86 Kan. 236 | Kan. | 1912
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The judge, at chambers, in Meade county, upon the application of the appellees, made an order opening a judgment rendered against them in the district court of Clark county, upon service by publication, quieting title to certain real estate. This is an appeal from an order of the district court overruling appellant’s motion made at the subsequent term of court to set aside the order opening the judgment.
The statute provides that where notice of a motion is required it must be in writing and served a reasonable time before the hearing. (Civ. Code, § 558.) It appears that the notice was served upon the attorney of record for appellant by registered mail. It necessarily must have been served by some person in the postal service. That person made no return of the service, but a return was not necessary, since appellant’s attorney signed the return card and acknowledged the receipt of the letter which, it is conceded, contained the notice. The acknowledgment on the back of a summons is equivalent to service. (Civ. Code, § 68.) We think that service of a motion made in this way is not objectionable, and ought to be upheld; it is a substantial compliance with all the requirements of the code, and furnishes its own proof of the fact and character of the service.
Has the judge at chambers power to grant the application? It is true, the district judge at chambers can exercise only such powers as are conferred by law. The application to open a judgment rendered upon service by publication is nothing more than a motion. The code defines a motion as an application for an order “addressed to the court, or a judge in vacation.” (Civ. Code, § 556.) An order setting aside a judgment rendered upon default and permitting the defendant to answer is not a judgment of any kind. (McCulloch v. Dodge, 8 Kan. 476, 478.) It is insisted that if it be held that the order is merely interlocutory, no appeal will lie from the order; but when the court finally acts upon the matter and sets aside the original judgment, if it shall decide so to do, the plaintiff may appeal from the order and have a review of any error committed in opening the judg
The judgment of the district court overruling the motion of appellant to set aside the order made at chambers is affirmed.