RAHUL TELANG and ASHWINI GANDHE, husband and wife, v. NVR, INC. trading and doing business as RYAN HOMES
Civil Action No. 19-1025
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
March 30, 2023
W. Scott Hardy, United States District Judge
Presently before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment and brief in support filed by Defendant NVR, Inc. t/d/b/a Ryan Homes (“NVR“) in this matter (Docket Nos. 56, 58), the brief in opposition filed by Plaintiffs Rahul Telang (“Dr. Telang“) and Ashwini Gandhe (“Dr. Gandhe“) (collectively, “Plaintiffs“) (Docket No. 61), and NVR‘s reply (Docket No. 64). In addition to the motion and briefs, the Court has considered the parties’ concise statements and counter statements of material facts, and the appendices that were filed in connection with the briefs (Docket Nos. 57, 59, 60, 62, 63, 65).
For the reasons set forth herein, NVR‘s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
I. Factual Background
As the parties are well-acquainted with the factual background of this case, at this juncture the Court will present an abbreviated version of the facts relevant to NVR‘s summary judgment motion. Plaintiffs, husband and wife, are homeowners, and NVR is a Virginia corporation that builds and sells homes in Pennsylvania and other states. (Docket Nos. 57, paragraphs 1, 2; 60, paragraphs 1, 2). On April 23, 2007, Plaintiffs and NVR entered into a Pennsylvania Purchase
During the construction process, Franklin Park Borough (the “Borough“) conducts periodic inspections of homes as they are being built in order to assure that the homes comply with applicable building codes. (Docket Nos. 57, paragraph 36; 60, paragraph 36). One such inspection is a framing inspection, which here included an inspection of the passageway and platform that houses the furnace in Plaintiffs’ attic. (Docket Nos. 57, paragraphs 37, 38; 60, paragraphs 37, 38). The Borough conducted a framing inspection of Plaintiffs’ home on August 1, 2007, and that inspection did not note any deficiency with the framing of the attic, including the attic platform. (Docket Nos. 57, paragraphs 41, 42; 60, paragraphs 41, 42). On October 1, 2007, NVR applied for a certificate of occupancy
Plaintiffs moved into their home in 2008, and from the time they purchased the home until January 28, 2019 - a period of over 11 years - neither Plaintiffs nor anyone else changed the air filter in their attic furnace. (Docket Nos. 57, paragraphs 53, 54; 60, paragraphs 53, 54). Prior to January 28, 2019, Dr. Telang did go into the attic between one and three times in order to change a light bulb. (Docket Nos. 57, paragraph 55; 60, paragraph 55). On January 28, 2019, Dr. Telang entered the attic to change the air filter in the attic furnace. (Docket Nos. 57, paragraph 56; 60, paragraph 56). According to Plaintiffs, while Dr. Telang was in the attic, he fell through the insulation and ceiling joists on the far side of the attic platform which, as noted, is more than five (5) feet past the location of the return air filter access. (Docket Nos. 57, paragraph 57; 60, paragraph 57). Dr. Telang landed in the home‘s foyer below, allegedly suffering various injuries. (Docket Nos. 57, paragraph 74; 60, paragraph 74; Docket No. 1-1).
When he went to the attic, Dr. Telang was accompanied by one of his sons, although that son did not enter the attic with his father and instead remained at the bottom of the attic stairs, so that son could not see his father in the attic. (Docket Nos. 57, paragraphs 59-61; 60, paragraphs 59-61).
No one saw Dr. Telang in the attic prior to the accident, and Dr. Telang has no recollection of what he was doing in the attic on that day. (Docket Nos. 57, paragraphs 66, 67; 60, paragraphs 66, 67). Dr. Telang has no recollection of the day of the accident, nor does he have any recollection of what caused his fall. (Docket Nos. 57, paragraphs 68, 71; 60, paragraphs 68, 71). Additionally, Plaintiffs’ two liability experts do not know why Dr. Telang fell through the insulation and drywall ceiling to the foyer floor below. (Docket Nos. 57, paragraphs 72-75; 60, paragraphs 72-75).
