176 Wis. 410 | Wis. | 1922
The plaintiffs contend that there was evidence upon which the case should have been submitted to the jury and that therefore the direction of a verdict by the court was error. It is argued that the defendant warranted the animal to be a breeder; that the plaintiffs purchased the animal in question in reliance upon the warranty; that she was bred on November 29, 1919, and in the ordinary course of events should have produced a mature calf on August 29, 1920; that on June 16, 1920, ten weeks prior to the full time, she aborted, giving birth to an immature calf
The proof in this case was not sufficiently certain and definite to establish the fact that the cow was infected with contagious abortion on the date of the sale, and under the evidence it remained a matter of doubt, speculation, and conjecture.
*415 “Opinion evidence alone is not conclusive in any case. The jury must pass upon the probabilities, and unless the opinion relied on is within the scope of reason and common sense’ it should not be regarded at all. .If that were not so, injustice would often rule in the jury room, because . . . there is no theory so preposterous but that men can be procured to support it under oath from the witness stand by expert evidence. On questions involving skill and experience in such matters, experts must be called from the necessities of the case, for want of better evidence; and when stripped of all the elements of mere conjecture, and pretense, and partisan influence, it is valuable, and what is left will rarely appear improbable to ordinary comprehension. It is the duty of courts and juries to do that, — to subject ex•pert opinions to all reasonable tests to determine their credibility.” Baxter v. C. & N. W. R. Co. 104 Wis. 307, 330, 80 N. W. 644; Bourda v. Jones, 110 Wis. 52, 85 N. W. 671.
It appears without dispute that the abortion occurred on June 16th and that the plaintiffs gave no notice thereof to the defendant until August 12th.
“Sec. 1684f — 49, Stats. . . . But, if, after acceptance, of the goods, the buyer fails to give notice to the seller of any breach of the promise or warranty within a'reasonable time after the buyer knows, or ought to know, of such breach, the seller shall not be liable therefor.”
Such was the law prior to the adoption of the Uniform Sales Act. Northern E. M. Co. v. H. M. Benjamin C. Co. 116 Wis. 130, 92 N. W. 553.
While ordinarily the 'question of what' constitutes a reasonable time is a question of fact for the jury, in this case, where there was a delay- of fifty-seven days',' there being no circumstances excusing or justifying the delay, it is held that notice was not given within a reasonable time as a matter of law, and the seller was therefore not liable for a breach of warranty had there been one. Plaintiffs lived in Price county, 130 miles from Iola, the place of sale. There was regular daily communication between the places. The
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.