Taylor v. State

sentencing so the defendant vanee fair opportunity

will afforded a to contro- be TAYLOR, Appellant L. Chad (Defendant vert the material included.” Ind.Code 35- Below), 38-l-12(b). .v Indiana, Appellee STATE of previously This Court has stated . (Plaintiff Below). that “it would better if trial courts rou tinely pre-sentence report made sure No. 17S00-9603-CR-202. day made available more one before the Court of Indiana. sentencing hearing.” Lang v. However, it is 3, 1997. Dec. upon incumbent defendant to show how he prejudiced by period short time within pre-sentence report. which to review (Ind.

Drake 555 Ñ.E.2d 1990).

In this defendant makes no pre-sentence report claim that the contains requiring factual errors or inaccuracies addi cases, try tional time to rebut. similar find error even in instanc have refused pre-sentence report provid es where the only a sentencing ed few hours before the Drake, 1283; hearing. Lang, 555 N.E.2d at Likewise, 461 N.E.2d at 1114. we find no error here.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s convictions and sentences for Murder, Murder, Attempted Attempted

Robbery are affirmed. The conviction and Attempted Carjacking

sentence are va- The cated. cause remanded to the trial purpose entering court for the limited sentencing new order consistent opinion.

SHEPARD, C.J., DICKSON, BOEHM, JJ., SULLIVAN and concur. object

attorney did not to statements during interrogation made on the ba- sis of right to remain silent (as opposed to his to counsel

asserted)? which was comparison

III. Did a of detective’s Tay- circumstances of the arrests of lor an accomplice constitute im- permissible comments on assertion of not to incrimi- nate himself?

IV. Did court commit reversible opinion error by allowing testimony of violation Rule Evidence 704(b) guilt of innocence someone other than the defendant? affirm We the conviction and remand for Smith v. resentencing, in with accordance N.E.2d 693 Background Factual and Procedural approximately p.m. At 11:30 on November West, Oberlin, John Howard Tina Rhodes, and Rhodes’s three children went they bed in manufactured home shared in County. rural DeKalb John West and Tina slept Rhodes in the front bedroom with the youngest in a child crib beside them. The other grandfather, two children and their Oberlin, slept Howard in their beds back bedroom. later, Several hours West was awakened Defender, Carpenter, Susan K. Public booming impact sound Lewis, Defender,