Plaintiffs filed the Complaint in this case in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, on July 30, 2019. (Docket No. 1-1). On August 15, 2019, NVR removed the action to this Court pursuant to the Court‘s diversity jurisdiction. (Docket No. 1). The Complaint includes three Counts brought against NVR under Pennsylvania law: Count I - Negligence (Dr. Telang v. NVR); Count II - Professional Negligence (Dr. Telang v. NVR); and Count III - Loss of Consortium (Dr. Gandhe v. NVR). (Docket No. 1-1 at 9-15). Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages for injuries they have suffered, interest, and costs of suit. (Id.). The parties have completed fact and expert discovery. (Docket Nos. 57, paragraph 78; 60, paragraph 78). As explained, supra, NVR filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, which has been fully briefed by the parties, and the motion is now ripe for decision.
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party without weighing the evidence or questioning the witnesses’ credibility. See Boyle, 139 F.3d at 393. The movant has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, while the non-movant must establish the existence of each element for which it bears the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant has pointed to sufficient evidence of record to demonstrate that no genuine issues of fact remain, the burden is on the non-movant to search the
III. Discussion
As previously indicated, Plaintiffs’ Complaint contains claims brought under Pennsylvania law for negligence and professional negligence, as well as a related claim for loss of consortium. (Docket No. 1-1 at 9-15). In moving for summary judgment, NVR argues that Plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of law because the record is devoid of evidence regarding causation, because Plaintiffs commenced this action long after the contractual statute of limitations had expired, and because the derivative loss of consortium claim must also be dismissed. The Court will address each of these arguments in turn.
A. Lack of Evidence Regarding Causation
In moving for summary judgment, NVR first argues that, after having engaged in extensive fact and expert discovery, there is simply no evidence to show what caused Dr. Telang to fall through his home‘s attic floor at a point past the far end of the attic‘s furnace/HVAC platform. NVR points out that Dr. Telang unequivocally testified in deposition that he recalls nothing from the day of the incident, and that no one else witnessed or knows what he was doing immediately before the accident occurred - when he fell at a point over five feet past the return air filter access, in an area that he had previously acknowledged was not safe to be entered. Therefore, NVR contends, because Plaintiffs have failed to show that NVR‘s alleged negligence was the proximate cause of Dr. Telang‘s fall (i.e., there is no evidence to support the essential
In support of its argument regarding the lack of evidence as to causation, NVR notes that “the mere happening of an accident is not evidence or proof of negligence on the part of anyone,” and that a plaintiff in a negligence action “has the burden of proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence that defendant was negligent and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.” Galullo v. Fed. Express Corp., 937 F. Supp. 392, 397 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Kester v. Rutt, 266 A.2d 713, 714 (1970). While Plaintiffs’ Complaint includes separate Counts based on negligence and professional negligence, both claims of negligence and professional negligence under Pennsylvania law1 must establish the basic elements of negligence, in that plaintiffs must show that “the defendant owed [the plaintiff] a duty; the defendant breached the duty; the plaintiff suffered actual harm; and a causal relationship existed between the breach of duty and the harm.” French v. Commonwealth Assocs., Inc., 980 A.2d 623, 630-31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009). Additionally, “[i]n determining whether a defendant‘s negligence is the proximate cause of a plaintiff‘s injury, Pennsylvania has adopted the ‘substantial factor’ test set forth in Section 431 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965),” under which “a defendant‘s negligent conduct is not the proximate cause of plaintiff‘s injury
Furthermore, in considering the evidentiary record and whether a case should go forward to trial, it is important to note that, while juries may draw reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence, there are limits to the inferences that a jury is permitted to draw. See Fitzpatrick v. Natter, 961 A.2d 1229, 1241 (Pa. 2008). “Viewed as a whole, the ‘evidentiary threads’ must be sufficient to ‘lift [the] contention out of the realm of speculation.‘” Id. (quoting Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 319 A.2d 914, 923 (Pa. 1974)). Although “the jury may draw reasonable inferences, it ‘may not be permitted to reach its verdict merely on the basis of speculation or conjecture, but . . . there must be evidence upon which logically its conclusion may be based.‘” Id. at 1241-42 (quoting Jones v. Treegoob, 249 A.2d 352, 354 (Pa. 1969)). Thus, a jury must be able to draw reasonable inferences “without resort to prejudice or guess.” Id. at 1242.
