262 Conn. 797 | Conn. | 2003
Lead Opinion
Opinion
The named defendant,
The plaintiff brought this medical malpractice action against the hospital alleging that it was negligent during the course of his medical care. The hospital subsequently filed a special defense asserting that the plaintiffs claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. At trial, the hospital requested that the jury be charged that the plaintiff had a duty to investigate whether the hospital had committed malpractice during the plaintiffs treatment.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On March 9, 1993, the plaintiff suffered from a sore neck while at work as a nurse anesthetist at the hospital. The pain increased throughout the day and, after having difficulty sleeping because of the pain, the plaintiff visited the emergency room at the hospital in the early morning of March 10, 1993. While in the emergency room, the plaintiff was examined by a physician, Gregory Kresel, who suggested that the plaintiff undergo a computerized axial tomography (CAT) scan. After undergoing the CAT scan, the plaintiff subsequently was discharged from the hospital by another emergency room physician, Glen Lovejoy. The discharge papers indicated that the CAT scan had revealed a possible brain bulge, cerebral edema and cervical arthritis. Also, upon being discharged, the plaintiff was prescribed medication that he knew was used to reduce brain swelling.
After being discharged from the emergency room, the plaintiff returned to his home. Thereafter, on March 12, 1993, the plaintiff awoke and noticed strange temperature sensations in his hands. Subsequently, the plaintiff realized that he was unable to hold a pen or write, and he experienced other subtle changes in motor control functions. At that time, the plaintiff returned
After being released from the hospital, the plaintiff underwent physical and occupational therapy at various rehabilitation facilities for the injuries he had sustained as a result of the stroke. The plaintiff testified that he did not question the care he had received at the hospital until 1995, when he read two magazine articles regarding the treatment of strokes. As a result of reading those articles, the plaintiff, in October, 1995, sought legal counsel regarding the treatment he had received at the hospital. The plaintiff also testified that the first time that he read his emergency room record from March 10, 1993, was when he met with his legal counsel. That record revealed that Lovejoy had recorded his diagnosis of the plaintiff as including “possible [cerebrovascular accident] CVA.” The plaintiff testified that this was his “first clue” that he actually may have had a stroke on March 10, and the hospital had not diagnosed it properly. Thereafter, on March 6,1996, the plaintiff filed the action in the present case, alleging that the hospital was negligent in its treatment and diagnosis of him.
I
The hospital first claims that the trial court improperly refused to give its requested jury instruction stating that § 52-584 imposes on a plaintiff a duty to investigate a potential claim of malpractice. The plaintiff claims, in response, that the trial court’s instruction was proper and followed the requirements of the statute. We agree with the plaintiff and conclude that § 52-584 does not explicitly impose a duty to investigate. Instead, § 52-584 requires that the jury consider all the facts and circumstances of the case in order to determine the
“Our analysis begins with a well established standard of review. When reviewing [a] challenged jury instruction ... we must adhere to the well settled rule that a charge to the jury is to be considered in its entirety, read as a whole, and judged by its total effect rather than by its individual component parts. . . . [T]he test of a court’s charge is not whether it is as accurate upon legal principles as the opinions of a court of last resort but whether it fairly presents the case to the jury in such a way that injustice is not done to either party under the established rules of law. ... As long as [the instructions] are correct in law, adapted to the issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury . . . we will not view the instructions as improper.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ancheff v. Hartford Hospital, 260 Conn. 785, 811, 799 A.2d 1067 (2002).
The dispute among the parties also raises an issue of statutory interpretation, namely, whether § 52-584 implicitly includes a duty on the plaintiff to investigate a potential claim of malpractice. We recently articulated our process of statutory interpretation in State v. Courchesne, 262 Conn. 537, 816 A.2d 562 (2003). “The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature. ... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. In seeking to determine that meaning, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter. . . . Thus, this
“In performing this task, we begin with a searching examination of the language of the statute, because that is the most important factor to be considered. In doing so, we attempt to determine its range of plausible meanings and, if possible, narrow that range to those that appear most plausible. We do not, however, end with the language. We recognize, further, that the purpose or purposes of the legislation, and the context of the language, broadly understood, are directly relevant to the meaning of the language of the statute.
