Taylor v. State

R.S., 357, § ch. sec. Leg., 74th 5.02, 2897.2 Tex. Gen. Laws AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR sum- filed a motion for American Honda INC., Petitioner, CO., among oth- ground, on the mary judgment ers, had waived its claim that Dupriest the Commis- protest file a with failing to AUTOMOTIVE, DUPRIEST the motion. granted The trial court sion. INC., Respondent. exclu- the Commission had Holding No. 99-0075. complaint, jurisdiction Dupriest’s over sive reversed the trial appeals the court of Supreme Court of Texas. the cause judgment court’s and dismissed March jurisdiction. subject want matter for American 524-25.

See in this petition Honda filed a for review In do- deny petition. so Court. We approve disapprove nor ing, we neither regarding appeals of the court of Paso, El R. Munzinger, Richard Charles note that nei- jurisdiction. We exclusive Watson, Lubbock, Hood, Jr., Jr., Joseph L. con- nor American Honda Dupriest ther Paso, Ekery, El for Petition-

Rachel Anne that, primary the doctrine of tended under er. in the trial court jurisdiction, proceedings Walton, Dallas, Respon- E. William consideration of pending should be abated

dent. issues the Commission.

PER CURIAM. per

On December we issued opinion denying

curiam American Honda petition

Motor Co.’s for review. We now

overrule American Honda’s motion for re- opinion

hearing original but withdraw our following place. in its substitute Raymond TAYLOR, Appellant, Automotive,

Dupriest proposed Inc. dealership. sell its Acura But after Amer- prospec- ican Honda refused to allow the of Texas. STATE purchaser tive to combine sales of Hondas facility, prospective and Acuras at the No. 1728-98. purchaser buy-sell agree- canceled the Texas. Appeals Criminal filing complaint ment. Without first with the Texas Motor Vehicle Commission 26, 2000. Jan. (now Board),1 Motor Vehicle Texas mone- Dupriest sued American Honda for that American

tary damages, alleging refusal the sale of approve

Honda’s location as Hondas

Acuras the same 5.02(b)(8)of Mo-

violated section the Texas Act Code. of June

tor Vehicle Commission 5.01B, 5.02(b)(8) (Vernon 4413(36), Supp. §§ 4413(36), 1. See art. Ann. Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. (Vernon 1999). suit, Supp. 1999), § May 2.01 Dupriest’s filed in by the amendments. not controlled Although effective this statute was amended see June Stat. Tex.Rev.Civ. Ann. art.

OPINION KELLER, J., opinion delivered the Court, McCORMICK, which P.J. MEYERS, HOLLAND, PRICE, WOMACK, JOHNSON, KEASLER, joined. JJ. presented by this case

The issue juvenile our abolition of the ex- rule, ception witness an- nounced Blake v. S.W.2d 451 (Tex.Crim.App.1998), applies retroactively currently pending to cases on direct review holding final. hold that our We affirm the judg- in Blake is retroactive and the Appeals. ment of Court of and divorced Appellant his wife Josefina They joint managing in 1989. were named of children. In conservators their two Garmon, and Josefina married John 3,May together they had a son. On children, ten ages eleven and appellant’s time, set fire to the home their the Josefina, John, stepfather. mother and injuries and their son suffered but sur- 1997, appellant In March vived. attempted on convicted three counts the capital According murder. State’s case, had theory of the used appellant physical punishment psychological manipulate children his into pressure killing ‍​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‍the fire -withthe setting ex-wife, husband, her and their son. his trial, appellant At a written submitted accomplice concerning witness instruction requested the two children and the jury сharge. instruction be included include the in The trial court failed to time, trial At the the court’s struction. was con to include the instruction failure with our cases that children sistent wit accomplice were not covered State, 708 S.W.2d ness rule. Villarreal v. Pokorak, DeKoatz, El Matthew Jeff over (Tex.Crim.App.1986), 848-849 Paso, appellant. for (Tex. ruled, Blake 971 S.W.2d Blake, DA, Paso, Crim.App.1998); see also Landinger, L. El Karen Asst. (cases Paul, Austin, there for at 455-458 discussed Atty.,

