*1 Tаylor 1971] v. Walter WALTER TAYLOR Opinion Court for the reasons stated be reversed ease should 1. This 117-120. J., in Black, Opinion Dissenting J. T. G. and Phrases. Law —Crime—Words
2. Criminal an act which is he does person a crime whenever A commits by fine, punishable penalty, by law, prohibited act which imprisonment. or forfeiture Crime—Automobiles—Michigan Vehicle Code. 3. Criminal Law — expressly Michigan Any made Vehicle Code violation of imprison- felony punishment a misdemeanor or a fine general proposition, ment, hence, is a crime. as a Left Turn— 4. Criminal Law —Crime—Automobiles—Prohibited Credibility. Witnesses — necessarily malting prohibited turn is not The “crime” of left credibility a witness. which touches on the “crime” Credibility — — — Prior 5. Witnesses Cross-Examination — Discretion. and Convictions Arrests regarding prior arrests witness Cross-examination aof judge’s credibility, convictions, is within the trial to test his 607). (CCS 1968, discretion in Headnotes References for Points [2] [3] [4] [5, [1] No headnote. 21 Am 7 Am 7 Am Jur 58 Am Jur Jur Jur, 2d, 2d, 2d, Automobiles and Witnesses Automobiles and Criminal Law § § Highway et Highway seq. Traffic Traffic §§ §§ 799-802. 312-346. 385 Mich Opinion op the Court Opinion
Dissenting T. E. Cross-Examination—Driving
6. Witnesses — Record —Discretion. *2 did, sustaining objection Trial not err cowrt to cross- discretionary examination a witness’ it is as with the trial court whether or not evidence unrelated traffic (GCM 607). 1963, violations is admissible Appeal Appeals, from Court of 1, Division Levin, Kavanagh P. J., and T. Gr. and Newblatt, JJ., affirm- ing Wayne, Fitzgerald, May Neal J. Submitted 6, (No. April 52,327.) 1970. Term No. Docket rehearing Decided October 6, 1970. on Submitted (No. 10,1971. June 16 June Term 1971, Docket No. 52,327.) August Decided 27, 1971. App
15 Mich 361 reversed. Complaint by against Taylor Rudi James W. personal injuries Walter for sustained defend- when judgment ant’s automobile struck him. Verdict and appealed for defendant. Plaintiff to the Court of Appeals. appeals. Affirmed. Plaintiff Affirmed Rehearing equally divided Court, granted. Reversed and remanded. Lopatin (Norman
Albert P.C., L. of coun- Zemke, sel), plaintiff.
Roy P. Nelson, for defendant. Rehearing
On (for remand). J. reversal Further and Black, writing expatiation. mere would amount to adhere original my (384 117-120) and Mich 114, again vote in accordance therewith. Walter Dissenting Opinion by T. Gr. J. Kavanagh, T. M. C. and J., Kavanagh, Adams, Swainson,
JJ., concurred with J. Black, (for remand). J. reversal concur Williams, passing with Justice Black on without “Professor prejudice’ agree McCormick’s ‘undue no discretion was exercised. test.” I (dissenting). T. G. The Court of Appeals judge’s affirmedthe circuit refusal to the cross-examination driv- of the defendant his ing credibility his record to test after he denied he had ever been arrested or convicted of crime. appeal
On Court that decision of the Court Appeals evenly was affirmed1 an divided Court, disqualified having the writer himself on account of participation Appeals in the Court of decision. *3 frequency of Because with which the issue judgment recurs, however, of it was the this Court that the matter should be for considera- resubmitted by hope tion in the full bench that authoritative, definitive resolution involved would assist the bench and bar. opinion
In his
for
An examination of no it shows that offer separate or In was made. such circumstance usually appel- this Court makes short shrift of an excluding lant’s assertion of error in of evidence, GrCB,1963, 604. granted Nonetheless to on the we leave rule question, so we shall. rule affirmance2
Our late Brother
Kelly’s
cogently
meticulously and
treated of the issue and