Gregory Deputy L. Public him the knocked off bed and onto floor. Indianapolis, Appellant. He heard at least booming three more Modisett, Jeffrey General, Attorney A. An- sounds, two of came from the back General, Hedges, Deputy Attorney drew L. Realizing bedroom. had been shot Indianapolis, for Appellee. badly, bleeding the arm and was drove West gas police to a station where the were called. BOEHM, Justice. residence, Upon arriving police at the found Taylor L. Chad convicted of murder. Oberlin, Rhodes, Howard Tina of the and one sixty years The trial court- him to sentenced shotgun children dead wounds. The imprisonment. appeal, In this direct front door of apparently the home had raises our four issues review: in, kicked and the door bore a shoe I. Did invoke his federal or forensics tests later established did not state constitutional counsel occupants. of shoes match during police interrogation such that West, gunmen who had seen one of-the his subsequent incriminating state- poorly hallway, initially police lit told that the ments were inadmissible? Larry Lee, gunman boyfriend a former II. Did receive ineffective assis- of Tina Rhodes with whom West had clashed relationship tance of counsel because his trial over Lee’s Lee with Rhodes. Admissibility of Police suspect I. Statements to investigated and eliminated as in Part below. described IV for reasons rights Taylor contends that under both shootings, four months after the Almost constitutions were vio- the federal and state station Delagrange came Shane him lated when continued to his involve- parents and confessed after he “I don’t know what to said: Delagrange told in the crime. ment but, mean, lawyer, guess I really want agreed help Chad defendant had so don’t know.” I’ve never done before alleged Taylor kill West because West’s Specifically, Taylor contends that two Taylor’s. a female Mend molestation statements made two arrived Delagrange said that the had objection over his and were admitted shotguns crime scene with First, prejudicial. after he was told that Taylor had provided. Delagrange had confessed, asked if Delagrange had he was planned the to shoot West he answered when believable, story Delagrange’s and he door, Tay- no one door. When answered Second, affirmatively. Taylor stat- answered in, and the two men lor kicked door he that he ed that was “involved” and had Finding people entered the home. several Delagrange. to At trial he shotguns lent the residence, Taylor Delagrange and inside the explained he his admission that was “in- everyone kill wit- to to eliminate all decided being having limited lent volved” as Delagrange front bed- went nesses. shotguns Delagrange hunting. for Both Tay- room and shot Tina Rhodes and West. shortly made before the statements were back lor shot Oberlin a child Taylor terminated when un- bedroom. equivocally requested lawyer. a confession, police ob- Delagrange’s After interrogation, Taylor of At the outset Taylor’s resi- tained a search warrant signed rights a written waiver of form and produced shotguns dence. The search two orally acknowledged that had been ad- experts by police later identified forensics rights agreed his vised of and had waive of shooting, several rounds those used Although Taylor always precise is them. not ammunition, pair later and a of tennis shoes describing rights he asserts were vio- of found match the shoe door ap- in this his lated it is clear waiver Taylor was not at home when the the home. plied right to both the to counsel and the executed, search warrant was but returned right to be free from self-incrimination under police home learn his mother that both the state and federal constitutions. The looking him. De- He went therefore, issue, whether, turns on after the County signed a of Kalb Jail where he waiver waiver, Taylor right asserted valid rights questioned by form and was Detective requires the federal or state constitution that Stacey. if he in- Miles asked When suppression his subsequent of statements. Taylor in the crime “I don’t volved said: of of a Review the denial motion to really guess know what to want suppress sufficiency to other similar mat but, mean, lawyer, I’ve never done ters. The must disclose record substantial Stacey know.” before so don’t continued probative supports evidence value that Taylor eventually two question who made reweigh trial court’s We do not decision. He was subse- statements described below. evidence conflicting and we consider evidence charged mur- quently arrested and with the favorably ruling. most to the trial court’s der Howard Oberlin. See, e.g., Wilcoxen v. 619 N.E.2d Taylor suppress filed a motion (Ind.1993); Warner 579 N.E.2d interrogation, statements made 1307, 1309(Ind.1991). claiming that involun- statements were tary they request- because occurred after he A. Federal constitutional claim mo- ed counsel. The trial court denied the tion, trial, jury argues rights the case went found first Arizona, appeal fol- guilty of This under Miranda 384 U.S. murder. (1966) 1602, 16 lowed. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d were violat- doubt, him is an expression request. ed when continued to A quoted statement. Asser reasonable officer after made circumstances objective would not understand that was unam- governed by tion of this biguously asserting have counsel standard set Court in U.S. fact, present. States, Stacey’s response Detective Davis United U.S. Taylor’s “Okay. (1994). comment was: Like I told 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 “Invoca S.Ct. you, I can’t you.” make. decision. for the Miranda tion to counsel re response This communicated minimum, quires, at a some statement take statement an asser- reasonably expres can be construed to be an tion of the to counsel and makes clear sion of a for the of an desire assistance lawyer, if wanted a he would attorney.” at 2355 have to communicate that desire. The (internal quotation marks and omit citation properly applied court Davis standard ted). clarity required The level meet finding Taylor’s purported assertion of standard sufficient reasonableness rights his Fifth Amendment was not an un- clarity such that “reasonable officer ambiguous request lawyer. for a The trial in the circumstances would understand the ruling pre- court’s was also consistent with a request attorney.” statement to be for an Davis decisions of this Court.1 Id. It enough might that the defendant rights; invoking request must be Indiana claim B. constitutional Davis, unambiguous. In the defendant’s Taylor next claims that the same interro- “maybe lawyer” statement should talk to a gation rights violated his under the Indiana for counsel. Id. be a request was held not to Taylor argues Constitution. right that the to 462, 114 Consequently, at S.Ct. at 2357. present during have counsel a custodial inter- duty question had no to stop officers rogation I, is § broader under Article 13 of Davis, ing any statements he subse the Indiana Constitution than quently made were admissible. Davis estab Fifth Sixth Specifically, Amendments. lished as a matter of Fifth Amendment law right contends that to counsel duty no questioning to cease 13, by § secured unlike federal Sixth equivocal request when an for counsel is counsel, right an Amendment attaches at they required clarify made. Nor are to ask stage earlier than or indictment information. questions ing determine whether sus forty years before Miranda was decid- Over pect actually lawyer. a wants ed on Fifth Amendment self-incrimination In Taylor’s this of “I grounds, statement suspect’s this Court held that a guess lawyer, but, mean, I really want a right counsel —not right to be free I’ve never done this before so I from don’t know” self-incrimihation —attaches when a State, ingly, on good 1. Sleek v. 751 were relies 499 N.E.2d even if Sleek still Fifth Amend- (Ind.1986) Sleek, law, authority refusing In as for reversal. ment the trial court did err in suspect ought grounds suppress "I said feel like to have an on federal Miranda incrimi- around,” attorney nating gathered Taylor during and this Court found the sus- statements pect's unambiguous enough interrogation Stacey. statement to be with Detective The ex- right change constitute assertion of the a valid coun- between and Detective "request” closely Id. at sel. 754. claims that more resembles what in Pasco happened State, (Ind.1990), indistinguishable pre- is from that in Sleek. Sleekwas 563 N.E.2d 587 another grounds eight years applying precedent. decided Fifth Amendment Davis case Fifth Amendment Davis, There, suspect and the before Davis standard is control- said: "I don’t know what to Nonetheless, ling slop as to federal law. would do ... don’t if I Sleek know should if should suspect’s get lawyer." (ellipses original). lead a at different result. The re- Id. 591 "Well, quest ambig- in Sleek was more inarticulate The com- officer told Pasco: that’s Davis, 459, up you....” pletely reasoning 512 at uous. U.S. 114 S.Ct. at Id. In Cf. (“[A] Davis, later, suspect speak presaged years 2355 need not the dis- this with decided four ....”) distinguished (quoting crimination an Oxford don Court Sleek and held that Pasco (internal concurring opinion) request” Souter's for the assistance Justice make "definite contrast, omitted). quotation Taylor's lawyer interrogation. during In marks of a custodial statement, sum, began punctuated which 592. Fifth Amendment claim know," fairly ques- pre-Davis don’t assessed this cases "I as self fails under Davis or Court’s tioning expression construing or an of indecision. Accord- the Fifth Amendment. 704 interrogation irrespective of formal custodial custody is in and before

