Mirеille Tchemkou, a native and citizen of Cameroon, arrived in the United States on a visitor’s visa and timely applied for asylum. An Immigration Judge (“U”) denied her request, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed that denial. Ms. Tchemkou timely petitioned for review in this court. We now grant the petition.
I
BACKGROUND
A. Facts
Ms. Tchemkou is a native of Cameroon and a member of the ethnic minority Bam-ileke tribe. Her troubles with the Cameroonian government began in 1993- during her senior year in high school. At that time, she was involved in the United Nations Education, Science and Culture Organization (“UNESCO”) at Mbanga High School. In April and May of 1993, the teachers at Mbanga High School went on strike because they, unlike teachers in non-Bamileke regions, had not been paid for several months. Because of the teachers’ absence, the Mbanga students were not able to prepare for a national examination required for admittance to Cameroon’s universities. Ms. Tchemkou helped organize a protest to end the strike; specifically, the students, together with parents and teachers, planned to march from the high school to the regional leader’s office.
On the day of the march, the police intercepted the students. Their presence frightened away most of the students with the exception of the six UNESCO board members. The police confronted Ms. Tchemkou and, according to Ms. Tchem-kou’s testimony, stated:
Do you think that you can change the government, do you think that these activities that you are, these activities that you have will end up somewhere? You should just shut up if you want to lead a quiet life in this country. We do not want people like you creating chaos and giving us so much work. If you want to stay alive you must keep away from these kind of activities which you have now started.
A.R.99. The police then began beating Ms. Tchemkou and the other students with batons; Ms. Tсhemkou was struck in the jaw, loosening several teeth. The students then were forced into a police truck and taken to the police station where the beatings continued.
At the station, the police interrogated Ms. Tchemkou, threatened her life and told her that they would teach her a lesson for speaking out against the government. A.R.558. The police detained Ms. Tchem-kou in a cell with numerous other prisoners. During her three-day incarceration, she had nothing to eat or to drink, and the cell in which she was placed did not have sanitation facilities. Because the cell was crowded and did nоt contain any benches or other furniture, Ms. Tchemkou was forced to stand throughout the duration of her detention. Additionally, because she was the only female in the cell, she was forced to clean the male prisoners’ excrement off the floor.
Upon Ms. Tchemkou’s release, she required a two-week hospital stay to recover from severe dehydration, fever, stomach pain and other physical injuries.
1
After Ms. Tchemkou’s hospitalization, her parents feared for her safety and sent her to the neighboring country of Benin. She stayed in Benin for two and one-half years.
In January 1998, Ms. Tchemkou began attending the University of Dschang. There, she became friendly with several members of the Social Democratic Front (“SDF”), the primary political opposition organization in Cameroon. Ms. Tchemkou learned that her uncle, an SDF official, was hosting a party in a nearby town. Ms. Tchemkou traveled to the party with several members of the SDF in a bus decorated with SDF banners. On the return trip, the police stopped the bus, demanded the students’ identity papers and took down their names. The police asked Ms. Tchemkou whether she had “come [to the university] to study or do politics?” A.R. 105.
In May 1998, Ms. Tchemkou learned that the university was closing its psychology department. According to Ms. Tchemkou, the government believed that the professors and students in the department were sympathetic to opposition groups. See A.R.108-09, 559. Ms. Tchemkou met with other psychology students to discuss ways to prevent the department’s closure. Shortly after the meeting began, police, armed with guns and batons, raided thе meeting. They told the students to disband and to leave any papers behind, including the attendance sheet the students had signed.
Later that night, as Ms. Tchemkou prepared for bed, she heard pounding and shouting at her apartment door. When she answered, three men wearing Cameroonian military uniforms forced their way into the apartment and turned out the lights. They immediately started questioning Ms. Tchemkou. After Ms. Tehem-kou identified herself in response to their queries, “[t]hey said so yes indeed you are the person we are looking for.” A.R.110. They accused Ms. Tchemkou of being a “Bamileke” and “against the government.” Id. Ms. Tchemkou then wаs gagged, blindfolded, forced into the abductors’ car and driven away from her apartment. After the car stopped, the soldiers dragged her through a wooded area, beat her and kicked her; as a result, she suffered scarring on her arms and shins. One of her abductors tore part of Ms. Tchemkou’s left ear and told her not to return to campus. A.R.560. The soldiers then threw Ms. Tchemkou back in the car where she fainted from pain.