NVR asserts that the evidentiary record developed during discovery supports none of Plaintiffs’ allegations as to NVR‘s alleged negligence or professional negligence, and so a jury would be forced to reach a verdict based on no evidence and thus through mere speculation, or by guessing, which is impermissible under the law. Specifically, the Complaint alleges that NVR was negligent in the following ways:
- In failing to inspect the residence for dangerous conditions prior to transferring ownership of the residence to the Telangs;
- In failing to warn the Telangs about the latent dangerous conditions prior to transferring ownership of the residence to the Telangs;
- In designing and constructing a residence that incorporated an attic appliance without having the necessary protections in place;
- In designing and installing an appliance platform without a protective railing;
In designing and installing an appliance platform that lacked warnings or markings to indicate where the platform ended; - In designing and installing an appliance platform without providing any warnings or marking to indicate where it was not safe to stand or step;
- In designing and constructing an attic that incorporated latent dangers, such as a 20-foot drop that was covered by blow-in insulation;
- In installing a furnace that did not clearly identify where the air filter was located;
- In failing to inform and warn the Telangs about the dangerous condition in the attic, including the latent 20-foot drop from the ceiling joists to the front foyer;
- In using blow-in insulation instead of batts insulation which caused the dangerous condition to be inconspicuous;
- In designing and/or installing the furnace which had condensate and gas lines running across the service platform causing a dangerous tripping hazard;
- In designing and installing the 2nd floor ceiling joists with such spacing so as to allow an individual to fall between the joists; and
- In installing a furnace platform that was too short, which contributed to the dangerous condition being latent.
(Docket No. 1-1, paragraphs 30, 36).
As to these allegations, NVR points to the following evidence, or lack thereof. To the extent that Plaintiffs allege a failure to warn of latent defects, with no evidence as to what Dr. Telang was doing in the attic when he fell five feet past the end of the platform, Plaintiffs cannot satisfy their burden to establish a causal link between NVR‘s alleged actions and Dr. Telang‘s injuries (subparagraphs b, e, f, i, j, and m). Additionally, Dr. Telang‘s repeated warnings to his sons about the importance of remaining on the attic platform and not stepping on the insulation undercut any allegations as to the existence of a latent danger, which are also otherwise unsupported by any evidence (subparagraphs g, i, and l). Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ allegations of condensate and gas lines creating a tripping hazard is not supported by any evidence indicating that Dr. Telang tripped (subparagraph k). There is also no evidence that Dr. Telang could not identify the location of the air filter access or that any such supposed inability to locate the air filter access contributed to his fall (subparagraph h). Although Plaintiffs allege a failure to
In its briefing, NVR also cites to a number of cases that support its argument that summary judgment is appropriate here because Plaintiffs have produced no evidence of causation - and since a jury would therefore have to speculate as to how Dr. Telang came to exit the attic platform and fall through the ceiling on the far side of the platform, at a distance of more than five feet past the location of the return air filter access. See, e.g., Galullo v. Federal Express Corp., 937 F. Supp. 392, 399 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (granting summary judgment for the defendant where the injured plaintiff offered no direct evidence that she had slipped on a letterpack delivered by the defendant, where it was just as likely that the plaintiff had slipped on wet leaves or a rug, and where a jury “would be left to speculate whether the letterpack was the cause in fact of her injuries and such speculation by a jury is not permitted“); Lattari v. 3180 MJT Corp., No. 140900773, 2016 WL 11469122 (Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas (Phila. Cnty.) Sept. 9, 2016) (granting summary judgment for the defendant where no one witnessed the decedent‘s fall and there was no evidence as to how the accident happened, and the court reasoned that the plaintiff had posited several theories why the defendant‘s negligence might have caused the plaintiff‘s fall, but numerous other equally possible theories existed whereby his fall may not have been due to any negligence by the defendant; and the plaintiff was not entitled to an inference of fact that amounted to a guess, speculation, or conjecture).
