OPINION AND ORDER
On Oсtober 12, 2006, Defendant the United States filed a motion pursuant to USCIT Rule 12(b)(1) seeking dismissal of the case that resulted in the issuance of
Tembec, Inc. v. United States,
30 CIT -,
The following day, October 13, 2006, we issued
Tembec II,
which directed that “all of Plaintiffs’ unliquidated entries, including those entered before, on, and after November 4, 2004, must be liquidated in accordance with the final negative decision of the NAFTA panel,”
Tembec II,
30 CIT at -,
On November 13, 2006, in a post-judgment motion styled as one seeking reconsideration and vacatur of Tembec II, Defendant renewed the substance of its October 12, 2006, motion to dismiss. See Def.’s Mot. Recons. & Vacate Ternbec II 1 (“Def.’s Mot. Recons. & Vacate”) (asking the court pursuant to USCIT R. 59 to “reconsider its decision in [Tembec II], and vacate that decision and judgment as moot”). By its motion, Defendant raised the additional claim that the court сommitted an error of law by not addressing in Ternbec II “the Court’s jurisdiction to order relief that had already been provided.” Def.’s Mot. Recons. & Vacate 7.
Jurisdiction lies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) (2000).
See Tembec, Inc. v. United States,
30 CIT -, -,
*1397 I. Background
On July 12, 2006, the court issued
Tem-bec I,
its first decision in this case, which found invalid the actions of the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) ordering the implementation of a United States International Trade Commission affirmative threat of material injury determination with respect to imports of Canadian softwood lumber into the United States. In
Tembec I,
the court reserved decision on the remedy to be imposed.
See Tembec I,
30 CIT at -,
On September 12, 2006, the Governments of Canada and the United States signed an agreement designed to settle the softwood lumber dispute, albeit at an undetermined “Effective Date.” See Softwood Lumber Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America (Sept. 12, 2006), Art. III, as amended by Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada Amending the Softwood Lumber Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada Done at Ottawa on 12 September 2006 (Oct. 12, 2006) (“Agreement”). By its terms, the Agreement was to enter into effect after the parties exchanged letters certifying that the conditions set out in Article II thereof were met. See Agreement, Art. II (stating, among other things, that the Agreement would not have legal effect unless and until “the CIT has modified the injunctions against liquidation issued in [West Fraser Mills Ltd. v. United States, Consol. Ct. No. 05-00079] to permit the United States to fulfill its obligations under Article III”). The certifying letters were еxchanged on October 12, 2006. 3 Thus, the Governments of Canada and the United States attested to each other that the Article II conditions had been satisfied, even though the injunctions on liquidation present in West Fraser Mills remained in place. See W. Fraser Mills, Consol. Ct. No. 05-00079 (CIT Mar. 7, 2005) (order granting preliminary injunction) at 2 (enjoining Defendant, during the pendency of the action, from liquidating entries of Canadian softwood lumber that “were entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption during the period May 22, 2002, through April 30, 2003”); W. Fraser Mills, Consol. Ct. No. 05-00079 (CIT Apr. 1, 2005) (order granting preliminary injunction) at 2 (same); W. Fraser Mills, Consol. Ct. No. 05-00079 (CIT May 20, 2005) (order granting preliminary injunction) at 3 (same).
Also, on October 12, 2006, Commerce retroactively revoked the AD Order and the CVD Order applicable to entries of softwood lumber from Canada. See AD Order Revocation, 71 Fed.Reg. at 61,714; CVD Order Revocation, 71 Fed.Reg. at 61,714. Under the terms of the AD Order Revocation, Commerce stated that it would instruct Customs “to cease collecting cash deposits, as of October 12, 2006, on imports of softwood lumber products from Canada,” and would further require Customs “tо liquidate all entries made on or after May 22, 2002, without regard to antidumping duties, except that, where liquidation of certain entries is enjoined for *1398 antidumping purposes, the antidumping liquidation instructions for such entries will be issued upon removal of the injunction. ” AD Order Revocation, 71 Fed.Reg. at 61,714 (emphasis added). The following day, Customs provided its port directors with liquidation instructions received from Commerce mirroring the terms set forth in the AD Order Revocation. See Instructions from Dir., Special Enforcement, to Dirs. оf Field Operations, Port Dirs. (Oct. 13, 2006) at 1-2 (“October 13 Liquidation Instructions”).
The “except” language in the October 12, 2006, AD Order Revocation was necessary because of the continued existence of the injunctions against liquidation present in West Fraser Mills. Those injunctions prevented Customs from liquidating entries of the Canadian merchandise made between May 22, 2002, and April 30, 2003. On September 21, 2006, Defendant, who is also the defendant in West Fraser Mills, filed a partial consent motion asking the court to lift the injunctions. The panel hearing that case granted Dеfendant’s motion and modified the injunctions on October 27, 2006, allowing the United States to “liquidate all Covered Entries [of softwood lumber from Canada] made on or after May 22, 2002 without regard to antidump-ing or countervailing duties and refund all deposits collected on such entries with all accrued interest pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677g(b) to the Importers of Record or their designates.” W. Fraser Mills, Con-sol. Ct. No. 05-00079 (CIT Oct. 27, 2006) (order modifying preliminary injunctions) (Restani, C.J., Eaton & Stanceu, JJ.) (internal quotation marks omitted).
