scrutiny,(cid:13) see Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82(cid:13) (1990),20 a notion so astonishing that we are unaware of(cid:13) any court--or even any law review article--that has(cid:13) suggested it.(cid:13) Plaintiffs maintain that, although the eruv is functional,(cid:13) it is also expressive, just as the 18-foot Chanukah menorah(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 20. As explained in more detail below, Smith held that the Free Exercise(cid:13) Clause offers no protection when a neutral, generally applicable law(cid:13) incidentally burdens religious practice, with a possible exception for(cid:13) "hybrid" rights situations in which both the right to free exercise of(cid:13) religion and another constitutional right are implicated. 494 U.S. at 879,(cid:13) 881-82. If the law imposing the burden on religious freedom is either not(cid:13) neutral or not generally applicable, however, it violates the First(cid:13) Amendment unless it satisfies strict scrutiny (i.e., unless it is narrowly(cid:13) tailored to advance a compelling government interest). See Church of the(cid:13) Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993).(cid:13) 23(cid:13) in Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU , 492 U.S.(cid:13) 573 (1989), was expressive even though the functional(cid:13) purpose of menorahs is to hold candles. To the extent that(cid:13) the plaintiffs’ point is that functionality and expression are(cid:13) "not mutually exclusive," we do not disagree; things(cid:13) ordinarily used for functional purposes can be used for(cid:13) communicative purposes as well. Name.Space, Inc. v.(cid:13) Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 586 (2d Cir. 2000)(cid:13) (concluding that Internet domain names are ordinarily(cid:13) functional, but can be expressive if they contain a message,(cid:13) e.g., ".jones_for_president"). But there is no evidence that(cid:13) the eruv is an example of such overlapping purposes,(cid:13) whereas there was ample evidence to that effect in(cid:13) Allegheny. As part of a holiday display that stood at the(cid:13) entrance to a government building and included a 45-foot(cid:13) Christmas tree, the 18-foot menorah was both intended(cid:13) and understood to express "a recognition that Christmas is(cid:13) not the only traditional way of observing the winter-holiday(cid:13) season" and "an acknowledgment of Chanukah as a(cid:13) contemporaneous alternative tradition." Allegheny, 492 U.S.(cid:13) at 617-18.(cid:13) In sharp contrast here, there is no evidence that(cid:13) Orthodox Jews intend or understand the eruv to(cid:13) communicate any idea or message. Rather, the evidence(cid:13) shows that the eruv--like a fence around a house or the(cid:13) walls forming a synagogue--serves the purely functional(cid:13) purpose of delineating an area within which certain(cid:13) activities are permitted.(cid:13) We also reject the plaintiffs’ contention that the eruv may(cid:13) be deemed expressive simply because some residents of(cid:13) Tenafly who are not Orthodox Jews discern various(cid:13) unintended messages emanating from it, notwithstanding(cid:13) that these persons would not be intended recipients even if(cid:13) the lechis were meant to send a message. To accept this(cid:13) position would mean that whether conduct is expressive(cid:13) depends entirely on how observers perceive it--even if the(cid:13) actor had no communicative intent, and even if the actor(cid:13) disapproves of the message (or messages) discerned by the(cid:13) observers. See Troster, 65 F.3d at 1092 (noting the(cid:13) difference between an observer’s independent inference(cid:13) from an actor’s behavior and an observer’s receipt of a(cid:13) 24(cid:13) nonverbal message intentionally sent by the actor); Peter(cid:13) Meijes Tiersma, Nonverbal Communication and the Freedom(cid:13) of "Speech", 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 1525, 1553, 1561-62 (stating(cid:13) that nonverbal conduct is expressive only if it involves "a(cid:13) conscious transfer of information," i.e.,"an attempt to(cid:13) communicate" by the actor).(cid:13) Finally, we cannot accept the plaintiffs’ argument that, by(cid:13) analogy to the protection afforded newsracks, the eruv is(cid:13) protected under the First Amendment. Relying on City of(cid:13) Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988),(cid:13) the plaintiffs insist that, just as newsracks facilitate the(cid:13) distribution of newspapers, the eruv facilitates religious(cid:13) worship.21 But City of Lakewood did not treat newsracks as(cid:13) protected based on the sweeping rationale that they(cid:13) facilitate speech, but rather because they are inextricably(cid:13) intertwined with speech. Id. at 768 ("The actual ‘activity’ at(cid:13) issue here is the circulation of newspapers, which is(cid:13) constitutionally protected."). Unlike a newsrack, which(cid:13) facilitates the paradigm of communication (the sale of(cid:13) newspapers), there is no evidence that the eruv is(cid:13) inextricably linked to a communicative activity. Instead, the(cid:13) record shows that the eruv exists solely to designate the(cid:13) boundaries within which Orthodox Jews can engage in(cid:13) certain activities on the Sabbath. Therefore, City of(cid:13) Lakewood does not support the plaintiffs’ position that the(cid:13) non-communicative act of delineating an area constitutes(cid:13) protected expression.(cid:13) In sum, as in Troster, the plaintiffs offer nothing more(cid:13) than a "bare assertion" that their conduct is expressive.22(cid:13) 65 F.3d at 1091 n.4. Because this does not satisfy the(cid:13) plaintiffs’ burden of proof, their free speech claim fails.23(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 21. City of Lakewood, the Supreme Court sustained a facial challenge to(cid:13) an ordinance granting the mayor "unfettered discretion" to grant or deny(cid:13) permits to place newsracks on public property. 486 U.S. at 772.(cid:13) 22. Our holding is limited to the record in this case and does not(cid:13) necessarily preclude the possibility that a party in another case might(cid:13) introduce evidence showing that attaching lechis to utility poles is(cid:13) conduct protected by the Free Speech Clause.(cid:13) 23. Accordingly, the plaintiffs cannot assert a"hybrid rights" claim under(cid:13) the Free Exercise Clause. See infra note 26.(cid:13) 25(cid:13) B. The Free Exercise Claim(cid:13) 1. Determining the appropriate level of scrutiny (cid:13) The Free Exercise Clause, which binds the Borough(cid:13) pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, see Cantwell v.(cid:13) Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), provides that(cid:13) "Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free(cid:13) exercise [of religion]." U.S. Const. amend. I. Depending on(cid:13) the nature of the challenged law or government action, a(cid:13) free exercise claim can prompt either strict scrutiny or(cid:13) rational basis review.24(cid:13) If a law is "neutral" and "generally applicable," and(cid:13) burdens religious conduct only incidentally, the Free(cid:13) Exercise Clause offers no protection. Employment Div. v.(cid:13) Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).25 Smith held that the Free(cid:13) Exercise Clause did not require a state to exempt the(cid:13) ingestion of peyote during a Native American Church(cid:13) ceremony from its neutral, generally applicable prohibition(cid:13) on using that drug. Id. at 882. On the other hand, if the(cid:13) law is not neutral (i.e., if it discriminates against religiously(cid:13) motivated conduct) or is not generally applicable (i.e., if it(cid:13) proscribes particular conduct only or primarily when(cid:13) religiously motivated), strict scrutiny applies and the(cid:13) burden on religious conduct violates the Free Exercise(cid:13) Clause unless it is narrowly tailored to advance a(cid:13) compelling government interest.26Church of the Lukumi(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 24. To survive strict scrutiny, a challenged government action must be(cid:13) narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest, whereas(cid:13) rational basis review requires merely that the action be rationally related(cid:13) to a legitimate government objective. As explained below, an intermediate(cid:13) level of scrutiny may apply in the public employment context.(cid:13) 25. Smith involved a criminal law, but its rule also applies in the context(cid:13) of non-criminal laws and regulations. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu(cid:13) Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993); Fraternal Order of(cid:13) Police v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 363-64 (3d Cir. 1999).(cid:13) 26. Strict scrutiny may also apply when a neutral, generally applicable(cid:13) law incidentally burdens rights protected by "the Free Exercise Clause in(cid:13) conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of(cid:13) speech and of the press, or the rights of parents . . . to direct the(cid:13) education of their children," Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (citations omitted),(cid:13) but the plaintiffs do not assert such a "hybrid rights" claim.(cid:13) 26(cid:13) Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532, 542(cid:13) (1993).(cid:13) Further, the Free Exercise Clause’s mandate of neutrality(cid:13) toward religion prohibits government from "deciding that(cid:13) secular motivations are more important than religious(cid:13) motivations." Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark,(cid:13) 170 F.3d 359, 365 (3d Cir. 1999). Accordingly, in situations(cid:13) where government officials exercise discretion in applying a(cid:13) facially neutral law, so that whether they enforce the law(cid:13) depends on their evaluation of the reasons underlying a(cid:13) violator’s conduct, they contravene the neutrality(cid:13) requirement if they exempt some secularly motivated(cid:13) conduct but not comparable religiously motivated conduct.(cid:13) See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537; Smith, 494 U.S. at 884;(cid:13) Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986) (plurality opinion);(cid:13) Fraternal Order of Police, 170 F.3d at 364-65. Thus in(cid:13) Lukumi the Supreme Court invalidated an ordinance(cid:13) "punishing ‘[w]hoever . . . unnecessarily . . . kills any(cid:13) animal,’ " where state and local officials interpreted the(cid:13) ordinance to ban animal sacrifices during Santeria religious(cid:13) ceremonies, but to exempt secular activities such as(cid:13) hunting, slaughtering animals for food, and even using live(cid:13) rabbits to train greyhounds. 508 U.S. at 537 (alteration in(cid:13) original). The officials’ selective application of the ordinance(cid:13) "devalue[d] religious reasons for killing by judging them to(cid:13) be of lesser import than nonreligious reasons," causing(cid:13) religiously motivated conduct to be "singled out for(cid:13) discriminatory treatment." Id. at 537-38. Therefore, strict(cid:13) scrutiny applied, and the ordinance failed that test because(cid:13) its "proffered objectives [were] not pursued with respect to(cid:13) analogous non-religious conduct." Id. at 546.(cid:13) Because the ordinance in Lukumi gave officials discretion(cid:13) to consider "the particular justification" for each violation,(cid:13) it "represent[ed] a system of ‘individualized governmental(cid:13) assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct,’ "(cid:13) triggering under Smith strict scrutiny of the ordinance’s(cid:13) application to religiously motivated conduct. Id. at 537(cid:13) (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 884). In Fraternal Order of(cid:13) Police, we held that the neutrality principle applies with(cid:13) equal force when government creates categorical, as(cid:13) opposed to individualized, exceptions for secularly(cid:13) 27(cid:13) motivated conduct. 170 F.3d at 365. A city’s police(cid:13) department applied its no-beard policy, which was designed(cid:13) to promote uniform appearance, to allow medical(cid:13) exemptions but deny similar exemptions to two Sunni(cid:13) Muslim officers whose faith required them to grow beards.(cid:13) Id. at 360-61, 366. Selective enforcement of this nature, we(cid:13) said, exemplified the Supreme Court’s concern in Smith and(cid:13) Lukumi about "the prospect of the government’s deciding(cid:13) that secular motivations are more important than religious(cid:13) motivations." Id. at 365. It showed that the police(cid:13) department "made a value judgment that secular (i.e.,(cid:13) medical) motivations for wearing a beard are important(cid:13) enough to overcome its general interest in uniformity but(cid:13) that religious motivations are not." Id. at 366. Therefore,(cid:13) the enforcement of the policy against the Sunni Muslim(cid:13) officers was "sufficiently suggestive of discriminatory intent(cid:13) . . . to trigger heightened scrutiny under Smith and Lukumi."27(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 27. Smith and Lukumi state unambiguously that strict scrutiny applies(cid:13) when government discriminates against religiously motivated conduct.(cid:13) See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884; Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546. However, our(cid:13) decision in Fraternal Order of Police applied only "heightened" or(cid:13) "intermediate" scrutiny, under which the challenged government action(cid:13) must be substantially related (rather than narrowly tailored) to(cid:13) promoting an important (rather than compelling) government interest.(cid:13) We did so because First Amendment rights are limited in the public(cid:13) employment context by a government’s need to function efficiently. See,(cid:13) e.g., United States v. Nat’l Employees Treasury Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465(cid:13) (1995); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). In any event,(cid:13) we determined that the police department’s discriminatory value(cid:13) judgment failed even intermediate scrutiny. Fraternal Order of Police, 170(cid:13) F.3d at 365-66 & n.7.(cid:13) We note that, in contrast to our decision in Fraternal Order of Police,(cid:13) two other circuit courts have stated that the Free Exercise Clause offers(cid:13) no protection when a statute or policy contains broad, objectively defined(cid:13) exceptions not entailing subjective, individualized consideration. See(cid:13) Swanson v. Guthrie v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 701 (10th(cid:13) Cir. 1998) (stating that school district’s excepting fifth-year seniors and(cid:13) special education students from "no-part-time-attendance" policy did not(cid:13) require strict scrutiny of refusal to allow Christian home-schooled(cid:13) student to attend part-time); Am. Friends Serv. Comm. v. Thornburgh,(cid:13) 951 F.2d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 1991) (determining that exceptions in(cid:13) statute regulating immigrant hiring for independent contractors,(cid:13) household employees, and employees hired before November 1986 did(cid:13) not trigger strict scrutiny of denial of religiously motivated exemption(cid:13) request because the statutory exceptions "exclude entire, objectively-(cid:13) defined categories of employees from the scope of the statute").(cid:13) 28(cid:13) Id. at 365. The Sunni Muslim officers’ beards posed no(cid:13) greater threat to uniform appearance than did the beards(cid:13) worn by officers with medical conditions. Id. at 366. Thus(cid:13) the police department’s policy was void under "any degree(cid:13) of heightened scrutiny." Id. at 367.(cid:13) Smith, Lukumi, and Fraternal Order of Police point the(cid:13) way to the appropriate level of scrutiny in this case. On its(cid:13) face, Ordinance 691 is neutral and generally applicable.(cid:13) But "[o]fficial action that targets religious conduct for(cid:13) distinctive treatment cannot be shielded [from(cid:13) constitutional attack] by mere compliance with the(cid:13) requirement of facial neutrality." Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534.(cid:13) We must look beyond the text of the ordinance and(cid:13) examine whether the Borough enforces it on a religion-(cid:13) neutral basis, as "the effect of a law in its real operation is(cid:13) strong evidence of its object." Id. at 535.(cid:13) Because Ordinance 691 is neutral and generally(cid:13) applicable on its face, if the Borough had enforced it(cid:13) uniformly, Smith would control and the plaintiffs’ claim(cid:13) would accordingly fail. The Borough insists it has done so,(cid:13) but the record shows otherwise. Indeed, the Borough has(cid:13) tacitly or expressly granted exemptions from the(cid:13) ordinance’s unyielding language for various secular and(cid:13) religious--though never Orthodox Jewish--purposes. Cf.(cid:13) Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69 (1953) (holding(cid:13) that city violated Free Exercise Clause by enforcing(cid:13) ordinance banning meetings in park against Jehovah’s(cid:13) Witnesses but exempting other religious groups).