Specifically, in response to NVR‘s summary judgment motion, Plaintiffs invoke the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 323(a) and argue for the first time in this case that such law applies here. (Docket No. 61 at 5-10). Section 323, otherwise known as the “Good Samaritan Rule,” provides as follows:
Negligent Performance of Undertaking to Render Services
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other‘s person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm . . . .
In adopting the Good Samaritan Rule, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained that Section 323(a) applies only to “a particular class of tort actions,” and that it “differs from those cases normally sounding in tort.” Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1286 (Pa. 1978); see also Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160, 1187 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (noting that Pennsylvania recognizes the so-called “good Samaritan rule“). Thus, the section applies when a defendant “render[s] services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other‘s person or things.” Restatement (Second) of Torts section 323. “It does not, however, change the burden of a plaintiff to establish the underlying elements of an action in negligence, nor can it be invoked to create a duty where one does not exist.” Morena v. South Hills Health Sys., 462 A.2d 680, 684 (Pa. 1983). Accordingly, Section 323 has been applied in cases involving issues such as medical malpractice (see Hamil, 392 A.2d at 1280; K.H. v. Kumar, 122 A.3d 1080 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015)), and the performance of safety inspections (see Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. at 1160; Isaacson v. Mobile Propane Corp., No. 1083, 1981 WL 207419 (Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas (Phila. Cnty.) Sept. 3, 1981)). Plaintiffs have not, however, cited to any case in which courts have applied Section 323 to claims against builders, and importantly, as NVR indicates, the Good Samaritan Rule entails a promise of protection, see Miller v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 611, 616-17 (E.D. Pa. 1982). The relationship between Plaintiffs and NVR, however, is governed by their Purchase Agreement, which contains no such promise of protection, and which thus renders the Good Samaritan Rule seemingly inapplicable to the facts of this case.
Moreover, NVR argues that even if the Good Samaritan rule could apply here (despite the existence of the parties’ Purchase Agreement), the allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint simply
Insofar as both of these sections provide that a negligent actor is liable for “physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if the plaintiff or the one to whom the actor undertook to render services relied on the undertaking or “if” the negligence increased the plaintiff‘s risk of harm . . . the language of the Restatement assumes that the injuries somehow factually “result” from the defendant‘s negligence before it even reaches the issues of reliance of increased risk questions of legal cause. In other words, that harm “results” from the negligence charged is inadequate under the Restatement unless the harm is caused by increased risk or reliance. Plaintiffs’ allegations never get past the “resulting from” language of the Restatement, and so could be said not to address at all the issue of legal cause.
Thus, we do not here have ambiguous pleadings that might conceivably be read to include the necessary allegations . . . . Rather, here we have a total failure to include, ambiguously or otherwise, any pleadings reaching the crucial causation factors under sections 323 and 324A. Because proximate cause is a critical element of a plaintiff‘s prima facie case in tort, when under section 323
or section 324A the requisite reliance or increased risk of harm does not appear, courts have dismissed, DeJesus v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., supra, [223 A.2d 849 (Pa. 1966)] rendered summary judgment, Clark v. Employers Mutual of Wausau, 297 F. Supp. 286 (E.D. Pa. 1969), or directed verdicts for defendant, Evans v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., supra, [398 F.2d 665 (3d Cir. 1968)] as the case‘s procedural posture made appropriate.