1 (1970),
The trial held a left general turn is not a “crime”. As a statement taken clearly wrong, out of context this is for “Whenever person prohibited by a does an act which is law, punishable by penalty, which аct is fine, forefeiture imprisonment, People or a he commits crime.” (1889), Hanrahan 75 Mich at 611, as a Thus, general proposition, any Michigan violation of the expressly Vehicle Code is made a misdemeanor or felony punishment by imprisonment, a with fine or foregoing and hence within the a definition, crime. say judge This is not to trial erred in applying the law, that in context his remark was wrong, making pro- however, for “crime” necessarily hibited left turn is not “crime” which credibility. touches on his ruling Thus, context, his was tantamount saying petty that “Conviction of crimes or misde- may meanors be shown, the discretion of the triаl judge, purpose testing credibility, for the but my prejudicial view it is too to the defendant here permit you prohibited to show his conviction of a turn.” Sting
In majority v. Davis of this Court subscribed to the dictum that under GCR. 1963, 607 “a trial has discretion no regard exclude cross-examination to the history plaintiff of a driver or a driver, defendant *4 being proper such cross-examination to test the cred ibility testimony of regard the witness’ to the central fact issue the case.” clearly
This be would an extension of the court rule language as written, for neither in the of the rule itself nor the four cases therein, cited viz. Van Dissenting Opiniоn by G.T. (1921),
Goosen v. Barlum 595; 214 Mich Zimmerman Goldberg (1936), Socony v. 134; 277 Mich Vacuum Oil Co. v. Marvin Mich 528; Cebulak v. (1948), 320 Mich Lewis 710was the discretion the judge trial so limited. supra, (p 599): Goosen,
In Van said Court “3. while on Defendant, the witness stand, interrogated as to the number times he been had complained arrested and convicted. This of as asking jury error. Defendant to believe his determining weight version of the accident. to he In given testimony they right to his had to know past. what questions manner man he had been in the These tendency had a elicit the information proper. and were Leland v. Kauth Mich [1882], 47 508; Pratt v. Wickham [1903], 356; Lunde Railway People [1913], 177 374; v. Cutler People [1917], Mich 6; v. LaLonde [1917], 197 Mich 76.” supra,
In (pp Zimmerman, said Court 137): “Notwithstanding plaintiff’s the contention of at torney testimony that this was material in that it hearing credibility,
had on defendant’s trial Appellant court struck it from the record. asserts ruling prejudicial of the trial court constituted error. It a fair inference from the record that judge the trial was of the that since defend ant’s conviction was not a crime, hut rather a misdemeanor, testimony therefore concern ing materially such upon conviction did not hear credibility. judge The statute which the trial had in provides part mind may that “conviction of crime drawing purpose be shown for the credibility Comp. of such witness.” 3 Laws 1929, § Notwithstanding statutory provision, long it has been established law in State that it is within the discretion of a trial having witness to be cross-examined as to his been *5 599 Mich Kavanagh, by T. G-. J. Opinion Dissenting v. Barlum Van Goosen misdemeanor. a convicted [1921], Coryell v. Niedzinski 595; [1921], mind that be borne must it case instant “In the not one per- of defendant cross-examination the taining upon bearing only matter and collateral to a was cross-examination Instead credibility. his a charge plea guilty defendant’s concerning accident very of the out arising driving reckless Exсluding such case. principal in the involved testimony striking or cross-examination from circumstances.” error under record was added.) (Emphasis Marvin, supra, v. Oil Co.