Matthew State’s in). However, subsequently we abolished the State. decided under the old accomplice have their cases juvenile exception to the every new trials in case require than to rule in Blake.1 witness an charge jury with instruc failure to appellаnt Appeals Before the Court of testimony.” witness tion contended, among things, that other petition to address granted We failing to submit his trial court erred relating to effect of doctrines scope and requested accomplice witness instruction. retroactivity of new rules. and in Appeals The reversed remanded for a structed that case be I. Although observing new trial.2 law, appel- an early common Under justified court’s actions were trial law, simply it created late court never time, the law at the the Court state of Linkletter v. Walk- “discovered” the law. that, in of the subse Appeals light held er, 1731, 14 85 S.Ct. Blake, quent holding the trial court’s appellate L.Ed.2d 601 When failure to submit the instruction constitut decisions, of its earlier court overruled one found that Appeals ed error. Court of thought that earlier decision “was preserved and properly the error had been discovery and was only a failure true that some harm had been shown under never the Id. Con- consequently law.” standards set forth Almanza v. decision, “accu- versely, being (Tex.Crim.App.1984) law, discovery of the was not rate” (Tex. v. 817 688 Saunders law, of what had application was an but Crim.App.1991). fact been the law. MThe “dis- always in review, petition discretionary In its decision-making covery” judicial view of the State contends that Blake should not to reflect the failing came under attack as applied retroactively. Relying upon оf an court’s task. Id. appellate realities (Tex.Crim. v. Geesa 820 S.W.2d 154 judges An held that fill alternative view App.1991), justice that State contends judi- by statutory law with the blanks left would the Blake by giving be best served clearly that more de- cial prospectivity. limited The State con 624, law. Id. at 85 S.Ct. 1731. fines the application tends that retroactive of the view, an earlier decision not Under this is (1) inequitable rule would be because two later, by a trace overrul- erased without defendants tried on the same date could instead, one; the earlier decision depending upon obtain different results existing juridical fact until stands “as an speed appellate issuing of an court an Hence, opin- the overruled ovеrruled.” Id. (2) opinion, application retroactive of the vitality as to decided ion retained cases burden of new rule increases the State’s Id. overruling occurred. before presented after the case is and proof (3) backdrop conflicting closed, Against this application and retroactive the Su judicial decision-making, require jury charged would on law views case- preme developed pragmatic, trial. not effect at the time of Court was constitutional by-case approach The that “it more for new State also asserts makes 629, 85 1731. This to allow defendants in the cases rules. Id. at S.Ct. sense clearly perhaps spelled most pending apprоach on direct review or not final to rule, that he was accomplice Appellant had also contended 1. The witness codified in Procedure, acquittal Texas Code of Criminal Article because the evidence entitled to 38.14, provides: to corroborate the accom- was insufficient Finding had the testi- plice testimony. A conviction cannot be mony that there witness of an unless corroborated non-accomplice evidence con- existed some tending by connect the offense, other evidence Court of necting appellant to the committed; offense and defendant with the Appeals rejected that contention. it sufficient if mere- the corroboration the offense. ly shows the commission of Denno, 293, only operative out in v. plying cases which 1967, (1967), occurred adoption S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 1199 which facts after the a three-factor rule.3 applied determining test for

whether a new rule should be retro- But repudiated Court later active effect: the Stovall doctrine of its and (a) by to be served the new underlying rationale. Ken Griffith standards, 314, 708, tucky, 479 U.S. 107 S.Ct.

