JUSTIN RAY TEETS
Civil Action No. 20-1334
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
September 22, 2022
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff‘s Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to
I. Background
As the parties are well-acquainted with the factual background of this case, at this juncture the Court will prеsent an abbreviated version of the facts relevant to the motion presently before the Court. Plaintiff Justin Ray Teets, formerly an inmate at SCI Mercer, brings this civil rights action pursuant to
Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff‘s Complaint pursuant to
II. Standard of Review
In considering a
It should be further noted, therefore, that in order to survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘stаte a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‘” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The Supreme Court has noted that a “claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The standard “‘does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,’ but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ the necessary element.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Moreover, the requirement that a court accept as true all factual allegations does not extend to legal conclusions; thus, a court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).
III. Legal Analysis
A. Count I: Alleged Violation of the Eighth Amendment
1. Eighth Amendment Claims Generally
In order to bring a claim under
In certain situations, an inmate‘s detention beyond his term of imprisonment can constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of that individual‘s Eighth Amendment rights. See Wharton v. Danberg, 854 F.3d 234, 241 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Montanez v. Thompson, 603 F.3d 243, 250 (3d Cir. 2010)); see also Askew v. Kelchner, Civ. Action. No. 1:04-CV-0631, 2007 WL 763075, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2007) (stating that unnecessary punishment includes incarceratiоn “without penological justification” (quoting Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1108 (3d Cir. 1989))). However, the Third Circuit has recognized that “‘[t]he administration of a system of punishment entails an unavoidable risk or error,‘” and that the “‘[e]limination of the risk of error in many instances
(1) a prison official had knowledge of the prisoner‘s problem and thus of the risk that unwarranted punishment was being, or would be, inflicted; (2) the official either failed to act or took only ineffectual action under the circumstances, indicating that his response to the problem was a product of deliberate indifference to the prisoner‘s plight; and (3) a causal connection between the official‘s response to the problem and the unjustified detention.
Montanez, 603 F.3d at 252 (emphasis added). Furthermore, in a Section 1983 case, in оrder to establish the requisite personal liability of a defendant, liability cannot merely be predicated on the operation of respondeat superior, and the defendant must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing. See DeJoie v. Folino, Civ. Action No. 14-1147, 2015 WL 4127590, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 7, 2015) (citing Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). “Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207).
2. Plaintiff‘s Eighth Amendment Claim Against the Records Defendants
In Count I of the Complaint, brought pursuant to Section 1983, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ actions caused him to be over-detained at SCI Mercer, which constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of his Eight Amendment rights. (Docket No. 20, ¶¶ 18, 38-40). Defendants argue in their motion to dismiss that Plaintiff has not pled a plausible Eighth Amendment claim because he has failed to allege that Defendants had personal involvement in the supposed wrongdoing (relevant to part one of the test set forth in Montanez). Defendants further contend that, even if the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately аlleged such personal involvement, Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that Defendants failed to act expeditiously to release Plaintiff from custody to establish Defendants’ deliberate indifference, nor has Plaintiff shown the existence of the requisite causal connection (relevant to parts two and three of the Montanez test).
Upon review of the Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff adequately alleges that certain Defendants had actual knowledge of and/or acquiescеd in his over-detention, thereby satisfactorily pleading the first part of the Montanez test. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the job duties of Defendants William Bennage-Gregory, Jessica Roush, Jennifer Shrift, Kelli Ann Pelter, Sandi Rhoades, Brenda Goodall, and Ashley Thompson (the “Records Defendants“)1 included reviewing Plaintiff‘s arrest records, criminal records, and incarceration dates to ensure that he was not detained beyond his maximum incarceration date. (Docket No. 20, ¶ 19). Plaintiff further alleges that, during his
The Court also finds that Plaintiff adequately alleges the Records Defendants’ failure to act, indicating deliberate indifference to Plaintiff‘s рlight, the second part of the Montanez test. “Among the circumstances relevant to a determination of whether the requisite attitude (deliberate indifference) is present are the scope of the official‘s duties and the role the official played in the everyday life of the prison.” Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 686 (3d Cir. 1993). In addition to alleging the Records Defendants’ job duties (including reviewing Plaintiff‘s records and ensuring that he was not over-detained) and citing to the Sentence Status Change notice specifically, Plaintiff аlleges that Defendants failed to take action to recalculate his maximum release date to ensure that he would not be incarcerated past that date, which Defendants knew or should have known was June 28, 2019.3 (Docket No. 20, ¶¶ 23-26). Finally, Plaintiff avers that as a result of Defendants’ failures, he was unlawfully incarcerated from his maximum release date of June 28, 2019, until July 15, 2019, thereby pleading a causal connection between the Records Defendants’ response to Plaintiff‘s problem аnd the unjustified detention. (Docket No. 20, ¶ 33; see also Docket No. 20-2 (DOC email dated July 15, 2019 (hereinafter “DOC email“), containing the subject line, “RE: URGENT!!!! PAST MAX TEETS NA4694 MAX 6/29/19“)).4
In sum, upon consideration of the Complaint, the Court notes that Plaintiff has alleged that the Records Defendants were personally involved in and had knowledge of Plaintiff‘s over-detention problem, that they failed to act under the circumstances, indicating deliberate indifference to Plaintiff‘s problem, and that a causal connection exists betwеen the Records Defendants’ response to Plaintiff‘s problem and his unjustified detention. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has pled a plausible Eighth Amendment Claim against the Records Defendants based on his over-detention.