In Vacuum Socony Zimmerman saying case on the Court commented 537): (p rule that a general comment
“Following convic- prior as to be cross-examined may witness credibility, his impeaching tions for the purpose it was said: “ in mind must be borne ‘In instant case it not one of defendant was that the cross-examination only bearing matter and collateral pertaining Instead it cross-examina- credibility. upon plea guilty tion defendant’s conсerning very out of the arising of reckless charge Excluding case. accident involved principal testimony striking such cross-examination error under the circumstances. from the record was defend- in this case the is this true since Especially testimony ant in his own behalf and his had testified As just effect was a denial of reckless driving. within the dis- indicated, above we think it was not cretion of cross- the trial to limit defendant’s from rec- testimony examination striking ord ; which, but instead this constituted error ruling would except indicated, the reason hereinafter ” have been reversal.’ prejudicial and necessitated Dissеnting Opinion T. G. supra, (p Lewis, the Court said In Cebulak 728): permitted The trial court cross-examination of “4. *6 charged Betty whether had been Lewis as to she right yield way pedestrian,
failing to of to as a having the accident. She admitted received of result failing yield right tickets, one for to two traffic having way one for a driver’s of and not license. objection over defendants’ She admitted that her (the ticket) paid father ‘took Doubtless counsel for the defendants made too much and it down the fine.’ importance showing this matter before the jury. permit However, was not error to Goldberg cross-exаmination. Zimmerman 277 [1936], v. Socony Mich 134; Vacuum Oil Co. v. Marvin [1946], Mich 528.” Socony in Goosen,
Thus Van and Cebulak it was permit regarding held no error to cross-examination arrests and conviction in crime, and Zimmerman expressly affirming “long while that it has been es tablished law in this State is within that it the discre judge tion of a trial a witness to be cross- having examined as to his been convicted of a mis demeanor” the Court held it was error to exclude concerning plea “cross-examination defendant’s guilty charge driving arising to a of reckless out very principal accident involved in the case.” provides
Since GCR 1963, that the rules of approved evidence in those cases and “reenacted appear PA 1961, 236” present No it would that the may rule is that witness be cross-examined, to test credibility, regarding prior his arrests and convic judge’s tions, within the trial discretion. Wigmore, (Chadbourn §
3ASee Evidence, 987 rev. 1970). In a footnote to this section the author exhaustively catalogued has many the authorities of jurisdictions including Michigan. apparent It 385 T. Kavanaoh, G-. vesting discretion the rule cited cases from invariably followed been has almost trial Michigan. in rule was set in forth behind
The ratiocination 16 Mich wherein Flood Wilbur (pр 43, 44): wrote Campbell a witness in own be- sworn as “Defendant was plaintiff’s Upon case. controverted half, against objection, allowed, he was cross-examination he ever confined the state to be whether asked ruling. prison, exception It is taken attempt erroneous, to have been as an claimed by improper means, witness and to discredit prove by parol evidence. do what rests We objection always think the tenable. It has been not found necessary to witnesses to be cross-ex- allow only upon amined, not the facts involved the issue, upon may but also the such collateral matters as enable *7 jury appreciate reliability. to their fairness and large given, a To this end circumstances seemed to latitude has been where
justify allowing a it, full inquiry history many witnesses, into the of and into tending things illustrate true other ter. This to their charac- may enabling jury court or be useful comprehend person just they of are what sort upon knowledge believe, called and such a is often very may quite espe- necessary, It desirable. be as cially strange suspicious or where witnesses brought from forward, enable counsel to extract whole It cannot them thе truth on merits. be experience previous criminal will de- doubted that preciate greater of to a or less the credit a witness judgment persons, of all and there extent, reaching history. be means of The must some specific misconduct, of law do not allow acts of rules or disgraceful specific to be character, of facts may proved against He be a witness others. proved by convicted of evidence to have been other infa- but not to have done crimes, infamous undergone personal dis- deeds, mous to have nor v. Walter Dissenting Opinion by T. G. previous grace. And even as to conviction of any great crimes, the rule is seldom infamous expected one can service, because no be to know in may appear, may what witnesses nor what advance history. remedy their Unless the is have been practically it is of no cross-examination, found account. always held, has been that within reasonable “It may, very cross-examination, a witness be limits upon thoroughly sifted his character and anteced- pro- The court has discretion as to ents. how far priety given allow be in a will this to done case, and prevent any will, should, needless or wanton abuse power. of the But within this discretion we think may concerning a witness be asked all antecedents really significant, explain which are his ment this why and which will credibility, proof punish- and it certain prison may important in a state be an fact for
purpose. very easy And is not to conceive knowledge may properly not be as derived from the witness as other from sources. He must be acquainted history, better than others with his own temptation under no to make his own case bim worse than truth will warrant. There can with identity. extenuating be no mistakes If there are readily no one can circumstances, else so recall them. We think the case comes within the well established rules of cross-examination, that the few author- ities which seem to doubt it have been misunder- upon or else stood, course have been based a fallacious reasoning, which would, in nine cases out prevent obtaining an ten, honest witness from bet- ter credit than abandoned ruffian.” varying There are some of us who feel for reasons *8 the rule should be re-examined. profession
Until we do so we owe it to the to state what the rule is and insist on its observance.
