TRAVIS TEEL V. THE STATE.
No. 17903
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Delivered February 5, 1936
Appeal Reinstated March 4, 1936
32 Tex. Crim. 32
Other interesting points are raised in this case, but we see no need for a discussion of them further than to say that if one be properly classified as a junk dealer, there would seem reason for requiring that he hold purchases of junk intact for the period of time mentioned in said ordinance, to-wit: until noon the day following the purchase of same, which we do not regard as an unreasonable restraint of trade; and that such dealer be required to keep records of his purchases for the reasonable inspection of officers and persons whose property may have been stolen. In numbers of states, including Texas, it has been held proper for ordinances to require persons engaged in the junk business to keep a record of their purchases. See Ex Parte Goldburg, 82 Texas Crim. Rep., 475; Ullman v. District of Columbia, 21 App. D. C., 241; Commonwealth v. Leonard, 140 Mass., 473; City of St. Louis v. Baskowitz, 273 Mo., 543. As holding that an ordinance requiring dealers to retain goods a reasonable length of time is valid see Philips v. State, 77 Ohio St., 214; Shurman v. Atlanta, 148 Ga., 1; Grossman v. City of Indianapolis, 173 Ind., 157.
Believing the ordinance in question to be invalid in its present form for the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the discharge of the appellant is ordered.
Judgment reversed and petitioner discharged.
ELMER WATKINS V. THE STATE.
No. 17858
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Delivered January 22, 1936
Rehearing Denied (Without Written Opinion) March 4, 1936
32 Tex. Crim. 33
MORROW, Presiding Judge; LATTIMORE, Judge
Earl M. Greer, of Wills Point, for appellant.
Lloyd W. Davidson, State‘s Attorney, of Austin, for the State.
MORROW, Presiding Judge.—The offense is driving an automobile while intoxicated; penalty assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for one year.
The appeal bond appearing in the record is insufficient to authorize consideration of the appeal by this court for the reason that it is not approved by the trial judge. The statute,
The appeal bond is also defective in that it fails to state that appellant has been convicted of a felony, as is required by
Appellant is granted fifteen days from this date in which to perfect his appeal.
The appeal is dismissed.
ON MOTION TO REINSTATE APPEAL.
LATTIMORE, Judge.—This appeal was dismissed at a former day of this term because of a defective appeal bond. The defect has been remedied. The appeal is reinstated, and the case now considered on its merits.
The only question raised is the refusal of a continuance. Appellant asked a continuance because of the absence of a witness named White. The averment in the application for continuance is that White had been subpoenaed as a witness, was not present, and the accused did not know why he was not there. No process was attached to the application, or exhibited during the hearing. No affidavit of the absent witness was appended to the motion for new trial. We do not know whether the witness had been subpoenaed under such circumstances as to call for the issuance of an attachment or not. We presume correctness in the ruling of the trial court in the absence of a showing to the contrary.
The testimony for the State was very plain and positive to the effect that appellant drove a car on a public highway while intoxicated on the occasion in question. Appellant‘s brother and father testified to seeing him on said day, and that in their opinion, he was not drinking whisky. The testimony was ample to support the conclusion of guilt arrived at by the jury. We perceive no error in any matter of procedure.
The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.