*1 that agreement conclude the settlement did
not relieve responsi- defendants criminal In re TEMPOROMANDIBULAR JOINT bility (TMJ) for their actions. in the Nowhere IMPLANTS PRODUCT . agreement S parties did crimes, the mention LIABILITY LITIGATION actions, prosecution, criminal or similar con- (TMJ) TEMPOROMANDIBULAR JOINT Indeed, cepts. only language the in the RECIPIENTS, IMPLANT agreement on which possibly defendants can Appellants, hope rely is the catch-all “any release of statutory all or common law of ac- causes E.I. DU PONT DE general tion.” Yet this AND language NEMOURS is necessar- COMPANY; ily American qualified by Durafilm specific language which Company, Inc., Appellees. precedes it, unless there is evidence of what parties actually by general intended No. 95-1394. language. See United States v. Mexico Feed United States Court of Appeals, & Seed 485 n. 6 Eighth Circuit. Cir.1992). Each of the specifically claims Submitted Oct. 1995. parties claim, released is a civil includ- contract, ing tort, warranty, defamation, con- Oct. Decided tribution, and similar claims. Nothing in the Rehearing Suggestion Rehearing record contrary; is to the defendants did not En Banc Denied Nov. 1996.* allege in their motions before the Dis- trict Court they subjectively believed negotiating non-prosecu- for a
tion agreement. Because the contractual is
language reasonably susceptible of the
meaning proposed defendants, we con-
clude that agreement the settlement is unam-
biguous. See John Morrell &
at 551. The agreement settlement poses no present prosecution.
obstacle
VII.
The judgment of the District Court is re-
versed, and the ease remanded
District Court for reinstatement of the indict-
ment. nary principles contract in that case drafted, was "tem- agreement jointly party neither
pered by implications plea constitutional of a should receive ambiguity. benefit of agreement.” Id. at 351. No such constitutional point case; is moot in this as discussed in the significance present civil action involved opinion, text of this we hold that the settlement here, and we ordinary conclude principles agreement unambiguous. interpretation apply. particular, contract In be- * cause the record reflects that Judge settlement grant McMillian would suggestion. *2 districts,
different such actions transferred to district for coordinated or pretrial consolidated proceedings.”). Temporomandibular Implant Joint Recipi (Recipients) ents appeal judgment from the *3 Court,1 of the District granted which sum mary judgment in favor of defendants E.I. (Du Pont) Du Pont de Company Nemours & (Du and American Company, Durafilm Inc. rafilm). Implants In re TMJ Prods. Liab. (D.Minn.1995). Litig., affirm.
I. Plaintiffs-appellants recipients are the Proplast Interpositional Implant, TMJ a prosthetic device used to temporo- correct (TMJ) joint mandibular disorders. The TMJ upper jaw; connects the and lower it facili- tates jawbone. normal movement of the When jawbone the articulating surface of the that fits diseased, into the TMJ becomes mobility normal by can implant- be restored ing prosthetic device Proplast like the TMJ Interpositional Implant. gravamen The complaint implants failed, abrading surrounding causing bone and pain to Recipients. implants The invented, designed, tested, manufactured, packaged, Vitek, Inc., and sold a now Hahn, Charleston, H. Blair SC, argued, for bankrupt company founded Dr. Charles Appellants. Homsy. Du Pont and Durafilm are the Mansfield, Phoenix, Edward M. AZ, ar- action, named however, defendants in this (Ross gued Schmucki, F. Forsyth, William F. because supplied manufactured and Ryan, Joseph Sullivan, Thomas G. P. Fem B. some of the raw materials were used to Miller, brief), Appellees. on the construct the implants including polytetra- — (PTFE fluoroethylene powder and fiber res- BOWMAN, HEANEY, Before and in) ethylene and fiuorinated propylene film WOLLMAN, Judges. Circuit (FEP film). Du Pont manufactured both of these materials and sold them under the BOWMAN, Judge. Circuit familiar Teflon trademark. Durafilm distrib- appeal film, This arises from uted multidistrict liti- but did manufacture it.2 gation proceeding, PTFE consolidating approxi- resin and FEP film chemically are mately products liability pre- actions for inert with a variety wide of safe industrial purposes trial (1994) § under 28 U.S.C. uses. PTFE is used to every- manufacture (‘When civil involving actions thing one or bearings jet more from aircraft to non- questions common pending fact are stick frying pans. surfaces on FEP film is Magnuson, Judge, Honorable