(cid:13) From the drab house numbers and lost animal signs to(cid:13) the more obtrusive holiday displays, church directional(cid:13) signs, and orange ribbons--the last of which the District(cid:13) Court erroneously deemed irrelevant to the constitutional(cid:13) analysis28--the Borough has allowed private citizens to affix(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 28. Pursuant to our "constitutional duty to conduct an independent(cid:13) examination of the record as a whole," Hurley , 515 U.S. at 567, we(cid:13) believe there is ample evidence in the record showing that orange(cid:13) ribbons were attached to the Borough’s utility poles for "a lengthy period(cid:13) of time" and that Borough officials knew about them but made no effort(cid:13) to remove them. A594-95 (Mayor Moscovitz Test.); see also A277(cid:13) (statement of Tenafly resident Lee Rosenbaum that"[s]urely, a town that(cid:13) brandished orange ribbons tied to almost every pole in town for what I(cid:13) think was several years can tolerate some unobtrusive markers").(cid:13) 29(cid:13) various materials to its utility poles. Apart from their(cid:13) religious nature, the lechis are comparable to the postings(cid:13) the Borough has left in place. If anything, the lechis are(cid:13) less of a problem because they are so unobtrusive; even(cid:13) observant Jews are often unable to distinguish them from(cid:13) ordinary utility wires. While the Borough alleges that the(cid:13) lechis are different because the plaintiffs intend them to be(cid:13) "permanent," house numbers nailed to utility poles are(cid:13) likewise intended to be permanent. And although the(cid:13) Borough insists that the lechis’ religious nature justifies its(cid:13) decision to remove them, this is precisely the sort of(cid:13) reasoning that Lukumi and Fraternal Order of Police forbid.(cid:13) We believe that the Borough’s selective, discretionary(cid:13) application of Ordinance 691 against the lechis violates the(cid:13) neutrality principle of Lukumi and Fraternal Order of Police(cid:13) because it "devalues" Orthodox Jewish reasons for posting(cid:13) items on utility poles by "judging them to be of lesser(cid:13) import than nonreligious reasons," and thus "single[s] out"(cid:13) the plaintiffs’ religiously motivated conduct for(cid:13) discriminatory treatment. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537;(cid:13) Fraternal Order of Police, 170 F.3d at 364-65. 29 Just as the(cid:13) exemptions for secularly motivated killings in Lukumi(cid:13) indicated that the city was discriminating against Santeria(cid:13) animal sacrifice, and just as the medical exemption in(cid:13) Fraternal Order of Police indicated that the police(cid:13) department was discriminating against religiously(cid:13) motivated requests to grow beards, the Borough’s(cid:13) invocation of the often-dormant Ordinance 691 against(cid:13) conduct motivated by Orthodox Jewish beliefs is(cid:13) "sufficiently suggestive of discriminatory intent," Fraternal(cid:13) Order of Police, 170 F.3d at 365, that we must apply strict(cid:13) scrutiny. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546.30(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 29. We note, however, that we reject the plaintiffs’ contention that the(cid:13) Free Exercise Clause bars the Borough from distinguishing between the(cid:13) lechis and the plastic-covered wires attached to utility poles by telephone(cid:13) and cable television companies. Because utility poles exist to facilitate(cid:13) telecommunications, utility wires are obviously unlike any of the other(cid:13) materials the Borough has allowed people to affix to the poles.(cid:13) 30. Whereas First Amendment rights are necessarily limited in the public(cid:13) employment context, see Nat’l Employees Treasury Union, 513 U.S. at(cid:13) 30(cid:13) The Borough nonetheless contends that three aspects of(cid:13) this case--the plaintiffs’ use of government property, the(cid:13) lack of a "substantial burden" on the plaintiffs’ religious(cid:13) freedom, and the "optional" nature of the eruv--place it(cid:13) outside the framework of Lukumi and Fraternal Order of(cid:13) Police, and thus preclude us from applying strict scrutiny(cid:13) even though the Borough has discriminated against(cid:13) conduct motivated by Orthodox Jewish beliefs.(cid:13) First, the Borough insists that, because the utility poles(cid:13) are on its land, this case is governed by Lyng v. Northwest(cid:13) Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988),(cid:13) which held that the Free Exercise Clause did not prevent(cid:13) the federal government from implementing a decision,(cid:13) based on religion-neutral criteria, to construct a road and(cid:13) allow timber harvesting on 17,000 acres of national forest(cid:13) land traditionally used by Native Americans for religious(cid:13) practices. Id. at 447-53; see also Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S.(cid:13) 693, 699-701, 708 (1986) (holding that Free Exercise(cid:13) Clause did not require government to grant religious(cid:13) exemption from generally applicable, religion-neutral(cid:13) statutory requirement that welfare recipients furnish their(cid:13) Social Security numbers where no individualized(cid:13) exemptions were allowed). According to the Borough, the(cid:13) controlling principle is that "‘the Free Exercise Clause is(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 465, our case, unlike Fraternal Order of Police , involves purely private(cid:13) conduct. Thus Smith and Lukumi obligate us to apply strict scrutiny. See(cid:13) supra note 27.(cid:13) We note that, in determining the appropriate standard to apply, we do(cid:13) not believe it necessary to consider the subjective motivations of the(cid:13) Council members who voted to remove the eruv. Lukumi and Fraternal(cid:13) Order of Police inferred discriminatory purpose from the objective effects(cid:13) of the selective exemptions at issue without examining the responsible(cid:13) officials’ motives. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537-38; Fraternal Order of(cid:13) Police, 170 F.3d at 364-66; see also Laurence H. Tribe, American(cid:13) Constitutional Law S 5-16, at 956 (3d ed. 2000) ("Under Smith, a law that(cid:13) is not neutral or that is not generally applicable can violate the Free(cid:13) Exercise Clause without regard to the motives of those who enacted the(cid:13) measure."). Likewise, the objective effects of the Borough’s enforcement(cid:13) of Ordinance 691 are sufficient for us to conclude that it is not being(cid:13) applied neutrally against the eruv.(cid:13) 31(cid:13) written in terms of what the government cannot do to the(cid:13) individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact(cid:13) from the government."’ Northwest Indian Cemetery, 485(cid:13) U.S. at 451 (1988) (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 412(cid:13) (Douglas, J., concurring)); Roy, 476 U.S. at 700.(cid:13) Contrary to the Borough’s position, however, the(cid:13) principle of Lukumi and Fraternal Order of Police--that(cid:13) government cannot discriminate between religiously(cid:13) motivated conduct and comparable secularly motivated(cid:13) conduct in a manner that devalues religious reasons for(cid:13) acting--applies not only when a coercive law or regulation(cid:13) prohibits religious conduct, but also when government(cid:13) denies religious adherents access to publicly available(cid:13) money or property. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,(cid:13) 404-05 (1963) (holding that Free Exercise Clause prohibits(cid:13) state from devaluing religious reasons for seeking(cid:13) unemployment benefits); Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748,(cid:13) 753-54 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that Free Exercise Clause(cid:13) bars state from making college scholarships contingent on(cid:13) recipients not majoring in theology); cf. Rosenberger v.(cid:13) Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. at 831-35(cid:13) (holding that Free Speech Clause precludes state university(cid:13) that pays student publications’ printing costs from denying(cid:13) funding based on publication’s religious viewpoint).(cid:13) In contrast, the principle of Northwest Indian Cemetery(cid:13) applies only when a person of faith asks for special, not(cid:13) equal, treatment in the context of a religion-neutral policy.