Appellant appealed from a judgment condemning him to the penitentiary for five years for the offense of robbery.
The appellant and Walter Dorsey were gambling, and the appellant lost some money, and it is the theory of the State that the appellant regained the money and in doing so made an assault upon Dorsey under circumstances rendering him guilty of the offense charged. The parties were sitting on the floor, and the prosecuting witness stated in his evidence that he had the money Avhich he had Avon from appellant and some of his own money 11 right betAveen my legs, up against the crotch;” that Avhile he was preparing to pick up the money, the appellant demanded it and picked it up and backed out of the door, exhibiting a pistol by pulling it part of the way out of his hip pocket. Appellant and other witnesses present denied the exhibition of the pistol or its possession by the appellant. Appellant Js theory Avas that Dorsey, who Avas dealing, represented to him that there were forty cards in the deck, and that he believed that to be true, when, as a matter of fact, it was false, Dorsey having but thirty-six cards in the deck. The evidence Avas undisputed that to play the game forty cards were necessary, and appellant contended that by reason of the fraud he Avas cheated out of his money. He also denied *220 any assault, arid claimed that when he discovered fraud he took hack his own money which was lying ón the floor between the legs of Dorsey, that he got no . money but his own, and not quite all of that.
The appellant by a special charge sought to have the jury instructed upon his theory of the case, and presents here the view that if the appellant was induced to part with his money and place it under the control of Dorsey through his déception and fraud, that he would not be guilty of the offense of robbery in regaining possession of it, though in doing so he used force. We believe this to be sound. This is a different proposition from that asserted in Blaine v. State,
We think the charge should have been so amended that it would inform the jury in appropriate terms of the appellant’s rights in the event they believed from the evidence that his money was obtained *221 from him by a false pretext, and that the failure to so instruct them constitutes error requiring a reversal of the judgment.
Reversed and remanded.