When Ms. Tchemkou regained consciousness, she was in a hospital where she remained for 24 days. During this time she was treated for a serious cut to her left earlobe as well as muscle aches. A.R.331. After her release, she returned to her parents’ home and continued to receive physical therapy and psychological treatment.
Ms. Tchemkou did not return to school for over a year. In October 2000, she began attending the British College of Professional Management in Douala. In January 2001, local police in Douala arrested nine males for allegedly stealing a neighbor’s cooking gas. It was feared that the teens had been executed, and Ms. Tchemkou coordinated with several political groups to try to determine what had happened to these young men. Together thеse groups organized peaceful demonstrations to pressure the government to disclose this information. The first demonstration was on March 4, 2001. When the protestors arrived, security officers already were on the scene and began attacking the crowd. Ms. Tchemkou suffered a baton blow to the head as police dispersed the protestors.
After Ms. Tchemkou arrived in the United States on April 9, 2001, the Cameroonian government issued two summonses for her to appear before the authorities.
B. Administrative Proceedings
A few months after Ms. Tchemkou had arrived in the United States, she applied for asylum. The asylum officer denied her request, and she was served with a notice to appear.
Before the IJ, Ms. Tchemkou conceded deportability but renewed her request for asylum, withholding of deportation and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). At the hearing, Ms. Tchemkou testified to the above events. 2 The IJ found that Ms. Tchemkou was “genuinely credible,” A.R.55, but nevertheless determined that Ms. Tchemkou had not established past persecution. The IJ first stated that the mistreatment suffered by Ms. Tchemkou in 1993, 1998 and 2001 “were disparate offense[s] in which the most serious mistreatment that she experienced was a cut to her earlobe.” A.R.53. 3 The IJ continued:
I don’t think these are comparable to which the Seventh Circuit[ 4 ] has found past persecution. The incidents, although united by detention and beating in two of the three cases, and by government security forces either administering the beating or arresting the respondent or pursuing her, do share that theme. However, otherwise, they’re very different. Namely they involve diffеrent places, respondent being involved in different activities. This is not a case for example, where the respondent’s activity, the same activity participated encounters with government forces each time.
Id.
Additionally, the IJ determined that Ms. Tchemkou was not likely to suffer persecution upon her return to Cameroon:
I think that, given the sporadic and varied nature of the incidents separated one from another time and the rather mild encounter that the respondent had, [in] 2001, which was the last incident and the incident on which she claimed she based her decision to depart Cameroon, I am just not convinced that there is an objectivе basis for her fear of returning to that country now....
Id. at 55. Having determined that Ms. Tchemkou did not meet her burden for asylum, the IJ also denied her withholding of removal. Finally, he did not “think that the mistreatment that she suffered rises to the level [of] torture,” and the type of treatment she endured did not “portend[ ] future mistreatment [that] would meet the definition of Section 1 of the Convention Against Torture. Therefore, Torture Convention relief is denied.” Id. at 56.
The BIA affirmed. The Board stated that “we find the record adequately supports the Immigration Judge’s finding that the respondent’s ‘genuinely credible’ testimony failed to establish past persecution or a well-foundеd fear or clear probability of future persecution or torture in Cameroon.” A.R.2 (citing
Liu v. Ashcroft,
Ms. Tchemkou timely petitioned for review of the BIA’s decision.
II
ANALYSIS
A.
Ms. Tchemkou first maintains that the BIA erred when it determined that she had not suffered past persecution. Where, as hеre, the BIA adopts the IJ’s decision and also supplements the IJ’s decision with its own reasoning, the IJ’s decision, as supplemented, forms the basis for this court’s review.
See Gjerazi v. Gonzales,
In the present case, we believe that the IJ and the BIA committed legal error with respect to the standard applied to Ms. Tchemkou’s claim and also that the agency’s factual conclusions find no support in the record. As noted in our recitation of the standard of review, the agency is obligated to consider the evidence of record “as a whole.”