(cid:13) See Adams v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 170 F.3d 173,(cid:13) 181 & n.10 (3d Cir. 1999) (rejecting argument that(cid:13) "uniform and facially neutral" penalty for"a conscious,(cid:13) intentional failure" to file taxes could not be applied to(cid:13) religious objector); Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No.(cid:13) I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 701-02 (10th Cir. 1998) (rejecting claim(cid:13) that school district must grant religiously motivated request(cid:13) for individualized exemption from no-part-time-attendance(cid:13) policy where no individualized exemptions were granted). It(cid:13) does not apply when government discriminates against(cid:13) religiously motivated conduct in allocating "the rights,(cid:13) benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens."(cid:13) Northwest Indian Cemetery, 485 U.S. at 449.(cid:13) 32(cid:13) In this case, the plaintiffs are not asking for preferential(cid:13) treatment. Instead, they ask only that the Borough not(cid:13) invoke an ordinance from which others are effectively(cid:13) exempt to deny plaintiffs access to its utility poles simply(cid:13) because they want to use the poles for a religious purpose.(cid:13) Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273 n.13 (1981) ("This(cid:13) case is different from the cases in which religious groups(cid:13) claim that the denial of facilities not available to other(cid:13) groups deprives them of their rights under the Free(cid:13) Exercise Clause.") (emphasis in original); Davey, 299 F.3d(cid:13) at 757-58 ("This is not a case where a person claims that(cid:13) denial of a financial benefit which is not available to others(cid:13) deprives him of his free exercise rights."). Therefore, Lukumi(cid:13) and Fraternal Order of Police, not Northwest Indian(cid:13) Cemetary, control our disposition.(cid:13) Second, the Borough maintains that strict scrutiny(cid:13) should not apply because the plaintiffs have not shown that(cid:13) the removal of the eruv would substantially burden their(cid:13) religious practice. Under Smith and Lukumi, however, there(cid:13) is no substantial burden requirement when government(cid:13) discriminates against religious conduct. See Lukumi, 508(cid:13) U.S. at 531-47 (finding Free Exercise Clause violation(cid:13) without considering whether a substantial burden on(cid:13) religious freedom existed); Fraternal Order of Police, 170(cid:13) F.3d at 364-67 (same); Brown v. Borough of Mahaffey, 35(cid:13) F.3d 846, 849-50 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Applying such a burden(cid:13) test to non-neutral government actions would make petty(cid:13) harassment of religious institutions and exercise immune(cid:13) from the protection of the First Amendment."). Instead, the(cid:13) plaintiffs need to show only "a sufficient interest in the case(cid:13) to meet the normal requirement of constitutional standing,"(cid:13) Hartmann v. Stone, 68 F.3d 973, 979 n.4 (6th Cir. 1995)(cid:13) (rejecting substantial burden requirement), and their(cid:13) inability to attend synagogue on the Sabbath without the(cid:13) eruv easily suffices.(cid:13) Moreover, Smith admonished courts not to engage in the(cid:13) sort of inquiry the Borough demands. The Supreme Court(cid:13) explained that "[j]udging the centrality of different religious(cid:13) practices" violates the principle that "courts must not(cid:13) presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a(cid:13) religion." Smith, 494 U.S. at 887; see also DeHart v. Horn,(cid:13) 33(cid:13) 227 F.3d 47, 56 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (same). Evaluating(cid:13) the extent of a burden on religious practice is equally(cid:13) impermissible, the Smith Court said, because it entails a(cid:13) forbidden inquiry into religious doctrine. "‘Constitutionally(cid:13) significant burden’ would seem to be ‘centrality’ under(cid:13) another name," and "inquiry into ‘severe impact’ is no(cid:13) different from inquiry into centrality."31 Smith, 494 U.S. at(cid:13) 887 n.4; see also Northwest Indian Cemetery, 485 U.S. at(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 31. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s admonition in Smith against(cid:13) judicial inquiries into the centrality of religious practices, a number of(cid:13) circuit courts persist in imposing a substantial burden requirement in(cid:13) various contexts. See, e.g., Levitan v. Ashcroft, 281 F.3d 1313, 1320(cid:13) (D.C. Cir. 2002) (stating in prison context that free exercise plaintiff(cid:13) must demonstrate that the challenged law burdens"a central tenet or(cid:13) important practice of [his] religion"); Am. Family Ass’n, Inc. v. City and(cid:13) County of San Francisco, 277 F.3d 1114, 1124 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting(cid:13) that Ninth Circuit continues to demand that a plaintiff show substantial(cid:13) burden in challenges to government actions that are not "regulatory,(cid:13) proscriptive or compulsory," though the more recent decision in Davey v.(cid:13) Locke, discussed above, did not impose this requirement); Altman v.(cid:13) Minn. Dep’t of Corrections, 251 F.3d 1199, 1204 (8th Cir. 2001)(cid:13) ("Government significantly burdens the exercise of religion if it(cid:13) significantly constrains conduct or expression that manifests a central(cid:13) tenet of a person’s religious beliefs, meaningfully curtails the ability to(cid:13) express adherence to a particular faith, or denies reasonable(cid:13) opportunities to engage in fundamental religious activities."); Altman v.(cid:13) Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 245 F.3d 49, 79 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating, contrary(cid:13) to Smith and Lukumi and without citing either opinion, that substantial(cid:13) burden test applies when neutral law incidentally impinges on religious(cid:13) exercise); Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57, 65 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting a(cid:13) pre-Smith case for the proposition that"the free exercise inquiry [is](cid:13) whether government has placed a substantial burden on the observation(cid:13) of a central belief or practice") (internal quotation marks omitted)(cid:13) (emphasis in original); United States v. Grant , 117 F.3d 788, 793 (5th(cid:13) Cir. 1997) (rejecting free exercise claim, without citing Smith or Lukumi,(cid:13) on ground that plaintiff’s religious freedom was not substantially(cid:13) burdened); Goodall by Goodall v. Stafford County Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168,(cid:13) 173 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that substantial burden requirement applies(cid:13) when challenged law is not generally applicable); Fleischfresser v. Dirs. of(cid:13) Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680, 689-90 (7th Cir. 1994) (requiring(cid:13) substantial burden as prerequisite for free exercise claim without citing(cid:13) Smith); Church of Scientology v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1549(cid:13) (11th Cir. 1993) (stating that strict scrutiny applies when a law that(cid:13) targets religion imposes a substantial burden on believers).(cid:13) 34(cid:13) 451 ("Whatever may be the exact line between(cid:13) unconstitutional prohibitions on the free exercise of religion(cid:13) and the legitimate conduct by government of its own affairs,(cid:13) the location of the line cannot depend on measuring the(cid:13) effects of a governmental action on a religious objector’s(cid:13) spiritual development."); cf. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269 n.6(cid:13) (rejecting distinction between "religious worship" and other(cid:13) religious speech because it would require courts"to inquire(cid:13) into the significance of words and practices to different(cid:13) religious faiths" and "[s]uch inquiries would tend inevitably(cid:13) to entangle the State with religion in a manner forbidden by(cid:13) our cases").(cid:13) Third, the Borough asserts that the plaintiffs cannot(cid:13) state a free exercise claim because the eruv is an "optional"(cid:13) religious practice. For reasons similar to those counseling(cid:13) against requiring the plaintiffs to demonstrate a substantial(cid:13) burden on their religious practice, we cannot accept the(cid:13) Borough’s contention that courts presented with free(cid:13) exercise claims should, as a threshold matter, determine(cid:13) whether the religious practices at issue are "mandatory" or(cid:13) "optional." We need not consider whether the Borough’s(cid:13) characterization of the eruv is accurate. Neither the(cid:13) Supreme Court nor our Court has intimated that only(cid:13) compulsory religious practices fall within the ambit of the(cid:13) Free Exercise Clause. To the contrary, our en banc decision(cid:13) in DeHart said that conduct implicates the Free Exercise(cid:13) Clause if it is motivated by "beliefs which are both sincerely(cid:13) held and religious in nature" without regard to whether it(cid:13) is mandatory. 