(b) the extent of reliance law en- L.Ed.2d 649 The Court criticized arbitrary “simply fishing forcement on the old stan- as practice authorities dards, appellant and one ease from the stream of re view, using it as (e) pronouncing a vehicle for the effect on the administration of standards, new constitutional аnd then of a retroactive permitting stream of similar cases subse new standards. quently to flow unaffected 297, Nevertheless, Id. at 87 S.Ct. 1967. (quoting rule.” Id. 107 S.Ct. 708 recognized holding in the Court that the States, Mackey v. United U.S. always its cases would to the 91 S.Ct. 28 L.Ed.2d 404 announced, in which the case the rule is (1971)(Harlan, concurring)). J. adjudications because “constitutional [do] prospectivity ineq criticized limited also as not stand as mere dictum.” Id. at uitable, violating principle treating “the Court, According S.Ct. 1967 “sound similarly situated defendants same.” policies decision-making” required Griffith, 479 S.Ct. 708 U.S. it solely “resolve issues in concrete cases States, (citing Desist United U.S. controversies,” applying a new rule 268-259, L.Ed.2d rule is neces- announcing the case (1969)(Harlan, dissenting) J. United give counsel “to sary to incentive advance Johnson, States n. requiring in the law.” change contentions a (1982)). L.Ed.2d 202 102 S.Ct. Although Id. that acknowledging some Consequently, Supreme the Court held arguably from accord- “[ijnequity results newly a rule that announced constitutional a ing parties the benefit of new rule to the conducting prosecutions for criminal ‍​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‍must of the case in which it but not is announced cases, all applied retroactively be to state to in litigants similarly other situated the federal, review not pending or on direct or process appellate trial or who raised final when the rule was announced. issue,” regarded the same the Court “the Griffith, 479 at 107 S.Ct. 708. U.S. parties fact that the involved are chance Griffith, аrriving at in the insignificant holding beneficiaries as cost for In its rejected to of deci- the “clear principles Supreme the adherence sound Court break essence, retroactivity Id. In if the fac- to that existed un- sion-making.” exception” that weighed prospective appli- prior exception, favor of der caselaw. Under tors cation, required applied new rule was that the “a new constitutional retroactively, the to cases on direct re- given prospectivity”: “limited new even be view, applied explicitly if the new overruled a rule would be Court, or past precedent disap- the new of this case which rule was announced (a applicatiоn), proved practice arguably but had retroactive Court eases, ap- prior or prospective, rule would otherwise be sanctioned overturned Geesa, prospective we a time other trial of the case. For In characterized the than the assessing prospectivity example, proper for aspect of limited as the new rule time frame prospective of a applying to cases "tried” after the effective or retroactive opinion announcing particular type of declaring new rule search date of the rule. recog- illegal may the date of search 820 S.W.2d at 163 n. 13. But we now Sexton, People v. for evaluat- than the of triаl. nize that the relevant time frame rather date (1998) application may prospective 458 Mich. 580 N.W.2d retroactive Nevertheless, a state (Wyo.1993). longstanding practice that lower courts retroactivity uniformly adopt at federal approved.” had Id. choose Supreme explained law. The 708. The Court as a matter of state S.Ct. standards face, then, exception” “clear break created question that we is what standards generally that attended problems determining the same for whether adopt should we prospectivity. of limited Id. at the use law should be new rule of state 327,107 S.Ct. 708. answering In that retroactive effect? cases to Geesa and to question, we look has а differ- Supreme applied The . (both jurisdictions from other federal With

ent to collateral review. state). federal con- exceptions, some narrow retroactively stitutional rules do not apply Geesa, In abolished the reasonable- we cases that became final before the new measuring for hypothesis construct Lane, Teague rule was created. in a sufficiency of the evidence circumstan- L.Ed.2d U.S. 109 S.Ct. case, created a defini- tial evidence and we finality The Court held that imposed upon doubt and tion of reasonable overriding importance. are of Id. interests juries duty trial courts the to instruct at 1060. Once a case be- S.Ct. at 161 & upon that definition. 820 S.W.2d final, purрose of a new rule is comes Linkletter, Stovall, 162. We discussed instead, the longer question; no a relevant Griffith, Teague deciding question applying only relevant is whether holdings make these retroactive. Gee- the new rule will further the sa, stating at 163-165. While 820 S.W.2d habeas, made corpus which the writ of is Supreme with the general agreement our Id. at 1060. Be- available. held that Griffith, rationale in we Court’s corpus designed as a tool cause habeas is rationale did not Griffith’s to deter the violation of consti- established Geesa, present case. standards, tutional a habeas court “need that rationale We observed “Griffith only apply the constitutional standards inequity’ the ‘actual that keyed prevailed original pro- the time the similarly only many one of results when ceedings place.” took Id. situated defendants receives benefit Geesa, 820 at 165. Court’s the new rule.” analysis party for federal constitutional In the State is the bene- errors upon the binding upon the states when federal con fitted from the new rule —based construct, the hypothesis stitutional errors are involved. James B. reasonable Court Distilling Appeals reversed the case and remand- Georgia, Beam Co. v.

