The defendant appeals from his convictions of murder, rape, sodomy, aggravated assault and armed robbery, for which he was given a life sentence for each offense, other than 10-years’ imprisonment for aggravated assault.
1. The first enumeration of error is the denial of a Brady 1 motion for an in camera inspection of all investigatory information and materials in the possession of the state which linked with illicit drug activities, any owner, past or present, of the retail clothing store where the crimes were perpetrated.
The burden is on the appellant to show that he was denied beneficial evidence which was so important that its absence prevented his receiving a fair trial, and to show how his case has been materially prejudiced, even
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though the trial court declined to make the in camera inspection.
Pryor v. State,
The appellant contends that the suspected involvement in illicit drug activity of one of the part owners of the store would be material in that the son of the other part owner was one of the two men who chased the perpetrator on foot and identified him as the appellant, thereby possibly giving him some undisclosed interest in prosecuting the appellant, and in that evidence of illegal drug activity at the store might authorize a finding that the appellant was seized by a compulsional delusion in entering the store. However, the trial court conducted an in camera hearing, in which evidence was adduced indicating that the state had at no time conducted an investigation of drug activity at the store, that the state had no information that the store or its employees were in any way linked with drug activities, and that, although the state had received rumors from an informant, in the course of an investigation of alleged drug activities in Ware County, as to the store’s part owner’s suspected drug-related activities, such rumors had produced no evidence which could be used against him. The investigation produced no information that the other part owner or his son, the state’s witness, were in any way involved in illegal drug traffic.
Furthermore, even if the state had information linking the part owner with drug activity, that information would be immaterial to the crimes in question. The other part owner’s son only became involved in the case when his help was sought and under circumstances wherein he could have identified the appellant only by the clothing that he wore. There was positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator by witnesses other than the part owner’s son. Moreover, there was no testimony indicating that the appellant’s visit to the store was in any way connected with drugs, and a search by police of the establishment after the crimes revealed no evidence of drugs on the premises.
The Constitution does not require police to provide a defendant with all police investigatory work, and the
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mere possibility that an undisclosed item of information might have helped the defendant or might have affected the outcome of a trial, is not sufficient to establish materiality under Brady v. Maryland, especially where there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the additional evidence is considered. United States v. Agurs,
2. The second enumerated error is the failure to excuse for cause juror Mercer, on the ground that her son was one of the state’s witnesses.
The conduct of the voir dire and whether to strike a juror for cause, are within the discretion of the trial court, and the court’s rulings are proper absent some manifest abuse of discretion.
Patterson v. State,
Although the juror testified on voir dire that she would trust the testimony of her son, she also indicated that she could fairly consider all of the evidence and render an impartial verdict by applying the evidence to the court’s charge regardless of who the witnesses were. Furthermore, her son’s subsequent testimony was uncontradicted, simply relating to the results of his investigation and the identification of state’s exhibits 15, 16 and 20. Failure to strike this juror for cause was neither an abuse of discretion nor harmful error.
3. The third enumerated error is the failure to excuse for cause juror Van Winkle, on the ground that she had testified on voir dire that she believed that the defendant was at the scene of the crime, because he was arrested and because of radio reports and discussions at the school where she taught.
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A juror is not incompetent merely because he "had a little opinion” about the
case. Butler v. State,
4. There was no abuse of discretion, as contended in enumerated errors 4 and 5, in excusing juror Henderson for cause when it appeared that he was related by marriage to the defendant, had known him a long time, did not believe he was guilty, and where he testified on voir dire that he could not be perfectly impartial between the state and the accused. See
Carr v. Carr,
Nor was the defendant denied due process of law, as claimed, by the peremptory striking of all black potential traverse jurors.
Jordan v. State,
5. Enumerated error 6, which is not supported in the brief by citation of authority or argument, is deemed to
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have been abandoned under Rule 18(c) (2) of this court.
6. In enumerated error 7, the appellant contends that a mistrial was required when a police captain, questioned as to whether he could recognize the party he had arrested after the crimes, answered by identifying the defendant in the courtroom and then volunteering that "I’ve known him previously” and "I’ve had — I know him.” The appellant urges that this testimony improperly interjected his character in evidence by indicating that the witness had had previous dealings with the appellant, which were, impliedly, related to prior offenses committed by the appellant.
Even if the witness had gone on to complete the sentence and testify that he knew the appellant from a "previous deal,” this would not put his character in issue, there being no inference therefrom that any previous deal or dealing was derogatory to the appellant.
Brown v. State,
7. In enumeration of error 8 the appellant complains of the admission in evidence of certain items of clothing which purportedly had been worn by the appellant or found in his possession at the time of his arrest shortly after the commission of the crimes of which he was convicted. Even assuming that the articles of clothing were not positively identified as belonging to the appellant, as he contends, they were admissible based on testimony which indicated that they were similar in color and description to the clothing worn by the perpetrator of the crimes. See
Jung v. State,
8. Enumeration of error 9 is the exclusion of testimony of witness Cole to the effect that she and the appellant’s uncle had had drug dealings with persons at the store which was the scene of the crimes.
The excluded testimony was of doubtful relevance and materiality, since the alleged transaction occurred *227 approximately a year earlier, none of the victims had been involved with the store at that time, and, as mentioned in Division 2, supra, no evidence of drugs was found at the store after the crimes, there was no evidence that the defendant was at the store in connection with drug-connected activities, and investigations by the state had failed to uncover evidence linking the store to illicit drug trade.
The appellant argues that perhaps the testimony could have convinced the jury that the appellant was motivated by a delusional compulsion activated by his drinking and taking drugs. However, in
Graham v. State,
The convictions were not erroneous for any reason urged.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Brady v. Maryland,