3 Grant 138 | Pa. | 1861
The opinion of the court was delivered
This is not the case of a note payable on demand, where the statute begins to run from the date of the note or promise, and where no other demand is necessary than such as is involved in the bringing of the action. There never was any right of action, until a proper release was procured for the share of William Witman in the property sold to Taylor. There was no promise to pay before such a release was procured, nor, indeed, was there any debt, for the conveyance of the land was the consideration out of which grew the indebtedness and the binding obligation of the promise. In Collins v. Benning, 12 Mod. 444, in indebitatus assumpsit, the plaintiff declared on a promise to pay on demand, to which the defendant pleaded the statute of limitation. The plaintiff demurred on the ground that nothing was due till demanded. But the court
It is, however, earnestly contended, that where there is a promise to pay money, and, by the terms of the contract, an actual demand or some other act of the promissee is necessary before suit can be brought, that demand must be made, or that act done within six years from the date of the promise, or the statute will begin to run from the date. This is certainly a novel principle, if it be a principle at all, unknown to any of the English decisions under the statute of 21 James 1st, and involving the absurdity that the statute begins to run before any cause of action has accrued. It was ignored in the case of Thorpe and Wife v. Booth, to which allusion has been made. It has been adopted as a general rule of law in no State in the Union so far as I have been able to discover. Its supposed, root is found in Coleman v. Rodgers, 10 Pick. 112, but that was a bill in equity, and the question was whether the complainant had been guilty of such laches as to forfeit his claim to be heard by a chancellor. A few cases have been decided in this
The judgment of the Common Pleas is affirmed.