“This does not mean, however, that we will not, in a given case, follow what may be regarded as the plain meaning of the language, namely, the meaning that, when the language is considered without reference to any extratextual sources of its meaning, appears to be the meaning and that appears to preclude any other likely meaning. In such a case, the more strongly the bare text supports such a meaning, the more persuasive the extratextual sources of meaning will have to be in order to yield a different meaning.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 577-78.
Turning to the merits of the issue before us, § 52-584 provides in relevant part: “No action to recover damages for injury to the person . . . caused by . . . malpractice of a . . . hospital . . . shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Thus, under the statute, an injured party must bring an action within two years of the time when he or she discovered or, in the exercise of
As the preceding analysis reveals, a plaintiffs claim of medical malpractice will accrue once he or she discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered, that he or she suffered an actionable harm. The plain language of the statute does not, therefore, impose any specific affirmative duty on the plaintiff to investigate a potential claim of malpractice. Rather, the sole inquiry, in this context, is whether, in light of all relevant circumstances, the plaintiff exercised reasonable care in the discovery of his or her injury.
Additionally, nothing in the legislative history supports the hospital’s claim that the statute implies an affirmative duty to investigate. At the time of the passage of § 52-584, the focus of the debate on the statute of limitations centered around the ability of plaintiffs to
In this regard, the trial court’s instruction clearly articulated the standard contained in the statute, namely, the exercise of reasonable care. The instruction also expressly outlined what the jury would be required to find in order for the hospital to prevail on its statute of limitation defense. Specifically, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: “In order for the [hospital] to prevail on the statute of limitations it must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that [the plaintiff] discovered or should have discovered through the exercise of reasonable care prior to March 6, 1994, that the [hospital] was negligent in its treatment of him on March 10,1993, and further that he discovered or should have discovered by March 6,1994, that this negligence of the [hospital] was a proximate cause of the stroke that he suffered on March 12, 1993.” The trial court’s charge outlined the elements that the hospital was required to establish, and gave guidance to the jury in its determination of whether the hospital satisfied its burden of proof. Because the trial court’s instruction appropriately articulated the standard of § 52-584, it was proper.
The hospital claims, however, that its requested charge was consistent with the Appellate Court’s decision in Mountaindale Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Zappone, 59 Conn. App. 311, 757 A.2d 608, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 947, 762 A.2d 903 (2000). In Mountaindale
In Mountaindale Condominium Assn., Inc., however, the Appellate Court merely determined that the exercise of reasonable care required the plaintiff to pursue a possible claim once it realized there had been actionable harm. Id. The Appellate Court did not, as the hospital suggests, create a new duty on plaintiffs to investigate potential claims of negligence prior to the realization that any injury has occurred. The hospital’s reliance on Mountaindale Condominium Assn., Inc., therefore, is misplaced.
The hospital also relies on various out-of-state cases for its proposition that a duty to investigate should be implied in § 52-584. Specifically, the hospital points to Graham v. Hansen, 128 Cal. App. 3d 965, 180 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1982). In Graham, the plaintiff suffered a perforated esophagus after undergoing a medical procedure, which, her doctor assured her, would take approximately one-half hour. Id., 973. As a result of her injury, the plaintiff spent months in the hospital, and was informed of the error that occurred during the procedure, which led to her long stay at the hospital. Id. The plaintiff also admitted that she had suspicions that her doctor had committed malpractice, but did not seek any legal advice until almost one year after she had
The court in Graham, analyzing the case under a statute that required a plaintiff to bring an action “one year after the plaintiff discover[ed], or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury”; id., 972; determined that, the facts of that specific case were “sufficient to place a reasonable person on inquiry as to the probability of actionable conduct on the part of [the] defendants.” Id., 973.