529, 535, 2439, at 155. acquit. 111 Id. 115 L.Ed.2d 481 ed with instructions Conversely, Teague acquittal that order for We reversed Griffith hypothesis con- retroactivity jettisoning do not bind the states on the the reasonable Instead, Geesa, re- the defendant was of new rules undеr state law. 820 struct. Duckworth, 164; and new quired at v. 74 to settle for reversal S.W.2d Mason (7th 815, Cir.1996); People v. trial the absence of reason- 818 based F.3d. Murtishaw, 1001, Id. at 163. Cal.Rptr. able doubt instruction. 48 Cal.3d Hence, (1989); in the case in which 773 P.2d 172 State v. the defendant (Iowa not 637, were announced did 640 n. 2 the new rules Royer, 436 N.W.2d Waters, 1989); any meaningful way in from v. Commonwealth benefit (1987); 1006, 356, formulated new rules. And because Geesa Mass. 511 N.E.2d 410; de- Sexton, which benefitted People at v. two new rules —one 580 N.W.2d their Mitchell, one which worked to fendants and 80 N.Y.2d 591 N.Y.S.2d in a (1992); applying both new rules Cooper v. 606 N.E.2d 1381 detriment — not be fashion could (Okla.Crim.App. prospective P.2d limited similarly 1995); any to work detriment v. 850 P.2d said Farbotnik situated defendants. Id. at 165. The sim- should be confined to constitu “Griffith ilarly defendants not рrocedure situated receive tional rules of criminal and thus in- the benefit of the reasonable doubt not require does retroactive application struction, would they but receive bene- not constitution procedural decisions construct, Owens, hypothesis ally Diggs fit reasonable 833 F.2d grounded.” (3rd Cir.1987). That upheld which was not available to the defendants court in finding Geesa. that an earlier case of the Interstate interpretation ratio- Although holding that Griffith’s Agreement Act not ret on Detainers was . implicated, nale not we also stated Id. non- roactive. The earlier case found retroactivity “must be decided retroactivity conducting a bal after Geesa, case-by-case at basis.” Williams, ancing test. States v. United We a Stovall-type conducted balanc- (3rd Cir.1980). The 615 F.2d 592-593 ing inquiry to determine whether Appeals of Military United States Court retroactively applied rules should be or possible application avoided Griffith at prospectively. that its new announcing pointed that the proce- We out rules were military a section code would be any in dural nature and did not confer did fully prospective, holding so greater protections than ex- constitutional ‍​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‍not even to the the case before, impos- isted and we observed that which the new rule was announced. Unit ing retroactively greatly the rules would (CMA Carter, ed States 25 M.J. burden the administration 1988). “We that —at least where conclude requiring every new trials in case for fail- directly in a constitutional is not give definition of reasonable prevent fully does volved—Griffith agree- MBy expressing general doubt. overruling, which not dis prospective does rationale, holding ment with the Griffith similarly tinguish result between situat that the implicated, rationale was not appellants.” ed Id. analysis, conducting a Stovall the Geesa opinion ambiguity left an unresolved our Most of states that have confronted retroactivity: law of was a whether Geesa context of retroactivity issue ap- anomaly mere to an otherwise uniform adopted non-constitutional rules retroactivity plication of under Griffith Some of these аpproach. Stovall factor approach whether case-by-case Stovall’s judicially rules. Wa cases involved made applied generally to new non-constitutional ters, 357, rehearing, N.E.2d rules. 859, 862-863 Mass. 506 N.E.2d agreed judge-made The on (1987)(denying federal courts have not t aby federal rule tha of a applies to new coercion confession Griffith origin. private requires suppression); rules of individual non-constitutional Sexton, 409-416 applies, First held that 580 N.W.2d Circuit has Griffith rule must finding “nothing Griffith, (Mich.)(prophylactic police either suspect or inform when retained counsel purport, distinguishing terms between consultation); v. Hud statutory interpreta for State constitutional and available son, 732, 122, 751 415 S.E.2d Lopez-Penа, tions.” v. 912 331 N.C. United States (1st vacated, (1992)(elimination Cir.1989), 1542, perjury aggra F.2d 912 as 1545 (1st reinstated, Gordon, P.2d Cir.1990), factor); 944 v. 913 vating F.2d 1552 State (Utah (1st Cir.1991), denied, 350, 1996)(judicially-made F.2d 51 501 353-355 cert. 1249, 2886, prohibiting part-time prosecutor 111 115 L.Ed.2d U.S. as autho a criminal (1991)(magistrate representing 1052 who was not from defendant Farbotnik, at counsel); P.2d preside jury rized to over accord defense selection statute). record 597-603(Wyo)(right complete to a interpretation to new contrast, imposed pursuant in a criminal case By the Third held that Circuit differently and have construe state law supervisory power). court’s Others high divergent interpre often done so when of a stat interpretation involved the new supported Carrera, tation seems to be better v. Pеople ute. Cal.3d intent of reason more in line with the Cal.Rptr. 777 P.2d State, 947 See Cain v. state lawmakers. (1989)(statutory pre right privacy of a (Tex.Crim.App.1997)(ex- Erickson, detainee); People trial v. la federal constitutional errors cept for 271, 111 Ill.Dec. 513 N.E.2d Ill.2d Supreme States Court beled United (1987)(statutory right 374-375 to waive structural, is immune from as no error Mitchell,