A. merely Paul Chief 2. Durafilm facilitated the distribution of purchasers United States FEP film to District Court for the like Vitek District who desired to buy less FEP willing film Du Pont Minnesota. than directly. sell safety judgment as to the legal medical pipe insula- ranging from applications used implants. Teflon collectors. to solar tion later, agent for Methodist an One 1960s, Homsy invented the week Dr. the late In Dr. Hom- Hospital executed the disclaimer. Proplast while conduct- implant biomaterial that he was explained separate in a letter Hospi- sy at Methodist research ing prosthesis that Du implant studies familiar with Houston, Proplast spongy Texas. tal in disclaimer; he charac- in its designed Pont mentioned gel porous coalesceable highly to the medical Homsy Du Pont’s references terized Dr. attachment. tissue to promote “crueiaUy incomplete.” Letter literature as to manufacture Vitek founded Homsy, Orthopedic Prosthe- A. from Charles devices Proplast prosthetic his distribute Hospital, Laboratory, Methodist sis at Methodist *4 research his he continued while Wilkins, Du Pont Consultant George A. Proplast, Vitek combined make Hospital. To (Mar. 20,1967). study distinguished each He and and solvents with carbons PTFE resin and subse- own and stated that his research eight-step to an subjected this mixture then discovered solu- quent scientific studies had heating, compressing, of process patented earlier Teflon problems with by tions to the formed itself is drying. implant and Homey’s and Dr. letter implants. Based on shape required Proplast into the molding the disclaimer, agreed Pont to Du the executed of it with translucent laminating one side and Hospital’s requests Teflon. fiE the Methodist layer replaced film FEP film. The FEP of the TMJ articulating surface or meniscus the Medical passage In after the underlying protect the designed to was and Food, to the Amendments Device joints load-bearing like from wear in Proplast 94-295, Act, No. Drug, Pub.L. Cosmetic and implant positioned the Surgeons TMJ. the once Vitek Du Pont advised 90 Stat. be anchored Proplast side would the so that grades surgical it again that did market FEP growth while the eventually by tissue sent to pohcy In a statement of Teflon. jaw to shield the lower side abutted film Pont wrote: Du of distribution The chain against wear. began film thus with resin and PTFE resins Teflon® fluorocarbon Du Pont initial suppliers, as the or Durafilm only. Du Pont purposes ... made for industrial are as the finished on Vitek then continued to to as are needed such tests We conduct manufacturer, finally with and ended prod- ordinary of these users protect the users of the as ultimate detailed, long- perform ucts do not but selling implant, while product. Each be made before should term which studies doEars, only a few fifty contained surgical pur- for at least or medical used for are FEP film. PTFE resin and surgical cents’ worth or no medical poses. make sought received or and have not grades Homsy that Dr. learned Du Pont When and Food ruEngs the Federal any from medi- products for use its to Teflon intended any govern- fromor Drug Administration purchas- advised the Du Pont purposes, cal safety or effective- agency as to the mental Hospital by a March agent at Methodist ing purposes. such products for these ness of 13, 1967, Teflon that its letter to use to or proposing evaluate Persons apphcations and for medical not made pur- surgical or products for medical these necessary had not conducted Du Pont medical and rely their own poses suitability must to studies long-term determine representation any judgment without legal Du use. Pont’s for medical of fluorocarbons accept fuE re- They part. must on our published scientific noted several also letter either di- consequences, for aE implants sponsibiEty indicating pure Teflon reports infor- or other Any indirect. data rect or tendency to disinte- badly and had wore good suppEed Pont from Du mation joints. Consequently, load-bearing grate any particular appEcabiEty faith its sign dis- but hospital to required the Du Pont recipi- by the must be determined warnings situation claimer, acknowledging Du Pont’s ent. independent its own agreeing to use Policy Regarding Statement of Medical or contend that while FEP film many have Surgical (May applications, Uses of Plastic Materials 1 safe industrial it designed 1977). defectively specific implants for its use in the implants because caused the to function required Homsy sign Du Pont Dr. to this unreasonably an dangerous manner.3 The statement, policy