Blessing, 447 F. Supp. at 1197 (emphasis added).
Similarly, here, to the extent Plaintiffs now apparently wish to re-frame what appear to be traditional negligence and professional negligence claims as Section 323 Good Samaritan Rule claims, even if such claims could be brought in a case like this, Plaintiffs have not pled that NVR‘s alleged negligence increased Plaintiffs’ risk of harm as required in a Good Samaritan Rule claim under Section 323(a). Plaintiffs have thus not alleged a Section 323 claim in their Complaint as it is drafted, and it is simply too late for Plaintiffs to amend their Complaint - nor have Plaintiffs requested leave to do so - since the parties have completed discovery and are at the stage of summary judgment, and the time for amendment of the pleadings has long passed.
Therefore, the Court concludes that NVR has shown that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there is no evidence of record showing that NVR‘s conduct was the proximate case of Dr. Telang‘s accident, which is a required element of Plaintiffs’ negligence and professional negligence claims. Plaintiffs have failed to rebut NVR‘s showing with the argument that they have offered in response - essentially that their burden of proof should be lowered here because their claims, which appear to be traditional negligence and professional negligence claims, should be viewed as Section 323 Good Samaritan Rule claims - which are not the type of claims that appear appropriate in light of the facts of this case, and which are not claims that are pled in the Complaint. The Court therefore further concludes that Plaintiffs, in responding to NVR‘s motion, have failed to meet their burden to show that there is a disputed issue of material fact as
B. The Contractual Limitation as a Bar to Plaintiffs’ Claims
As an alternative basis in moving for summary judgment, NVR asserts that Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred based on the limitations provision in the parties’ Purchase Agreement. In response, Plaintiffs argue that such limitations provision does not apply here, and they contend instead that their claims are timely based on a common law standard for accrual of claims. The Court looks to Pennsylvania contract law in considering the parties’ differing positions here.
“Pennsylvania contract law begins with the ‘firmly settled’ point that ‘the intent of the parties to a written contract is contained in the writing itself.‘” Bohler-Uddeholm Am., Inc. v. Ellwood Grp., Inc., 247 F.3d 79, 92 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Krizovensky v. Krizovensky, 624 A.2d 638, 642 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)). “‘Where the intention of the parties is clear, there is no need to resort to extrinsic aids or evidence,’ instead, the meaning of a clear and unequivocal written contract ‘must be determined by its contents alone.‘” Id. (quoting Steuart v. McChesney, 444 A.2d 659, 661 (Pa. 1982)) (additional quotation marks and citation omitted). “‘Where language is clear and unambiguous, the focus of interpretation is upon the terms of the agreement as manifestly expressed, rather than as, perhaps, silently intended.‘” Id. (quoting Steuart, 444 A.2d at 661) (emphasis in original).
