65 Fla. 153 | Fla. | 1913
Riggin brought an action against Tedder. The declaration consisted of two counts. A demurrer to the first count ivas sustained. The second count alleges that on March 25, 1908, “in consideration that the plaintiff would effect a sale to one W. C. McClure of about 52,000 acres of land belonging to Gulf Pine Company, a corporation, near Odessa in the County of Pasco, which lands lay in the Counties of Hillsborough and Pasco aforesaid and the State of Florida, said sale to be made at a price satisfactory to the said corporation, defendant agreed that said corporation would pay the plaintiff ten per cent commission upon the price for which said lands should be sold to said W. C. McClure, as compensation for effecting said sale, and the defendant promised and warranted to the plaintiff that he, the de
To the damage of the plaintiff in the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars.”
A demurrer was interposed to the declaration upon grounds that (1) it does not state a cause of action; (2) it is vague, indefinite and uncertain; (3) it is contradictory; (4) it appears that the price offered was not satisfactory to the Gulf Pine Company.
The declaration is not drawn with marked precision
Where a cause of action is alleged,- inappropriate elements of damage stated in the declaration are not reached by demurrer. Hall v. Western Union Tel. Co., 59 Fla. 275, 51 South. Rep. 819.
There was no error in overruling the demurrer to the second count of the declaration, as the plaintiff was entitled to recover at least nominal damages. The elements of special damages that are alleged based on the unauthorized contract may be disregarded. There was no motion to strike or for compulsory amendment under the statute.
Two pleas were stricken and four were overruled on demurrer, but material errors do not appear in such rulings.
The case was tried on pleas of never promised as alleged, and that defendant never represented, warranted or promised the plaintiff that he was authorized to make the agreement as alleged. These pleas did not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of alleging and proving facts upon which proper damages for the breach of warranty as alleged may be determined under appropriate rules of
In an action on an implied warranty of authority to act as agent in making a contract, the action is not on the contract purported to have been authorized, but it is on the unauthorized conduct of the supposed agent who acted under claim of authority. The object is to recover damages for the actual losses sustained by the plaintiff as the natural and proximate result of the breach by the defendant of his implied warranty that he was authorized to make the contract. Whether it be ex contractu or ex clelicto, the gist of the action is the misrepresentation made by the' defendant to the plaintiff’s pecuniary injury; and the purpose of the action is compensation. In such cases the rule of compensation seeks to put the party misled back into the condition in which he was before he acted on the asserted .authority of the defendant to make a contract for another. Where a misrepresentation has been relied on by the plaintiff to his detriment, the measure of recovery is not the difference between the plaintiff’s pecuniary condition if the representation had been true, and his condition under the actual facts, but rather the difference between what the plaintiff had before he acted on the representation and what he had afterward. This represents his actual loss. See 2 Sedwick on Damages, Sec. 439.
One who, without authority, has assumed to act as the agent of another, and as such agent has entered into a contract in the name of the principal for the sale of the property of such assumed principal, cannot be held liable on the contract for damages for breach thereof unless the contract itself makes the agent personally liable. In this action the plaintiff cannot recover for profits which he might have made if the one for whom the de
Where one, pretending to be an agent has contracted as such without authority from the principal, the party contracted with may hold the assumed agent responsible for damages to be measured, not by the contract, but by the injury resulting from the agent’s want of power. While v. Madison, 26 N. Y. 117.
An agent purporting to act for and bind a principal whom he has no authority to represent is liable for breach of implied warranty or in tort to the extent of any damages resulting to the other party from such misrepresentation of authority. Groeltz v. Armstrong, 125 Iowa 39, 99 N. W. Rep. 128. This case supports the rule that special damages resulting from the misrepresentation of authority may be recovered. It does not indicate that recovery in this action could be had for the failure to make anticipated commissions. The failure or refusal of the corporation to carry out an assumed contract made by the defendant without authority and the consequent failure of the plaintiff to make the commissions contemplated, are not proximate results of the defendant’s misrepresentation of his authority to act for the corporation, therefore the contemplated commissions that were not realized do not constitute the damages recoverable in this action. The proximate results of the misrepresentation of authority for which damages may be recovered in this action are the pecuniary losses actually sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the misrepresentation, not what he expected to make out of the unauthorized contract.
“6. If you find for the plaintiff the amount of your verdict should be ten per cent, of the price of the lands at $1.25 per acre, with interest at the rate of 8 per cent, per annum from the date of the institution of the suit.”
This charge is inapplicable and erroneous, and the verdict rendered in accordance therewith is not authorized by law.
No recoverable special damages are' alleged, and the plaintiff is entitled on this record to a verdict and judgment only for nominal damages.
The judgment is reversed.