For reason the this decision of the trial here Appeals and the Court of should bе affirmed and appellee. costs to awarded the 385 Dissenting Opinion by Brennan, E.T. J. (dissenting): young If the T. E. they only people today, the are who think public with candor, officials would who criticize ones pro, speaking example of an old his mind, like an courtesy, argument oral albeit with utmost appellee Roy Nelson of De- Mr. in this case, profit. troit Bar could be read prepared spoke without a which text, Mr. Nelson gram- starts and accounts for the occasional false however, fault- substance, matical miscues. The is adopt my I as less. dissent. my name “Mr. Members of Court, Nelson: represent
Roy I Nelson, and and I I defendant, might question, ‘Why ask the am I same here?’ says got feel like the fellow who I two slim chances, none, and slim out of town. But notwithstand- ing, Sting1 say I read the and I case, will be frank to very you cannot it. It isn’t understand often that you come before a tribunal like this, and know going get beat before come, so what have I got way. to lose. I feel read the decision of previous Justice Black, who dissented in the case. Sting read the things case. think there are several distinguished that are different in this case, as from Sting case. One, Court, am sure, has still Sting fresh Sting memories of the case. The case permitted involved cross-examination which concerning driving record, and the defendant exception objected took it, he to it, and permitted court cross-examination. The then was, ‘Was abuse of discretion on the part permitting of the trial court in cross-examina- driving tion of the ?’ Sting That was the case. The which case, is now before this Court, objected was case where the cross-examination to me, and the trial court sustained it. Now the question is, ‘Was this an abuse of discretion, in re- fusing examination of record?’
1 Sting v. Davis Mich 608. *9 Walter E. Brennan, Dissenting Opinion J. T. Entirely guishes there which issue, third distin- The differеnt. materially 8ting is case, from case this there no record; in this
is no evidence
the defendant had
in the trial court that
evidence
way
driving
only
driving
any
record
all. The
record at
Appendix
Lopatin
appears
is Mr.
in this
paper
waving
when,
the trial
front of
a sheet
and said,
motion for a new trial
he made a
got
driving record.’ That’s where it
in.
is the
‘this
So
I
a
of difference between
think there is
lot
Sting
and this case.
case
all
“I
to refer first of
to Justice
like
Black’s
opinion when this case was here before.2 It isn’t
say,
get
‘Why
I
come back and
that
a chance to
often
did
Maybe
you say
audacity,
?’
lot of
it takes a
long
for a
think have known Justice
but
Black
enough
an-
time, that
think that he doesn’t mind
differing
him.
other fellow
: Not at all. Not at all.
“Justice
Black
spent
differing.
“Mr. Nelson: He
most of his life
question
my
making
“I raised in
brief the
separate
your right
you
preserve
If
record.
want to
appeal,
prejudice.
Lopatin
to
made no
show there
Mr.
separate
any
record. He
no offer
made
record
the lower court.
raised this
I said,
under Rule 604.
about it?’
‘What
anything
Justice Black
never mentioned
about it
opinion.
in his
But since
the case was
time,
just
today, by
here
I Mr.,
mentioned
think it was
argued, malpractice
in the first case
Henson3 case. This Court was
case, the
pretty strong
preserve
appeal.
unanimous
how to
you
prejudiced by
If
claim that
denial of
right
right
of cross-examnation or a denial of
to in-
separate
troduce evidence then make a
record so we
prejudicial.
can show to this Court that it has been
That was not done in this case. And if it wasn’t
you,
strength
done in this
how
case,
can
say
anything
the Henson case,
that there
before
2 Taylor
(1970),
his mind or not. I would like to But that out to him. thing “Now, another that Justice said Black previous opinion was, in the case there by Judge Fitzgerald no discretion exercised trial court whеn he refused to examination on driving record, because, he said in his several making improper remarks, crime. turn left is not referring don’t know if Justice I Black to the if fact that he said that it is all crime, not really
misdemeanors and felonies are all
crimes.
reasoning.
don’t understand his
But
Black
says there
nowas
discretion
ifWell,
exercised.