which also included his Recipients also claim that the defendants agreement Du to use Pont’s materials breached failing duties owed to them compliance regulations with FDA and to con- dangers warn of associated with im- duct clinical tests on humans in accor- plants, insisting that the defendants should Food, Drug, dance with the federal and Cos- conveyed warnings directly physi- metic Act. patients concerning cians and years Based on of clinical studies with implants though the defendants had Proplast implants in animals and humans and designing no direct role in selling experience his extensive in the manufactur- implants. devices, ing marketing prosthetic Dr. granted The District Court sum Homsy Proplast believed was an excel- mary judgment defendants, rejecting Indeed, lent material. FDA two ad- defect claim as well as the failure visory safety committees stated that “the to warn respect claim. With to the *5 [Proplast] effectiveness has been estab- claim, defect the court concluded that long-term through lished clinical trials.” 47 summary judg defendants were entitled to (1982) 2810, (to Fed.Reg. 2818 be codified at undisputed ment because “the evidence dem 878) 1982). pt. (proposed 19, 21 C.F.R. Jan. onstrates that the PTFE FEP film used The FDA authorized the Proplast sale of Implants the Vitek TMJ were not ‘defec implants By 1980s, TMJ the late ” products.’ tive Implants, In re TMJ however, it apparent had become F.Supp. at respect 1024.4 With to the failure FEP film particles abraded into despite the claim, to warn the court held that the defen precautions additional Vitek had taken to dants were summary judgment entitled to ensure that happen. this would not In No- duty because no to warn was owed to the 1989, vember Du Pont informed Vitek and Recipients under material/compo the raw Homsy Dr. longer that it would no fill Vitek’s part supplier nent pro doctrine. The court orders for Teflon because of concerns about premise ceeded on the that the law refuses to by spawned lawsuits disintegrating im- suppliers hold inherently safe and multi- plants. January 1991, In the FDA ordered responsible injuries use raw materials Proplast implants removed from the market resulting dangerous from a condition created fragmentation because of their and irritation a finished manufacturer. Alter to human tissue. natively, that, the court held assuming Recipients The filed against this action duty the defendants owed a to warn the defendants, asserting liability neg- strict Recipients, the defendants discharged had ligence particular, claims. In their case duty their aas matter of law under the bulk grounded on liability: two theories of design supplier/sophisticated purchaser doctrine. defect and Recipients that, failure to warn. The The court suppliers reasoned as bulk appeal, Recipients 3. On products. abandoned all Although defective Id. this "deviation relating claims to PTFE resin and instead focus may appropriate from the norm test” entirely their efforts on FEP film. defect, analyzing manufacturing claims of it is inappropriate case, i.e., to use this test in a 4. The District Court found that PTFE resin and plaintiff where the contends that the FEP film were not defective because defectively designed. entire line is De manufacturing only ‘‘[a] defect exists where an error, spite the trial court’s Du Pont still is enti compared item is substandard when to other summary judgment tled to once the correct test assembly identical units off of the line.” re In applied. may This Court "affirm the district Implants Litig., TMJ Prods. Liab. judgment grounds supported court's 1019, (D.Minn.1995). The court reasoned Lohman, the record.” United States Recipients that because the made no claim that (8th Cir.), -, cert. - U.S. the PTFE and FEP film “were somehow inferior (1996). 116 S.Ct. 135 L.Ed.2d film,” typical to the PTFE and FEP were not parties, originally filed. The actions were the de- purchaser like sophisticated however, appeal have conceded on that “the warn the discharged any fendants part liability law is con- basis under- by making that Vitek sure Recipients jurisdictions.” Recipients’ Br. at stant in all materials in using Teflon risks of stood the i. grant of affirm the sum- implants. We on both the the defendants mary judgment to Liability Claims A. Strict claims on and failure to warn design defect part (Second) material/component the raw the basis of Restatement of Torts The (1965) imposes liability on sell § doctrine.5 402A strict products. “unreasonably dangerous”
ers of
“unreasonably
A
be considered
II.