On October 31, 2006, Customs relayed to its port directors Commerce’s second set of liquidation instructions, which ordered Customs officials to: (1) “cease immediately any suspension of liquidation for all shipments of certain softwood lumber from Canada entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption from 05/22/2002 through 04/30/2003”; (2) liquidate those entries “without regard to antidumping duties”; and (3) refund “all deposits ... with accrued interest to the importers of record or their designates.” Instructions from Dir., Speсial Enforcement, to Dirs. of Field Operations, Port Dirs. (Oct. 31, 2006) at 1-2 (“October 31 Liquidation Instructions”). Thus, by October 31, 2006, liquidation instructions were issued with respect to all subject imports of Canadian softwood lumber, directing that they be liquidated without regard to antidumping duties and that the cash deposits be returned to the importers of record, with interest.
II. Standard of Review
Defendant’s motion to dismiss asserts that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case when it issued the deсision and judgment in
Tembec II.
Where the Court’s jurisdiction is challenged, “[t]he burden of establishing jurisdiction ... lies with the party seeking to invoke the court’s jurisdiction.”
Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Watkins,
A motion to reconsider or vacate a prior decision “should be granted, and the underlying judgment or order modified, when a movant demonstrate^] that the judgment is based on manifest errors of law or fact.”
Union Camp Corp. v. United
*1399
States,
III. Discussion
The primary issue for us to decide is whether Commerce’s October 12, 2006, revocation of the Orders rendered this case moot and thus ousted the court of jurisdiction to issue Tembec II. Defendant insists that this is the case. 4 According to Defendant, this matter was moоt as of October 12, 2006, because “after [the] retroactive revocation (without the possibility of reinstatement) [of the Orders ], all further relief requested by the [P]laintiffs in their complaint had either been provided, or the provision of relief was wholly ministerial.” Def.’s Mot. Recons. & Vacate 5 (citing Def.’s Mot. Dismiss 7). Specifically, Defendant maintains that “[t]he fact that [Customs’s] ministerial task of liquidating all relevant entries of softwood lumber [was] not yet complete, or that liquidation of the entries during the first review period [was] enjoined, is irrelevant to the mootness analysis in this case.” Def.’s Mot. Dismiss 6. 5
For their part, Plaintiffs insist that the controversy remained alive when Tembec II was issued on October 13, 2006, because the “injunctions in [West Fraser Mills ] were still in place, preventing' the liquidation of all entries of softwood lumber from Canada.” Pl. Tembec’s Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Recons. & Vacate 2-3; see also Pl. CLTA’s Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Dismiss 4. In other words, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant’s argument overlooks both the specific nature of the relief sоught by Plaintiffs and the actual effect of the AD Order Revocation.
Because we find that Defendant’s revocation of the Orders on October 12, 2006, did not provide Plaintiffs with the complete relief sought in their complaint, the motion pursuant to USCIT Rule 59 to reconsider and vacate our decision and judgment as moot is denied. That the case was not moot can be seen by an *1400 examination of Plaintiffs’ complaint asking the court, among other things, to:
(c) Order Commerce to: (1) revoke the [Orders ] on Softwood Lumber from Canada in full; (2) instruct Customs to terminate suspension of liquidation with regard to all entries of softwood lumber from Canada for the period May 22, 2002 forward, liquidate those entries without regard to antidumping or countervailing duties, and refund, with interest, all cash deposits collected on those entries since May 22, 2002....
Am. & Supplemental Compl. ¶ 37(c). 6 Thus, Plaintiffs sought two things: (1) the revocation of the Orders and (2) an order directing Commerce to issue instructions to Customs directing the liquidation of all their entries without unfair trade duties, including those made from May 22, 2002, through April 30, 2003.
While the revocation of the
Orders
gave Plaintiffs the first part of the relief they sought, it fell short of affording them complete relief. That is, the
AD Order Revocation
did not direct the liquidation of all subject merchandise entered since May 22, 2002.
See AD Order Revocation,
The United States makes the further argument that, even if the court had jurisdiction to issue Tembec II, the decision and judgment should nevertheless be vacated based on the 30-day automatic stay of execution of a judgment provided for in USCIT Rule 62(a). See Def.’s Supplemental Br. Resp. Ct.’s Order of Dec. 20, 2006 5 (“In any event, assuming ... that this case did not become moot until October 31, 2006, ... the Court ... should vacate its decision and judgment in Tem-bec II because the judgment remained subject to the Rule 62(a) 30-day automatic *1401 stay, and, thus, was not final ... [on] October 31, 2006(“Def.’s Resp.”); see also USCIT R. 62(a) (“Except as stated herein or as otherwise ordered by the court, no execution shall issue upon a judgment nor shall prоceedings be taken for its enforcement until the expiration of 30 days after its entry.”). Specifically, Defendant states that “[bjecause Tembec II remained subject to the automatic stay, the Court’s judgment had not yet altered the legal relationship between the parties when Commerce issued the [October 31 Liquidation Instructions].” Def.’s Resp. 5. 7 Put another way, Defendant argues that the judgment was not legally effective until Plaintiffs were in a position to enfоrce it.
