TEEL STYLES, Appellant v. CVS PHARMACY, Appellee
No. 05-21-00720-CV
Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
October 21, 2022
On Aрpeal from the 68th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-11163
VACATE and DISMISS and Opinion Filed October 21, 2022
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Myers, Carlyle, and Goldstein
Opinion by Justice Goldstein
In this pro se appeal, appellant Teel Styles challenges the trial court‘s order dismissing her claims pursuant to
We gather these facts from Styles‘s original petition and the attached medical records.1 In 2016, Styles‘s then-eleven-year-old son, A.O., underwent surgery to remove his tonsils and adenoid glands. Over thе next three years, A.O. required additional care related to his asthma, sleep apnea, and obesity. In 2018, Styles sought medical treatment for A.O. for complications arising from his surgery. In the course of that treatment, A.O. was prescribed medication that Styles filled at two different CVS pharmacies.
In August 2020, Styles filed the instant lawsuit against CVS, alleging that the pharmacies incorrectly filled the prеscriptions, the prescriptions did not work, and A.O.‘s pain and suffering continued even after taking the medication. CVS filed a motion tо dismiss under the Texas Medical Liability Act on grounds that Styles failed to file an expert report within 120 days after serving citation on CVS. See
On September 27, 2022, we notified the parties that we questiоned our jurisdiction over the appeal. We directed Styles to file a letter brief addressing our
DISCUSSION
We conclude that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case and, consequently, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. Therefore, we do not reach the merits, conceived substantive issues raised, or arguments to dismiss based upon briefing deficiencies.
Appеllate courts “always have the duty to ensure that subject-matter jurisdiction—their own and that of the lower courts—is secure.” S.C. v. M.B., 650 S.W.3d 428, 449 (Tex. 2022). We nеver presume jurisdiction and must inquire as to our own jurisdiction sua sponte even if the parties do not raise the issue. See Brashear v. Victoria Gardens of McKinney, L.L.C., 302 S.W.3d 542, 546 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.); Bank of New York Mellon v. Guzman, 390 S.W.3d 593, 596 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). Our jurisdiction over “the merits of a case extends no further than that of the сourt from which the appeal is taken.” Kerr v. Harris Cnty., 177 S.W.3d 290, 295 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (quoting Pearson v. State, 159 Tex. 66, 315 S.W.2d 935, 938 (1958)). If the trial court lacks jurisdiction, then the appellate court has jurisdiction only to vacate the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the cause. Id. (citing Dallas County Appraisal Dist. v. Funds Recovery, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, writ denied)).
In determining whether jurisdiction exists, we look not to the merits of the pleader‘s claims, but to the allegations in the pleadings. County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002). We accept the factual allеgations as true and construe them in the pleader‘s favor. Id. If the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, the case must be dismissed, but if the pleadings do not affirmatively demonstrate an incurable defect, the party should be affordеd the opportunity to replead. See Tex. Dep‘t of Transp. v. Ramirez, 74 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Tex. 2002).
Standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction and a constitutional prerequisite to suit. Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012). “A trial court has no jurisdiction over a claim made by a plaintiff who lacks standing to assert it.” Id. If a plaintiff lacks standing tо assert any of her claims, the trial court must dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. Id.
Texas courts have long recognized that a minor child has a well-defined common law cause of action to sue for injuries negligently inflicted by others. Morrell v. Finke, 184 S.W.3d 257, 290 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, pеt. denied) (citing Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex. 1983)). A child‘s cause of action, however, is distinctly separate from the parent‘s right to recover damages for injuriеs to her children. Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 666.
Based upon the record before us, we conclude Styles, individually, had no standing to bring the medical negligence claim belonging to A.O., and thus the trial court lacked subjеct-matter jurisdiction over the claim. We further conclude that this defect is incurable. The problem here is not the absenсe or ambiguity of jurisdictional facts; rather, the defect involves an improper party or failure to plead a claim by a proper party. In order to “cure” the defect in this case, Styles would have to either add claims of her own to the petition or add A.O. as a party. This is not a pleading defect. See Ramirez, 74 S.W.3d at 867 (dismissing case without
CONCLUSION
We vacate the trial court‘s judgment and dismiss this case for want of jurisdiction.
210720F.P05
/Bonnie Lee Goldstein/
BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN
JUSTICE
JUDGMENT
In accordance with this Court‘s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is VACATED and the cause is DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.
Judgment entered October 21, 2022.