33 Ind. App. 675 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1904
Appellant, who was the plaintiff below, filed her amended complaint in one paragraph, in which she alleged that “on the 24th day of May, 1901, she was a resident of the town of Petersburg, in said county and
“That in making the record of employment the secretary of said board omitted to insert the given name of the plaintiff in said record, but that she was the person referred to, and the one who was intended to be and was employed by said board; that pursuant to her application and the order of said board the plaintiff attended a teachers’ training school at the city of Terre Haute, Indiana, and expended the sum of $50 in expenses and tuition therefor; that the plaintiff fully complied with all the conditions of her said contract, and did not engage in any of the acts forbidden by said defendant; that afterwards, after the beginning of said school year, William H. Foreman, superintendent of said schools, and while acting as such, assigned the plaintiff to the eighth grade or grammar department of said school, which position the plaintiff accepted as the teacher thereof. And the plaintiff says, that on the - day of August, 1901, the said defendant, by said board of trustees, repudiated said contract hereinbefore set forth, and employed another teacher in the place of the plaintiff, without her consent, and refused to recognize the plaintiff as a teacher in said school, although she
The court sustained the defendant’s demurrer for want of facts to the complaint. Railing to plead further, judgment was rendered against the appellant for costs. The ruling upon the demurrer is assigned as error.
The General Assembly of the State of Indiana (Acts 1899, p. 113, §§5989a, 5989b Burns 1901) passed an act to provide for contracts between teachers and school corporations, as follows: “Section 1. That all contracts hereafter made by and between teachers and school corporations of the State of Indiana shall be in writing, signed by the parties to be charged thereby, and no action shall be brought upon any contract not made in conformity to the
Nor do we regard the fact that the order of the school board mentions “Taylor” as one of the teachers, giving no Christian name, as a serious omission. The identity of a party referred to in a contract is the legitimate subject of averment and of proof. Zann v. Haller, 71 Ind. 136, 36 Am. Rep. 193.
The language of the act is free from ambiguity. Its enactment doubtless had origin in the opinion of the legislature of the importance to prevent misunderstandings in contracts between school boards and teachers. It is a matter of judicial history that much litigation has grown out of verbal contracts for teaching in the public schools. The writer of the opinion, Davis, C. J., in Jackson School Tp. v. Shera, 8 Ind. App. 330, says: “The winter not only agrees with Judge Elliott that ‘there is much reason for scrutinizing with care contracts made so far in advance of the opening of the school year as was 'that here sued on, and sound policy requires that the terms should bé so .definitely fixed and made known that all interested may have full and reliable information,’ but is also of the opinion that sound policy requires that the lawmaking power should prescribe that when the minds of the parties meet as to the terms of such contract, the same should be reduced
A teacher can not recover from a school corporation for the breach of an executory contract unless it is so full and definite as to be capable of specific enforcement. Fairplay School Tp. v. O’Neal, 127 Ind. 95. The application of appellant for employment and the resolution of the school board as set out in the complaint do not tell when the schools in the town of Petersburg began in the year 1901 —neither the day nor the month — nor the grade appellant was to teach, nor the pay she was to receive. It can not be claimed that they are definite in these essentials to a complete contract. “It is frequently provided by statute that all public contracts shall be in writing. This being a mandatory provision and restrictive of the power of the corporation to contract it must be complied with, else the contract is invalid.” Beach, Pub. Corp., §253. See, also, §§251, 252, 691, 697.
A township trustee is a special agent possessing statutory powers only, and is without general authority to bind the township. He can bind it when he does what the statute authorizes and does it in the manner prescribed. Peck-Williamson, etc., Co. v. Steen School Tp., 30 Ind. App. 637, and authorities cited. A school trustee, like the board of
It is a well-settled rule of law that where the statute prescribes the manner of exercising power, the manner prescribed must be adopted. Wrought Iron Bridge Co. v. Board, etc., 19 Ind. App. 672; Dillon, Mun. Corp. (4th ed.), §449; Platter v. Board, etc., 103 Ind. 360. In Platter v. Board, etc., supra, it is said that where a statute prescribes a mode of exercising a power, that mode must be adopted, for there is no inherent right of discretion in corporate bodies. Persons contracting with school trustees are bound to take notice that their powers are limited by law. Honey Creek School Tp. v. Barnes, 119 Ind. 213; Bloomington School Tp. v. National School, etc., Co., 107 Ind. 43; City of Laporte v. Gamewell, etc., Tel. Co., 146 Ind. 466, 475, 35 L. R. A. 686, 58 Am. St. 359; State, ex rel., v. Board, etc., 147 Ind. 235.
The following cases by analogy hold the contract in suit indefinite and incomplete. Fairplay School Tp. v. O'Neal, supra. The trustee promised to pay “good wages.” The court held that such a contract was not sufficiently definite to enforce.
The case of Atkins v. Van Buren School Tp., 77 Ind. 447, was a suit by a teacher, on what he claimed aá a contract to teach a school, against appellee school township. The contract on which suit was brought is in w'ords and figures as follows: “It is hereby contracted and agreed, between John Steed; township trustee of the township of Van Burén, county of Olay, and State of Indiana, and William H. Atkins, a regularly licensed teacher of said county, that the said William II. Atkins shall superin
The case of Jackson School Tp. v. Grimes, 24 Ind. App. 331, was by a teacher — Grimes—to recover damages for an alleged breach of contract. He averred that he contracted with the trustee of said Jackson township to teach No. 4 in said township for and during the school year 1897-98 upon the same terms and conditions as those upon which he taught during the school year 1896-97. The court said that a contract to be enforceable, or sufficient, upon which an action for damages for its breach may be based, must be so full and definite as to be capable of specific performance. A contract between a township trustee and a teacher by which the latter agrees to teach a certain school implies that he is to receive compensation for such service; but if the contract is silent as to what that compensation is to be, it is not such a contract as can be enforced either against the teacher or the trustee. The court said: “It is clear that the minds of the parties never met as to the terms of the contract, and that no contract was ever made between them.”
The case of Wrought Iron Bridge Co. v. Board,
Illustrative cases might be multiplied, and particulars pointed out in which the instruments of writing made the basis of action failed to show a meeting of the minds of the contracting parties, but further elaboration is not deemed necessary. The facts do not show a substantial compliance with the statute. See Lee v. York School Tp., 163 Ind.—.
Judgment affirmed.