We find Defendant’s argument unconvincing. When the court issues a decision that “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment,”
Catlin v. United States,
The foregoing notwithstanding, the court concludes that the Tembec II judgment should be vacated because no case or controversy remains as the result of prejudgment and postjudgment events. As noted аbove, on October 12, 2006, by the exchange of letters, the Governments of the United States and Canada finalized their mutually-agreed-upon settlement of *1402 this dispute. The terms of the Agreement provided for the issuance of liquidation instructions with respect to the enjoined entries upon the lifting of the West Fraser Mills injunctions. See Agreement, Art. III(2)(b). These instructions were issued on October 31, 2006. Thus, Plaintiffs gained complete relief in fact on October 31, 2006, by reason of the parties having entеred into the Agreement before the judgment was issued.
The facts of this case, then, are unlike those presented in
U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership,
That neither party has asked the court to vacate its judgment based on the Agreement does not bar the court from doing so
sua sponte. See
USCIT R. 60(b) (“On motion of a party or upon its own initiative and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party ... from a final judgment .... ”);
see also Fort Knox Music Inc. v. Baptiste,
Because the court finds that the issues in
Tembec II
were decided within the context of a live controversy, however, the court will not withdraw its decision. When determining whether to vacate a prior decision, the court cannot ignore the substantial public interest in the establishment of judicial precedent. “Judicial preсedents are presumptively correct and valuable to the legal community as a whole. They are not merely the property of private litigants and should stand unless a court concludes that the public interest
*1403
would be served by a vacatur.”
U.S. Bancorp,
Finally, the court’s finding that this matter was not moot on October 12, 2006, leads to the additional conclusion that Defendant’s October 12, 2006, motion to dismiss for mootness is without merit. Because this case was still alive on October 12, 2006, Defendant’s motion was premature. Moreover, it is apparent that Defendant has not been precluded from having its arguments heard by the court. The court, therefore, having considered the arguments raised by Defendant in its motion to dismiss and having found them merit-less, concludes that it committed no error of law by declining to consider the motion prior to issuing Tembec II.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant’s motion tо dismiss pursuant to USCIT Rule 12(b)(1) is denied;
ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for reconsideration and to vacate Tembec II pursuant to USCIT Rule 59 is denied; and it is further
ORDERED that the Tembec II judgment is vacated.
Notes
. Defendant appealed the court’s decisions in
Tembec I
and
Tembec II
on December 11, 2006.
See Tembec I,
30 CIT --,
. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, upon which this Court’s rules are based, the terms "decision” and "judgment” do not have the same meaning. A decision "consists of the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.” 10 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 2651, at 9 (3d ed.1998). On the other hand, a judgment is "the pronouncement of that decision and the аct that gives [the decision] legal effect.”
Id.
(footnote omitted);
see also Rau v. Apple-Rio Mgmt. Co., Inc.,
. The injunctions in West Fraser Mills Ltd. v. United States, Consol. Ct. No. 05-00079, were modified on October 27, 2006. See W. Fraser Mills, Consol. Ct. No. 05-00079 (CIT Oct. 27, 2006) (order modifying preliminary injunctions) (Restani, C.J., Eaton & Stanceu, JJ.). The West Fraser Mills case involves an appeal to this Court of Commerce’s final determination in the first periodic review of the AD Order covering U.S. imports of Canadian softwood lumber. See W. Fraser Mills, Compl. ¶ 1.
. While the court is considering both the United States' motion to dismiss pursuant to USCIT Rule 12(b)(1) and its motion for reconsideration and vaсatur pursuant to USCIT Rule 59(e), the parties agree that the arguments for and against the two motions are the same. See, e.g., Def.'s Mot. Recons. & Vacate 4-5; Pl. Tembec Inc.’s Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Recons. & Vacate Tembec II 1 ("Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration and to Vacate has the same substantive basis as its pending motion to dismiss on mootness grounds — that the entry into force of the settlement between the Governments of the United States and Canada made the case moot on October 12, 2006, the day before the Court entered its judgment.”); Pl. CLTA's Opр'n Def.’s Mot. Recons. & Vacate Tembec II 1 (same). Thus, the court will address issues in the context of Defendant’s motion for reconsideration and vacatur.
. A duty is considered to be "ministerial” if its performance leaves nothing to the actor’s discretion.
See Mississippi v. Johnson,
. In
Tembec I,
we found for Plaintiffs with respect to the relief requested in paragraphs 37(a), (b) and (d) of their complaint.
See Tembec I,
30 CIT at -,
. As support for its claim that the 30-day automatic stay of execution prevents a judgment from becoming final until the expiration of that period, Defendant cites
Porco v. Trustees of Indiana University,