Russell D. TEFFER, Claimant-Appellant, v. TWIN FALLS SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 411, Employer, and State Insurance Fund, Surety, Defendants-Respondents.
No. 13567
Supreme Court of Idaho
May 11, 1981
Rehearing Denied Aug. 17, 1981.
631 P.2d 610 | 102 Idaho 439
BAKES, Chief Justice.
James T. Jones of Seeley, Jones & Fuller, Jerome, for claimant-appellant. Hollis A. Mercer of firm of Paul Boyd, Boise, for respondents.
This is an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission denying appellant Russell Teffer‘s claim for worker‘s compensation benefits. The commission held that Teffer‘s accident did not arise out of and in the course of his employment, as required by
Teffer began employment as a custodian at Twin Falls High School on March 6, 1978. His work shift began at 2:30 p. m. and ended at 11:00 or 11:30 p. m., depending upon the length of lunch break taken. On April 11, 1978, Teffer completed his work before his shift ended. He and other custodians began playing basketball soon after 10:00 p. m. About twenty or twenty-five minutes later, Teffer injured his knee. Prior to that time, Teffer had used the gym facilities on about two occasions.
At the time he was hired, Teffer‘s supervisor told him that he could use the gym or weight room “after work.” The supervisor testified that to him “after work” meant after hours. Teffer testified that he understood it to mean after he had completed his assigned tasks. According to Teffer‘s supervisor and the district personnel director, school district policy did not permit employees to use gym facilities during working hours.
Whether an accident arose out of and in the course of employment is a question of fact to be resolved by the Industrial Commission under the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Smith v. University of Idaho, 67 Idaho 22, 170 P.2d 404 (1946). We are statutorily and constitutionally compelled to defer to the Industrial Commission‘s findings of fact where supported by substantial and competent evidence.
In denying Teffer‘s claim, the Industrial Commission and its referee cited the following factors in support of its decision: recre
The above findings are amply supported by the record. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Industrial Commission. Costs to respondent.
McFADDEN, DONALDSON and SHEPARD, JJ., concur.
BISTLINE, Justice, dissenting.
I cannot agree with the majority that the Industrial Commission was correct in its conclusion that the accident which injured Teffer did not arise out of and in the course of Teffer‘s employment.
The referee found that “[n]o regular pattern of usage of the gym facilities after working hours by the claimant or other school district employees was established.” This finding is contrary to the record. While Teffer personally had used the facilities only two or three times, the unrebutted testimony of Larry Baxter, the personnel director for the school district and a witness for the district, established that employees had permission to, and did in fact, use those facilities on a regular basis. Mr. Baxter testified that:
“[T]he facilities are available to employees prior to or after the normal working shifts. We have many of our certified staff that utilize our gymnasium complex, tracks, etc., prior to starting their work day or after they had completed their work day. This would apply, also, to our classified people that those facilities would be available to them, also, as it is to our certified people that they are available prior to or after their normal work period.”
William Ruffell, the maintenance and grounds supervisor for the school where Teffer was employed (and also a witness for the district), testified:
“Q. O.K. To the best of your knowledge, Mr. Ruffell, what did you know about the use of the gym by the night custodians?
“A. I Wasn‘t aware that they were using it during the working hours, which I figure is eight hours. I knew that they were using it and, I can say, as a custodian when I was out there, I used it on my own time during my lunch hour and after work. As a matter of fact, when I was out there, they done it quite often.”
Mr. Ruffell also testified that he gave Teffer specific permission to use the gym facilities after working hours at the time that Teffer was hired. In fact, Teffer passed over an admittedly easier job in order to undertake the custodial duties at the gym because of his desire to take advantage of the availability of the facilities. The district did not introduce any evidence that use of the facilities was sporadic or irregular; to do so would have been contrary to the testimony of the district‘s own employees. In short, the district never disputed the fact that gym facilities were available to employees after hours and during lunch, and that employees used those facilities, with the district‘s permission, on a regular basis.
Where the evidence is not in conflict and can produce only one conclusion, a finding that is contrary to that conclusion will be set aside on appeal. See, e. g.,
“Where there is no dispute in the evidence and it is not reasonably susceptible of more than one inference, whether or not an accident to a workman arose out of and in the course of his employment is a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact and may be reviewed by this court.” Id. at 351, 252 P.2d at 1050.