The parties’ Purchase Agreement provides, in part, as follows concerning “Claims and Disputes“:
PURCHASER AND SELLER COVENANT AND AGREE THAT ANY AND ALL CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS AGREEMENT, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY CLAIMS BASED IN WHOLE OR IN PART ON
FACTS OCCURRING BEFORE SETTLEMENT, WHETHER KNOWN OR UNKNOWN, AND THAT ARISE OUT OF OR RELATE TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS AGREEMENT, SETTLEMENT HEREUNDER, THE AGREED IMPROVEMENTS TO THE PROPERTY (WHETHER AS-BUILT OR AS-PROMISED) AND/OR THE HEREIN DESCRIBED REAL ESTATE, REGARDLESS OF LEGAL THEORY AND REGARDLESS OF THE NAMED RESPONDENT(S)/DEFENDANT(S) (“CLAIMS“), SHALL BE GOVERNED BY A ONE (1) YEAR LIMITATION OF ACTION PERIOD AND BAR DATE RUNNING FROM THE DATE THE CLAIM OR CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUES (IF AT ALL). CONSISTENT WITH THE FOREGOING, ALL SUCH CLAIMS BASED ON MATTERS OCCURRING BEFORE THE SETTLEMENT DATE SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE ARISEN AND ACCRUED, IF AT ALL, AND THE AFORESAID ONE YEAR LIMITATION OF ACTION PERIOD FOR ALL SUCH CLAIMS SHALL BEGIN TO RUN NOT LATER THAN THE SETTLEMENT DATE. WITH THE SOLE EXCEPTION OF COUNTERCLAIMS, ANY SUCH CLAIMS INITIATED IN ANY FORUM AGAINST ANY PARTY TO THIS AGREEMENT AND/OR THEIR JOINT AND SEVERAL SUCCESSORS, MEMBERS, AFFILIATES, EMPLOYEES, AGENTS, CONTRACTORS AND/OR SUPPLIERS BY ANY OTHER PARTY TO THIS AGREEMENT AND/OR THEIR SUCCESSORS, SUBROGEES AND ASSIGNS SHALL BE DEEMED AUTOMATICALLY BARRED AND PRECLUDED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND CONTRACT IF NOT FILED/INITIATED WITHIN THAT AGREED ONE (1) YEAR LIMITATION OF ACTION PERIOD FOLLOWING SETTLEMENT AND BEFORE SAID BAR DATE. ALL APPLICATION OF THE SO-CALLED “DISCOVERY RULE” IS MUTUALLY WAIVED BY THE PARTIES. BY EXECUTING THIS AGREEMENT, PURCHASER ACKNOWLEGES PURCHASER‘S UNDERSTANDING AND AGREEMENT TO THESE TERMS AND THAT THE SAID ONE (1) YEAR PERIOD IS COMPLETELY REASONABLE IN ALL RESPECTS.
(Docket No. 59-5 at 5-6, section 13 (original is in bold).
NVR argues that the only natural reading of the Purchase Agreement is that Plaintiffs’ claims here constitute “claims” as defined in that contract, and that the accrual date of such claims according to that contract is the settlement date in 2007. Accordingly, NVR reasons, the claims that Plaintiffs allege here had to have been asserted within one year of that settlement date in order to be timely.
In response to Plaintiffs’ argument, NVR breaks down the Purchase Agreement‘s language in greater detail to show that Plaintiffs’ claims in this action clearly fit within the Purchase Agreement‘s definition of “claims.” NVR reasons that Plaintiffs’ claims here arise out of and relate to the subject matter of the Purchase Agreement in that all such claims assert defects in NVR‘s design and construction of Plaintiffs’ home, the construction of which was the subject of the Purchase Agreement. NVR also points out that Plaintiffs’ claims are based in part
Having shown that Plaintiffs’ claims are “claims” under the Purchase Agreement, NVR next endeavors to show that the Purchase Agreement also establishes the contractual limitations period for the assertion of such claims. The Purchase Agreement clearly provides that claims shall be governed by a one (1) year limitation of action period and bar date, and that it shall run from the date the claim or cause of action accrues (if at all). (Docket No. 59-5 at 6, section 13). The Purchase Agreement further provides that all such claims based on matters occurring before the settlement date shall be deemed to have arisen and accrued, if at all, and the aforesaid one-year limitation period shall begin to run not later than the settlement date (which, in this case, is 2007). (Id.).