227 F.3d at 51; cf. id. at 54-55 (rejecting(cid:13) contention that, in the context of prisoners’ free exercise(cid:13) claims, conduct based on "religious commandments"(cid:13) should receive more protection than conduct that is"a(cid:13) positive expression of belief"); see also Levitan v. Ashcroft,(cid:13) 281 F.3d 1313, 1319 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that,(cid:13) because "[a] requirement that a religious practice be(cid:13) mandatory to warrant First Amendment protection finds no(cid:13) warrant in the cases of the Supreme Court or of this court,"(cid:13) Catholic prisoners could raise free exercise challenge to rule(cid:13) barring them from consuming small amounts of wine(cid:13) during Communion).32 Further, if the Borough’s position(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 32. But see Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 1993) (suggesting,(cid:13) without citing supporting legal authority, that there is a "distinction(cid:13) 35(cid:13) were correct, the Lukumi Court would have considered(cid:13) whether Santeria adherents believe their faith commands(cid:13) them to sacrifice animals. But the Court did not do so,(cid:13) instead deeming it sufficient that they had a sincere desire(cid:13) to sacrifice animals for religious reasons. See Lukumi, 508(cid:13) U.S. at 531.(cid:13) Additionally, if anything turned on whether a religious(cid:13) practice is "mandatory" or "optional," courts would have to(cid:13) question "the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations(cid:13) of [their] creeds" and perhaps even adjudicate(cid:13) "controversies over religious authority or dogma," tasks that(cid:13) are "not within the judicial ken." Smith , 494 U.S. at 877,(cid:13) 887 (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Presbyterian(cid:13) Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Hull Mem’l Presbyterian(cid:13) Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449-50 (1969) (holding that the Free(cid:13) Exercise Clause prohibits courts from deciding church(cid:13) property disputes by resolving underlying conflicts over "the(cid:13) interpretation of particular church doctrines and the(cid:13) importance of those doctrines to the religion"); see also(cid:13) United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 84-88 (1944) (holding(cid:13) that courts can inquire into the sincerity, but not the truth(cid:13) or falsity, of religious beliefs).(cid:13) Finally, if the First Amendment shielded only compulsory(cid:13) religious practices, religions without commandments(cid:13) "would find themselves outside the scope of First(cid:13) Amendment protection altogether," Levitan, 281 F.3d at(cid:13) 1320, a result antithetical to basic Free Exercise Clause(cid:13) norms. See, e.g., Fowler, 345 U.S. at 70 ("[I]t is no business(cid:13) of courts to say that what is a religious practice or activity(cid:13) for one group is not religion under the protection of the(cid:13) First Amendment.").(cid:13) As the Borough’s arguments for eschewing strict scrutiny(cid:13) are unpersuasive, we must consider whether its invocation(cid:13) of Ordinance 691 against the lechis is likely to pass that(cid:13) test.(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) between a religious practice which is a positive expression of belief and(cid:13) a religious commandment which the believer may not violate at peril of(cid:13) his soul" in the context of prisoners’ free exercise claims).(cid:13) 36(cid:13) 2. Application of strict scrutiny(cid:13) Because the Borough’s decision to remove the eruv is not(cid:13) neutral toward conduct motivated by Orthodox Jewish(cid:13) beliefs, it "must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny."(cid:13) Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546. To be permissible under the Free(cid:13) Exercise Clause, it "must advance interests of the highest(cid:13) order and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those(cid:13) interests." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The(cid:13) Borough attempts to justify its decision to remove the eruv,(cid:13) and distinguish the lechis from the violations of Ordinance(cid:13) 691 it has tolerated, on the grounds that the lechis are(cid:13) "permanent" and religious in nature. Neither ground is(cid:13) persuasive.(cid:13) Much of our strict scrutiny analysis parallels our earlier(cid:13) discussion of why the Borough’s decision is not religion-(cid:13) neutral. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546-47 (stating that lack(cid:13) of neutrality eviscerates contention that restriction is(cid:13) narrowly tailored to advance compelling interest). First, for(cid:13) many years--and, the record shows, after the plaintiffs(cid:13) sued--the Borough has allowed its residents to nail house(cid:13) numbers to utility poles. Because the Borough has(cid:13) tolerated equally permanent house numbers, it hardly has(cid:13) a compelling interest in refusing to allow the inconspicuous(cid:13) lechis on the ground that they are permanent. Further, it is(cid:13) hard to see how the allegedly permanent nature of the(cid:13) unobtrusive lechis somehow undermines Ordinance 691’s(cid:13) objective of avoiding visual clutter and maintaining control(cid:13) over municipal property more than items like bright orange(cid:13) ribbons and lost animal signs. Moreover, even if the(cid:13) Borough had a compelling interest in preventing permanent(cid:13) fixtures on its utility poles, its decision to remove the eruv(cid:13) while allowing the house numbers is not narrowly tailored(cid:13) to promote that interest.(cid:13) Though the Borough’s claim that it can remove the eruv(cid:13) because of its religious nature requires more discussion, it(cid:13) is similarly unpersuasive. The Borough maintains that its(cid:13) decision to remove the eruv is justified by its "compelling"(cid:13) interest in avoiding "an Establishment Clause controversy."(cid:13) Contrary to the Borough’s position, however, a government(cid:13) interest in imposing greater separation of church and state(cid:13) than the federal Establishment Clause mandates is not(cid:13) 37(cid:13) compelling in the First Amendment context. See Widmar,(cid:13) 454 U.S. at 276 (rejecting state university’s contention that(cid:13) its interest in complying with the state constitution’s(cid:13) prohibition on religious establishments, which was more(cid:13) restrictive than its federal counterpart, justified(cid:13) discriminating against religious speech, and explaining that(cid:13) "the state interest asserted here--in achieving greater(cid:13) separation of church and State than is already ensured(cid:13) under the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution(cid:13) --is limited by the Free Exercise Clause and in this case by(cid:13) the Free Speech Clause as well")33 Davey, 299 F.3d at 759(cid:13) (same in context of free exercise claim).(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 33. In 1990, a divided panel of our Court suggested in dictum--in a case(cid:13) that did not involve a Free Exercise Clause claim, and without citing(cid:13) Widmar--that public schools have "a compelling interest in maintaining(cid:13) the appearance of religious neutrality" in their classrooms, and that this(cid:13) interest, even if not required by the Establishment Clause, might(cid:13) outweigh public employees’ free exercise right to wear religious garb.(cid:13) United States v. Board of Education, 911 F.2d 882, 889 (3d Cir. 1990)(cid:13) (holding that Title VII does not require public schools to allow teachers(cid:13) to wear religious garb, as this would impose an"undue hardship" on the(cid:13) schools under 42 U.S.C. S 2000e(j)). The opinions cited in support of this(cid:13) proposition were Cooper v. Eugene School District, 723 P.2d 298 (Or.(cid:13) 1986)--which also did not cite Widmar--and the Supreme Court’s one-(cid:13) sentence order dismissing an appeal from the Oregon Supreme Court’s(cid:13) ruling "for want of a substantial federal question." 480 U.S. 942 (1987).