(1) manufacturing
dangerous” because
has the authori
A transferee court
(3)
(2)
defect,
defect,
a failure to
terminating
dispositive orders
ty to enter
product’s
Ryn
in the
use.
warn
§ 1407.
28 U.S.C.
under
cases consolidated
Co., 21
v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours &
ders
Trump
Sec.
Donald J.
Casino
In re
See
(8th Cir.1994).
835, 842
As noted
F.3d
Litig.,
367-68
Litig. Taj Mahal
—
above,
Recipients
that the defen
assert
(Rule 12(b)(6) order),
Cir.1993)
(3d
cert. de
unreasonably dangerous
FEP film
dants’
nied,
114 S.Ct.
510 U.S.
design defect and failure to warn
under the
(1994).
novo the
review de
L.Ed.2d
theories.
judgment.
summary
grant
decision
design defect
We first address the
Hood,
College, Inc. v.
Technical
Southern
argue
the Dis
claim.
Cir.1996).
1381, 1383
F.3d
summary judg
granting
trict Court erred
*6
feder
analyzing questions of
When
they have raised
against them because
ment
apply
law,
court should
the
transferee
al
the
film
as to
FEP
was
factual issues
whether
located. See
in which it is
law of the circuit
defectively designed. The
insist
Disaster, 829 F.2d
Air Lines
that,
many
In re Korean
safe
though FEP film has
122,
(D.C.Cir.1987),
1171, 1176
aff'd, 490 U.S.
inherently danger
not
industrial uses and is
(1989).
1676,
uses,
L.Ed.2d 113
104
the film was
109 S.Ct.
for all
ous or defective
law,
considering questions
“reasonably
of state
defectively designed for its
fore
When
however,
apply the
implants. Recipients’
court must
Br.
the transferee
use in the
seeable”
words,
applied
they
to the
claim that FEP
would have
In other
state law that
at 12.
it
they
designed defectively,
trans
not because
not been
film was
cases had
individual
malfunctioned,
incorporat
In re Air
when
See
but because
for consolidation.
ferred
Ill.,
implants implants it
the
Chicago,
644 F.2d
into the
caused
Near
ed
Crash Disaster
Cir.)
dangerous man
(7th
unreasonably
594,
(holding
court
function in an
transferee
610
sup
reject
argument because
ner. We
this
rules of the
apply the “choice-of-law
must
parts
inherently
“component
pliers
safe
originally
the actions were
states where
878,
responsible for accidents that result
not
filed”),
102 S.Ct.
are
454 U.S.
cert.
larger
(1981).
integrated into a
parts are
358,
liabili when the
Products
70 L.Ed.2d
part supplier did
course,
system
component
that the
are,
tort ac
state law
ty claims
Bauermeis
design
Sperry v.
from not
or build.”
approximately 280 cases
tions. With
Cir.1993) (dis
(8th
Inc.,
596,
action,
ter,
4 F.3d
consolidated
this
the nation
across
application
previous
court’s
daunting
cussing
a district
normally
the
task
would
face
we
law).6
reviewing
carefully
After
the
of Missouri
law of each state where
analyzing the
summary judgment
the
in favor of
argue
we
the
are entitled
affirm
also
5. The defendants
grounds.