he
Coryell
4 Niedzinski
(1921),
says guess it must be but don’t it, true, under- maybe he means, what there is some stand ex- planation see. which cannot any certainly “Now, secret, don’t think it is it attorneys any people isn’t who are down secret to trial and the ways, Supreme the line a little that the away chipping getting driving- been Court has at gone great record evidence. It some into over extent, and Justice God rest did a Soul, His Kelly, job reviewing- thing on the whole tremendous his when was written on this case time before. Smith It started Smith Smith remember the case, A. J. Elliott, case it was Elliott v. A. J. Co.,7 Construction when the permitted negligent under, was ment to show the entrust theory. really And notable that deci sion because the Honorable Talbot iswho Smith, promoted now—I don’t know whether he has been noted—is now on the Federal Bench. He stated in opinion, commenting that for Rule 723 and is rule, the reasons *11 prohibits [sic], whiсh the introduction 8 driving of evidence of criminal convictions record. says, principal sought He that statute arise this ‘The evil to be cured
way: A driver has been con of a victed criminal offense in connection with a civilly traffic accident. In addition, he is sued with respect danger to the same accident. There is a that jury might, permitted, if the civil consider the crim neglig-ence inal conviction as evidence the in civil negligence prior action, civil that in a cases, regarded negligence, neg case will be as evidence of ligence in the later case.’ signed opinion, “Now, Justice that and Black heartily supported whole that. now Black signs Sting just the which is the case, opposite. saying people change I am Now, not can’t pretty their guy mind, but it is hard down Mich 398. [7] 6 Taylor CLS Elliott v. A. J. Smith 1956, Walter § 257.731 (1970), (Stat Contracting Company, Ann 1957 Cum 114, at Supp p Inc. § 9.2431). [358] Opinion by T. E. Dissenting you happen going to if figure what is out street your is we keep changing that the reason mind, maybe up the reason is twice, and here have been this gets years old it going when to be ten is case to be tried. certainly are arose aware, as we “Now, Rule inception in the hear its second I it had of, out think
ing
theory
I don’t
Peuler,
And,
on Perin v.
Peuler.9
probably
behind Perin v.
somewhat
quite
negligent
to,
if
I
want
don’t
entrustment,
your
say, you
agree
I
are entitled to
but,
it,
with
maybe
right.
disagree
opinion,
all
don’t
particularly.
anyhow,
legally
where Rule 607 had its
But,
it,
inception, and
in
this Court
gave
thought
formally, I
be
sure,
am
considerable
they
They
rules of
said,
the rule.
fore
wrote
applica
shall
evidence as
forth
these cases
be
set
driving
notwithstanding
says,
regarding
records,
ble,
what
[sic]
rule,
statute 723
where the
what
says, you
legislature make the
can’t have
statute,
any
any
proceed
civil
evidence
records
very
ings.
followed
cases
closеly
line
So the trial court down the
they
this.
think
did. What did those
say?
your
Well,
four
Van
one,
cases—
Zimmerman;10
second,
Goosen
case;
third,
Socony Vacuum11 case;
fourth,
and the
Cebulak12
case.
reviewed all these cases in the
we
first time
up
got
per
change
were
since
here, but
we have
just
sonalities,
will,
these,
so
for the
benefit
might review these.
before,
involved, as stated
case
Van Goosen
“The
of a
convictions
introduced of
was
there
evidence
objection
counsel,
of defense
record, over
traffic
up
discre-
of an abuse of
basis
and that went
something
Again,
admittеd,
tion.
*12
they
least,
at
claimed.
been,
have
and it shouldn’t
plea
a
was en-
where
Zimmerman case
one
The
[9]
11 Socony
Perin
Zimmerman
Cebulak v. Lewis
v.
Vacuum Oil Co. v.
Peuler
v.