jury sentencing); 591 N.Y.S.2d Hulit v. analysis); harmless error 993-995, (statutory 606 N.E.2d 1381 (Tex.Crim.App. 435-437 when trial right present of defendant 1998)(no requirement under Texas warrant prospective jurors court about questions ; in lan despite similarities Constitution bias) Cooper, 889 P.2d 307-310 Amendment). We guage to the Fourth (Okla.)(statutory right presumption rigid. reject approach as too Griffith’s innocence that had been found to bаr a Fairly. assessing whether a new jury flight when the defen instruction given requires retroactive effect should be explanation dant had no for his examining the various interests in favor of minority flight). adopted A of states has retroactivity, against and Stovall’s rules, regardless for all new Griffith balancing accurately en three factor test rule is constitutional in compasses competing interests origin. v. Smith 598 So.2d Hence, adopt we the Stovall bal volved. (Fla.1992); at 640 Royer, 436 N.W.2d determining whether new ancing test for (Iowa); n. State ex. rel. Schmelzer origin should be rules of non-constitutional Murphy, 201 Wis.2d 548 N.W.2d given retroactive effect. (1996). did While Griffith rules, not apply to new non-constitutional II. applied the Arizona con question The next we must thаt appears “fairness” standard to be sim applies to a front is how Stovall test n ilar underlying rationale. Griffith implicate To the retroac- given case. even Gardfrey, Ariz. State 775 P.2d rule in tivity question, the articulated 1095, 1097n. 1 rule. question must fact be a “new” widely agree We with the more upon supervisory rules based Court-made analysis held view that a Stovall should judicial power may new if or inherent apply to new rules of non-constitutional artic previous of the court has no decision origin. only approach Not is the Stovall reasonable ulated the rule. Geesa supported by prior opinion our as instruction, instance, a new doubt well as the caselaw of most other states articu rulе because we had never before issue, confronting we but However, when a requirement. lated that commonly distinguished have between con statute, fact that the interprets a court and non-constitutional rules stitutional been artic interpretation has never before exacting a more respects. other We enough for the ulated is not analysis for constitutional violations harm example, to be considered a new rule. For than for non-constitutional errors. See interpreted a statute never been 44.2(a) (b). And, non- Tex.RApp. P. & interpretation, A even if first time before. case, generally are