(1)
other
defendants on
summary judgment
the Medical
because
preempt
ac-
of 1976
state
Device Amendments
sup-
against
of bulk medical
whether FEP
manufacturers
no difference
tions
6. We believe it makes
(2)
part”
supplier
"component
plies;
to a medical
as a bulk
as a
film is characterized
manufacturer,
Du Pont De
FDA and Vitek had
See Bond v. E.I.
“raw material."
(Colo.Ct.App.1993),
Co.,
adequate warnings.
P.2d
develop
Nemours &
need
28, 1994).
(Colo.
arguments
t.
denied
Feb.
because
do not consider these
not and
cer
record,
cases,
we are convinced that
component part
the undis-
may
maker
be
puted facts
show as matter of law that the
strictly
Apperson
held
liable.
v. E.I. du
defect was in
design
the overall
of the im-
Co.,
Pont de Nemours
&
F.3d
plants
and not
film. FEP film is
(7th Cir.1994) (“Strict liability may extend to
building-block
a mere
material suitable for
component parts
inju
manufacturers of
many
Recipients’ argument
safe uses. The
by design
ries caused
or manufacturing de
nothing
boils down to
more than the fact that
itself.”);
component part
fects
Bond v.
proved
Vitek decided to use what
to be an
Co.,
E.I. Du Pont De Nemours &
868 P.2d
unsuitable material
to manufacture its im-
(“[A]
1119 (Colo.Ct.App.1993)
plaintiff
plants. The erroneous and unfortunate deci-
present
jury
must
evidence from which a
design
sion to use FEP film in the
of the
any
‘design’
could find that
‘defect’
inwas
Vitek,
implant
however,
was made
component part,
of the
product.”),
not the final
Du Pont or
component
Durafilm.
part
“[A]
(Colo.
28, 1994);
rt.
denied
Feb.
see
ce
supplier should not be
east
the role of
also Klem v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours
may
insurer for
accident that
arise after
Cir.1994).8 If,
1002-03
on
component
part
supplier’s
leaves the
hand,
the other
product
finished
Quality
hands.”
Control
Crossfield
unreasonably dangerous
compo
because the
(8th Cir.1993)
Equip.
part
nent
particular
was unsuited for the
use
(discussing a
previous applica-
district court’s
product
that the finished
manufacturer chose
law). Therefore,
tion of Missouri
as courts in
it,
to make of
then the
design
defect is
held,7
already
other TMJ
eases
the finished
rather
than in the
we hold that the defendants were entitled to
design
component
part.
In these
summary judgment
on the
defect
cases, it
is the finished
manufacturer
claim.
component part
and not the
supplier that
While the law of
strictly
Sperry,
held
liable.
4 F.3d at
clearly
liability
extends
to finished
(affirming summary
judgment
compo
rarely imposes
manufacturers like
nent
part
airlock
where
was “inte
liability
strict
part suppliers
grated
larger
into
[spice milling] system
merely
who
parts
sell their multi-use
to man
supplier did not
products.
ufacturers of
Page
See W.
build”);
design or
Mfg.
Childress v. Gresen
al.,
Keeton et
*7
Prosser and Keeton on the
(6th
Co.,
45,
Cir.1989)
888 F.2d
49
(affirming
(5th
100,
§
Law Torts
at 705
ed. 1984 &
summary judgment
component
sup
for
valve
cases).
Supp.1988) (citing
inqui
The critical
plier
design
where
defect
inwas
the finished
ry
determining
focuses on
why
the reason
log-splitter); see
Boy,
also Lee v. Butcher
component
part turned out to be unsuita
375,
Cal.App.3d
195,
169
Cal.Rptr.