Goldberg
(1964),
(1936),
“Now, this, down to seems to me. talking talking What are we about? We are about сredibility. Credibility is the whole nub thing. you talking This is when what about credibility, enact a determine said, the rule. You whether or not credibility, witness, can be tested on we will purpose can, whether he and for that we think that evidence of convictions of traffic violations *13 599 385 614 Brennan, J. by T. E. Dissenting Opinion are But we it. we think This, credibility. to goes of con- evidence Now, is credibility. talking about violation, something a traffic in plea or a viction, hand —are we accident at to unrelated that a credi- to man’s does it all, go to—first going I would wager anyone know, but I don’t bility? I don’t times, suppose many stopped been have you out found they when tickets many have you gotten number on the but reflect were, just you who who you been if hadn’t have, you could you times say, and they to court you come then were, and so of going convicted got he crook, ‘Look at that to go Now does in a 70 zone.’ miles an hour I brief. will in my out point your credibility? one second hesitate said, I wouldn’t it, just read who made with family guy assets some trusting hour 35 miles an going left turn or improper I sure wouldn’t hesitate. But in a zone. he five if had been him with cents wouldn’t trust a or the shoplifter, a being pickpocket, convicted of the circus. But shill who runs shell at game now, point know the about you strange thing we ourselves, at find all in the trial court has no dis- now cretion or not at whether someone’s he have introduced, but still can being whether or he will let in evidence any discretion of whether he has ever been not a of being
convicted or house of pickpocket, prostitution. hasn’t shoplifter, caught can keep out,
He because that credibility; do with anything they but can’t out the he keep fact made an improper left turn or that ran he into someone the rear on end this in a traffic does expressway jam. Now, sense? doesn’t
make It make me, sense to so Mr. Lopatin says, ‘Why you here?’ coming IWell, said, ‘Because you know have certain faith, a certain amount of faith jurisprudence, in our and I you don’t think meant what really said case.’ Sting com got but I’ve me, “Pardon Adams, read a little And like to ment on this. would just by T. E. said, General where Justice this, bit Adams adopted by Court in ‘607 was ac Rule Court rule-making powers,’ etc. its The cordance central issue tributory negligence, was the con negligence, goes say, And etc. he *14 important, whom the issue of and On this driving plaintiff a believe, believe the record of evidentiary a crucial or can become dеfendant may I how in Now, ask, the world can the factor. evidentiary record of a man become negligence in the trial of a case? How factor, the way can somebody express ran that he into on the fact ago years anything three rear end have through light to do or he whether not went red today? talking credibility, Now, if are about thing, certainly nothing that is one but it has to do driving history, with evidence. The both before and after the whether it accident, be for serious or minor vital infractions the vehicle can code, have bearing jury enabling to determine the plaintiff testimony truth of a or defendant’s as to the exercise of due How in care. the world can anything ability that have the to do with a man’s to tell talking truth? And that we is what about. Now negligently, whether or not he drove or whether he’s a careless or driver, whether he has been con victed nothing ten times, has that to do, we’re talking credibility about the statute, and so ask driving- Court, how in the world can a man’s anything you say, record have with, to do what testimony with the defendant’s as to the exercise figure up, of due care. can’t it out. We wind and say, we presently we conclude under Rule as 607, adopted by judge this Court, the trial has no dis Maybe сretion. I didn’t read the same rule. Rule adopted by 607, as Court, never said that there contrary, was no discretion. Quite Rule 607, adopted by says as this Court, the court does have permit discretion, but it has discretion to it or to [1] 3 Sting Davis v. [384] Mich 608, 613-614.—Reporter. 599 by T. E. forget said, it did, Rule And all keep out. it get say you it in. can’t they statute about to let wants trial saying if the that We’re evidence saying he we’re prior in, convictions procedures trial, goes to the it because do it can I don’t blame rules, going to set and we’re said, it is all it me, but you, is O.K. longer discretion say no there didn’t right. a matter in that might Kavanagh Justice “I comment. T. G. opiniоn, G. T. same Kavanagh, agreed He with me. kind of somewhat cor if I read that, under thinks still rectly, some discretion there is thinks he still they’re going to not court, whether trial driving records; he of evidence introduction by say up discretionary, winds and he thinks it ing, Rule, because look at this we better think *15 interpret, changing. doesn’t He some it needs think changed. It says, is all needs to be I think it he right change you it. Because if to with me want very thing you one rule, enacted the when important I read the last line me, to says, I think the case, in Peuler he Black’s say, goes improved. And on to be he Rule should prospective. operate future and shall to the that it right, you going say, gentlemen, to all if are And game, change the ball 607 in the middle of Rule make it work for but let’s me, that is O. K. you you did when future, because that what you change going rule, if to it, enacted to the future. Don’t send it back let’s make it work something for four case that was tried years ago. Now, followed the rule. five We change say defendant, decided to ‘We’ve to to you pay for the Defendant, and Mr. rule, so, Sting Davis, supra, pp 614, 615.—Reporter. T. E. expense of I don’t think cricket. Well, this.’ that’s up gentlemen, the reason I’m here. that’s Didn’t say. long much Well, have it won’t take write just get said. the answer to what is my had to it off staying I thank chest, and much for awake you, to listen me. Thank Your Honors.”