624 F.2d 1084 | Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. | 1980
Lead Opinion
Plaintiffs are four Mobil Oil Corporation (Mobil) “N”
All Mobil retail dealers — both N and OG&L — in the Detroit resale district were charged the same price for gasoline, i. e., the dealer tankwagon price. Those N dealers who received a competitive allowance paid the full dealer tankwagon price but received a monthly refund based upon the number of gallons of gasoline purchased during the month.
The basis of plaintiffs’ complaint in the district court, as it had been in the earlier administrative proceeding which they had instituted, was the allegation that Mobil improperly withdrew their respective allowances on gasoline purchased from Mobil. In fact, the Pre-trial Order, which controlled the course of the trial, defined plaintiffs’ claim as follows:
Plaintiffs’ claim. The withdrawal of allowances being paid to the plaintiffs per gallon of gasoline on May 15, 1973, was a violation of regulations promulgated by the Federal Energy Office (now Federal Energy Administration) which required the defendant to maintain customary price differentials in effect as of that date for a class of purchasers, of which plaintiffs are a part, consisting of all Mobile “N” dealers (those owning their stations as opposed to those who leased their stations) who received allowances from defendant.
That Pre-Trial Order further framed plaintiffs’ statement of the legal issues involved as follows:
A. Plaintiffs’ statement of legal issues.
1. Whether all N dealers in the Detroit Resale District who received allowances as of May 15, 1973 is the appropriate “class of purchaser” for the purpose of 10 CFR § 212.31.
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5. Whether defendant violated FEA regulations, 10 CFR § 212.1, et seq., requiring Mobil to maintain customary price differentials in effect as of May 15, 1973 for a class of purchasers, of which plaintiffs are a part, consisting of all Mobil N dealers in the Detroit Resale District who received an allowance from Mobil, by withdrawing said allowance.
It was upon the foregoing factual and legal issues that the case proceeded to trial in the district court. In opening statement to the court, plaintiffs stated that they would prove:
(That) these were their dealers; that they had contracts; that they were receiving the allowances; that the allowances were withdrawn; that the allowances were in effect on May 15 of 1973 are matters which for the most part, constitute our prima facie case.
We are showing primarily that these were dealers; that they were a separate class of purchaser by virtue of being dealers who received competitive allowances from this district, and as a result, the defendant, Mobil was under a duty to compute a weighted average for that class of purchasers. .
Mobil contended that plaintiffs’ allowances at issue here were granted solely for competitive reasons and, therefore, were not “cost justified” customary price differentials as defined in the Regulations.
This case was tried to the court in March 1977. Thereafter, Judge Joiner’s August 2, 1977 Memorandum Opinion acknowledged at the outset the precise nature of plaintiffs’ claim:
This is a suit for monetary damages brought by four of one hundred twenty Detroit area owner-dealers of Mobil Stations [hereinafter referred to as “N” dealers] alleging that the Mobil Oil Corporation [“Mobil”] violated certain of these regulations by discontinuing certain “competitive discounts” on purchases by these “N” dealers that had been in effect on May 15, 1973 under retail dealer contracts.
It is the claim of the plaintiffs that in the Detroit Resale District, “N” dealers who were receiving “competitive discounts” as of May 15, 1973 constitute a “class of purchaser” as defined by FEA regulations and that these “competitive discounts” given to the members of this class constituted a “customary price differential” as used in those regulations. Plaintiffs contend that the failure of Mobil to continue this “customary price differential” to this “class of purchaser” violated a regulation of the FEA requiring that such price differentials be maintained.
In that Memorandum and Order the court held against plaintiffs’ claim that the appropriate class of purchaser was N dealers receiving allowances and that their allowances were “cost justified.” The court found (Finding No. 8) that “the Detroit resale district is one of Mobil’s most competitive marketing areas in the United States” and, in holding that the allowances were competitive in nature, stated:
The court, however, finds no evidence to support the argument that the discounts given to this smaller number of “N” dealers (the evidence shows that 60 of the 120 “N” dealers in the Detroit Resale Area received such discounts) were based on anything other than the necessity of meeting bona fide competition from other oil companies wanting to have these stations sell their own brand of gasoline.
Inasmuch as these allowances were truly competitive in nature, they were properly withdrawn by Mobil at the time of the shortages created by the Arabian oil embargo, that is to say, at the time when the competitive conditions which originally prompted the discounts no longer existed. At that point, having denied the relief sought by plaintiffs and having disposed of the issues herein, the court should have entered final judgment for the defendant and against the plaintiffs.
The district court, howeyer, then proceeded, sua sponte, to decide a claim that was never presented to it.' It was neither pleaded nor tried. The court concluded that Mobil’s N dealers and OG&L dealers comprised two different classes of purchasers because there existed hidden “cost-justified”, “customary price differentials” between them and that Mobil should have computed a separate base price for each class.
Finding No. 22. Mobil has no expenses relating to the upkeep, ownership or leasing of property on which the stations of plaintiffs and other N dealers are located
Finding No. 31. Mobil realized cost savings and advantages from doing business with N dealers which cost savings and advantages were not realized when doing business with OG&L dealers.