3. Plaintiff‘s Eighth Amendment Claim Against the Supervisor Defendants
Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint that Defendants John Wetzel, Erin Brown, Denise Wood, Shelly Fox, Irlene Ross,
they are liable for Plaintiff‘s over-detention because they failed to correct the constitutionally inadequate system, policies, and procedures for calculating inmates’ sentences. (Docket No. 20, ¶¶ 30, 31). Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants John Wetzel and Erin Brown, in their supervisory positions, failed to adequately train, supervise, discipline and/or otherwise oversee records managers and specialists. (Id. ¶¶ 28, 29, 32). In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has allegеd no facts to support his claims against the Supervisor Defendants, nor are there any specific instances alleged relative to Plaintiff or any inmate where the Supervisor Defendants acquiesced in the use of a constitutionally inadequate computing system.
The Third Circuit has identified two ways in which a supervisor-defendant can be liable for unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates in a Section 1983 action. See DeJoie, 2015 WL 4127590, at *2. “Individual defendants who are policymakers may be liаble under § 1983 if it is shown that such defendants, ‘with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.‘” A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989)). Second, “a supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff‘s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates’ violations.” Id. “‘Failure to’ claims—failure to trаin, failure to discipline, or failure to supervise—are generally considered a subcategory of policy or practice liability.” DeJoie, 2015 WL 4127590, at *2.
The Third Circuit has developed a four-part test for supervisor liability on an Eighth Amendment claim for failure to supervise, as set forth in Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099 (1989):
The plaintiff must identify a supervisory policy or practice that the supervisor failed to employ, and then prove that: (1) the policy or procedures in effect at the time of the alleged injury created an unreasonable risk of a constitutional violation; (2) the defendant-official was aware that the policy created an unreasonable risk; (3) the defendant was indifferent to that risk; and (4) the constitutional injury was caused by the failure to implement the supervisory practice or procedure. Sample, 885 F.2d at 1118; Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2001). In this Circuit, when a plaintiff seeks to hold a defendant liable under the Eighth Amendment in his or her role as a supervisor, “Sample‘s four-part test provides the analytical structure . . . it being simрly the deliberate indifference test applied to the specific situation of a policymaker.” Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 135 (3d Cir. 2001).
DeJoie, 2015 WL 4127590, at *3; see Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d at 134-35.
Sample further indicates one way that a plaintiff can make out a supervisor liability claim, which is “by showing that ‘the supervisory official failed to respond appropriately in the face of an awareness of a pattern of such injuries.‘” Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 134 (quoting Sample, 885 F.2d at 1118). “But that is not the only way to make out such a claim, as ‘there are situations in which the risk of constitutionally cognizable harm is so great and so obvious that the risk and the failure of supervisory officials to respond will alone support findings [1] of the existence of an unreasonable risk, [2] of knowledge of that unreasonable risk, and [3] of indifference to it.‘” Id. (quoting Sample, 885 F.2d at 1118). Thus, the Sample four-part test can be met by either (1) “showing that the supervisor failed to adequately respond to a pattern of past occurrences of injuries like the plaintiffs‘;” or (2) “showing that the risk of constitutionally cognizable harm was ‘so great and so obvious that the risk and the failure of supervisory officials to respond will alone’ support finding that the four-part test is met.” Id. at 136-37 (quoting Sample, 885 F.2d at 1118). Notably, although Sample had concerned whether a supervisor could be liable for a subordinate‘s Eighth Amendment tort, while the plaintiffs in Beers-Capitol seemed to claim that the supervisors committed their own Eighth Amendment violations by implementing defective policies, the Third Circuit remarked in Beers-Capitol that it did not think that difference material and thus proceeded to use the same tests in both analyses. See id. at 134.