Gjerazi,
The BIA did not correct this error in its opinion. However, perhaps wary of the approach taken by the IJ, the Board notes that “[e]ven when analyzed in the aggregate ... the incidents of which the respondent complained do not reveal harm that rises to the level of persecution.” A.R.2. The BIA relies on
Liu v. Ashcroft,
In Liu, the petitioner was detained for two days while the police interrogated her about her sale of unauthorized literature. The petitioner was not beaten, nor was she deprived of food and water. However, on two occasions during her detention, police pulled her hair in an effort to make her confess to the crimes. One month after her release, the police ransacked her home to teach her a lessоn. In reviewing these incidents, we stated:
Here, Mei Dan’s detainment was relatively short. As physical brutality goes, hair-pulling and pushing rank on the less serious end. The search and ransack was a singular event and it is unclear if the officials caused any serious, permanent damage to her home. Taken as a whole, it was not improper for the BIA to determine that these and the other incidents of which Mei Dan complained are more akin to abusive or harassing treatment than persecution.
Id. at 313.
The atrocities suffered by Ms. Tchemkou in Cameroon bear no resemblance to the comparatively minor abusеs suffered by the petitioner in Liu. Unlike the petitioner in Liu, Ms. Tchemkou was detained under terrible conditions: She was deprived of food, water and sanitation facilities and was forced to clean human waste off the floor of the cell — a crowded cell in which she was the only woman. Prior to her detention, she had been beaten by police, and, after her release, she required two weeks of hospitalization to recover from the ordeal.
If this were the sum of the abuses suffered by Ms. Tchemkou, it would be sufficient to establish past persecution; however, there is more. Ms. Tchemkou was interrogated by police and abducted from her apartment in 1998; she was dragged through the woods, beaten, kicked and had her earlobe severed. Her hospitalization following this incident lasted twenty-four days. This ordeal was not Ms. Tchem-kou’s last run-in with Cameroonian police. Following a peaceful demonstration in 2001, Ms. Tchemkou again was beaten with a baton and chased away by police. She was able to escape detention only by seeking sanctuary in a church.
This court has defined persecution as “ ‘punishment’ or ‘the infliction of harm’ which is administered on account of ... race, religion, nationality, group membership, or politiсal opinion.... ”
Asani v. INS,
The Government acknowledges that Ms. Tchemkou suffered abuse, but argues that her experiences do not constitute persecution for several reasons, none of which we find persuasive. First, the Government maintains that these incidents “were wholly unrelated and do not sup
Equally unconvincing is the Government’s contention that Ms. Tchemkou did not suffer any harassment different in kind from the general population of Cameroon. According to the Government, hers “were abuses of short duration that were commonly experienced by the people of Cameroon, a country that maintains a poor human rights record. The evidence in the record shows only the existence of general conditions of political conflict in Cameroon....” Appellee’s Br. at 21. Again, this assertion is belied by the record. On three different occasions, Ms. Tchemkou was singlеd out for abuse because of her political opposition to government action. She did not suffer the general deprivations and danger of individuals living in a war-ridden nation.
Finally, the Government argues that any abuse suffered by Ms. Tchemkou cannot be considered persecution because she was able to live without incident for several years at a time and was able to pursue her education. The record actually demonstrates the opposite. Ms. Tchemkou became politically active in 1993. Her initial efforts on behalf of striking teachers were met with violence, as was every оther effort of hers to speak out against government oppression. The only time that Ms. Tchemkou did not experience difficulties was when she spent several years in exile in Benin and when she was confined to her parents’ house. When she did reappear and express opinions in opposition to the government, she was severely punished.
The fact is that Ms. Tchemkou suffered two severe beatings (and other less severe ones) after voicing opposition to government policies. One of those beatings (followed by three days of incarceration) resulted in her being hospitalized for 14 dаys; another beating resulted in her being hospitalized for 24 days. Both of these incidents conclusively establish that Ms. Tchemkou has suffered persecution as a result of her political opinion. She, therefore, is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that she will suffer future persecution if returned to Cameroon, thus meeting the eligibility requirements for asylum.
B.
