81 S.E. 474 | S.C. | 1914
Lead Opinion
April 21, 1914. The opinion of the Court was delivered by This was an action for damages for an alleged wrongful ejection of plaintiff, a passenger on defendant's train from Columbia to Greenville, at Chappells, S.C. on June 3, 1912. The cause was heard before Judge Shipp, and a jury, at the September term of Court for Greenwood county, 1913, and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff for $500. After entry of judgment, defendant appeals.
The first exception complains of alleged error in the Judge's charge in reference to the duty of the carrier when a dispute arises between the carrier and the passenger as to the right of the passenger to transportation, and is as follows: "The presiding Judge erred in charging the jury that in every case of dispute between a passenger and a carrier as to his right of transportation it is the duty of the carrier to heed the reasonable explanation of the passenger and to investigate the same; that if the carrier fails to investigate, and it turns out that the passenger's explanation *159 was true, the ejection would be wrongful; that the ejection is only lawful where, after investigation, the passenger's explanation is shown to have been false. Specifications: (a) The duty to investigate depends upon the character of the passenger's explanation, the facts and circumstances he details; they may be, and in the case at bar they were, of such a character as to render an investigation impracticable and even impossible without serious embarrassment to the movement of the train and subsequent inconvenience to the other passengers; (b) such rule applied to the facts of this and establishing a precedent in all similar cases. would seriously embarrass the revenues of the carrier by placing it in the power of all persons so disposed to defraud the carrier and secure transportation for which they have not paid; (c) such rule applied to the facts of the case at bar, takes no account of the obstructive, obstinate, and unreasonable conduct of the passenger. The plaintiff claimed to have in his pocket at the time of the dispute a receipt from the defendant's agent in Columbia for his fare from Columbia to Greenville, which he would not produce; common honesty and fairness required him to do so and not throw upon the carrier the duty of conducting upon independent lines for itself an investigation which, under the circumstances, was impracticable and even impossible without serious embarrassment to the movement of the train and consequent inconvenience to the other passengers; (d) such rule makes the right to eject a passenger depend upon the carrier's ascertainment that the passenger's explanation was false; whereas, the carrier has a right to eject a passenger who does not present evidence of his right to ride and refuses to pay fare, when he obstinately fails or refuses to present such evidence in his possession, or where he offers an explanation which in the nature of the case cannot be investigated without serious embarrassment to the movement of the train and consequent inconvenience to the other passengers." *160
This exception will have to be overruled, as we think his Honor followed the law as laid down in Smith v. RailwayCo.,
The second, third and fourth exceptions complain of error on the part of his Honor in reference to the preponderance of the evidence, and challenge the correctness of the same.
We have examined his Honor's charge as a whole, and find no prejudicial errors therein such as would warrant a reversal on errors in his charge. In his general charge he stated in his own language that the plaintiff was required to make out his case by the greater weight of the testimony, or if there was an even balance of testimony in jury's mind, after considering the whole case, the defendant would be entitled to a verdict, and even when he was requested by Mr. McSwain, plaintiff's counsel, after *162
this, to explain the meaning of preponderance of the testimony, and he did so, and afterwards requested by Mr. Dean, defendant's counsel, as to the credibility of witnesses, and did so, his charge and explanation could not have misled the jury as to their power and duty in the case, and could not be prejudicial to either side. In Davis v. R.R.,
Judgment affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
I can not concur in the opinion of the majority.
If the plaintiff had refused to show his ticket, even though he had paid his fare, he would have been properly ejected. If he had on his person other convincing evidence that he had paid his fare, I do not see why he is not required to show it. *163
It seems to me that it was error to charge that the preponderance of evidence is that evidence which produces conviction. When Courts resort to preponderance of evidence, conviction is excluded. On the criminal side of the Court the State must produce evidence that convinces. The defense is made out by evidence that preponderates. Evidence for the defense may, by preponderance, raise a reasonable doubt. To define preponderance as evidence that convinces, would require the defendant to produce evidence to convince and not to raise a reasonable doubt. The effect is different in the Court of Sessions, but the term "preponderance of the evidence" means the same thing in both Courts. It is true, his Honor elsewhere states the true rule, but this is stated last and much emphasized.
I think it is error to say, as an absolute proposition: "It makes no difference whether one witness testifies against twenty or twenty against one." It may make no difference, but then again it may make a very great difference. One truthful witness may be believed against any number of untruthful witnesses. If one witness of unimpeachable integrity testifies one way, and two witnesses of equally unimpeachable integrity testify to the contrary, could it be said that two would not outweigh one? Now make the number twenty to one; can it still be said that it makes no difference? A just man would say that one man was mistaken, but he would believe the twenty. The one may have an opportunity to observe that the twenty did not have; circumstances may sustain this one, but to say without qualification that numbers make no difference is, I think, error. *164