Here, Plaintiff appears to allеge two theories of liability with regard to the Supervisor Defendants. First, Plaintiff seems to allege that all the Supervisor Defendants are liable for failing to correct certain deficient DOC policies. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the Supervisor Defendants were in supervisory positions and were policymakers within the DOC, that they were all aware that the DOC system, policies and procedures for computing inmates’ sentences and correcting errors in sentencе computation were constitutionally inadequate, and that they failed to improve the system or to take necessary action to correct it. (Docket No. 20, ¶¶ 30, 31).
Second, Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendants Wetzel and Brown are liable for failure to supervise and train employees. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that “in the scope and authority of their supervisory positions,” Wetzel and Brown failed to adequately train, supervise, discipline and/or otherwise oversee records managers and specialists, and thereby created an unreasonable risk that Plaintiff‘s rights would be violated. (Docket No. 20, ¶ 32). Plaintiff further avers that Defendant Wetzel was responsible for the day-to-day operation of the prison system including oversight of the department of Population Management and Sentence Computation, which is responsible for the computation of inmate sentences, and that Defendant Brown was responsiblе for ensuring that inmates’ sentences were correctly calculated. (Id. ¶¶ 28, 29). As to all Defendants, Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of all their failures and without cause or justification, he was unlawfully incarcerated past his maximum detention date. (Docket No. 20, ¶¶ 33-34). Further, Plaintiff attached to the Complaint the Sentence Status Change notice as well as the DOC email, described supra, both of which lend additional factual support to his allegations. (Docket Nos. 20-1, 20-2).
As explained above, Defеndants argue in their motion to dismiss that Plaintiff‘s
Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged a plausible Eighth Amendment claim against the Supervisor Defendants based on his incarceration past his maximum relеase date. Accordingly, to the extent Defendants’ motion seeks dismissal of Count I of Plaintiff‘s Complaint, that motion is denied.
B. Count II: Alleged Violation of Procedural Due Process Under the Fourteenth Amendment
In Count II of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants denied him his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process in relation to his over-detention. (Docket No. 20, ¶¶ 24, 41-44). In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not stated a plausible procedural due process clаim because he has not alleged that he gave “an opportunity to ‘someone having authority to decide the challenge[‘] to the calculation of his release date.” (Docket No. 23 at 7-8 (quoting Sample, 885 F.2d at 115)).
In order for a plaintiff to state a claim for violation of procedural due process rights pursuant to
(1) that he was deprived of a protected liberty or property interest; (2) that this deprivation was without due process; (3) that the defendant subjected the plаintiff, or caused the plaintiff to be subjected to, this deprivation without due process; (4) that the defendant was acting
under color of state law; and (5) that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the deprivation without due process.
Upon consideration of the Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately pled the first factor required to show a violation of procedural due process rights in that Plaintiff alleges that he was deprived of his liberty interest by being forced to remain incarcerated past his maximum detention date (Docket No. 20, ¶¶ 18, 22, 31, 35, 44), without penological justification, which is an interest protected under the Eighth Amendment‘s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment, as discussed supra. See Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 686 (3d Cir. 1993).
In considering whether Plaintiff has adequately pled the second factor of his claim, that the deprivation of his constitutional rights was without due process, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants denied him of “notice and opportunity for hearing apрropriate to the nature of the case.” Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965). Upon review of the Complaint, however, the Court notes that Plaintiff does not allege that he did not receive notice and an opportunity for a hearing. The Complaint alleges that Defendants knew that Plaintiff had been re-sentenced and that his maximum sentence date needed to be re-examined, that Defendants failed to take action to ensure that Plaintiff would not be incarcerated past his maximum sentencе date, and that Defendants failed to calculate Plaintiff‘s maximum sentence date until July 15, 2019. (Docket No. 20, ¶¶ 21-26). However, the Complaint is entirely silent as to whether Plaintiff was – or was not – provided with notice or an opportunity for a hearing with regard to his release date.6 The Court thus finds that Plaintiff has failed to
allege that the deprivation of his rights occurred without due process, the second factor of a due process claim. Since Plaintiff has failed to allege that factor, the Court need not procеed to determine, further, whether Plaintiff has adequately alleged that all Defendants subjected him, or caused him to be subjected to, the deprivation of his rights without such due process.
Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim against Defendants for violation of his procedural due process rights. Accordingly, to the extent that Defendants’ motion seeks the dismissal of Count II for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the motion is grаnted.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff‘s Second Amended Complaint pursuant to
An appropriate Order follows.
Dated: September 22, 2022
s/ W. Scott Hardy
W. Scott Hardy
United States District Judge
cc/ecf: All counsel of record