215
ble for
198-
product.
use in the finished
“If the
(1985) (no design
99
component
failure
defect in
was due to a
component
flaw the
motor;
part,
design
then the
is itself
defect was in
defec
finished meat
grinder);
Co.,
tive and the
cause for the assembled
Mfg.
Moor v. Iowa
320 N.W.2d
being
927,
(S.D.1982) (no
defective.” Id. at 705-06.
In such
design
928
defect in com
See, e.g.,
15,
(Ariz.
1986);
7.
Jacobs v. E.I. du Pont de
Apr.
Nemours &
denied
component
or if the
Co.,
1219,
(6th Cir.1995);
67
Hoyt
F.3d
1241
v.
supplier
design
exercised some control over the
Vitek,Inc.,
271,
1225,
Or.App.
134
894 P.2d
1231
Feeders,
product,
of the final
DeSantis v. Parker
(1995).
Inc.,
357,
(7th Cir.1976) (cattle
547 F.2d
361
feeder);
Carey by Carey
Estate
Hy-Temp
component parts may
A
also be held
Inc.,
666,
Mfg.,
(N.D.Ill.1988)
F.Supp.
702
670
strictly
parts
special
liable
supplies
if the
it
(furnace
Garza,
damper);
vent
Rourke v.
530
ly
use,
designed
particular
for a
see Fleck v. KDI
794,
(Tex.1975) (leased
S.W.2d
scaffolding
Pools, Inc.,
107,
Sylvan
(3d
981 F.2d
Cir.
supplied
case,
company).
to construction
In this
1992) (replacement pool liner in failure to warn
undisputed
designed
it is
that FEP film was
to be
case),
1005,
cert.
507 U.S.
113 S.Ct.
broad, nonparticularized
useful in a
range of
(1993);
Operat
L.Ed.2d 267
Maake v. Ross
applications and that the
defendants did not ex
ing
Valve
149 Ariz.
717 P.2d
any
ercise
control over
(valve
of the im
(Ariz.Ct.App.1985)
designed to limit ma
plants.
chine
cycle
on which it was installed to one
case),
each activation in failure to warn
review
inherently
raw material to insure
of an
safe
roller;
in finished
design defect was
ponent
case,
undisputed
against
facts
all
misuse of his
conceivable
conveyor). In this
expensive.”).
law that the defect
As an-
prohibitively
a matter of
show as
would
implants and
of the
in a
panel
in the overall
of this Court has determined
other
Recipients
film. The
design of FEP
case,
in the
would be unreason-
previous
“[i]t
TMJ
that the disinte
failed to show
simply have
place
impractical
and
to
the burden of
able
any design
implants was due
gration of the
testing
developing all
that incor-
devices
than to
FEP film itself rather
in the
component
Du Pont.”
porate Teflon as a
incorporate
decision to
erroneous
Vitek’s
Rynders,
Suppliers
A
against
failure to warn claim
now
Du Pont had no
suppliers
multi-purpose components
Recipients.
impose
to warn the
“To
precluded by
material/compo
responsibility
the same raw
[a
nondefee-
part supplier analysis
component]
larger
nent
that forecloses
tive
in the context of the
*9
example,
defectively
designed
system
defect claims. For
Cross
machine
would
Co.,
704;
Quality
Equipment
simply
liability
v.
1
Control
extend
too far.” Id. at
field
(“[E]xtend-
law),
Childress,
(applying
F.3d 701
Missouri
we held
see also
mary judgment thus Second, statutory several state schemes failure to warn on the for the defendants from explicitly exempt mere distributors claim. See, liability. e.g., Ann. strict Tenn.Code 29-28-106(b) (Supp.1996) (stating § seller Negligence B. Claims subject liability to strict unless seller is argue also that the defen- The manufacturer); Mo.Rev.Stat. also to warn them of negligently failed dants (1994) (allowing dismissal of seller § 537.762 when used dangerous propensities film’s liability action if manufacturer is fail, how- argument must implants. This defendant). exemptions statutory Such also ever, analysis leads same which because “the independent grant- basis for provide an also had defendants] that [the us to the conclusion summary judgment in some of ing Durafilm theory duty plaintiffs warn under no actions. these consolidated [they] liability us to conclude that strict leads theory negli- duty to warn under had no 1120; Bond, P.2d at accord gence.” IV.
