TEJON REAL ESTATE, LLC, Plаintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent.
No. B247255
Second Dist., Div. Four.
Jan. 22, 2014.
February 14, 2014
149-159
MANELLA, J.
David M. Leeper for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Michael N. Feuer, City Attorney, and Brian I. Cheng, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent.
OPINION
MANELLA, J.----Appellant Tejon Real Estate, LLC, the owner of a vacant lot in Los Angeles, contends the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer of respondent City of Los Angeles (City) to appellant‘s complaint and dismissing the underlying action. Appellant had engaged in discussions with City representatives concerning the conditions under which it could obtain an extension of water service to its lot, and whether installation of a fire hydrant would be required prior to building a residence. Having obtained informal opinions from City and fire department representatives concerning the cost of the water extension and the necessity of the hydrant, appellant initiated an
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant‘s original complaint alleged that it owned a vacant lot described as unimproved and zoned for a single-family residence. The lot is located on an unpaved portion of Harriman Avenue, approximately 430 feet from the closest water main and fire hydrant. Appellant alleged that it desired to build a residence on the lot and had been informed by a fire department “representative” that a building permit would not be approved unless there was a fire hydrant within 300 feet of the proposed structure. In addition, appellant allegedly received a written estimate from the DWP stating that the cost of extending the water main to the lot would be $77,000.1 Appellant alleged that the requirements outlined by the representatives were not authorized by law, and that it was DWP‘s obligatiоn to provide water service at its own expense, “rather than make it impractical for an owner of a lot to build on the lawfully subdivided lot, because of the expense of obtaining water and fire protection . . . .” Appellant sought a court interpretation of the DWP Rules, in particular rule 15, governing “[e]xtensions of the Department‘s Water Distribution System which are necessary to make water service of a permanent character available to Applicants . . . .”
The City demurred contending that the case was not ripe, and that appellant had failed to exhaust the administrative process as it had not submitted plans, applied for a permit or obtained an official decision from the City. Moreover, to the extent appellant contended it had received a final administrative decisiоn, administrative mandamus rather than declaratory relief was the appropriate remedy. The demurrer was sustained with leave to amend, and appellant filed a first amended complaint (FAC).
In the FAC, appellant alleged that its inquiries to City and fire department personnel represented a “complete application for water service to the subject lot” and that the letter it received in response to its inquiry represented “the official action and final determination on [its] application[] by [DWP].” Appellant conceded it had not applied for a building permit, but contended
Appellant quoted a DWP rule applicable to a water main extension “on [an] unimproved street[], not in [a] new subdivision,” which was “not at . . . grade” level. The provision permitted DWP to charge the applicant “up tо the full cost of any extension” under certain circumstances, including ” ‘[w]here[] in the opinion of the Chief Engineer of Water Works, the estimated revenue from the service to be provided does not justify the additional cost necessary for local distribution facilities.’ ” (Quoting DWP Rules, rule 15.A.6.c.) Appellant asserted that because the Harriman Avenue lot was at grade level this provision was inapplicable. Neverthеless, he relied on the language of the provision to assert that DWP could charge an applicant the cost of an extension only where all the conditions of the provision were met, including issuance of an opinion by the chief engineer of water works that “the estimated income from water use [did] not justify the cost that would be incurred by [DWP] for providing a water line.” (Underscoring omitted.) In addition, appellant alleged that a fire hydrant and six-inch water supply was not required, because the applicable provisions of the fire code state that its requirements pertain ” ‘unless otherwise determined by the Chief.’ ” (Quoting
In the prayer for relief, the FAC requested a declaration determining whether “a service connection could be used, instead of a main extension, and still provide adequate water for a permit for a single family residence on the subject lot” and whether “a standard, single outlet fire hydrant, located directly in front of plaintiff‘s lot, fed by a 1-1/4 inch service connection, would be a project which should be approved by the Fire Chief, if the
The City again demurred, asserting as it had before that the request for declaratory relief was not ripe, and that administrative remedies had not been exhausted as appellant had not prepared plans for an actual project or applied for permits. The City pointed out that “until complete plans (showing all features of the house) are submitted for review, [it] [could] not grant any exemption or impose any conditions.” The City also continued to assert that declaratory relief was not an appropriate substitute for mandamus. Appellant contended that the facts alleged in the FAC established that application for a permit would have been futile. It stated it would amend to seek a writ of mandate if necessary.