Those costs “relating to the upkeep, ownership or leasing of property” which the N dealers confront could only relate to or be compared with the rentals which the OG&L dealers were required, by separate contracts, to pay to Mobil. But this court has heretofore held in Shell v. FEA
Unlike the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, the Allocation Act has not given FEA specific authority to control rents of service station properties. Only the authority to control gasoline prices has been given. .
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The FEA’s position is that the rents charged to service station operators are so inextricably interwoven with the prices which they pay for gasoline from Shell that the regulation of prices would be frustrated unless the FEA has also the authority to control the rents charged. The only factual basis for the argument is that some of the rents are expressed as a flat rate in cents per gallon and are therefore a combined charge to the retailer by the supplier for the purchasing and retailing of gasoline. It is, however, common in many businesses to express rent on a basis which is related to sales, and Shell’s service station rentals and its gasoline sales are contracted for under separate agreements. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
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The mere fact that many leases provide that rent is to be determined on the basis of cents per gallon does not make prices and rents inextricably woven together so that they become legally identical. Rents are not prices; Congress recognized the difference in the Stabilization Act by providing for both. In the Allocation Act, Congress included prices but excluded rents. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
400 F.Supp. 968-970.
In reaching the conclusion of two classes of purchasers, the district court here relied upon Example 6 in FEA Ruling 1975-2. However, our ruling in Shell, supra, coming as it did after the promulgation of Ruling 1975-2, effectively invalidated any effort to bring filling station rentals, or costs of the “upkeep, ownership or leasing of property” into the ambit of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act.
We hold that, under the applicable FEA regulations, all Mobil retail service station dealers, both N dealers and OG&L dealers, in the Detroit resale district comprise one class.
In view of our holding here, we do not reach the other issues raised by appellant in this appeal.
The judgment of the district court is reversed, with instructions to enter judgment for the defendant and against the plaintiff.
REVERSED.
. Mobil’s term for service station dealers who own their stations or who lease them from someone other than Mobil.
. Mobil’s term for service station dealers who lease their stations from Mobil.
. The FEA’s Mandatory Petroleum Price Regulations, 10 C.F.R. Part 212.31, define “customary price differential” as follows:
Customary price differential includes a price distinction based on a discount, allowance, add-on, premium, and an extra based on a difference in volume, grade, quality, or location or type of purchaser, or a term or condition of sale or delivery.
. See note 3, supra.
. Reported at 402 F.Supp. 368 (E.D.Mich.1975).
. See this court’s opinion in Mr. Magic Car Wash v. Department of Energy, 596 F.2d 1023 (TECA) 1978. See also Merry Twins, Inc., et al. v. Exxon Corporation, 611 F.2d 874 (TECA) 1979.
. Shell Oil Company v. Federal Energy Administration, 400 F.Supp. 964 (S.D.Texas 1975), affd. 527 F.2d 1243 (TECA) 1975. See also Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Zarb, 532 F.2d 1363, 1370 (TECA) 1976.
. 87 Stat. 628, 15 U.S.C. See 751, et seq. (1975 Supp.).
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
I respectfully join in the decision insofar as it holds that final judgment for the
Furthermore, it is my opinion that this Court’s decisions in Shell Oil Co. v. Federal Energy Administration, 527 F.2d 1243 (TECA 1975), and Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Zarb, 532 F.2d 1363 (TECA 1976), would not have foreclosed the result reached by the District Court herein had the claim been properly before the court. Ruling 1975-2 does not represent an attempt to control rents, but rather represents an attempt to define who constitute the appropriate classes of purchaser under the energy regulations. This Court in the Shell Oil case recognized that some consideration of the status of the dealer vis-a-vis the supplier-manufacturer of the gasoline would be necessary in some circumstances:
“The FEA contends that these [rent] regulations prevent the frustration of its petroleum price regulations. But, while the rent charged by the lessor for real property used in retailing gasoline will affect the total cost of the retailer-lessee’s operation, it is only when the lessor of the real property and the supplier of the gasoline to be marketed at that site are one and the same that any increase in rent could possibly be construed as a hidden increase in the price of gasoline. The rent regulations promulgated by the FEA are not limited to this situation.” 527 F.2d at 1246.
By implication, therefore, when the lessor of property is also the gasoline supplier for a lessee-dealer, that relationship can have an impact on the pricing of the gasoline. Ruling 1975-2 recognizes as much. It does not allow the FEA (now the DOE) to regulate the rent charged but it does require in some circumstances that those dealers who rent from the supplier be treated as a separate class of purchaser.
A principal function of the class of purchaser concept is to preserve the price distinctions among purchasers that customarily existed under free market conditions. By construing practical distinctions based upon the relationship between the dealer and the supplier of gasoline to fall within the proscription on regulating rents, this Court will further hamper the DOE in its efforts to carry out the mandate of Congress to effectively regulate gasoline prices in the United States.