suspect suspect requests If suspect’s wishes. initiated. As re “proceedings” have been counsel, until end the matter sult, obtained after a exclusion of statements up But it counsel is furnished. required by suspect requested counsel was being suspect request make that after counsel. Batchelor v. the state to do so. (1920); advised State, Suter 189 Ind. N.E. (1949). 648, 88 N.E.2d 227 Ind. § 13 of the Taylor also contends has not addressed the This Court requires police to limit Rights Bill of § to counsel under re whether the clarifying questions rule, an proper source of the mains ambiguous request For when made. Suter, that state nounced in Batchelor and proposition Taylor relies on Sleek police custody request after a ments made However, .2dN.E must from evidence. for counsel be excluded expressly Sleek noted above footnote required under the Four That is the result interpreting it was the Fifth stated that 1966 when Mi teenth Amendment since and makes no mention of the Amendment not on the basis of incor randa was decided if assume Indiana Constitution. Even poration of the Sixth Amendment request suggest that Sleek would necessary but as incident counsel triggers counsel the same limitation under self-incrimination Fifth Amendment imposes, 13 as the Fifth Amendment Arizona, See also Edwards v. 451 U.S. explicitly rejected Court U.S. (1981) (once 68 L.Ed.2d 378 Davis, clarifying questions limitation in attorney, suspect requests presence of an questions in clarifying held has questioning must cease until counsel ambiguous “good face of an statement suspect made available or the voluntari constitutionally police practice” but were not ly police). communication with the initiates required request of a absence Davis, 461, 114 512 U.S. at S.Ct. at counsel. that same result Assuming Mi above, Taylor’s 2356. As state elaborated require progeny its now is also randa and Tay request. ment did not constitute such a by right constitutional demanded authority contrary lor offers no to the Davis counsel, unequivocal request to an for coun construing view the Indiana constitutional necessary require suppression sel to counsel, good no right to and we discern in subsequent statements made while custo Nothing pre reason for a rule. different dy, just required by it is to invoke Davis clarify attempting am cludes right to counsel. and the Miranda Suter invoking the biguous right statements about suspects who Batchelor both involved un counsel, require but 13 does not equivocally requested counsel while sum, although by requests effort. In custody, emphasized necessity both suspect scrupulously for counsel must be request right. a invoke the We make honored, police interrogation is not re a explicit today implied what Suter and merely quired to to halt come because the suspect’s request must Batchelor: be suspect think chooses to out loud about unequivocal. agree with clear and We right. It whether to exercise constitutional in Davis that Court’s observation is within constitutional bounds for the inter “a either is such an assertion of statement rogating place of mak Davis, officer burden right it not.” to counsel or 512 ing explicit request an for counsel on the (internal quota at at 2355 U.S. Detective, Stacey suspect. This is omitted). what did Although tion marks and citation by responding Taylor’s expressions of in ambiguous invoking statement about not make saying decision he could may suspect right to counsel indicate Taylor. the decision for idea, considering the it not reflect a does decision to ask the assistance of counsel. II. Ineffective Assistance Notably, Taylor later that threshold crossed Counsel/Right unequivocally in Remain Silent so, the inter voked When he stopped. argues rogation The Indiana Constitution next that he received require lawyer present assistance of counsel under the does ineffective attorney Sixth his slip up Amendment because failed because don’t wanna say like object the admission of wrong thing get .to statements that’ll me into trouble. gathered during interrogation. Taylor exchange, Taylor After this continued to talk expression after contends that of indeci- with Detective indicating without I, sion described Part he also made stop. he wanted to statements described below which he con- State, tends his Fifth right asserted Amendment This Court in Haviland v. silent, (Ind.1997) remain and that the therefore recently described the duty stop had a question- analysis under Miranda purported of a assertion of the ing objection him. no Because there was “intensely to remain silent as fact-sensitive.” ground, Taylor the statements on this asserts Id. at 514. In suspect, after that he received ineffective assistance validly waiving silent, to remain said counsel. through “I’m with this” several times interrogation. affirming custodial To establish ineffective assis court, suspect reasoned that counsel, tance of first defendant “must questions pausing “answered without or indi performance show that trial counsel’s cating in longer manner no would prevailing professional deficient respond.” Although “par there no are norms. He also must show that the deficient ticular words of legal magic ques off cut performance prejudicial was so to his case id., tioning,” a suspect must more do that he was denied a fair trial.” Marshall express reluctance to talk in order invoke State, 621 N.E.2d There his Fifth Amendment to remain silent. strong presumption that trial counsel’s Taylor expressed a concern would performance deficient, was not de and the wrong use the words while talking and would fendant that presumption must overcome adequately convey story. Critically, See, convincing with strong and evidence. however, Haviland, Taylor as in never indi e.g., Yerden 682 N.E.2d cated that he not talk would at all. Because (Ind.1997). Where a claim as ineffective comments did constitute an as object sistance is on a based failure to silent, sertion of the to remain failure trial, proper the defendant must show that a object theory based on that to the admis objection, made, if sus would subsequent sion of statements cannot consti N,E.2d tained. Jackson tute ineffective assistance. (Ind.1997). Taylor not has met the burden of overcom- III. Reference to of Invocation ing presumption attorney’s the that his trial Right Remain Silent performance was He effective. claims to asserted to remain silent dur- Taylor next asserts the ing following the exchange with Detective allowing jury court erred in the hear an Stacey: alleged Taylor’s reference to decision to as you version, Stacey: If your wanna tell us During sert his to remain silent. redi why that’s we’re taking here. We’re the rect, prosecutor Stacey asked Detective you. time to talk to in whether “the manner which Shane Dela would, Taylor: say I but I don’t wanna grange ultimately was [was] arrested ... anything to I know. I don’t wouldn’t different the manner in which Chad word it I know wouldn’t and .1 Stacey responded: was arrested.” get myself don’t wanna into trouble that “Yes, that [Delagrange] due the fact came didn’t that I or do or did do whatever and voluntarily in gave and a statement or a just, it, you know. Since I’ve never done confession of his involvement in this murder.” I’m nervous. I don’t what know this characterizes and an you guys story. know my want to hear improper Taylor’s swer as an reference to Stacey: Absolutely. exercise remain silent. He