The court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, stating: “In spite of the ruling on the Demurrer to the complaint placing [appellant] on notice of this defect in the pleading, [appellant] has still not alleged facts to establish that this controversy is ripe for declaratory relief. [Appellant] admits it never applied for permits, nor is there an allegation of an actual proposal for construction. Nor are there any facts alleged to establish that applying for a permit would have been futile.” The court found that “[a]dministrative decisions are reviewable by administrative writ,” and observed that appellant was “attempting to sidestep the administrаtive process by obtaining an advisory opinion on a hypothetical project . . . requir[ing] [the court] to apply the applicable Rules in the abstract.” Appellant‘s action was dismissed. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
The sole cause of action in appellant‘s complaint was for declaratory relief. Appellant contends (1) that it “completed the application process for water service” and received a “final determination” and (2) that it is, therefore, entitled to a declaration interpreting the pertinent rules and regulations under
A. Declaratory Relief Is Not an Appropriate Method to Challenge an Administrative Decision
Bеcause appellant‘s complaint and FAC improperly sought declaratory relief to review a purported administrative decision, demurrer was properly sustained on that ground alone. (See State of California v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.3d at pp. 248-249; Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura (1973) 10 Cal.3d 110, 126-127.)
B. Appellant Failed to Exhaust Its Administrative Remedies as the Informal Information Provided by Representatives of DWP and the Fire Department Did Not Represent a Final Administrative Decision
When a statute or lawful regulаtion establishes a quasi-judicial administrative tribunal to adjudicate remedies, “the aggrieved party is generally
“The exhaustion doctrine is principally grounded on concerns favoring administrative autonomy (i.e., courts should not interfere with an agency determination until the agency has reached a final decision) аnd judicial efficiency (i.e., overworked courts should decline to intervene in an administrative dispute unless absolutely necessary).” (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 377, 391.) Restricting courts to review of final agency decisions permits courts to “benefit[] from the expertise of an agency particularly familiar and experienced in the area.” (Styne v. Stevens, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 58.) ” ‘Even where the administrative remedy may not resolve all issues or provide the precise reliеf requested by a plaintiff, the exhaustion doctrine is still viewed with favor “because it facilitates the development of a complete record that draws on administrative expertise and promotes judicial efficiency.” ’ ” (Sierra Club v. San Joaquin Local Agency Formation Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 489, 501.)
A demurrer may properly be sustained based on the failure to adequately plead exhaustion of administrative remedies. (Shuer v. County of San Diego (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 476, 482.) In order to withstand a demurrer for failure to allege exhаustion of available administrative remedies, the plaintiff must allege facts showing that he did exhaust administrative remedies or facts showing that he was not required to do so. (Ibid.; Campbell v. Regents of University of California (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, 333.)
Here, it is clear from the allegations of the complaint that appellant failed to obtain a final administrative decision before filing the underlying action. Indeed, appellant admits that it did not prepare or submit plans or seek a building pеrmit which would have provided an opportunity for all the relevant City departments to determine precisely what conditions to impose
Appellant contends exhaustion would be futile, as there is no basis to believe completiоn of a formal application for a building permit would affect
The necessity of engaging in the administrative process to the end is particularly critical in the present situation. Among other things, appellant requested that the court determine whether “a service connection could be used, instead of a main extension, and still provide adequate water [for thе residence]” and whether a “1-1/4 inch service connection” would be adequate to feed a fire hydrant if the residence were made of stucco and constructed with “two-hour fire rated walls and ceiling” and “all roofs were covered with class A fire rated covering.” Courts are in no position to resolve such matters without the benefit of the expertise of City personnel knowledgeable about
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded its costs on appeal.
Epstein, P. J., and Willhite, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied February 14, 2014, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above.