NVR argues that the natural reading of such provision incorporates the preceding portions of the provision, and thus the accrual date applies to “claims,” including Plaintiffs’ claims (discussed, supra). By its terms, such provision expressly extends to “claims” based on
NVR notes that, to remove all doubt as to the application of the limitations provision, the Purchase Agreement expressly waived any application of the “discovery rule.” NVR also cites cases indicating strong policy reasons that support the enforcement of the limitations provision as it is written.3 See, e.g., Adamitis v. Erie Ins. Exch., 54 A.3d 371, 376 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (“Generally, a clear and unambiguous contract provision must be given its plain meaning unless to do so would be contrary to a clearly expressed public policy,” and “it is only when a given policy is so obviously for or against the public health, safety, morals or welfare that there is virtual unanimity of opinion in regard to it, that a court may constitute itself the voice of the community in so declaring [that the contract is against public policy].‘” (quoting Eichelman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 711 A.2d 1006, 1008 (Pa. 1998) (additional internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); PSC Info Group v. Lason, Inc., No. 08-2176, 2008 WL 4660943, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 2008) (explaining that only “[i]n the absence of a contractual provision addressing accrual” will a court “apply ordinary Pennsylvania law when analyzing accrual“); Gustine Uniontown Assocs., Ltd. v. Anthony Crane Rental, Inc., 892 A.2d 830, 838-39 (Pa. Super. Ct.
Upon consideration of the language of the parties’ agreed-upon Purchase Agreement, Pennsylvania contract law, and the arguments set forth by the parties, the Court finds that NVR has set forth the natural reading of the limitation provision in light of the clear and unambiguous language of the contract, while Plaintiffs’ position would require the Court to strain to find contract language ambiguity where none exists. The claims that Plaintiffs set forth in their Complaint clearly constitute “claims” under the terms of the Purchase Agreement. The Purchase Agreement plainly indicates that the settlement date would be the accrual date for any such claims. The parties agreed to the terms of the Purchase Agreement. This action was commenced nearly 12 years after the settlement date, which was long after the contractual limitations period had expired. Plaintiffs’ claims here are thus time-barred.
Therefore, even if the Court were to find that NVR is not entitled to summary judgment based on the lack of evidence to show causation (discussed, supra), the Court finds, alternatively, that the negligence and professional claims here are barred by the contractual limitations period set forth in the parties’ Purchase Agreement. Accordingly, the Court concludes that NVR is also entitled to summary judgment as to the claims alleged at Counts I and II of Plaintiffs’ Complaint because such claims are time-barred.
C. Loss of Consortium
Finally, NVR argues that, because it is entitled to summary judgment as to Dr. Telang‘s claims of negligence and professional negligence, the Court must also grant summary judgment
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, NVR‘s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 56) is granted. NVR is entitled to summary judgment as to Counts I and II based on the lack of evidence to show causation, and, alternatively, such claims are also barred by the contractual limitations period set forth in the parties’ Purchase Agreement. Because the Court is granting summary judgment in favor of NVR as to Dr. Telang‘s claims at Counts I and II, Dr. Gandhe cannot succeed on her derivative claim for loss of consortium, and NVR is entitled to summary judgment as to Count III as well. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted in favor of NVR as to all counts of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.
An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion follows.
Dated: March 30, 2023
s/ W. Scott Hardy
W. Scott Hardy
United States District Judge
cc/ecf: All counsel of record
Notes
Also, under Pennsylvania law:
In a professional malpractice action, the determination of whether there was a breach of duty requires the plaintiff to additionally show that the defendant‘s conduct fell below the relevant standard of care applicable to the rendition of the professional services at issue. In most cases, such a determination requires expert testimony because the negligence of a professional encompasses matters not within the ordinary knowledge and experience of laypersons. * * * [W]e discern that there are two questions involved in determining whether a claim alleges ordinary as opposed to professional negligence: (1) whether the claim pertains to an action that occurred within the course of a professional relationship; and (2) whether the claim raises questions of professional judgment beyond the realm of common knowledge and experience.
French v. Commonwealth Assocs., Inc., 980 A.2d at 631 (quoting Merlini ex rel. Merlini v. Gallitzin Water Auth., 934 A.2d 100, 104-05 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (internal citations omitted)).