Taylor: my And I you only logical would love tell claims inference story, you story testimony but I don’t tell wanna because waited to counsel, Taylor. on cross examina- until Defense station he heard

come into tion, “possible” it looking Stacey him whether was he must asked crime, and Sta- “something to hide.” that Lee had committed have had cey anything possible. conceded that prosecu plainly improper It prosecutor Stacey on response, asked post-arrest on a tor to comment defendant’s “proba- thought whether it was redirect Ohio, See, e.g., Doyle v. 426 U.S. silence. Lee the crime. ble” that committed (1976). 49 L.Ed.2d objected Evi- on fact Indiana based However, Stacey’s Taylor’s inde reference to 704(b) opinions as dence Rule does not allow when to initiate contact pendent decision of guilt or innocence in a criminal ease. The as a refer cannot be construed objection, stating trial court overruled the assertion of ence opinion prosecutor seeking an that the Although silent. the relevance remain and, than the defendant about someone other exchange questionable, there is on redirect 704(b) therefore, apply. not Rule did prejudice to no ascertainable fairly statement is not understood detective’s Taylor correctly asserts that Rule jury imply on by the comment 704(b) distinguish opinions does not between silence. defendant’s intent, guilt, as to or innocence a defendant’s intent, guilt, or innocence of someone Testimony Opinion IV. respect other than the defendant. In this Taylor contends that the trial court version of the rule differs from Indiana by allowing opin- expressly reversible error counterpart, committed its federal Evi- testimony violation of Indiana ion It is limited to defendant’s intent. diffi 704(b). part That rule dence Rule states any purpose cult ascribe to the omission of testify may opinions that “witnesses to the reference defendant intent, guilt, concerning or innocence prevent opinion testimony it is Rule if not to case_” During intent, direct examina- anyone’s guilt, criminal as to or innocence. tion, Stacey prosecutor Nonetheless, asked Detective the error is harmless. To be Lee, explain why Larry original sus- reversible, opinion testimony prejudice must murders, had eliminated pect as Butler v. defendant. suspect despite opinion West’s identification Lee Stacey’s plain perpetrators. Stacey one of the testimony answered ly light cumulative in of his as to was no evidence that Lee was there the reasons that Lee was eliminated as a (1) night

anywhere other than at home on the suspect, including: Lee’s alibi withstood (2) that in four- the murders. noted scrutiny; investigative Lee’s shoes did alibi, Lee, investigation door; Lee’s cor- month home match the shoe members, by family (3) was never roborated Delagrange, Lee not know questionable. found to Forensic evidence participant. Consequently, admitted there showed that Lee’s shoes did match the prejudice Taylor. was no in person of the kicked shoe who Sentencing V. Delagrange of the victims’ residence.