(cid:13) To the extent that the Oregon Supreme Court held in Cooper that(cid:13) concerns about appearing neutral toward religion could outweigh(cid:13) employees’ free exercise rights in the public school context, we do not(cid:13) believe the United States Supreme Court’s summary disposition(cid:13) approved that reasoning. Instead, we believe, especially in light of(cid:13) subsequent doctrinal developments, that the dictum in United States v.(cid:13) Board of Education may be inconsistent with Widmar’s principle that an(cid:13) interest in more separation between church and state than the(cid:13) Establishment Clause requires cannot justify restricting rights shielded(cid:13) by the Free Exercise Clause. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276.(cid:13) First, summary dispositions by the Supreme Court"cannot be taken(cid:13) as adopting the reasoning of the lower court," Wis. Dep’t of Revenue v.(cid:13) Wrigley Co., 505 U.S. 214, 224 n.2 (1992); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S.(cid:13) 55, 64 n.13 (1982) (same), and they can be used as precedent "only if(cid:13) the [lower court’s] decision[ ] rested solely on established constitutional(cid:13) principles and did not break any new ground." Robert L. Stern et al.,(cid:13) Supreme Court Practice S 4.29, at 284 (8th ed. 2002). Hence the Supreme(cid:13) 38(cid:13) The Borough further argues, however, that leaving the(cid:13) eruv in place would constitute an actual Establishment(cid:13) Clause violation, and that the need to avoid such a(cid:13) violation justifies discriminating against the plaintiffs’(cid:13) religiously motivated conduct. Before explaining why this(cid:13) argument is also unavailing, we must examine the Supreme(cid:13) Court’s recent pronouncements in the area.34 Until the past(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) Court’s summary disposition in Cooper cannot be interpreted as(cid:13) endorsing the Oregon Supreme Court’s reasoning, particularly since that(cid:13) reasoning flatly contradicts Widmar. See Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S.(cid:13) 379, 388-89 n.15 (1975) (stating that, even though a lower court’s(cid:13) interpretation of a summary affirmance by the Supreme Court was(cid:13) "plausible," it was improper because it would"leave little vitality" to an(cid:13) earlier Supreme Court decision); see also id. at 391-92 (Burger, C.J.,(cid:13) concurring) ("An unexplicated summary affirmance settles the issues for(cid:13) the parties, and is not to be read as a renunciation by this Court of(cid:13) doctrines previously announced in our opinions after full argument.").(cid:13) Since Cooper, moreover, the Supreme Court has held in several cases(cid:13) that a government interest in appearing neutral toward religion, where(cid:13) not necessary to comply with the Establishment Clause, cannot justify(cid:13) limiting First Amendment rights. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent.(cid:13) Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112-19 (2001); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839-46;(cid:13) Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761-63(cid:13) (1995); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.(cid:13) 384, 395 (1993). Because subsequent doctrinal developments remove(cid:13) whatever precedential authority a summary disposition inconsistent with(cid:13) them might have, see Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1975);(cid:13) Lecates v. Justice of Peace Ct. No. 4, 637 F.2d 898, 902 (3d Cir. 1980),(cid:13) we believe that in all likelihood the Supreme Court summarily dismissed(cid:13) the appeal in Cooper under the principle of Pickering v. Board of(cid:13) Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), which held that government can impose(cid:13) restrictions on the First Amendment rights "of public employees that(cid:13) would be plainly unconstitutional if applied to the public at large." United(cid:13) States v. Nat’l Employees Treasury Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465 (1995).(cid:13) Thus the Supreme Court had no need in Cooper to consider whether an(cid:13) interest in appearing neutral toward religion can trump free exercise(cid:13) rights outside the context of public employment.(cid:13) 34. Two courts have held that the Establishment Clause allows a(cid:13) municipality affirmatively to grant Orthodox Jews access to public(cid:13) property so they can create an eruv. See ACLU of N.J. v. City of Long(cid:13) Branch, 670 F. Supp. 1293, 1295-97 (D.N.J. 1987); Smith v. Community(cid:13) Bd. No. 14, 491 N.Y.S.2d 584, 586-87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985), aff’d, 518(cid:13) N.Y.S.2d 356, 357 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). Those cases are not on point(cid:13) here because the Borough has not approved the eruv.(cid:13) 39(cid:13) decade, the Supreme Court generally applied the three-(cid:13) prong test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971),(cid:13) under which government action is consistent with the(cid:13) Establishment Clause if it (1) "has a secular purpose"; (2)(cid:13) "does not have the principal or primary effect of advancing(cid:13) or inhibiting religion"; and (3) "does not foster an excessive(cid:13) entanglement with religion." Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches(cid:13) Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993). 35(cid:13) Recent Supreme Court decisions, however, have not(cid:13) applied the Lemon test. Instead, in cases involving(cid:13) Establishment Clause challenges to private individuals’ use(cid:13) of government resources, the Court has applied the(cid:13) endorsement test developed by Justice O’Connor, which(cid:13) dispenses with the "entanglement" prong of the Lemon test(cid:13) and collapses its "purpose" and "effect" prongs into a single(cid:13) inquiry: would a reasonable, informed observer, i.e., one(cid:13) familiar with the history and context of private individuals’(cid:13) access to the public money or property at issue, perceive(cid:13) the challenged government action as endorsing religion?36(cid:13) See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, ___ U.S. ___ , ___, 122 S. Ct.(cid:13) 2460, 2468-69 (2002) (upholding school voucher program(cid:13) where 96% of participating students attended religiously(cid:13) affiliated schools because parents’ genuine and(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 35. Compare, e.g., Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271-75 (applying Lemon test to(cid:13) hold that Establishment Clause does not bar state university from(cid:13) allowing religious groups to use generally available facilities); Lynch v.(cid:13) Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679-86 (1984) (applying Lemon test to uphold(cid:13) city-sponsored Christmas display that included creche alongside various(cid:13) secular symbols), with Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586-87 (1992)(cid:13) (invalidating prayer at public school graduation led by clergyman chosen(cid:13) by school officials without relying on Lemon test); Marsh v. Chambers,(cid:13) 463 U.S. 783, 792-95 (1983) (upholding practice of opening state(cid:13) legislative sessions with prayers by state-employed chaplain without(cid:13) mentioning Lemon test); see generally Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398-(cid:13) 99 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (chronicling Court’s erratic(cid:13) invocation of Lemon test).(cid:13) 36. "Entanglement" still matters, however, in the context of direct aid to(cid:13) public schools, where the Court subsumes it within the "effect" analysis,(cid:13) see Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232-33 (1997), and in the rare case(cid:13) where government delegates civic power to a religious group. See Bd. of(cid:13) Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet , 512 U.S. 687, 696-705(cid:13) (1994); Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1982).