Teal v. State
187 S.W.3d 80
Tex. App.
2006
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CITGO PETROLEUM CORP. v. GULF COAST ASPHALT CO., L.L.C.

80 S.W.3d 80

March 8, 2006

the evidence that had arisen through continuing discovery and expert analysis. The plaintiff class‘s own expert did not use the plaintiff class structure defined in the 1995 order to craft his damages anаlysis. We also cannot ignore the settlements included in the record which, in resolving claims against other co-defendants of Citgo, created distinct settlement classes that do not correspond to the original 1995 certification order or the class definitions set forth therein.

The trial court was presented with motions requesting it to revisit the issue of class certification in light of the mаny changed circumstances. It held one hearing, denied the motion to decertify, then approved the settlement agreement (which was found to have been abandoned in our September 30 opinion), and ultimately moved forward with trial on the breach of contract claim. Though requested and presented with new motions, the trial court did not hold an additional hearing on decertification prior to trial. We conclude that, in light of the many and dramatic changed circumstances, regardless of whether they are best considered under modification or dеcertification, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to adequately address the motions to decertify and to conduct the rigorous analysis demanded by .

We note that where problems arise with a class definition, appellate courts should be reluctant to step in or redefine the class. .

[U]nder rule 42(c)(1), the trial court may alter, amend, or withdraw class certification at any time before final judgment. For example, the contours of the case may change after discovery is completed and as the parties prepare for trial, necessitating mоdification of the class definition. Rule 42(c)(1) invests the trial court with the responsibility of managing the class action, and provides it with the tools to respond to changes in the case‘s development. Prescribing the class definition for the trial court, therefore, interferes with the trial court‘s discretion to monitor the class.

. Further, “the trial court‘s discretion to define, modify, subclassify, or decertify in response to the case‘s development counsels in favor of remanding to the trial court when an appellate court identifies definitional problems.”

Conclusion

We grant Citgo‘s motion for rehearing. We expand the holding in our opinion of September 30, 2005, to include remand to the trial court for further consideration and rigorous analysis of the motions to decertify in light of that oрinion and the changed circumstances of the case.

Wilbert James TEAL, Appellant, v. ‍​‌​‌​​‌​​‌​​​‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‍The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 09-05-162-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Beaumont.

Submitted Nov. 10, 2005. Delivered March 8, 2006.

Rehearing Overruled April 6, 2006.

Bill Burnett, Coldspring, for appellant.

Clyde M. Herrington, Dist. Atty., Dale Summa, Asst. Dist. Atty., Lufkin, for state.

Before McKEITHEN, C.J., GAULTNEY, and KREGER, JJ.

OPINION

CHARLES KREGER, Justice.

Appellant, Wilbert James Teal, was convicted in the 217th District Court for the offense of Hindering Apprehension. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 38.05 (Vernon Supp. 2005). The pertinent part of his indictment reads: “did then and there intentionally, with the intent to hinder the arrest, prosecution, or punishment of Curtis Brown for the offense of Failure to Comply with Registration as a Sex Offender, did harbor or conceal Curtis Brown by stating to peace officers that Curtis Brown was not present at a residence occupied by the defendant at a time when Curtis Brown was then and there present at said residence ....” Following the jury‘s verdict, the trial court assessed punishment at confinement in thе Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Correctional Institutions Division for a term of two years. On appeal, he complains of the lack of both legally and factually sufficient evidenсe to sustain his conviction as well as of jury-charge error. However, as the record raises a question as to the trial court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction, we must address this issue before proсeeding to any other. See ; (jurisdiction is a systemic requirement that cannot be waived or conferred by consent, and which may be considered at any time). See also , overruled on other grounds, ; (threshold inquiries of jurisdiction must be disposed of before addressing substantive issues raised by parties because subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by agreement of the parties, but must be vested in a court by constitution or statute).

Section 38.05 of the Texas Penal Code, titled “Hindering Apprehension or Prosecution,” describes the offense pertinent to the instant case in the following manner:

(a) A person commits an offense if, with intеnt to hinder the arrest, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for an offense ..., he:

(1) harbors or conceals the other;

(2) provides or aids in providing the other with any ‍​‌​‌​​‌​​‌​​​‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‍means of avoiding arrest effecting escаpe; or

(3) warns the other of impending discovery or apprehension.

