292 P. 120 | Cal. | 1930
Joseph D. Teahan, a civil service employee of the city of Oakland, a municipal corporation, sustained injuries to his head and spine when he fell on the steamer "Washington," at the time tied up at one of the city's wharves and afloat on navigable waters of the United States. Upon his death several months later his dependents filed an application with the respondent commission for adjustment of claim. The city of Oakland, which is self-insured, opposed the application, contending that the injury was of a maritime character and that, therefore, the Workmen's Compensation Act (Stats. 1917, p. 831) was without application by reason of the paramount force of the law maritime. Evidence addressed to this jurisdictional question was taken by the commission, which found that "said injuries were sustained by the employee while upon navigable waters of the United States, and the work being done by deceased at said time was maritime in character." [1] A dismissal of the application for adjustment of claim followed, and the cause comes to this court on a writ of review to determine whether or not the respondent commission has jurisdiction in the premises. In denying an award of compensation the commission apparently assumed the position, vigorously urged by the employer, that since the unloading of vessels has been held to be a maritime occupation, the delivery of the manifest papers, which is a prerequisite to such unloading, partakes of the nature of the unloading and is also essentially maritime in character.
The evidence discloses that, as an assistant wharfinger at the Livingston Street dock, Teahan was charged with the care and custody of goods and property placed thereon. While he was required to check all property arriving on or leaving the wharf, he took no part in the actual loading or unloading of vessels and exercised no control over persons engaged for that purpose. His duties were performed almost entirely on land, though occasionally he would board a vessel tied to the dock in order to secure the manifest papers and thus facilitate the work of unloading. The testimony *344 of the captain of the steamer "Washington" shows that it is the usual and customary thing for the captain of a vessel to take the papers ashore. His testimony also discloses that "most of the time" he took the manifest papers ashore when he docked at the Livingston Street wharf. However, on February 7, 1929, Teahan, varying this procedure, boarded the steamer "Washington," which had just docked, to get the manifest papers. After securing them and while returning to the dock, but while still on board the vessel, he fell down a ladder or stairway and sustained the injuries above described.
A wharfinger has been described as the "owner or occupier of a wharf." (Ency. Brit.) In Chapman v. State,
After reviewing the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, it is concluded in La Casse v. Great Lakes Eng. Works,
Teahan was essentially a land employee engaged under a nonmaritime contract. The parties thereto unquestionably contracted with reference to the state statute, and the application of the local law to their rights and liabilities "cannot materially affect any rules of the sea whose uniformity is essential." (Grant Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde, supra,
In the cases cited by respondents where admiralty has taken jurisdiction to the exclusion of the local law, the person injured was either employed under a maritime contract or was engaged in activities which had a much plainer and more direct relation to navigation than the work of Teahan. (Northern CoalCo. v. Strand,
The three more recent cases above cited fell squarely within the earlier rulings of the Supreme Court and therefore added nothing of a new or novel character to its prior adjudications. For the respondent commission to assume jurisdiction of this proceeding will not, in our opinion do violence to any of these decisions. The deceased in this case was not a seaman in any sense of the word. His boarding of vessels was merely casual and prompted solely by a desire to facilitate the discharge of his duties under a nonmaritime contract. To permit the rights and liabilities of the parties to this proceeding to be determined by the respondent commission under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act will not in any way interfere with the characteristic features of the general maritime rules. This conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to determine petitioners' remaining contention that the city of Oakland is precluded, under the decision in City of New York v. McEntee,
The order and decision denying the petitioners an award in this case is set aside and the cause is remanded for further proceedings before the commission.
Seawell, J., Langdon, J., Preston, J., Curtis, J., Shenk, J., and Richards, J., concurred.