(cid:13) 40(cid:13) independent choices determined where children went to(cid:13) school); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch. , 533 U.S. 98,(cid:13) 117-19 (2001) (holding that Establishment Clause did not(cid:13) require public school to bar evangelical Christian student(cid:13) group from using facilities accessed by various other(cid:13) groups);37 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette,(cid:13) 515 U.S. 753, 763 (1995) (relying on the endorsement(cid:13) analysis in Lamb’s Chapel to hold that Establishment(cid:13) Clause did not require state to prevent private group from(cid:13) erecting cross on statehouse grounds, a traditional public(cid:13) forum)38; Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395 (reciting the(cid:13) Lemon test but relying primarily on the endorsement test to(cid:13) hold that the Establishment Clause did not prohibit school(cid:13) district from letting evangelical church group use publicly(cid:13) available school facilities to show film series on Christian(cid:13) family values); see also ACLU of N.J. v. Schundler, 168 F.3d(cid:13) 92, 103, 105-07 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that Justice(cid:13) O’Connor’s endorsement test is the governing standard and(cid:13) applying it to uphold government-sponsored holiday display(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 37. When presented with Establishment Clause claims in the context of(cid:13) public education, the Supreme Court considers not only whether a(cid:13) reasonable, informed observer would perceive an endorsement of(cid:13) religion, but also whether the challenged government practice coerces(cid:13) students into participating in religious activity. See Good News Club, 533(cid:13) U.S. at 115-16; Lee, 505 U.S. at 592-93. The Court has not applied its(cid:13) coercion test outside the public education context.(cid:13) 38. Seven Justices in Capitol Square agreed that the reasoning of Lamb’s(cid:13) Chapel controlled, Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 762, three of these seven(cid:13) expressly applied the reasonable, informed observer test, see id. at 772(cid:13) (O’Connor, J., joined by Souter & Breyer, JJ.), and the two dissenting(cid:13) Justices also applied the endorsement test, see id. at 797-98 (Stevens,(cid:13) J., dissenting); id. at 817-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Four Justices,(cid:13) however, recognized that the endorsement test controls when(cid:13) government discriminates in favor of religion, but argued that there is no(cid:13) need to apply the test to "purely private" religious expression that occurs(cid:13) in a public forum "open to all on equal terms" because such expression(cid:13) can never violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 770 (opinion of Scalia,(cid:13) J.). Notwithstanding the Justices’ divergent approaches, subsequent(cid:13) Supreme Court decisions treat the reasonable, informed observer test(cid:13) discussed at length in Justice O’Connor’s opinion as representing Capitol(cid:13) Square’s holding with respect to the appropriate Establishment Clause(cid:13) test. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 119; Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v.(cid:13) Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000).(cid:13) 41(cid:13) against Establishment Clause attack). Each of these(cid:13) decisions upheld the challenged government action because(cid:13) it treated religion neutrally, and thus would not be viewed(cid:13) by a reasonable, informed observer as endorsing religion.39(cid:13) In contrast, government runs afoul of the endorsement(cid:13) test and violates the Establishment Clause when it(cid:13) affirmatively supports religion on preferential terms. See(cid:13) Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 305-10(cid:13) (2000) (invalidating school policy of encouraging and(cid:13) sponsoring student-initiated, student-led prayers before(cid:13) high school football games because reasonable, informed(cid:13) observer would perceive school as endorsing religion);(cid:13) County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,(cid:13) 492 U.S. 573, 598-601 (1989) (holding that county violated(cid:13) Establishment Clause by giving Roman Catholic group(cid:13) preferential access to display stand-alone creche depicting(cid:13) birth of Jesus on main staircase of its seat of government(cid:13) because reasonable observer would believe county’s action(cid:13) was meant to support and promote Christianity); see also(cid:13) ACLU of N.J. v. Black Horse Pike Regional Bd. of Educ., 84(cid:13) F.3d 1471, 1484-88 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (invalidating(cid:13) scheme that allowed public high school students to choose(cid:13) graduation prayer, but not any secular speech, by plurality(cid:13) vote).40 In addition, some Justices have held out the(cid:13) possibility that, even if government grants equal rather(cid:13) than preferential access to religion, a reasonable, informed(cid:13) observer could perceive an endorsement of religion in(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 39. While the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence(cid:13) consistently emphasizes neutrality toward religion, it allows government(cid:13) to "accommodate religious needs by alleviating special burdens" on(cid:13) religious practice unless the "accommodation" delegates political power(cid:13) to a particular religious group or otherwise "singles out a particular(cid:13) religious sect for special treatment." Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 512(cid:13) U.S. at 705-06.(cid:13) 40. The Allegheny Court also held, with no majority opinion on this(cid:13) point, that local officials did not endorse religion by erecting a display(cid:13) including a menorah, a Christmas tree, and a sign entitled "Salute to(cid:13) Liberty" in front of another government building. See 492 U.S. at 613-21(cid:13) (opinion of Blackmun, J.); id. at 632-36 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part(cid:13) and concurring in the judgment); id. at 663-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring(cid:13) in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).(cid:13) 42(cid:13) extraordinary cases. See Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 777-78(cid:13) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the(cid:13) judgment). For instance, if one or more religious groups(cid:13) dominated property the government made available to the(cid:13) public, a reasonable observer might perceive an(cid:13) endorsement of religion. See id.; cf. Freedom from Religion(cid:13) Found. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 489, 494-96(cid:13) (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that Establishment Clause was(cid:13) violated where sole display in public forum was fifteen-foot-(cid:13) tall white marble statue of Jesus bearing inscription "Christ(cid:13) Guide Us On Our Way" in twelve-inch block letters and(cid:13) facing oncoming traffic on adjacent highway).(cid:13) Applying these principles to this case, we believe that, if(cid:13) the Borough ceased discriminating against the plaintiffs’(cid:13) religiously motivated conduct to comply with the Free(cid:13) Exercise Clause, a reasonable, informed observer would not(cid:13) perceive an endorsement of Orthodox Judaism because the(cid:13) Borough’s change of heart would "reflect[] nothing more(cid:13) than the governmental obligation of neutrality" toward(cid:13) religion. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409. A reasonable observer(cid:13) "must be deemed aware of the history and context of the(cid:13) community," Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 119 (internal(cid:13) quotation marks omitted); see also Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at(cid:13) 2468-69; Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1486, and(cid:13) "presumed to possess a certain level of information that all(cid:13) citizens might not share." Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 780(cid:13) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the(cid:13) judgment); see also Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 118(cid:13) (stating that reasonable observer would know about non-(cid:13) neutral implementation of policy); ACLU of N.J. v.(cid:13) Schundler, 168 F.3d at 106 (noting that reasonable(cid:13) observer would be aware of city’s year-round practices(cid:13) regarding cultural displays and celebrations). Thus the(cid:13) reasonable, informed observer would know that the lechis(cid:13) are items with religious significance and that they enable(cid:13) Orthodox Jews to engage in activities otherwise off limits on(cid:13) the Sabbath, but would also know that the Borough was(cid:13) allowing them to remain on the utility poles only because(cid:13) its selective application of Ordinance 691 renders removing(cid:13) the lechis a free exercise violation. See Allegheny, 492 U.S.