constitutional violations unanticipated because, corpus. on Ex cognizable parte habeas cannot сonsidered a new rule (Tex.Crim. Sanchez, Legislature 918 527 the intended that presumably, S.W.2d Moreover, while we are bound when it enacted the statute. App.1996). interpretation governed not to be parties on of feder The are entitled the Court matters of a statute law, interpretation to an erroneous power al constitutional we have the 682 (1983)(Stovall usually did P.2d 110 test denies interpretation

when an authoritative For an to interpretation holdings not exist. and seizure retroactivity to search rule, new the qualify interpretation as a to decisions but affords which an preceded by innocence); must have been earlier and implicate guilt question interpretation. inconsistent And the eаrli- Carrera, at 777 P.2d at Cal.Rptr. 261 er must be one that can be interpretation (“Decisions generally 143 been made authoritative the court issu- viewed as fully only right where the vin- retroactive interpretation. In es- ing subsequent the dicated is which is essential one sence, interpretation a the new must be process. integrity fact-finding On of the past concept “clear with the break” as hand, retroactivity the other is not custom- is in For the explained example, to arily required Griffith. when the interest be vin- requirement is when a clear break fulfilled merely dicated is is collateral to one which a deci- prior court of last resort overrules guilt or a fair determination of inno- so, sion, doing replaces prior a cence.”); Erickson, 111 Ill.Dec. of the statute with an incon- interpretation the (purpose N.E.2d new rule at 367 To case interpretation. sistent be a true factor is concerned with particularly the overruling, interpretation newer or new rule the whether not the enhances upon legislative change a cannot be based retroactivity is not truth-seeking process; Instead, the question. the statute rule is not shown to favored when the new is interpretation newer articulated because jury’s truth-seeking bear the directly upon been found original the has (rule role); Sexton, at 413 580 N.W.2d inaccurate, to at least insupportable or informed concerning right about legislative оf factors other than a light not relevant to the availability counsel’s in the statute. change not impli- and does guilt ascertainment of appellate court determined Once has the the integrity fact-finding pro- cate rule, new that a rule is a the court must cess; prospec- the rule should be hence the factors. Most courts tive); Mitchell, at 591 N.Y.S.2d addressing the first factor —the (retroactivity not N.E.2d 1381 mandated key question found the new rule —have the only indirectly to when rule relates impacts to the be whether new rule Farbotnik, fact-finding process); a If the truth-finding function of trial. (rule requiring complete P.2d at 603 truth-finding impact rule does “sufficiently significant record function, gen the purpose then factor will resрect finding at trial with to fact the reliance adminis erally outweigh of that retrospective application warrant justice require tration of factors and rule”). if retroactivity. Conversely, holding of impacts a rule Determining impact truth-finding new rule does not important part function is truth-finding function, then the state’s reliance and the fairness concerns an because of the administration of burdens a new rule is nounced in When deny retroactive generally are sufficient Griffith. truth-finding function of a unrelated to the Williams, F.2d effect the new rule. trial, application of rule to retroactive (“because violations of IADA bear announcing case is guilt actual little on the defendant’s system necessary for a price pay charged, of the offense retroac innocence challenge bad rules: encourages parties to will not affect tive correct or party ... trial”); “there is a need to reward truth-finding process any convincing the Court (rule responsible for P.2d at 1097 concern Gardfrey, 775 precedent.” overrule Proctor unsound insanity defense proof burden of (Tex.Crim. n. 5 retroactive); Superior held Donaldson inserted). sense, In a 24, App.1998) County, (ellipsis Angeles Court Los 35 Cal.3d gains party & procuring n. Cal.Rptr. windfall, rule would be limited. challenges to cation of required encourage Moreover, the harshness of retroactive required precedent, to bad that we are not mitigated by requir rule can sometimes be similarly-situated to individu to extend remedy a different than would ordi ing by the als—at least when there is reliance prospec the rule in its narily be accorded applying and the new rule retroac State party prevailing A under application. tive adminis tively add burdens to the would may rule application of a new retroactive But, justice. when “the new tration the same relief that necessarily not “obtain truth-finding goes rule to the heart of the if had awarded the rule would have been function, accuracy raising doubts about the an old one.” James B. Beam Distill been cases,” guilty past verdicts concerns Co., 535, 111 S.Ct. 501 U.S. equity impor more of fairness and become Moreovеr, regarding preserva rules Waters, tant. 511 N.E.2d pertaining tion of error the rules against any analyses mitigate harm also prevailing In line with the hardship suffered the State from jurisdictions, in other we find that trend of a new rule. Even imposition retroactive key question inquiry in a will retroactively imposed, if the rule is de generally center around whether the new on the may fendant be denied relief truth-finding significantly impacts pre not properly basis that the error was function of the trial: the new rule should served or was harmless. does, generally be retroactive if it non- Hence, if significantly a new rule if proposition retroactive it does not. This function, jury’s truth-finding impacts the generally though holds true even the State generally the Stovall factors will balance though the old upon relied rule and even pur application: favor of retroactive retroactive administration of the new rule pose generally the new rule factor will may pose some on the burdens administra outweigh the kinds of reliance and admin justice. Ordinarily, tion of when a new justice concerns that are ordi istration one, replaces old the State will narily ap whenever a new rule is present upon have relied the old rule. And ordi differ, retroactively. may plied The result narily, there will be some added burden situation, however, if in a the State is upon justice that the administration of at unusually strong reliance found retroactively applying tends the new rule. interests, upon or the burdens the admin But there are also some mitigating consid justice to be unusu istration of are shown play erations that come into with these ally high. First, factors. as discussed earlier opinion, gener are non-constitutional rules Conversely, if the new rule does ally cognizable not corpus. habeas significantly impact jury’s truth-