Klem, (holding negligence at 1003 reasons, judgment of foregoing For the “duplicate” each liability claims and strict is affirmed. the District Court Vitek, Inc., other); Veil (D.N.D.1992) (“there significant is no theories”); see also difference between HEANEY, Judge, dissenting. Circuit al., § supra, at 697. Conse- et Keeton majority ex- respectfully I dissent. Recipients frame their quently, whether doctrine pands the negligence or strict argument terms liability suppliers from even those to shield suppliers of liability, is the same: the result going to be product was who knew how their safe, no multi-purpose raw materials have posed use knew that the intended used and of a ultimate consumer to warn the I danger the ultimate consumers. grave may ex- about protection for accept such blanket cannot integrated are when the raw materials ist In this part manufacturers.1 product. into the final trend, however. company decline to follow that recognize majority trine. I that the is in 1. I *10 previous by any expansive is not controlled This case of our sister circuits in its with several Rynders v. E.I. Eighth Both part supplier Circuit decision. application component doc- of the case, majority case, not as the con- permit Recipients’ I would claims to This is tends, incorpo- go jury for a determination of what of an “erroneous decision to to a DuPont knew and whether it had a to out to be an unsuitable rate what turned Rather, Maj. Op., supra for in human prohibit the sale of Teflon use material.” at 1057. fully implants, provide adequate suggests at to that DuPont was least the evidence warnings to Vitek of those known risks. aware of the risk of harm Teflon serious implants. posed when used in human To part Underlying component responsible these known hold DuPont premise doctrine is the that the manufactur- require component part sup- risks would generally in a er of a finished pliers every possible application to research potential dangers position better to detect its recognizes product; of its DuPont’s actual only part than of the the manufacturer knowledge, without further research or Certainly, product manu- product. a finished speculation. Recipients claiming Nor are the responsible dangers facturer is that re- designed FEP film that DuPont should have product design or from the sult from the differently, majority suggests, as the but that component part manner in which a is inte- inappropriate if DuPont the film was knew grated product. into the finished As a corol- implants, in human it should not have for use lary, part gen- manufacturers of a supply film. continued to erally know about such will not required every should not be to research significant utility” There is “social in mak- nondefective, possible application multi- of its ing DuPont for what it accountable knew product. Quality use Con- See Crossfield prevent for its failure to harm to the ultimate (8th Cir.1993) Co., Equip. trol consumers. While Vitek have been in (“ component parts which [M]anufacturers position the better to evaluate film’s safe- standing are not defective alone cannot be use, ty particular position for the DuPont’s taking place hable for accidents after the may it to well have been sufficient for have system part integrated larger has been into a posed harm hu- known Teflon they played building.”). part which no my implants. position man It is that where place But the facts of this case it outside manufacturer knows that parameters general component of the going particular in a its to be used part supplier doctrine. The that, fashion and knows no matter what the presented jury evidence sufficient for a to design, product poses danger to the going find that DuPont knew Vitek was consumer, escape it cannot from ultimate implants. use the Teflon the TMJ There1 liability. Dupont is also evidence that that Tef- knew
lon, load-bearing implants, used human no implants designed,
matter how the can
disintegrate injury re- cause
cipients. DuPont was aware of several stud- demonstrating precise
ies this risk. More-
over, a chemist who worked for DuPont for thirty years
over testified that a known char- Teflon, film, including
acteristic of all severely fragments
that it con- after constant pressure sharp edges.
tact with and from (Tab 61)
(Appellants’ App. (Dep. at 370 of Dr. Fang).)
James
DuPont,
(8th
allegedly
unchanged
De Nemours &