Put differently, in Graham, the court determined that, on the facts as the plaintiff knew them to be, as a matter of law, she did not exercise reasonable care in bringing her cause of action after the discovery of her injury. Id., 972-73. Thus, the inquiry was whether a reasonable person would have been put on notice of a potential malpractice claim with all the facts known to the plaintiff at that time. Id., 973. We, therefore, do not interpret Graham to require a plaintiff to affirmatively investigate a claim of malpractice before any information that would put a reasonable person on notice that such a claim might exist. In this regard, then, Graham is similar to what our statute requires, namely, that the plaintiff exercise reasonable care in the discovery of actionable harm.
II
The hospital next claims that the plaintiff, as a certified nurse anesthetist, had a heightened duty under § 52-584 to discover his claim for malpractice. The plaintiff responds that the trial court properly rejected a height
As discussed previously in this opinion, § 52-584 requires that the plaintiff bring his or her claim for medical malpractice within two years of when he or she discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have discovered, the injury. The hospital has not offered, and we are not aware of, anything in the statute, legislative history or our case law that would impose a heightened duty on health care professionals to discover a claim of potential malpractice. We, therefore, do not find persuasive the hospital’s argument that the statute implicitly requires health care professionals, because of their experience in the health care field, to discover their claims of malpractice earlier than persons who are not healthcare professionals. If the hospital disagrees with our conclusion that the statute does not prescribe a heightened standard for health care professionals, its remedy lies with the legislature, not this court. See State v. Angel C., 245 Conn. 93, 120, 715 A.2d 652 (1998) (“[i]f the defendants disagree with the legislative conclusion of which class of juveniles presumptively should be tried as adults, their remedy lies with the legislature, not this court”).
We also note that the jury in the present case was aware of the plaintiffs education and experience as a nurse anesthetist and could have considered those facts in deciding whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable care in discovering actionable harm. The trial court appropriately did not instruct the jury to disregard the plaintiffs status as a health care professional. Moreover, the hospital argued to the jury that because of the plaintiffs profession, he should have discovered his
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion PALMER and VERTEFEUILLE, Js., concurred.
The named plaintiffs claims against the defendant physicians, Richard Dutton, Yolanda Pena, Gregory Kresel and Glen Lovejoy, were all withdrawn prior to trial. The only defendant in this appeal, therefore, is the named defendant, Winsted Memorial Hospital. Additionally, the loss of consortium claim of the plaintiff Rosemary Taylor, the named plaintiffs wife, was also withdrawn prior to trial. Hereafter references to the plaintiff are to William Taylor.
The hospital appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 65-1 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c).
General Statutes § 52-584 provides: “No action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, or by reckless or wanton misconduct, or by malpractice of a physician, surgeon, dentist, podiatrist, chiropractor, hospital or sanatorium, shall be brought but within two years from the date when tire injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, and except that no such action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of, except that a counterclaim may be interposed in any such action any time before the pleadings in such action are finally closed.”
The hospital’s request to charge provided: “If the [plaintiff] did not in fact discover the actionable harm but would have discovered it if [he] exercised reasonable care, then you should hold [him] to the standard of reasonable discovery, not just actual discovery. For instance, if you find that the [plaintiff] reasonably should have investigated [his] claim or hired [his] attorneys sooner, and that if [he] had done so [he] would have known about the actionable harm sooner, then you should make your decision based on what [he] reasonably should have done under the circumstances.”
The trial court’s instruction on the statute of limitations defense provided: “The [hospital] claims that the plaintiffs action is barred by the statute of limitations. Now the [hospital] has a burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence each of the elements of the special defense. The statute of limitations that is applicable to this action provides that a person must bring an action within two years from the date that he discovers or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered that he has suffered actionable harm.
“Actionable harm occurs when the plaintiff discovers or in the exercise of reasonable care or should have discovered the essential elements of a cause of action.