Ms. Tchemkou also challenges the BIA’s and the IJ’s conclusion that she has not demonstrated a well-founded fear of future persecution if she is returned to Cameroon. The burden is on Ms. Tchem-kou to establish a “reasonable possibility of future persecution,”
Kllokoqi v. Gonzales,
Even absent the rebuttable presumption of future persecution to which
The Government argues that Ms. Tchemkou’s belief that she will suffer harm upon her return to Cameroon is speculative, and that the reasonableness of her belief is undermined by the fact that her family has lived in Cameroon without incident since her departure. The Government points to
Bhatt v. Reno,
In Bhatt, the petitioner was claiming persecution on the basis of his religion — a trait he shared with other family members. Consequently, the fact that family members in his home country had not suffered harm was probative of what the petitioner’s experience would be if returned to his home country.
Similarly, in
Lwin,
the petitioner claimed that he would suffer future persecution because the Burmese government would “impute” to him the political opinions of his eldest son. However, petitioner’s wife and other sons had remained in Burma without incident. Consequently, the petitioner’s fears were merely speculative.
See Lwin,
Finally, in
Toptchev,
this court agreed that any presumption of future persecution was rebutted by the State Department report, which recounted Bulgaria’s movement toward democracy since the petitioners’ departure. This conclusion was bolstered by the fact that other family members, some of whom also had been active in speaking out against the former communist regime, had lived in Bulgaria undisturbed.
See Toptchev,
C.
Ms. Tehemkou also challenges the IJ’s and the BIA’s conclusion that she is not entitled to relief under the CAT. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2) sets forth the standard for obtaining relief under the CAT: “The burden of proof is on the applicant ... to establish that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” The regulations define torture as
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether рhysical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for suchpurposes as obtaining from him or her or a third person information or a confession, punishing him or her for an act he or she or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or her or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.
8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a);
see also Mabasa v. Gonzales,
Here again we believe that the record compels a finding that Ms. Tchemkou is entitled to relief under the CAT. There is no question that her prior experiences in Cameroon constituted torture as defined by the regulations. Both Ms. Tchemkou’s initial run-in with police, which included a beating and a detention under deplorable conditions, as well as her 1998 abduction and beating, only could be described as the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering for the purposes of punishing Ms. Tchemkou’s political activity and preventing such behavior in the future. Furthermore, other regulatory considerations strongly suggest that Ms. Tchemkou will suffer torture if returned to Cameroon: She has not been able to escape government retaliation regardless of her location in Cameroon, and Cameroon admittedly continues to have a poor civil rights record. On this record, it is more likely than not thаt Ms. Tchemkou will be tortured if removed to Cameroon.
Conclusion
In sum, the record compels a conclusion that Ms. Tchemkou has suffered past persecution and will suffer future persecution if returned to Cameroon. Additionally, the record establishes that Ms. Tchemkou has endured torture and likely will endure additional torture if returned to Cameroon. We therefore grant the petition for review. We reverse the decision of the BIA and remand this case for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Petition Granted; Reversed and Remanded
Notes
. During her stay in prison, she also contracted a chronic fungal nail infection that still afflicts her today.
.In addition to hеr oral testimony, Ms. Tchemkou provided the IJ with documentation concerning her hospitalizations, her recent health examinations and Cameroon's poor human rights record. The record also contains a letter from Ms. Tchemkou’s uncle and SDF parliamentarian, Paul Tchat-chouang, stating that, because Ms. Tchemkou previously had opposed the Cameroonian government, she continued to face a serious risk of abuse and death should she return to Cameroon. He also noted that many of the students with whom Ms. Tchemkou had associated in the past had died after her departure and thаt the government of Cameroon would do its best to destroy anyone who had opposed it. A.R.248-53.
. The IJ's characterization of the first incident was equally benign: “One of the incidents occurred when the respondent was very young and in the equivalent of high school. She had to do some unpleasant duty cleaning toilets. However distasteful, I don’t think this constitutes persecution.” A.R.53.
. The cases cited by the IJ as examples of this court’s jurisprudence on persecution were Asani v.
INS,
. In support of his determination that Ms. Tchemkou did not suffer past persecution under this court’s case law, the IJ relied on three cases. In the first cаse,
Asani v. INS,
The IJ also relied on
Vaduva v. INS,
Finally, in
Dandan v. Ashcroft,