(cid:13) at 632 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in(cid:13) the judgment) ("In cases involving the lifting of government(cid:13) 43(cid:13) burdens on the free exercise of religion, a reasonable(cid:13) observer would take into account the values underlying the(cid:13) Free Exercise Clause in assessing whether the challenged(cid:13) practice conveyed a message of endorsement."). Cognizant(cid:13) of the Borough’s secular purpose of complying with the(cid:13) Free Exercise Clause, see Mergens, 496 U.S. at 249, and(cid:13) the religion-neutral effect of treating the lechis like other(cid:13) postings, the reasonable observer would not believe that the(cid:13) Borough was promoting Orthodox Judaism. See Gregoire v.(cid:13) Centennial Sch. Dist., 907 F.2d 1366, 1380 (3d Cir. 1990)(cid:13) (concluding that religion-neutral treatment of Christian(cid:13) group seeking access to public school facilities sent(cid:13) message of neutrality toward, not endorsement of, religion).(cid:13) This is true a fortiori because there is no evidence in the(cid:13) current record that the unobtrusive lechis are intended to(cid:13) send a religious message to anyone.(cid:13) Further, there is a vital difference between purely private(cid:13) religiously motivated conduct and conduct initiated or(cid:13) sponsored by government. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at(cid:13) 841. No reasonable, informed observer would perceive the(cid:13) decision of the plaintiffs to affix lechis to utility poles owned(cid:13) by Verizon and to do so with Cablevision’s assistance as " ‘a(cid:13) choice attributable to the State.’ " Santa Fe Indep., 530 U.S.(cid:13) at 311 (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 587). Similarly, because(cid:13) the eruv is maintained solely with private funds, and(cid:13) because allowing the lechis to remain in place would(cid:13) represent neutral rather than preferential treatment of(cid:13) religiously motivated conduct, no reasonable, informed(cid:13) observer would believe the Borough is "affirmatively(cid:13) sponsor[ing]" an Orthodox Jewish practice. Santa Fe Indep.,(cid:13) 530 U.S. at 313.(cid:13) To the extent that access to the utility poles on Borough(cid:13) land constitutes a "benefit," "the ‘guarantee of neutrality is(cid:13) respected, not offended"’ when religious persons benefit(cid:13) incidentally from "‘neutral criteria and evenhanded(cid:13) policies."’ Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 114 (quoting(cid:13) Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839). In this context, there is "no(cid:13) realistic danger" that, if the Borough treated the plaintiffs’(cid:13) religiously motivated conduct on religion-neutral terms,(cid:13) reasonable, informed observers would perceive an(cid:13) endorsement of Orthodox Judaism. Lamb’s Chapel , 508(cid:13) 44(cid:13) U.S. at 395. Moreover, even if there is some slight risk that(cid:13) a reasonable, informed observer might "misperceive the(cid:13) endorsement of religion," there is a much greater risk that(cid:13) the observer would perceive hostility toward Orthodox Jews(cid:13) if the Borough removes the lechis. Good News Club, 533(cid:13) U.S. at 118; Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248; see also(cid:13) Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 846 (O’Connor, J., concurring)(cid:13) ("Withholding access would leave an impermissible(cid:13) perception that religious activities are disfavored.").41(cid:13) Because the Free Exercise Clause requires neutral(cid:13) treatment of religion, see Smith, 494 U.S. at 879, only in a(cid:13) most unusual case could compliance with free exercise(cid:13) norms offend the Establishment Clause. Cf. Kiryas Joel(cid:13) Village Sch. Dist., 512 U.S. at 717 (O’Connor, J.,(cid:13) concurring) ("The Religion Clauses prohibit the government(cid:13) from favoring religion, but they provide no warrant for(cid:13) discriminating against religion.") (emphasis in original).(cid:13) This is not such a case. Therefore, the Borough has no(cid:13) Establishment Clause justification for discriminating(cid:13) against the plaintiffs’ religiously motivated conduct.(cid:13) Accordingly, the plaintiffs are reasonably likely to prevail on(cid:13) their free exercise claim.(cid:13) 3. Requirements for preliminary injunctive relief(cid:13) Where a district court has denied a motion for a(cid:13) preliminary injunction, we may order the injunction to(cid:13) issue if "the four factors required to grant a preliminary(cid:13) injunction are apparent on the record before us." Tanimura(cid:13) & Antle, Inc. v. Packed Fresh Produce, Inc., 222 F.3d 132,(cid:13) 140 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Council of Alternative Political(cid:13) Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876, 883-84 (3d Cir. 1997);(cid:13) Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 1006 (3d Cir. 1988).(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 41. To the extent that the Lemon test retains some trace of vitality, see(cid:13) Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1484, even after Zelman, Good News Club,(cid:13) and Santa Fe eschewed it in favor of the endorsement test, it does not(cid:13) support the Borough’s Establishment Clause defense. Allowing the eruv(cid:13) to remain in place serves the secular purpose of complying with the Free(cid:13) Exercise Clause, does not have the effect of advancing religion because(cid:13) no reasonable, informed observer would perceive an endorsement of(cid:13) religion, and involves no government entanglement with religion because(cid:13) the Borough will not monitor or support the maintenance of the eruv.(cid:13) 45(cid:13) Our review of the record leaves us convinced that, in(cid:13) addition to the reasonable probability that the plaintiffs will(cid:13) ultimately prevail on their free exercise claim, the(cid:13) remaining three factors for injunctive relief--irreparable(cid:13) injury, the balance of hardships, and the public interest--(cid:13) also favor a preliminary injunction. Limitations on the free(cid:13) exercise of religion inflict irreparable injury. Fifth Ave.(cid:13) Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 293 F.3d 570, 574(cid:13) (2d Cir. 2002); Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 963(cid:13) (10th Cir. 2001); see also Swartzwelder v. McNeilly, 297(cid:13) F.3d 228, 241 (3d Cir. 2002) ("‘The loss of First Amendment(cid:13) freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably(cid:13) constitutes irreparable injury."’) (quoting Elrod v. Burns,(cid:13) 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). The plaintiffs have demonstrated(cid:13) that, if the eruv is removed, they will be unable to push and(cid:13) carry objects outside the home on the Sabbath, and those(cid:13) who are disabled or have small children consequently will(cid:13) be unable to attend synagogue. This showing easily(cid:13) satisfies the irreparable injury requirement.(cid:13) With respect to the balance of hardships, a preliminary(cid:13) injunction would not harm the Borough more than denying(cid:13) relief would harm the plaintiffs. Enjoining removal of the(cid:13) eruv would cause neither the Borough nor its residents any(cid:13) serious injury. Without an injunction, on the other hand,(cid:13) the plaintiffs’ free exercise of religion will be impaired. The(cid:13) balance easily tips in the plaintiffs’ favor.(cid:13) Finally, where there are no societal benefits justifying a(cid:13) burden on religious freedom, "the public interest clearly(cid:13) favors the protection of constitutional rights." Council of(cid:13) Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876, 884 (3d(cid:13) Cir. 1997). We do not see how removing the lechis could(cid:13) advance any interests sufficient to outweigh the(cid:13) infringement of the plaintiffs’ free exercise rights.(cid:13) In this context, the District Court should have(cid:13) preliminarily enjoined the Borough from removing the lechis(cid:13) pending a trial.(cid:13) IV. Conclusion(cid:13) Though the plaintiffs are not likely to prevail on their Fair(cid:13) Housing Act claim and do not present a viable free speech(cid:13) 46(cid:13) claim, they are reasonably likely to show that the Borough(cid:13) violated the Free Exercise Clause by applying Ordinance(cid:13) 691 selectively against conduct motivated by Orthodox(cid:13) Jewish beliefs. Because the three other factors for(cid:13) injunctive relief also favor the plaintiffs, we reverse the(cid:13) District Court’s denial of injunctive relief and will enter an(cid:13) order directing the Court to issue a preliminary injunction(cid:13) barring the Borough from removing the lechis.(cid:13) A True Copy:(cid:13) Teste:(cid:13) Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals(cid:13) for the Third Circuit(cid:13) 47