door admittedly at two one of least shooters necessary Finally, it to address house, Delagrange and and Lee did sentencing by parties. issue not raised Finally Stacey ob- not know each other. At of the in the time murders this there West, only impli- person served that sentencing in were two statutes for murder Lee, seriously saw cate wounded and State, explained As v. 675 effect. Smith trial, poorly hallway. in a lit At perpetrator (Ind.1996), controlling statute N.E.2d explained his initial identification of West 1,1994 July for murders between committed assumption Lee as shooter as an he made 5, 158-1994, May and 1995 is Public Law based the altercations between the two forty-year presumptive provides which for over Tina Rhodes. subject twenty-year sentence to a maximum by aggravating theory advanced the defense was enhancement for circumstances. One Acts, 158, § Ind. 5. Also that Lee committed the crime instead of See 1994 P.L. period sentencing story slip I don’t wanna like up effect because and fifty-year say wrong for a providing presumptive thing get statute that’ll me in trou- discussion, by sentence enhanced a maximum of ten ble.” After more years questioning aggravating respond- for Defendant circumstances. continued. Acts, Thus, ed, “But sixty-year my story Ind. P.L. 2. if I told side and ... I possible Lawyers say you’re sup- sentence is under either don’t statute know. only posed say nothing present. difference between them is the without him I Well, aggravating movies, length you of the enhancement for don’t know. it’s like the say nothing Here know. your circumstances. court did Never unless law- (R. present.” specify arriving yer’s (ellipsis it used in at origi- statute at 2027 nal).) Taylor. sixty years part, Again for questioning relevant resumed sentencing aggravating states that incriminating order “the and defendant made the state- (R. 2027-32.) outweigh mitigating circumstances ments cir- used at trial. at (60) justify sixty years cumstances ... agree majority While I with the incarceration....” Because it unclear questioning stop just need not because the sentencing from the order whether the trial “thinking loud,” defendant out here the statute, proper sentencing court used the questioning defendant asked for counsel but resentencing for remand control- continued. Defendant then made at- three ling of the statute. version Alvarado explain tempts why asking he was (Ind.1997). N.E.2d 823-24 questioning counsel but each time neverthe- circumstances, less continued. Under the I Conclusion statements, believe the defendant’s four tak- L. Chad conviction for murder is together, en sufficiently constituted a clear case affirmed. This is remanded resen- unambiguous request to have an attor- tencing accordance with Smith present ney that all questioning should ceased. SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON and

SELBY, JJ., concur. J.,

SULLIVAN, separate dissents with opinion.

SULLIVAN, Justice, dissenting. police began interrogating After the defen- PAGE, Defendant-Appellant, L. Robert dant, them, he told “I don’t know what guess really lawyer, but, I I I want mean, I’ve never done this so I before don’t Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee. STATE of (R. 2024.) discussion, know.” After police questioning continued. Defendant re- No. 48S00-9411-CR-1095. sponded request story to their that he tell his Court Indiana. would, say I saying, “I but don’t wanna anything to ... don’t know. wouldn’t Dec. 1997. it I know word I wouldn’t and don’t get myself wanna into do trouble that didn’t just,

no you did do whatever and it, know. Since I’ve never I’m nervous. done you guys don’t know what to I know (R. my story.” want hear at 2025-26 (ellipsis in original).) One of the officers (R. 2026.) responded, “Absolutely.” De- continued, fendant love to “And would tell you my story, you Ibut don’t wanna tell

Case Details

Case Name: Taylor v. State

Court Name: Indiana Supreme Court

Date Published: Dec 3, 1997

Citation: 689 N.E.2d 699

Docket Number: 17S00-9603-CR-202

Court Abbreviation: Ind.