And, they if cognizable, even were function, finding the Stovall factors will finality Teague interests articulated generally prospective balance favor appear appli would to bar the retroactive ordinarily, application: regarding concerns upon cation of new non-constitutional rules justice will reliancе and administration collateral review. See United States balancing enough tip the scales of the be * (4th Martinez, n. 139 F.3d retroactivity. The result against test Cir.1998), denied, cert. different, however, if the State’s reli (1999)(“it 807, 142 L.Ed.2d 667 would the ad ance interests burdens rules of statu anomalous insignificant ministration of are tory ‍​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‍retroactively, but not wholly absent. rules, collateral new constitutional when III. statutory

relief for errors is more circum principles An of the above scribed than for errors of constitutional Hence, the correctness of our refusal magnitude”). appli the retroactive Geesa shows holding impacts truth-finding to afford retroactive effect to the the function of the in that case. The reasоnable doubt defini juvenile trial. In a case in which a is an by clearly imposed tion Geesa relates to accomplice, rule entitles the de- the truth-seeking function since the defini jury to have the that fendant instructed it attempts clarify tion to the reasonable may not on convict the defendant the basis by jury doubt standard that is utilized juvenile’s testimony of the unless there is the case. There is at least some deciding tending other to the evidence connect de- question about whether the definition im Blake, fendant to the offense. 971 S.W.2d pacts truth-finding the function because we This is from a at 455.5 much different rule jury’s cannot be certain that a un which the time a trial to changes limits for doubt, derstanding of reasonable unaided begin require- or one which revises the definition, by by substantially changed is legal accomplice ments for a search. The Nevertheless, assuming the definition. prism through witness rule is a which the impact fact that the definition does in jury strength evaluates the of the evidence function, truth-finding other considerations prov- and whether the State has convict unique prevent as to the Geesa ease that juries guilt. may en the defendant’s While First, sumption dictating from the result. have a sense notion that accom- common significance is factor plice testimony suspect, the ac- witness inequity undercut the absence of actual goes beyond witness rule such complice above, tradеd the case. As noted Geesa straitjacket notions abstract placing another, one beneficial rule for so that jury’s ability on the to convict on certain governed by defendants the new' rules jury evidence. The cannot convict unless necessarily were not in a better position there is evidence that the non-accomplice governed by than those the old rules. jury believes that tends connect Further, fac administration so defendant to the offense. This is re- strong: exceptionally every tor was case accomplice gardless of how believable the jury that was tried to a would have error may appeared on the witness witness failing give in it for the reasonable regardless any characteristics stand doubt definition if the Geesa rules were (such youth) particular of a as .that witness the n Moreover, applied retroactively. minds, jurors’ distinguish might, required struetion was even absent a re “suspect” from ac- person typical that quest, have be and the Court well complice witness. that the definition lieved the absence of would result in reversible error without Further, the accomplice witness A regard subsequent to harm. decision sufficiency that imposes