Subsection (c) of 38.05 classifies the above-quoted offense as a Class A misdemeanor. However, the offense becomes a third degree felony when the following languagе is added as additional elements:

(c) ... except that the offense is a felony of the third degree if the person who is harbored, concealed, provided with a means of avoiding аrrest or effecting escape, or warned of discovery or apprehension is under arrest for, charged with, or convicted of a felony, ... and the person charged under this section knеw that the person they harbored, concealed, provided with a means of avoiding arrest or effecting escape, or warned of discovery or apprehension is under аrrest for, charged with, or convicted of a felony[.] (emphasis added)

For a defendant to be charged and convicted of felony hindering apprehension the State must additionally allege and prove: (1) that the person harbored or assisted was facing arrest, charge, or had been convicted of a felony (“felony fugitive status“); and (2) that the defendant knew the person being harbored or assisted had felony fugitive status. In the instant case, while the indictment language indicates that the person being assisted, Curtis Brown, did have felony fugitive status for failure to register as a sex offender,1 the indictment failed to additionally allege that Teal had knowledge of Brown‘s felony fugitive status so as to facially chаrge a third degree felony under section 38.05, and vest the district court with subject-matter jurisdiction.

In criminal cases, the original jurisdiction of district courts is limited to felony offenses and those misdemeanor offenses (1) that involve official misconduct, or (2)that are transferred to the district court under article 4.17 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 4.05 (Vernon 2005). District courts in Texas have the jurisdiction provided ‍​‌​‌​​‌​​‌​​​‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‍by Article V, Section 8, of the Texas Constitution. Tex. Gov‘t Code Ann. § 24.007 (Vernon 2004). Tex. Const. art. V, § 8 reads in pertinent part: “District Court jurisdiction consists of exclusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proсeedings, and remedies, except in cases where exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitution or other law on some other court, tribunal, or аdministrative body.” The Texas Government Code provides that: “The 217th Judicial District is composed of Angelina County.” See Tex. Gov‘t Code Ann. § 24.395 (Vernon 2004). The Legislature also has provided two statutory county courts at law for Angelina County, each with “jurisdiction over all causes and proceedings, civil and criminal, original and appellate, prescribed by law for county courts.” See Tex. Gov‘t Code Ann. § 25.0003 (Vernon Supp.2005); §§ 25.0051-25.0052 (Vernon 2004). County courts have “exсlusive original jurisdiction of misdemeanors other than misdemeanors involving official misconduct and cases in which the highest fine that may be imposed is $500 or less.” Tex. Gov‘t Code Ann. § 26.045 (Vernon 2004). See also Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 4.05, 4.07 (Vernon 2005).

Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was brоught to the trial court‘s attention following the swearing-in of the jury panel. The State appears to have responded that Teal‘s knowledge of Brown‘s felony fugitive status was merely a mattеr of proof. The trial court denied trial counsel‘s jurisdictional complaint.

The State‘s argument to the trial court was incorrect. The misdemeanor hindering apprehension can only be elevated to third degree felony hindering apprehension by including the additional jurisdictional elements of the other person‘s felony fugitive status and the defendant‘s knowledge of the other person‘s felony fugitive status. See generally ; . “As a general rule, a charging instrument must charge an offense within the jurisdiction of the trial court in which it is filed.... [I]f [a charging instrument] affirmatively ‍​‌​‌​​‌​​‌​​​‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‍alleges an offеnse not within the jurisdiction of the court in which it is filed, the instrument should be dismissed or transferred.” 41 George E. Dix & Robert O. Dawson, Texas Practice: Criminal Practice and Procedure § 20.92 (2d ed.2001)(footnotes omitted). In the instant case, the trial court never acquired felony jurisdiction of the misdemeanor offense alleged in the indictment and was required to transfer the indictment to a court having misdemeanоr jurisdiction. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 21.26 (Vernon 1989); ; ; . Because we conclude the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the case, the judgment of conviction must be vacated and the cause remanded to the 217th District Court with instructions to transfer the cause to one of the county courts in Angelina County having misdemeanor jurisdiction. See ; .

VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

GAULTNEY, Justice, dissenting.

DAVID GAULTNEY, Justice, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. The Constitution of the State of Texas providеs that the “presentment” of an indictment to a court vests the court with jurisdiction of the cause. See Tex. Const. art. V, § 12(b). “Presentment” occurs when the indictment is delivered by the grand jury to the judge or clerk of cоurt. See . Once an indictment is presented, jurisdiction vests, and defects discovered later do not divest the court of jurisdiction. . The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that a substantively defectivе indictment is sufficient to vest the trial court with jurisdiction. See ; . An indictment vests the court with jurisdiction even if it fails to allege an element of the offense. See . See also Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.14(b) (Vernon 2005) (defect in indictment must be raised before trial commences). I cannot agree with the ‍​‌​‌​​‌​​‌​​​‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‍majority‘s conclusion that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the case.

Notes

1
See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.102 (Vernon Supp.2005).