“Now, therefore, in order to establish that the plaintiff has discovered or reasonably should have discovered that he suffered actionable harm, the [hospital] must prove that the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered first, that the [hospital] was negligent and second, that the [hospital’s] negligence was a proximate cause of his injuries.
“In the present case, I instruct you that this lawsuit was filed on March 6, 1996. In order for the [hospital] to prevail on the statute of limitations it
The hospital claims that merely reading the “discovered or . . . should have been discovered” language of § 52-584 without explanation was not an appropriate instruction because it did not adequately explain the law to the jury. We disagree. Juries frequently decide factual questions regarding the exercise of reasonable care. In fact, the jury’s definition of reasonable care is often precisely the issue in negligence cases. Thus, when read as a whole and within the context of the entire charge, we conclude that the trial court’s instruction was proper.
The hospital also relies on Lumnsden v. Design Tech Builders, Inc., 358 Md. 435, 749 A.2d 796 (2000), for the proposition that we should read into § 52-584 an affirmative duty on plaintiffs to investigate their potential claims of malpractice. The statute involved in Luwsden, allowed breach of warranty claims for construction defects, but only if commenced “within two years after the defect was discovered or should have been discovered or within two years after the expiration of the warranty, whichever occurs first.” Id., 441. The court, after explaining that jurisdiction’s reliance on the “discovery rule,” determined that “[a] claimant reasonably should know of a wrong if the claimant has knowledge of circumstances which ought to have put a person of ordinary prudence on inquiry [thus, charging the individual] with notice of all facts which such an investigation would in all probability have disclosed if it had been properly pursued.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 445. Finally, the court upheld the defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations because the statute of
While at first blush, the cases on which the hospital relies seem persuasive, they do not reflect Connecticut’s law, which merely requires that a plaintiff exercise reasonable care. Put differently, § 52-584 requires that the plaintiff exercise reasonable care in the discovery of his or her injury, while the statute at issue in Lumsden puts the plaintiff on inquiry notice when the plaintiff has in his or her possession all the relevant facts that would require a reasonable person to investigate. Because nothing in § 52-584 evidences an intent by our legislature to put plaintiffs on inquiry notice when certain facts are available to them, we find the hospital’s reliance on Lumsden unpersuasive. Rather, the sole inquiry under § 52-584 is whether, in light of all relevant circumstances, the plaintiff exercised reasonable care in the discovery of actionable harm.
During closing argument, counsel for the hospital stated: “We, indeed, have pleaded statute of limitations in this case. The law provides that in a medical [mal]practice case like this one, plaintiffs have to bring suit within two years of when they discover or reasonably should have discovered actionable harm. Should have discovered actionable harm.
“In other words, potential plaintiffs just can’t shut their eyes and put their hands over their ears if they have reason to think they’ve been wrong. They’ve got to investigate their claim[s] so that the person whom they’re targeting gets fair notice and is able to marshal a defense. . . .
“When you’re considering that issue, keep in mind that [the plaintiff] was an advanced practice registered nurse with numerous contacts in the medical profession. Judging from the disability form that he filled out, which I passed around to you . . . [h]e knew in May of 1993 he had a lot of detail about what was done for him in the hospital in March of 1993. And keep in mind that [the plaintiff’s] wife, who has training as a nurse—she’s not a nurse— but she had about a year, she said, which is quite lot of time was obviously unhappy with his medical care.”
Concurrence Opinion
joins, concurring. I agree with the majority’s conclusion. I disagree, however, with the majority’s approach to statutory interpretation. My view on the appropriate method of statutory interpretation continues to be the same as set forth in my concurrence in Mandell v. Gavin, 262 Conn. 659, 672, 816 A.2d 619 (2003), and in the dissenting opinion by Justice Zarella, in which I joined, in State v. Courchesne, 262 Conn. 537, 597, 816 A.2d 562 (2003).