This factual error becomes important in light of the referee‘s decision to treat the accident as if it had occurred after working hours.1 While this was admittedly a fiction, it did form the basis for the referee‘s, and consequently the Commission‘s decision.
In light of the fact that gym facilities were used by employees after work both regularly and with the approval of the district, and in light of the referee‘s election to treat the accident as if it had happened after work, only two questions need be answered. First, does the fact that Teffer had only personally used the gym two or three times make a difference in determining whether the accident arose out of and in the course of his employment? If the answer to that question is negative, then we must ask whether the regular use of such facilities after working hours brings those activities within the scope of the employer‘s workers compensation liability.
The first question is easily disposed of. The determination to be made in this case is what the scope of employment is, not what any particular employee has or has not done. In deciding whether recreational activities are within the scope of employment, courts universally look at the job and the employer‘s practices, not the individual activities of the claimant. As Larson puts it, the question is when the practice “becomes a fixture of the employment” and “whether the activity has in fact become an incident of the employment ....”
I turn then to the question of whether the fact that employees regularly used the gymnasium facilities after work brings the activities within the scope of the employer‘s worker‘s compensation liability. Two general rules of law provide the framework for my analysis. The first is that injuries sustained by an employee on the employer‘s premises are deemed to arise out of and in the course of employment. Colson v. Steele, supra. “[A presumption] that the injury arises out of and in the course of employment prevails where the injury oc
Finally, if the referee‘s fiction that the accident occurred after work is either ignored or assumed away, the district‘s liability becomes even more certain. The basketball game must then be held to have occurred during working hours. As Larson puts it:
“[The majority of courts have] recognized that workmen whose jobs call for vigorous physical activity cannot be expected, during idle periods, to sit with folded hands in an attitude of contemplation. They must do something, and the most natural thing in the world to do is to joke, scuffle, spar, and play with the equipment and apparatus of the plant.
“[I]n Meigel v. General Foods Corporation [2 A.D.2d 945, 156 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1956)], an injury to the claimant while he and other employees were engaged in a test of strength by trying to bend a steel bar against a post was held compensable. The court stated:
‘Young lads whose jobs call for expenditure of physical energy cannot be expected, during slack period, to sit in idleness and gossip. The employer must expect that they will engage in some form of activity. Here it was natural for claimant to attempt to match his strength with his fellow employees and to use the objects found on his employer‘s plant to do so. The risk was a risk of the employment.’
“On the same reasoning, compensation was awarded for injuries resulting from a ride on a conveyor belt during a lull in the work, from a pole-climbing contest at a remote work site and, in several cases, from fooling around with guns during a slack period.”
1A Larson, Workmen‘s Compensation Law § 23.65 at 5-157 through 5-160 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
If this were a close case, I would invoke the proposition that “‘all courts are agreed that there should be accorded to the Workmen‘s Compensation Act a broad and liberal construction, that doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of compensation, and that the humane purposes which these acts seek to serve leave no room for narrow technical construction.‘” Smith v. University of Idaho, supra, 67 Idaho at 26, 170 P.2d at 406. However, this is not a close case. Teffer was engaged in a regularly conducted activity, on the employer‘s premises, using plant facilities and with the employer‘s permission, albeit without specific permission to engage in the activity at that particular time. Under these undisputed facts, I would hold as a matter of law that the Commission erred in denying compensation.
I respectfully dissent.
Notes
Conclusion of Law V was as follows:
“One factor which makes this case unusual is the misunderstanding between the claimant and the employer as to when he was allowed to use the gym facilities; the claimant believed that he was allowed to use the gym when he had completed his work; but the employer‘s policy allowed such activity when the claimant‘s work shift was completed. Thus, in one sense the employer took no action which would bring the claimant‘s basketball game of April 11, 1978, within the course of employment because such games were not authorized during working hours. But because the claimant honestly misunderstood the employer‘s policy, the Referee concludes that, for the purposes of determining whether the claimant was in the course of his employment, his injury should be treated as if it had occurred during a game played after his work shift. Treating the injury as if it had occurred during a game after the claimant‘s work shift has the effect of treating the game as if it were authorized by the employer, which it was from the claimant‘s point of view, but it does not expand the scope of activities permitted by the employer; it thus approximates the position that the parties would have been in had there been no misunderstanding.” (Emphasis added.)