review conclu very from this Court came to by ap would not otherwise be conducted (Tex. State, Reyes sion. v. 938 S.W.2d 718 Accomplice witness testi pellate courts. Crim.App.1996).4 mony support can sufficiеnt to a convic sufficiency legal standard case, however, tion under present Virginia, dictated Jackson provides compelling a much more case for 61 L.Ed.2d 560 S.Ct. retroactivity. no trade Unlike (Tex.Crim.App.), here; 939 S.W.2d present clearly the new rule is off is McDuff v. denied, U.S. t. more beneficial to defendants than the old cer (1997)(accom- juvenile 139 L.Ed.2d 75 abolishing exception one. And be corroborated accomplice significantly plice testimony need not witness opinion juvenile is an accom- express 4. We no about the continued instruction if Toney, vitality Reyes after Cain and State v. plice, juiy may the defen- then the not convict (Tex.Crim.App.1998). 979 S.W.2d testimony juvenile's dant on the basis of the tеnding to connect absent other evidence Or, disputed, where status is Id. defendant to offense. to the submission of an defendant is entitled applies that Blake Consequently, we hold legally corpus sufficient to show de- direct ); pending all cases retroactively Cathey licti see also Blake final when (Tex.Crim.App.1999)(“The appeal accom judgment of the Court statutorily imposed rule is a decided. The plice witness is affirmed. sufficiency Appeals review and is not derived from principles

federal or state constitutional MANSFIELD, J., with note. legal sufficiency and factual dissented that define the standards”). law, however, if Under state MANSFIELD, J. dissented with note: produce any non-accom the State fаils to expressed my For the reasons plice connecting evidence the defendant in Blake v. dissenting opinion offense, then the defendant is entitled 1998), I (Tex.Crim.App. S.W.2d Code acquittal appeal. to an See Texas respectfully dissent. Procedure, 38.17; Mu of Criminal Article (Tex. noz v. 559-560 S.W.2d

Crim.App.1993). Prospective application when the especially inappropriate

seems what constitutes a failure ‍​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‍changes proof case. State’s

There can be no doubt that the State juvenile upon exception has relied Eugene BRUMBELOW, William witness rule. But reli- Appellant, appear ance does not to be more than the ordinarily expect reliance one would reрlaced when an old rule is with a State Texas, Appellee. The STATE And, shows, new one. as the present case No. 12-91-00019-CR. will some resulting there new trials But, from the of this rule. Texas, Appeals widespread unlike cascade of Tyler. expected.

reversals is not This case will Feb. only a portion affect of the total cases tried jury only to a those cases which a Rehearing April Overruled — juvenile may accomplice. be an And the Discretionary Review Refused new rule provide will not relief on collater- 7,1994. Oct. Further, al jury charge review. while er- defaulted, ror can be completely never object

failure to will result in a harm stan-

dard that is more onerous the defen- Almanza,

dant. at 171. And properly preserved,

even when error is Id.; Saunders, analysis applies.

harm still at 690. applying While retroactively may provide some addi-

tional burden administration

justice by requiring few cases

retried, magni- this burden is not of the required justify prospective appli-

tude impacts

cation for a new rule that

truth-finding function. balancing find that the test

We applying retroactively. Blake

supports

Case Details

Case Name: Taylor v. State

Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

Date Published: Jan 26, 2000

Citation: 10 S.W.3d 673

Docket Number: 1728-98

Court Abbreviation: Tex. Crim. App.