31 Ala. 383 | Ala. | 1858
— By the act of 15th January, 1852, the treasurer for Randolph and some other counties is made, eligible by the qualified voters, “at the same time, and in like manner, as sheriffs and clerks of said county;” and the commissioners’ court is authorized to make appointments for filling vacancies, “until the next succeeding general election.” — See Pamphlet Acts of ’51-52, p. 477. By an act adopted twenty-four days afterwards, the statute of 15th January, ’52, was suspended as to Randolph county, until the first of February, 1854. During the interval between the adoption and suspension of the act of 15th January, 1852, the commissioners’ court of Randolph county elected a county treasurer. The act of 15th January, 1852, was of force at the time of the election.
The rule, which once prevailed in England, that acts of Parliament should be deemed to have been in force from the first day of the session, when not otherwise prescribed, does not obtain here, for reasons which are explained in the ease of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad Company v. The State, 29 Ala. 573. It results, that statutes passed at the same session are not to be regarded as having effect from the same day, or as constituting one act, because they pertain to the same subject.
The act of 15th January, 1852, was of force from the date of its approval, and continued in operation, until the suspension act of 9th February, 1852, (twenty-four days afterwards,) was adopted. The appointment of a
Section 2655 of the Code, in reference to the proceeding by quo warranto, says: “A judge of the circuit court may direct such action to be brought, whenever he believes these acts can. be proved, and it is necessary for the public good; or it may be brought on the information of any person, giving security for thé costs, to be approved by the clerk of the court in which such action is brought.” Under the authority of this section, we decided, in the State, ex rel. Burnett v. The Town Council of Cahaba, 30 Ala. 66, that the omission to give security for the costs was a fatal objection to such a proceeding as this. The statute contemplates that the security should be given before the commencement of the suit. The security is a condition precedent to the right under the statute of instituting the proceeding. The decisions of this court,